Jason Dean Trussell v. State ( 2019 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-18-00430-CR
    ___________________________
    JASON DEAN TRUSSELL, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 1560173R
    Before Gabriel, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Jason Dean Trussell appeals from his conviction for continuous sexual abuse
    of a child, arguing in a single point that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
    his motion for continuance. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b). We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND1
    In early 2005, Natalie began a relationship with Trussell. At that time, Natalie
    had two children from a previous marriage: Cody and Annie. Shortly after their
    relationship started, Natalie and Trussell began living together.             Annie was
    approximately two years old when this occurred. Shortly after Natalie and Trussell
    moved in together, Natalie became pregnant with Isabel.                In approximately
    October 2006, Natalie and Trussell, together with Cody, Annie, and Isabel, moved to
    a house in Fort Worth,2 where they lived for about three years before moving to
    another house in late 2009. Shortly after that move, Natalie’s relationship with
    Trussell ended, and Trussell moved out.
    While Natalie, Trussell, and the children were living at the Fort Worth house,
    Trussell sexually abused Annie on multiple occasions. Annie testified that on one
    occasion, Trussell had completely undressed her, held her down on the living room
    1
    Because this case involves a minor child, we will refer to the complainant and
    her family using aliases in order to protect the child’s privacy. See McClendon v. State,
    
    643 S.W.2d 936
    , 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
    2
    We refer to this particular house as the “Fort Worth house.”
    2
    sofa, and photographed her. Annie said that after Trussell did this, he rubbed his
    sexual organ on her buttocks. Annie further testified that Trussell had touched her
    sexual organ with his fingers on multiple occasions; rubbed his sexual organ on her
    sexual organ on one occasion; touched her sexual organ with his mouth on one
    occasion; and made her touch his sexual organ with her hand on one occasion. Annie
    made an outcry to Natalie in 2012, several years after Trussell moved out. She
    testified that she did not tell anyone about the abuse because Trussell had told her
    that if she did, he would kill her family.
    After learning of Trussell’s abuse against Annie, Natalie notified the police, and
    Dennis Hutchins, a detective with the Fort Worth police department, was assigned to
    investigate. In the course of the investigation, Natalie gave Detective Hutchins the
    camera Trussell had used to photograph Annie. Although photographs taken with
    that camera were stored on a removable memory card, Natalie did not provide
    Detective Hutchins with any memory cards because the cards had been reformatted
    and were consequently unusable. That notwithstanding, Detective Hutchins informed
    Natalie that it was possible for the police department’s forensic team to recover
    images from the camera even if they had been deleted and even though there were no
    memory cards. But after Natalie handed over the camera to Detective Hutchins and
    an initial forensic interview and physical examination of Annie was performed, Natalie
    did not hear anything from Detective Hutchins or the Fort Worth police department
    3
    for several years. At that time, another Fort Worth police detective, Pawel Nabialek,
    who is now a Sergeant, contacted her about the case.
    Sergeant Nabialek became involved in this case after the Fort Worth police
    department discovered that Detective Hutchins had mishandled a case and formed a
    task force to audit all of Detective Hutchins’s cases. Sergeant Nabialek joined that
    task force and was assigned to this case. Sergeant Nabialek testified that when he
    received the assignment, the case was marked “pended” within the department’s
    system, meaning it was awaiting further leads and was not closed. Sergeant Nabialek
    said that a case status of “closed” meant that all investigative leads had been
    exhausted and that there was nothing to do on the case.            Sergeant Nabialek
    acknowledged that a report from Child Protective Services (CPS) in connection with
    its investigation of the allegations underlying the case indicated that Detective
    Hutchins had previously told a CPS investigator that he was going to close the case.
    Sergeant Nabialek also stated that Natalie had provided a statement indicating her
    belief that Detective Hutchins had closed the case for lack of sufficient evidence. But
    Sergeant Nabialek reiterated that notwithstanding the CPS report and the statement
    from Natalie, when he was assigned the case, its status was pended, not closed.
    Sergeant Nabialek reinvestigated the case and determined there was probable
    cause to arrest Trussell for continuous abuse of a child. Consequently, Sergeant
    Nabialek obtained an arrest warrant, and Trussell was arrested. A jury ultimately
    4
    convicted him of continuous sexual abuse of a child and assessed his punishment at
    thirty years’ confinement.
    Four days before trial started, Trussell filed a motion for continuance based on
    the absence of a witness, namely, Detective Hutchins. The record does not show that
    Trussell requested, or that the trial court held, an oral hearing on this motion. But the
    record contains a written order denying the motion, which the trial court signed the
    same day trial started. Trussell did not file a motion for new trial.
    In his sole point on appeal, Trussell complains that the trial court abused its
    discretion by denying his motion for continuance.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for continuance for an
    abuse of discretion. Vasquez v. State, 
    67 S.W.3d 229
    , 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
    Cantu v. State, No. 02-05-00436-CR, 
    2006 WL 1919684
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    July 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).          Under that
    standard, we will not find the trial court’s ruling to be an abuse of discretion unless it
    fell outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Gallo v. State, 
    239 S.W.3d 757
    ,
    777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    III. DISCUSSION
    When a defendant bases a motion for continuance on an absent witness, he
    must show (1) that he has exercised diligence to procure the witness’s attendance,
    (2) that the witness is not absent by the procurement or consent of the defense,
    5
    (3) that the motion is not made for delay, and (4) the facts he expects the witness to
    prove. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 29.06; Harrison v. State, 
    187 S.W.3d 429
    , 435
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The motion must show on its face the absent testimony’s
    materiality to the court; mere conclusions and general averments do not suffice.
    
    Harrison, 187 S.W.3d at 435
    With regard to the facts Trussell expected Detective Hutchins’s testimony to
    establish and the materiality of that testimony, Trussell’s motion contained only a
    couple of assertions. First, he asserted that he “expect[ed] [Detective] Hutchins to
    testify to and establish” that “he was the initial investigator in the case and that he
    dropped the case based on insufficient evidence in 2012.” Second, he alleged that
    “[t]he testimony to be procured from [Detective] Hutchins is material to the
    Defendant’s cause.”    These are merely conclusory, general averments:        the first
    provides no factual basis for Trussell’s expectation that Detective Hutchins would
    testify to the facts asserted in the motion, and the second is nothing more than a bare
    conclusion that the expected testimony was material to Trussell’s case. Consequently,
    Trussell failed to show on the face of his motion that Detective Hutchins would
    provide testimony that was material to the case. See 
    Harrison, 187 S.W.3d at 434
    –35
    (stating that a motion for continuance based on the absence of a witness must show
    on its face the absent testimony’s materiality to the court and that mere conclusions
    and general averments are insufficient). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Trussell’s motion for continuance when the motion failed to
    6
    show, beyond conclusory, general averments, the materiality of the testimony he
    expected Detective Hutchins to provide. See 
    id. Accordingly, we
    overrule Trussell’s
    sole point.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Trussell’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See
    Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
    /s/ Lee Gabriel
    Lee Gabriel
    Justice
    Do Not Publish
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered: August 26, 2019
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-18-00430-CR

Filed Date: 8/26/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021