State v. Craig Doyal , 541 S.W.3d 395 ( 2018 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-17-00123-CR
    ________________
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
    V.
    CRAIG DOYAL, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 221st District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 16-06-07315-CR
    __________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    The State of Texas appeals the trial court’s dismissal of an indictment, which
    alleged that appellee Craig Doyal, as a member of the Montgomery County
    Commissioners Court, knowingly conspired to circumvent the Texas Open Meetings
    Act (“TOMA”). We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment and
    remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    1
    Doyal, a member of the Montgomery County Commissioners Court, was
    indicted for knowingly conspiring to circumvent the provisions of TOMA by
    meeting in a number less than a quorum for the purpose of secret deliberations “by
    engaging in a verbal exchange concerning an issue within the jurisdiction of the
    Montgomery County Commissioners Court, namely, the contents of the potential
    structure of a November 2015 Montgomery County Road Bond[.]” See Tex. Gov’t
    Code Ann. § 551.143 (West 2017). Doyal filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,
    asserting that section 551.143 is facially unconstitutional because it violates the free
    speech provisions of the First Amendment and is vague and overbroad.
    Doyal1 asserted that he, a county commissioner, and a political consultant met
    with representatives of a local political action committee (“PAC”) to discuss placing
    a road bond referendum on the November 2015 ballot, and as a result of the meeting,
    a memorandum of understanding was produced, in which the Texas Patriots PAC
    promised its political support for putting a road bond proposal on the commissioners’
    special meeting agenda. According to Doyal, he posted the agenda for a special
    meeting of the Commissioners Court, and citizens praised the commissioners’ work
    at the special meeting and thanked them for putting a road bond on the ballot. Doyal
    1
    Doyal is the elected County Judge of Montgomery County, and not
    technically a commissioner. The County Judge is a member of Commissioners
    Court. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.001(a) (West Supp. 2017).
    2
    asserted that the county attorney wrote him a letter stating that the commissioners
    had complied with the requirements of TOMA, and voters passed the bond in the
    November election. Doyal alleged that the discussions between himself, the other
    commissioner, the consultant, and the members of the PAC were not a meeting under
    TOMA and were not intended to be an agreement to conspire to avoid TOMA.
    In his motion to dismiss, Doyal argued that section 551.143 of the Texas
    Government Code burdens free speech and is subject to strict construction.
    According to Doyal, the statute facially “does not make sense[]” because “[m]eeting
    in numbers of less than a quorum does not violate a statute that requires a quorum to
    meet in open session.” Doyal contended that because TOMA applies only to specific
    speech by public officials, it is a content-based penal regimen subject to review
    under strict scrutiny. According to Doyal’s motion to dismiss, section 551.143 is
    constitutionally overbroad because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
    speech when judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep. Doyal
    further asserted that section 551.143 is vague and confusing because the terms
    “conspire” and “secret” are not defined, and the statute fails to explain what kind of
    “deliberations” are covered.
    The State’s response in the trial court asserted that section 551.143 is “both
    constitutional and enforceable.” According to the State, section 551.143 is content
    3
    neutral because “it does not restrict speech based on specific content, but simply
    requires that the disclosure of the speech take place in an open forum.” The State
    asserted that the purpose of section 551.143 is to control the effects of closed
    meetings, including decreased transparency, encouragement of fraud or corruption,
    and increased mistrust in governmental entities. In addition, although the State
    argued that intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard for reviewing section
    551.143, the State contended that even if the strict scrutiny standard applied, section
    551.143 meets that test because “it is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling state
    interest.”
    The trial court held a hearing, but heard no testimony regarding the underlying
    facts. Rather, Doyal’s witnesses offered opinion testimony regarding their
    interpretations of section 551.143, the challenges it poses, and its constitutionality.
    The trial judge signed an order granting Doyal’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
    No party requested the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law,
    and none were filed. The State then filed this appeal, in which it raises two issues
    for our consideration: (1) the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment on the
    ground that section 551.143 is facially unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, and
    (2) the trial court erred by dismissing the indictment on the ground that section
    551.143 facially violates the First Amendment and is overbroad.
