Southwest Pipe Services, Inc and Joe Briers v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. ( 2016 )


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  • Opinion issued March 8, 2016
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-15-00124-CV
    ———————————
    SOUTHWEST PIPE SERVICES, INC. AND JOE BRIERS, Appellants
    V.
    SUNBELT RENTALS, INC., Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 13-CCV-050901
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In this breach of contract case, Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. (“Sunbelt”) sued
    Southwest Pipe Services, Inc. and its president Joe Briers (collectively, “Southwest
    Pipe”) after Southwest Pipe rented machinery from Sunbelt and then failed to pay
    for the rentals. Sunbelt moved for summary judgment on its own claim. The trial
    court granted summary judgment and awarded Sunbelt $29,731.63 in damages. In
    one issue, Southwest Pipe contends that, because it raised a fact issue by
    designating a responsible third party, the trial court erroneously rendered summary
    judgment in favor of Sunbelt.
    We affirm.
    Background
    Sunbelt rents equipment and machinery to other companies for use in
    various projects. Southwest Pipe removes pipelines, cleans the pipe, and then
    resells the pipe. In January 2008, Sunbelt and Southwest Pipe entered into an
    agreement whereby Sunbelt would periodically rent equipment to Southwest Pipe
    for use in its pipe-removal projects. Briers signed a personal guaranty.
    From November 2011 through January 2012, Southwest Pipe rented
    equipment from Sunbelt for use in removing a pipeline in Upshur County, Texas.
    Sunbelt submitted periodic invoices to Southwest Pipe, totaling $29,731.63, but
    Southwest Pipe never paid any of these invoices.         Sunbelt filed suit against
    Southwest Pipe, alleging suit on a sworn account, breach of contract and breach of
    Briers’ personal guaranty, and quantum meruit.
    Southwest Pipe filed an amended answer and asserted, as an affirmative
    defense, that Sunbelt’s “alleged damages were the result of a responsible third
    2
    party.” Shortly thereafter, Southwest Pipe filed a motion for leave to designate a
    responsible third party. In the motion, Southwest Pipe alleged:
    Southwest Pipe Services, Inc. hired Rodney Beshears as a sub-
    contractor to remove an abandoned pipeline. Beshears, utilizing
    equipment rented from [Sunbelt], almost immediately [began]
    removing the pipe and selling it to a local scrap dealer and pocketing
    the profits. As soon as [Southwest Pipe] discovered that Beshears was
    misappropriating the pipe, [Southwest Pipe] filed a [temporary
    restraining order] to stop Beshears. The [temporary restraining order]
    was granted, but the [temporary injunction] was unsuccessful.
    Beshears continued to use the rented equipment and continued to
    remove and sell the pipe that belonged to [Southwest Pipe]. Thus,
    Beshears is at least partially responsible for the rental bills claimed by
    [Sunbelt].
    Sunbelt did not file an objection to this designation, and the trial court signed an
    order designating Beshears as a responsible third party.
    Nearly one year later, in July 2014, Sunbelt moved for summary judgment
    on its own claims. As summary judgment evidence, Sunbelt attached Southwest
    Pipe’s credit application, Briers’ personal guaranty, and invoices relating to the
    Upshur County project.      Sunbelt argued that Southwest Pipe, and Briers as
    guarantor, entered into an agreement with Sunbelt for Sunbelt to supply rental
