the State of Texas v. Vicente Alonso-Carbajal ( 2022 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-22-00198-CR
________________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT
V.
VICENTE ALONSO-CARBAJAL, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 368th District Court
Williamson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 18-2077-K368, Honorable Rick Kennon, Presiding
October 13, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, J.J.
The State appealed from an order quashing part of the indictment accusing Vicente
Alonso-Carbajal (Carbajal) of money laundering. Through one issue, it asserts that the
trial court erred. We reverse.
1 Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to
this Court from the Third Court of Appeals. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Therefore, we will decide this
case “in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court” if our decision otherwise would have been
inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
Background
The State indicted Carbajal under section 34.02 of the Texas Penal Code.
Through the indictment, it accused him of “knowingly acquir[ing] or maintain[ing] an
interest in or conceal[ing] or possess[ing] or transport[ing] the proceeds of criminal
activity.” The averred “criminal activity” consisted of (1) “proceeds of narcotics trafficking
or delivery of a controlled substance”; (2) “proceeds obtained or acquired or possessed
in violation of 31 United States Code §5324(a)(l), by defendant causing or attempting to
cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report required by 31 United States
Code §5313(a)”; or (3) “proceeds obtained or acquired or possessed in violation of 31
United States Code §5324(c)(1) pertaining to the exporting of monetary instruments more
than $10,000.00, by defendant failing to file a report or by causing or attempting to cause
a person to fail to file a report under 31 United States Code §5316.”
Carbajal moved to quash the entire instrument. Supposedly, the allegations in
paragraph one were defective because they failed to provide him sufficient information to
prepare a proper defense. Paragraphs two and three were defective because the State
sought to try him for violating a federal statute; such crimes fell outside the jurisdiction of
a Texas district court, he posited. The trial court rejected his contention regarding the
first paragraph but apparently accepted those pertaining to paragraphs two and three.
Thus, it granted the motion to quash, in part. That resulted in the current appeal.
Standard of Review, Applicable Law, and Application
First, the sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law reviewed de novo.
Hughitt v. State, 583 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Second, under section
34.01 of the Penal Code, one commits the offense of money laundering if he knowingly
acquires or maintains an interest in, conceals, possesses, transfers, or transports the
2
proceeds of “criminal activity.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1). Third, the legislature
defined “criminal activity” as any offense “classified as a felony under the laws of this state
or the United States” or “punishable by confinement for more than one year under the
law of another state.” Id. at § 34.01(1) (emphasis added). Fourth, an indictment alleging
an offense under section 34.02 must specify the relevant “criminal activity.” Deschenes
v. State, 253 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d). So, fifth, that
“criminal activity” must be revealed and may be a felony under either federal or state law
or an act made criminal by some other state which carries a prison sentence exceeding
one year.
In comparing the indictment at bar to the requisites of section 34.02, we construe
reference to the provisions of the United States Code in paragraphs two and three as the
predicate “criminal activity” mandated by the statute. And, that very same statute permits
the requisite criminal activity to be conduct violating federal law. The State so argued. In
turn, Carbajal failed to address the definition of “criminal activity” and explain how federal
crimes fell outside its scope.
Simply put, our Texas legislature said a federal crime may be a component of a
state prosecution for money laundering. It is not our role to ignore the statutory words
permitting that. Thus, we sustain the State’s issue, reverse the trial court’s order quashing
paragraphs two and three of the indictment, and remand the cause to the trial court.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
3