    4
    “Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law that we review
    de novo.” Ex parte Lo, 
    424 S.W.3d 10
    , 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). If we determine
    that there is a reasonable construction which will render the statute constitutional,
    we must uphold the statute. Tarlton v. State, 
    93 S.W.3d 168
    , 175 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). We presume that a statute is valid and that the
    Legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily. Ex parte 
    Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 14
    -
    15. “The burden normally rests upon the person challenging the statute to establish
    its unconstitutionality.” 
    Id. at 15.
    “The First Amendment—which prohibits laws ‘abridging the freedom of
    speech’—limits the government’s power to regulate speech based on its substantive
    content.” State v. Stubbs, 
    502 S.W.3d 218
    , 224 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2016, pet. ref’d); see U.S. Const. amend. I. “Content-based regulations are those that
    distinguish favored from disfavored speech based on the idea or message expressed.”
    
    Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d at 224
    . “[W]hen the government seeks to restrict and punish
    speech based on its content, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed.”
    Ex parte 
    Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15
    . “Content-based regulations (those laws that
    distinguish favored from disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed) are
    presumptively invalid, and the government bears the burden to rebut that
    presumption.” 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations.
    5
    
    Id. On the
    other hand, if the statute punishes conduct and not speech, we apply a
    rational basis level of review to determine if the statute has a rational relationship to
    a legitimate state purpose. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
    413 U.S. 601
    , 615 (1973).
    Before a statute will be invalidated on its face as overbroad, the overbreadth
    must be real and substantial when “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
    legitimate sweep.” 
    Id. A statute
    should not be invalidated for overbreadth merely
    because it is possible to imagine some unconstitutional application. See In re Shaw,
    
    204 S.W.3d 9
    , 15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d). With respect to issues
    of vagueness, statutes are not necessarily unconstitutionally vague merely because
    the words or terms employed in the statute are not specifically defined. See
    Engelking v. State, 
    750 S.W.2d 213
    , 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). When a statute
    does not define the words used therein, we give the words their plain meaning. See
    Parker v. State, 
    985 S.W.2d 460
    , 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Tex. Gov’t
    Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (West 2013) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context
    and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”). Under the
    void-for-vagueness doctrine, a statute will be invalidated if it fails to define the
    offense in such a manner as to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
    opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. See State v. Holcombe, 
    187 S.W.3d 6
    496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 
    461 U.S. 352
    , 357
    (1983).
    “TOMA requires that meetings of governmental bodies be open to the public.”
    Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 
    696 F.3d 454
    , 458 (5th Cir. 2012). Section 551.143(a) of
    TOMA, which makes a violation of TOMA a criminal offense, provides as follows:
    (a) A member or group of members of a governmental body commits
    an offense if the member or group of members knowingly conspires to
    circumvent this chapter by meeting in numbers less than a quorum for
    the purpose of secret deliberations in violation of this chapter.
    Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.143(a). Chapter 551 defines the term “deliberation” as
    “a verbal exchange during a meeting between a quorum of a governmental body, or
    between a quorum of a governmental body and another person, concerning an issue
    within the jurisdiction of the governmental body or any public business.” 
    Id. § 551.001(2)
    (West Supp. 2017). In addition, chapter 551 defines “governmental
    body” to include a county commissioners court. 
    Id. § 551.001(3)(B).
    Furthermore,
    chapter 551 defines a “meeting” as follows:
    (A) a deliberation between a quorum of a governmental body, or
    between a quorum of a governmental body and another person, during
    which public business or public policy over which the governmental
    body has supervision or control is discussed or considered or during
    which the governmental body takes formal action; or
    (B) except as otherwise provided by this subdivision, a gathering:
    7
    (i) that is conducted by the governmental body or for which the
    governmental body is responsible;
    (ii) at which a quorum of members of the governmental body is
    present;
    (iii) that has been called by the governmental body; and
    (iv) at which the members receive information from, give
    information to, ask questions of, or receive questions from any third
    person, including an employee of the governmental body, about the
    public business or public policy over which the governmental body
    has supervision or control.
    ...
    The term does not include the gathering of a quorum of a governmental
    body at a social function unrelated to the public business that is
    conducted by the body, the attendance by a quorum of a governmental
    body at a regional, state, or national convention or workshop,
    ceremonial event, or press conference, if formal action is not taken and
    any discussion of public business is incidental to the social function,
    convention, workshop, ceremonial event, or press conference.
    The term includes a session of a governmental body.
    
    Id. § 551.001(4).