    equipment “to be used for the improvement of real property and various other
    works performed by” Southwest Pipe. Sunbelt argued that Southwest Pipe had a
    duty to pay Sunbelt for the rental equipment, but Southwest Pipe breached the
    agreement by failing to pay for use of the equipment. Sunbelt further argued that it
    was entitled to $29,731.63 in damages, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and
    3
    attorney’s fees. It attached the affidavit of its counsel to support its request for
    $2,500 in attorney’s fees.
    In response, Southwest Pipe objected to Sunbelt’s use of the credit
    application and the invoices, arguing that the documents were inadmissible hearsay
    because Southwest Pipe had not attached a business records affidavit. Southwest
    Pipe also argued that a fact issued existed as a result of the designation of Beshears
    as a responsible third party.     Specifically, Southwest Pipe argued “that Mr.
    Beshears should be responsible for any alleged debts owed to [Sunbelt] because he
    utilized the equipment for his own benefit.” Southwest Pipe pointed out that under
    Texas’s proportionate liability scheme, the trial court shall grant leave to designate
    a named person as a responsible third party unless another party files an objection
    within fifteen days. Sunbelt did not file a motion objecting to the designation, so
    the trial court was required to designate Beshears as a responsible third party, and
    because the court did so, “[a] fact issue exists as to who is responsible for
    payment” to Sunbelt.
    On September 19, 2014, Sunbelt filed an amended motion for summary
    judgment. This motion was substantively identical to Sunbelt’s first summary
    judgment motion, but its exhibit containing Southwest Pipe’s credit application and
    the unpaid invoices from the Upshur County project was accompanied by a
    4
    business records affidavit. Sunbelt set the motion for a hearing on November 12,
    2014.
    Southwest Pipe filed a response to the amended summary judgment motion
    on November 10, 2014. Southwest Pipe again objected to Sunbelt’s summary
    judgment evidence, arguing that the affiant of the business records affidavit failed
    to establish that she was a custodian of records and that she was familiar with the
    manner in which the records were created and maintained. The remainder of
    Southwest Pipe’s response was identical to its response to Sunbelt’s first summary
    judgment motion.
    The trial court did not rule on Southwest Pipe’s objection to Sunbelt’s
    summary judgment evidence. Instead, it granted Sunbelt’s summary judgment
    motion and awarded Sunbelt $29,731.63 in damages, pre- and post-judgment
    interest, and $2,500 in attorney’s fees. This appeal followed.
    Summary Judgment
    In its sole issue, Southwest Pipe contends that the trial court erred in
    rendering summary judgment in favor of Sunbelt because Southwest Pipe
    designated Beshears as a responsible third party, which creates a fact issue as to
    who must pay Sunbelt.
    5
    A. Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo.
    Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 
    315 S.W.3d 860
    , 862 (Tex. 2010). To prevail on a
    traditional summary judgment motion, the movant bears the burden of proving that
    no genuine issues of material fact exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors,
    Inc. v. Fielding, 
    289 S.W.3d 844
    , 848 (Tex. 2009). When a plaintiff moves for
    summary judgment on its own claim, it must prove that it is entitled to judgment as
    a matter of law on each element of its cause of action. See MMP, Ltd. v. Jones,
    
