in Re: M. F. G., Individually and as Next Friend for I.J.G., a Minor ( 2021 )


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  •                                         NO. 12-21-00110-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    IN RE: M.F.G., INDIVIDUALLY                               §
    AND AS NEXT FRIEND FOR I.J.G.,
    §        ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    A MINOR,
    RELATOR                                                   §
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    PER CURIAM
    M.F.G., individually and as next friend for I.J.G., a minor, filed this original proceeding
    to complain of various actions and inactions by Respondent. 1 We deny the writ.
    BACKGROUND
    This proceeding arises out of a suit affecting the parent child relationship. Relator is the
    mother of I.J.G. On April 29, 2021, Relator filed a notice of appeal from the final order. That
    appeal remains pending before this Court in cause number 12-21-00068-CV.
    On July 1, Respondent held a hearing on the Texas Department of Family and Protective
    Services’s motions for orders pending appeal. One motion sought to stop Relator’s visitation
    with I.J.G.    Relator argued that she did not receive timely notice of the hearing and was
    inadequately prepared. Respondent asked, “If I were to grant you time [a continuance], would
    you be willing to waive this weekend’s visit?” The following exchange ensued:
    Respondent: …so you’re telling the Court you’re not willing to waive your visitation at this time
    by agreement until we can have this hearing? It’s up to you entirely, [M.F.G.], but I’m willing to
    give you time if you’re willing to do that. And if you are right and you prevail, I would be willing
    to give you some make up time.
    Relator: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. I’ll take it.
    Respondent: You would agree with that?
    1
    Respondent is the Honorable Robert H. Wilson, Judge of the 321st District Court in Smith County, Texas.
    The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services is the Real Party in Interest.
    Relator: Absolutely.
    Respondent: Okay. So, Mrs. Wortham [Department’s counsel], I think at this point we have a
    stipulation that [M.F.G.] will not exercise her visitation until we’re able to reset this hearing.
    Respondent rescheduled the hearing for July 21 and informed Relator that she would have an
    opportunity to present evidence at the hearing. Further, the Department explained during the
    hearing that a trial had been scheduled for October 19, but that trial could not occur until
    resolution of the appeal. Relator expressed that the jury demand was in error and expressed an
    intent to withdraw the demand. On July 14, Relator filed this original proceeding.
    PREREQUISITES TO MANDAMUS
    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 
    235 S.W.3d 619
    ,
    623 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only when the relator has no
    adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. In re
    Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 
    164 S.W.3d 379
    , 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). The relator
    has the burden of establishing both of these prerequisites. In re Fitzgerald, 
    429 S.W.3d 886
    , 891
    (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, orig. proceeding.). “Mandamus will not issue when the law provides
    another plain, adequate, and complete remedy.” In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
    