    Lastly, chapter 551 defines “quorum” as “a majority of a
    governmental body, unless defined differently by applicable law or rule or the
    charter of the governmental body.” 
    Id. § 551.001(6).
    8
    In analyzing section 551.144 of TOMA,2 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    Fifth Circuit held that “[t]ransparency is furthered by allowing the public to have
    access to government decisionmaking . . . . The private speech itself makes the
    government less transparent regardless of its message. The statute is therefore
    content-neutral.” 
    Asgeirsson, 696 F.3d at 461-62
    . The Asgeirsson court held that a
    regulation is not content-based merely because the applicability of the regulation
    depends on the content of the speech. 
    Id. at 459.
    “A statute that appears content-
    based on its face may still be deemed content-neutral if it is justified without regard
    to the content of the speech.” 
    Id. at 459-60.
    Doyal contends that Asgeirsson was
    abrogated by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
    135 S. Ct. 2218
    (2015). He emphasizes that
    this Court need not follow cases from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and argues
    that two additional U.S. Supreme Court cases “show that Section 551.143 does not
    pass constitutional muster even under intermediate scrutiny[,]” 3 and that Asgeirsson
    2
    Section 551.144 makes calling or aiding in calling a closed meeting, closing
    or aiding in closing a meeting to the public, or participating in a closed meeting a
    criminal offense. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.144 (West 2017).
    3
    Doyal argues that under Packingham v. North Carolina, 
    137 S. Ct. 1730
    (2017) and Matal v. Tam, 
    137 S. Ct. 1744
    (2017), section 551.143 cannot survive
    even intermediate scrutiny. In those cases, the Supreme Court invalidated a law
    banning sex offenders from using social media and held that the First Amendment
    bars a law that prohibited disparaging trademarks. Packingham, 
    137 S. Ct. 1735
    ,
    1738; 
    Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751
    . We reject the assertion that these cases render it
    impossible for section 551.143 to survive intermediate scrutiny.
    9
    dealt with section 551.144, which is “a simple, clear statute[,]” but section 551.143
    is “so vague that experts call it ‘gibberish’ and are confused about its meaning and
    application.”
    First, we note that Reed does not mention or discuss Asgeirsson, and we reject
    Doyal’s assertion that Reed abrogated Asgeirsson. See 
    Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218-39
    .
    Second, in Reed, the issue facing the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of a
    town’s “Sign Code” that prohibited the display of outdoor signs without a permit,
    but exempted numerous categories of signs from that requirement, including
    ideological signs, political signs, and temporary directional signs relating to a
    qualifying event. 
    Id. at 2224-25.
    In Reed, a church and its pastor wished to advertise
    the time and location of its Sunday church services, which were held in a variety of
    different locations due to financial constraints. 
    Id. at 2225.
    The church was twice
    cited for exceeding the time limits for displaying temporary directional signs, as well
    as its failure to include the date of the event on the signs. 
    Id. The church
    filed suit in
    federal district court, arguing that the Sign Code violated its freedom of speech. 
    Id. at 2226.
    After the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the town,
    the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
    Id. After concluding
    that the town’s Sign Code was clearly not content-neutral, but instead
    was “content based on its face[,]” the Supreme Court held that the Sign Code could
    10
    not survive strict scrutiny because the Sign Code was not narrowly tailored to further
    a compelling government interest. 
    Id. at 2228-32.
    We conclude that, unlike the circumstances in Reed, which involved the
    particular type of speech or message on signs, section 551.143 of TOMA is directed
    at conduct, i.e., the act of conspiring to circumvent TOMA by meeting in less than
    a quorum for the purpose of secret deliberations in violation of TOMA. See Tex.
    Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.143; 
    Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228-32
    ; 
    Asgeirsson, 696 F.3d at 461-62
    . It is not the content of the deliberations that is targeted by section 551.143;
    rather, section 551.143 targets the act of knowingly conspiring to engage in
    deliberations that circumvent the requirements of TOMA. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
    § 551.143. “The prohibition in TOMA is applicable only to private forums and is
    designed to encourage public discussion[.]” 
    Asgeirsson, 696 F.3d at 461
    . Therefore,
    we reject Doyal’s contention that we must apply strict scrutiny in reviewing section
    551.143.