    710 S.W.2d 59
    , 60 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Cleveland v. Taylor, 
    397 S.W.3d 683
    ,
    696–97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
    A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as
    to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 
    168 S.W.3d 802
    , 816 (Tex. 2005); 
    Cleveland, 397 S.W.3d at 697
    . If the movant meets
    its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of
    material fact precluding summary judgment. See Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler,
    
    899 S.W.2d 195
    , 197 (Tex. 1995); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 
    236 S.W.3d 754
    , 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (stating that summary judgment
    evidence raises fact issue if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their
    conclusions in light of all evidence presented). To determine if the nonmovant
    6
    raised a fact issue, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmovant, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and
    disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. 
    Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848
    (citing City of 
    Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827
    ); 
    Cleveland, 397 S.W.3d at 697
    .   We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the
    nonmovant’s favor. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 
    73 S.W.3d 211
    , 215 (Tex.
    2002) (citing Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 
    941 S.W.2d 910
    , 911 (Tex. 1997));
    
    Cleveland, 397 S.W.3d at 697
    .
    We must affirm a summary judgment order if any of the grounds presented
    to the trial court are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 
    128 S.W.3d 211
    , 216 (Tex. 2003); 
    Cleveland, 397 S.W.3d at 697
    .
    B. Sunbelt’s Breach of Contract Claim
    To be entitled to summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, Sunbelt
    was required to conclusively establish (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) its
    own performance or tendered performance; (3) Southwest Pipe’s breach of the
    contract; and (4) damages sustained as a result of the breach. See B & W Supply,
    Inc. v. Beckman, 
    305 S.W.3d 10
    , 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
    denied) (citing Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Kalama Int’l, 
    51 S.W.3d 345
    , 351
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)). “A breach of contract occurs
    when a party fails or refuses to do something he has promised to do.” 
    Id. (quoting 7
    Mays v. Pierce, 
    203 S.W.3d 564
    , 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet.
    denied)).
    As summary judgment evidence, Sunbelt attached copies of Southwest
    Pipe’s 2008 application for credit with Sunbelt, as well as Briers’ personal
    guaranty and the invoices relating to the rental of equipment for the Upshur County
    project.1 The credit application and the invoices were accompanied by a business
    records affidavit from Catherine Hargis, Sunbelt’s Corporate Collections Manager.
    Hargis averred that Sunbelt “delivered all of the rental equipment in accordance
    with the parties’ agreement.” She also averred:
    Despite repeated requests on the part of [Sunbelt] that it be paid for
    such materials and equipment rental pursuant to the parties’
    agreement, the [Southwest Pipe has] failed and refused to pay for
    same.    [Southwest Pipe’s] account balance with [Sunbelt] is
    $29,731.63. [Southwest Pipe’s] account has been kept on a
    systematic record and all lawful offsets, payments, and credits, if any,
    have been applied or accounted for.
    1
    Southwest Pipe objected to Sunbelt’s Exhibit A—the credit application and the
    invoices—arguing that the business records affidavit failed to establish that the
    affiant was a custodian of records and that she was “familiar with the manner in
    which [Sunbelt’s] records are created and maintained by virtue of the affiant’s
    duties and responsibilities.” The trial court did not rule on this objection, either in
    the summary judgment order or in a separate order. Defects in the form of
    summary judgment evidence must be raised before the trial court, and the court
    must rule on the objection or the objection is waived. See Vasquez v. S. Tire Mart,
    LLC, 
    393 S.W.3d 814
    , 819 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). “[A] trial court’s
    ruling on an objection to summary judgment evidence is not implicit in its ruling
    on the motion for summary judgment . . . .” Delfino v. Perry Homes, 
    223 S.W.3d 32
    , 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Southwest Pipe points out
    that it objected to Sunbelt’s Exhibit A, but it does not argue on appeal that the trial
    court erroneously overruled its objection to this evidence. We hold, therefore, that
    Southwest Pipe did not preserve this issue.
    8
    This evidence conclusively establishes that the parties had a valid contract, that
    Sunbelt tendered performance, that Southwest Pipe breached the contract by not
    paying the agreed-upon rental amounts for the equipment, and that Sunbelt
    sustained damages totaling $29,731.63. See id.; see also Triton 88, L.P. v. Star
    Elec., L.L.C., 
    411 S.W.3d 42
    , 56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)
    (concluding that plaintiff conclusively established elements of breach of contract
    claim in summary judgment motion by presenting invoices and affidavits
    demonstrating amount owed and that invoices were unpaid).
    Because Sunbelt conclusively established its right to recover damages from
    Southwest Pipe on its breach of contract claim, the burden shifted to Southwest
    Pipe to present summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on an element of
    Sunbelt’s claims. Southwest Pipe did not present any evidence in response to
    Sunbelt’s summary judgment motion; instead, it argued solely that, because
    Beshears had been designated as a responsible third party, this designation created
    a fact issue “as to who is responsible for payment” to Sunbelt.
    Southwest Pipe relies on Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 33 to
    support its argument that the designation of Beshears as a responsible third party
    creates a fact issue in this case. Chapter 33 sets out the statutory scheme for the
    apportionment of responsibility in tort and deceptive trade practices actions.
    Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Brokerage Servs., LLC, 
    315 S.W.3d 109
    , 121 (Tex.
    9
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    §§ 33.001–.017 (Vernon 2015); Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha,
    
    290 S.W.3d 863
    , 868 (Tex. 2009) (“The proportionate responsibility scheme of
    chapter 33, on the other hand, is a complex statutory scheme for the comparative
    apportionment of responsibility among parties in most tort actions in Texas.”)
    (emphasis added). Chapter 33, by its plain language, does not apply to breach of
    contract actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a) (Vernon
    2015) (providing that chapter applies to “any cause of action based on tort” or “any
    action brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act” in
    which “a defendant, settling person, or responsible third party is found responsible
    for a percentage of the harm for which relief is sought”); Doncaster v. Hernaiz,
    
