Robert K. Rawles v. State ( 2004 )


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  • In The

    Court of Appeals

    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


    ______________________________


    No. 06-03-00245-CR

    ______________________________



    ROBERT K. RAWLES, Appellant

     

    V.

     

    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee



                                                  


    On Appeal from the 202nd Judicial District Court

    Bowie County, Texas

    Trial Court No. 01-F-0468-202



                                                     




    Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross



    MEMORANDUM OPINION


              Robert K. Rawles appeals from his conviction by a jury for aggravated sexual assault on a child, a thirteen-year-old girl. The jury assessed his punishment at twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Rawles contends trial counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and ineffective, and resulted in the wrong result at trial.

              The State presented testimony from the victim, who was in her early twenties at the time of trial, that she and Rawles had sexual intercourse three times over a period of two months in 1994. Rawles' contentions of ineffective assistance of counsel are based on counsel's alleged failure to obtain sufficient (and available) information to support his defenses against the charge. Those defenses were, first, that he was, at the times alleged, employed in another city and working extremely long hours, and was not at the house in Texarkana; thus, he could not have engaged in the acts. He contends counsel did not obtain employment records to support this defense, instead relying on Rawles' testimony and his check stubs. The second defense was that the victim had a venereal disease at the time of the alleged offense, and although Rawles testified he did not, the defense position would have been stronger had counsel obtained information to confirm this information. Rawles contends that, in these two respects, counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to prepare properly for trial.

              The standard of testing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted for Texas constitutional claims in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To prevail on this claim, an appellant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that his or her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To meet this burden, the appellant must prove that the attorney's representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

              When, as in this case, ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose. Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). However, some claims may be disposed of on direct appeal where "trial counsel's ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003); Freeman, 125 S.W.3d at 506. Such situations are rare.

              In this case, Rawles complains because his counsel did not obtain records and then effectively present them to the jury for consideration. The appellate record in this case, however, does not show that such records actually existed, that they could be obtained if they had existed, or whether the records would have actually been helpful to Rawles' defense. It is possible that they could have been helpful. Evidence that an alleged rape victim had a pre-existing venereal disease—and that the person alleged to have had sex with that victim three separate times during the time she had the disease did not himself have the disease either before or after the alleged assault—would likely be relevant. Similarly, if records could be obtained showing that Rawles was not present at the location at the relevant time because he was in another city, this would likewise be relevant to his defense.

              To defeat the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, an allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In such a case, where the alleged derelictions primarily are errors of omission outside the trial record rather than commission revealed in the record, collateral attack may be the vehicle by which a thorough and detailed examination of alleged ineffectiveness may be developed and spread upon a record. Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Under the record presented in this direct appeal, we cannot address those questions, and appellant's arguments remain nothing more than speculation.

     


              We affirm the judgment.   

     

                                                                               Donald R. Ross

                                                                               Justice


    Date Submitted:      November 10, 2004

    Date Decided:         December 22, 2004


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