    This Court’s opinion in Ex parte Poe, 
    491 S.W.3d 348
    (Tex. App.—
    Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d), is instructive. In Ex parte Poe, the appellant asserted
    that the disorderly conduct statute is facially unconstitutional due to its alleged
    vagueness and its alleged violation of his rights under the First, Second, Fifth, and
    Fourteenth Amendments. 
    Id. at 350.
    The statute at issue in Ex parte Poe provided
    11
    that ‘“A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly . . . displays a
    firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to alarm.’”
    
    Id. at 354.
    This Court concluded that the statute punishes conduct (displaying a
    firearm in a public place in a manner calculated to cause alarm) rather than protected
    expression, and that the statute bears a rational relationship to the State’s legitimate
    interest in protecting its citizens from harm. 
    Id. We therefore
    rejected Poe’s
    argument that strict scrutiny applied, and we began by presuming that the statute is
    valid and that the Legislature did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in enacting it.
    
    Id. We also
    rejected Poe’s argument that the word “alarm” was undefined and
    inherently subjective, and instead gave the undefined terms in the statute their plain
    meaning. 
    Id. In the
    case at bar, Doyal argues that section 551.143 is vague because the
    terms “conspire,” “circumvent,” and “secret” are not defined, and the statute does
    not explain what type of deliberations are covered. As was the case in Poe, the terms
    at issue have a plain meaning. “Conspire” is commonly understood to mean “to make
    an agreement with a group and in secret to do some act (as to commit treason or a
    crime or carry out a treacherous deed): plot together[.]” Webster’s Third
    International Dictionary 485 (2002). “Circumvent” means “to overcome or avoid the
    intent, effect, or force of: anticipate and escape, check, or defeat by ingenuity or
    12
    stratagem: make inoperative or nullify the purpose or power of esp. by craft or
    scheme[.]” 
    Id. at 410.
    “Secret” means “kept from knowledge or view: concealed,
    hidden” and “done or undertaken with evident purpose of concealment[.]” 
    Id. at 2052.
    Doyal asserts that because chapter 551 defines “deliberation” as a verbal
    exchange during a meeting between a quorum of members concerning an issue
    within the jurisdiction of the governmental body or any public business, yet section
    551.143 refers to deliberations of less than a quorum, the statute is unconstitutionally
    vague. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 551.001(2), 551.143. The Attorney General
    has opined that TOMA does not require that a governmental body’s members be in
    each other’s physical presence to constitute a quorum, and, therefore, section
    551.143 applies to “members of a governmental body who gather in numbers that
    do not physically constitute a quorum at any one time but who, through successive
    gatherings, secretly discuss a public matter with a quorum of that body.” Tex. Att’y
    Gen. Op. No. GA-0326 p. 3 (2005).4 The Attorney General explained that the
    definition of “deliberations” as used in section 551.143 “is consistent with its
    definition in section 551.001 because ‘meeting in numbers less than a quorum’
    4
    We recognize the difficulties this language causes the State in its attempt to
    prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt; however, a statute that creates
    difficulty for the State in meeting its burden of proof is not unconstitutional.
    13
    describes a method of forming a quorum, and a quorum formed this way may hold
    deliberations like any other quorum.” 
    Id. at p.
    4; see Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr.
    v. City of San Antonio, 
    316 F. Supp. 2d 433
    , 473, 476 (W.D. Tex. 2001). The
    Attorney General also opined that “[t]his construction is discernible from a plain
    reading of the provision.” Tex. Atty’s Gen. Op. No. GA-0326 p. 4. We find the
    Attorney General’s reasoning persuasive.
    We conclude that section 551.143 describes the criminal offense with
    sufficient specificity that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited.
    See 
    Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 499
    . The statute provides reasonable notice of the
    prohibited conduct. See 
    Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 499
    ; see also 
    Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357
    ; see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.143. We conclude that the statute is
    reasonably related to the State’s legitimate interest in assuring transparency in public
    proceedings. See 
    Asgeirsson, 696 F.3d at 461-62
    . The alleged overbreadth of section
    551.143 is not real and substantial when judged in relation to its plainly legitimate
    sweep. See 
    Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615
    . Doyal has not satisfied his burden to prove
    that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. See 
    id. We sustain
    the
    State’s appellate issues, reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment, and
    remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    14
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    ______________________________
    STEVE McKEITHEN
    Chief Justice
    Submitted on January 24, 2018
    Opinion Delivered February 7, 2018
    Publish
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
    15