    161 S.W.3d 594
    , 604 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (holding that
    Chapter 33’s doctrine of proportionate responsibility was not applicable because
    “underlying suit lies in contract, not in tort”); see also Dugger v. Arredondo, 
    408 S.W.3d 825
    , 832 (Tex. 2013) (“When the Legislature intends an exception to
    Chapter 33’s broad scheme, it creates specific exceptions for matters that are
    outside the scope of proportionate responsibility.”).
    Southwest Pipe argues that Sunbelt has waived any argument about the
    applicability of Chapter 33 because Sunbelt did not file an objection in the trial
    court to Southwest Pipe’s motion to designate Beshears as a responsible third
    10
    party. A “responsible third party” is “any person who is alleged to have caused or
    contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is
    sought . . . .” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(6) (Vernon 2015).
    Section 33.004 provides, in relevant part:
    (a)    A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible
    third party by filing a motion for leave to designate that person
    as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed on or
    before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds
    good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.
    ....
    (f)    A court shall grant leave to designate the named person as a
    responsible third party unless another party files an objection to
    the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the date the
    motion is served.
    ....
    (h)    By granting a motion for leave to designate a person as a
    responsible third party, the person named in the motion is
    designated as a responsible third party for purposes of this
    chapter without further action by the court or any party.
    ....
    (l)    After adequate time for discovery, a party may move to strike
    the designation of a responsible third party on the ground that
    there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible
    for any portion of the claimant’s alleged injury or damage. The
    court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant
    produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact
    regarding the designated person’s responsibility for the
    claimant’s injury or damage.
    
    Id. § 33.004(a),
    (f), (h), (l) (Vernon 2015). The granting of leave to designate a
    responsible third party does not, absent joinder of the third party as a defendant,
    11
    impose liability on the responsible third party. Flack v. Hanke, 
    334 S.W.3d 251
    ,
    256 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, pet. denied) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
    CODE ANN. § 33.004(i)).
    Southwest Pipe accurately points out that Sunbelt did not file an objection in
    the trial court to its motion to designate Beshears as a responsible third party,
    which was subsequently granted by the trial court. However, Southwest Pipe
    points to no authority holding that a breach-of-contract plaintiff’s failure to object
    to a motion to designate a responsible third party renders Chapter 33’s
    proportionate responsibility scheme applicable to the breach of contract action,
    contrary to an explicit statutory provision stating that Chapter 33 only applies to
    tort and deceptive trade practices actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
    § 33.002(a) (providing that Chapter 33 only applies to “any cause of action based
    on tort” and “any action brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer
    Protection Act”); see also F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 
    237 S.W.3d 680
    , 687 (Tex. 2007) (“Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
    governs the apportionment of responsibility in cases within its scope.”); CBI NA-
    CON, Inc. v. UOP Inc., 
    961 S.W.2d 336
    , 341 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    1997, pet. denied) (“A breach of contract claim is not a basis for contribution under
    chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.”). Under the facts of
    this case, Southwest Pipe cannot rely on Sunbelt’s failure to object in the trial court
    12
    to its motion to designate Beshears as a responsible third party—or the fact that the
    trial court granted the motion despite statutory language providing that the
    proportionate responsibility scheme does not apply to this breach of contract
    action—to create a fact issue precluding summary judgment.
    Because Southwest Pipe presented no other evidence controverting any
    element of Sunbelt’s breach of contract claim, we hold that Southwest Pipe did not
    raise a fact issue on the claim and, thus, the trial court correctly rendered summary
    judgment in favor of Sunbelt. See Centeq 
    Realty, 899 S.W.2d at 197
    (holding that
    when movant conclusively establishes elements of its claim, burden shifts to
    nonmovant to raise fact issue to defeat summary judgment).
    We overrule Southwest Pipe’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Evelyn V. Keyes
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.
    13