    210 S.W.3d 609
    , 613 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
    ENTITLEMENT TO MANDAMUS RELIEF
    Relator presents several issues for our review with respect to the July 1 hearing. First,
    she complains that Respondent abused his discretion by restraining her from further
    contact/visitation with I.J.G. and by not returning I.J.G. to her parent. But the record indicates
    that Relator agreed to forego visitation pending a rescheduled hearing on the Department’s
    motions. She cannot now complain of an action to which she agreed in the trial court. See In re
    Guardianship of Jordan, 
    348 S.W.3d 401
    , 411 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, no pet.). Second,
    she complains that Respondent entertained a motion submitted by the Department on the day of
    the hearing to cause termination of her parental relationship. But the record does not support this
    assertion, as the hearing was held to address orders pending appeal. Third, Relator appears to
    challenge Respondent’s jurisdiction and authority to act at the hearing. However, in a suit
    affecting the parent-child relationship, on a party’s motion or on the trial court’s own motion,
    2
    after notice and hearing, the “court may make any order necessary to preserve and protect the
    safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of an appeal as the court may deem
    necessary and equitable.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.001(a) (West Supp. 2020). Fourth,
    Relator asserts that Respondent restrained her from obtaining evidence controlled by the
    Department. Again, the record does not support this assertion. Respondent informed Relator that
    he did not normally get involved in discovery, but that she had the right to request evidence from
    the Department. Fifth, she complains of inadequate notice and lack of an opportunity to defend
    herself. The record reflects that she broached this issue with Respondent and the hearing was
    rescheduled to July 21. She did not object to the rescheduled date. Finally, Relator requests that
    we order Respondent to vacate the order from July 1.           But because the record does not
    demonstrate that Respondent signed any orders on that date, there is no order to vacate.
    Additionally, Relator challenges Respondent’s setting trial for October when trial should
    have concluded on or before the anniversary of the date that I.J.G. was removed from Relator’s
    possession. However, this issue is more appropriately raised in Relator’s pending appeal. See
    Interest of E.S., No. 12-21-00057-CV, 
    2021 WL 3265543
     (Tex. App.—Tyler July 30, 2021, no
    pet. h.) (mem. op.) (addressing on appeal expiration of trial court’s jurisdiction when dismissal
    deadline passed without extension or trial); see also In re Z.S., No. 14-19-00891-CV, 
    2020 WL 2037202
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 28, 2020, no pet.) (op.) (addressing on
    appeal whether trial court lacked jurisdiction because trial did not commence before statutorily
    prescribed date).
    Relator also asks this Court to order Respondent to vacate his numerous orders dated
    between September 27, 2019, and July 1, 2021. She complains of various rulings made by
    Respondent pertaining to danger to I.J.G.’s health and safety caused by Relator’s actions or
    failures to act, an urgent need for I.J.G.’s protection, efforts made to prevent removal,
    requirements that Relator submit to drug screenings and counseling, failure to impose restrictions
    on the Department’s care and treatment of I.J.G., whether standard possession guidelines are in
    I.J.G.’s best interest, continuance of conservatorship with the Department, and failure to set an
    adversary hearing date in the September 27, 2019, order. She contends that the Department
    lacked sufficient evidence to support its allegations against her and that I.J.G. suffered physical
    injuries after removal from Relator’s care. She further raises constitutional challenges and
    3
    alleges violations of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the fit parent
    presumption.
    However, a party seeking mandamus relief must bring forward all that is necessary to
    establish her claim for mandamus relief. See TEX. R. APP. P 52. On July 14, 2021, the Clerk of
    this Court notified Relator that her petition failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate
    Procedure 52.3(k) and 52.7. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k) (appendix); see also TEX. R. APP. P.
    52.7 (record). The notice further advised that the petition would be referred to the Court for
    dismissal unless she provided an appendix and record on or before July 19. We subsequently
    granted Relator two extensions to comply. She provided an appendix and the July 1 hearing
    transcript. The appendix contains a copy of the July 1 transcript, Relator’s request for findings
    of fact and conclusions of law, and Relator’s notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions
    of law.
    But Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7 requires the relator to file (1) a certified or
    sworn copy of every document that is material to her claim for relief and that was filed in any
    underlying proceeding; and (2) “a properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony
    from any underlying proceeding, including any exhibits offered in evidence, or a statement that
    no testimony was adduced in connection with the matter complained.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a).
    Relator did not provide a record in accordance with Rule 52.7 with respect to arguments related
    to issues outside the July 1 hearing. It is a relator’s burden to provide this Court with a record
    sufficient to establish the right to mandamus relief. See In re Mack, No. 12-19-00238-CV, 
    2019 WL 3024757
    , at *1 (Tex. App.–Tyler July 10, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem op.). Absent the
    applicable record, we cannot determine whether Relator is entitled to mandamus relief as to her
    remaining complaints. 2 See 
    id.
    2
    We note that the record has been filed in Relator’s pending appeal. But Relator does not provide any
    record references in her various arguments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain clear and concise
    argument for contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and the record); see also Muhammed v.
    Plains Pipeline, L.P., No. 12-16-00189-CV, 
    2017 WL 2665180
    , at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 21, 2017, no pet.)
    (mem. op.) (a pro se litigant is held to same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable
    rules of procedure). Even were we to take judicial notice of the appellate record, it is not this Court’s duty, or even
    right, to conduct an independent review of the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.
    Interest of A.E., 
    580 S.W.3d 211
    , 219 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. denied). Were we to do so, we would be
    abandoning our role as neutral adjudicators and become an advocate for that party. 
    Id.
    4
    DISPOSITION
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Relator has not established a right to
    mandamus relief. We deny her petition for writ of mandamus and overrule as moot all pending
    motions.
    Opinion delivered September 1, 2021.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
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    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    SEPTEMBER 1, 2021
    NO. 12-21-00110-CV
    M.F.G., INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
    NEXT FRIEND FOR I.J.G., A MINOR,
    Relator
    V.
    HON. ROBERT H. WILSON,
    Respondent
    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
    ON THIS DAY came to be heard the petition for writ of mandamus filed by
    M.F.G., individually and as next friend for I.J.G., a minor; who is the relator in appellate cause
    number 12-21-00110-CV and the respondent in trial court cause number 19-2400-D, pending on
    the docket of the 321st Judicial District Court of Smith County, Texas. Said petition for writ of
    mandamus having been filed herein on July 14, 2021, and the same having been duly considered,
    because it is the opinion of this Court that the writ should not issue, it is therefore
    CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the said petition for writ of mandamus be,
    and the same is, hereby denied.
    By per curiam opinion.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-21-00110-CV

Filed Date: 9/1/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/6/2021