Anthony Prescott v. State ( 2018 )

07-18-00022-CR ACCEPTED
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
6/1/2018 10:42 AM
Vivian Long, Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
FILED IN
7th COURT OF APPEALS
ANTHONY PRESCOTT, § AMARILLO, TEXAS
APPELLANT § 6/1/2018 10:42:57 AM
§ VIVIAN LONG
CLERK
v. § No. 07-18-00022-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
___________________________________________________
STATE’S BRIEF
___________________________________________________
FROM THE 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DENTON COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL CAUSE NUMBER F15-1942-211
THE HONORABLE SHERRY SHIPMAN, JUDGE, PRESIDING
PAUL JOHNSON
Criminal District Attorney
Denton County, Texas
CATHERINE LUFT
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Chief, Appellate Division
Oral argument is requested
only if Appellant is ANDREA R. SIMMONS
requesting argument. Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No.24053478
1450 East McKinney, Suite 3100
Denton, Texas 76209
(940) 349-2600
FAX (940) 349-2751
andrea.simmons@dentoncounty.com
MICHELLE DOBSON
RACHEL NICHOLS
Assistant Criminal District Attorneys
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................... 2
SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS ........................................ 5
STATE’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE ONE
(JURY CHARGE) ...................................................................................... 6
Appellant’s Contention ......................................................................... 6
State’s Reply ......................................................................................... 6
Argument And Authorities ................................................................... 6
The Trial Judge Did Not Err by Denying
the Requested Charge ...................................................................... 6
Standard of Review – Jury Charge Error ................................... 6
Applicable Jury Charge Law ....................................................... 7
Affirmative Defense of Temporary Use....................................... 9
There Is No Evidence Raising the
Affirmative Defense ..................................................................... 9
STATE’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE TWO
(SUFFICIENCY) ..................................................................................... 13
Appellant’s Contention ....................................................................... 13
State’s Reply ....................................................................................... 13
Argument And Authorities ................................................................. 13
Standard of Review – Sufficiency .................................................. 13
The Evidence is Sufficient to
Prove Appellant’s Intent ................................................................ 14
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................... 19
i
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ........................................................ 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................................................. 20
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes, Codes, and Rules Page
3 Texas Annotated Penal Statutes 434-35
(Branch’s 3d ed. 1974) ........................................................................................9
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (West 2007) .......................................7
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West 2007) .......................................8
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §29.02(a)(2) (West 2006) ...........................................14
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §31.01(2)(A) (West 2006) ...........................................14
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §31.03(a) (West 2006) ................................................14
Cases
Almanza v. State
686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g) ...............................7
Baum v. State
848 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.)..........17
Blackburn v. State
44 Tex. 457 (1876) ...............................................................................................9
Booth v. State
679 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) .........................................................8
Brooks v. State
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................................................ 13, 18
Cortez v. State
469 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) .........................................................6
iii
Delgado v. State
235 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .........................................................8
Draper v. State
539 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) .........................................................15
Flores v. State
888 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).........17
Galloway v. State
71 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1934) .........................................................10
Griffin v. State
614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ............................................... passim
Guevara v. State
152 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .........................................................14
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) ....................... 13, 14
Kuczaj v. State
848 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.)...........................15
Lee v. State
415 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d)......................7, 8
Lugo v. State
667 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) .........................................................8
Nava v. State
415 S.W.3d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)........................................................7
Ngo v. State,
175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .........................................................6
Price v. State
457 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) .........................................................7
iv
Roberson v. State
821 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d) ................14
Rowland v. State
744 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) .......................................................18
Thomas v. State
753 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) .......................................................14
Walters v. State
247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ...................................................8, 11
Warren v. State
565 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) .........................................................8
Will. v. State
Nos. 01-03-01295-CR, 01-03-01296-CR,
2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2059
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 17, 20015,
pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) ..................................................17
v
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
ANTHONY PRESCOTT, §
APPELLANT §
§
v. § No. 07-18-00022-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
___________________________________________________
STATE’S BRIEF
___________________________________________________
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Charges................................... Robbery (Count I); Robbery (Count II)
(C.R. at 8)
Tex. Penal Code § 29.02
The Pleas ................................................................................... Not Guilty
(4 R.R. at 6; C.R. at 89)
The Verdicts (Jury)........................................................................... Guilty
(5 R.R. at 25-26; C.R. at 89)
The Punishments (Jury) ............................. 10 years; ID-TDCJ (Count I);
.............................................. 10 years; ID-TDCJ (Count II); concurrently
(7 R.R. at 4-5; C.R. at 89)
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 2, 2015, Keeley Taylor was staying at the La Quinta Inn
in Denton, Texas, with her mother, Tamera Tanner, and her stepfather,
Robert Tanner (4 R.R. at 16-17, 30-31, 90). The family was visiting
Denton for a high school graduation (4 R.R. at 18, 30).
After the graduation, the family drove back to the hotel with Robert
driving, Tamera in the front passenger seat, and Keeley seated in the
rear (4 R.R. at 19, 32, 91). Keeley got out of the car first (4 R.R. at 19, 32,
91-92). Appellant walked up to Keeley and asked her to give him the car
keys (4 R.R. at 19). Keeley tapped on her mom’s window as Appellant
grabbed Keeley’s arm (4 R.R. at 20-21, 26). He told Keeley, “give me the
keys or I will hurt you” (4 R.R. at 21). His other hand was behind his back
(4 R.R. at 21).
Robert told his wife to get out of the car, and then he reached for
his gun (4 R.R. at 34, 43-44). But the gun was in the hotel room (4 R.R.
at 43-44). Robert told Appellant he could have the car if he would just let
Robert’s family go (4 R.R. at 34-35, 95-96, 100). As Robert got out of the
car, Appellant and Keeley walked around the backside of the car to the
driver’s side (4 R.R. at 22, 34). Appellant told Robert, “give me your
2
fucking keys to your car or I’m going to hurt your daughter” (4 R.R. at 33,
93, 95, 100). After Robert gave Appellant the keys, Appellant started to
get inside the car, but Robert slammed the car door on him (4 R.R. at 22,
26, 36, 40, 97). Appellant asked Robert why he was trying to hurt his
family, said something about his family being in the hotel or being held
hostage by the police, then threw the car keys and ran away (4 R.R.
at 26-27, 40-42, 98, 100).
Robert and some bystanders chased Appellant and yelled for him to
come back to the hotel (4 R.R. at 24, 37, 85, 87). Appellant ran to the
backside of the hotel, then the front, and then went inside the hotel lobby
(4 R.R. at 37, 41, 91, 101).
Nathan Fenner, front desk receptionist for the hotel, testified that
prior to the robbery, hotel residents had complained that Appellant was
kicking and banging on doors and yelling “let me in, let me in” (4 R.R.
at 47, 55). Next, Nathan saw Appellant harass a lady that just got out of
her car (Keeley), and put his hands on her (4 R.R. at 50-51). The woman
was terrified (4 R.R. at 51). And after the altercation at the car, Appellant
ran away, followed by three or four men (4 R.R. at 51, 58). When
Appellant returned to the hotel, he entered the lobby, and went behind
3
the front desk and began answering telephone calls and hanging up on
people (4 R.R. at 52, 59). Appellant asked Nathan if the coffee was hot
before returning to his hotel room on the third floor (4 R.R. at 53, 59-61).
When officers arrived, Nathan opened Appellant’s hotel room door (4 R.R.
at 54, 69, 109-10). Appellant was in the room with his wife and two
children (4 R.R. at 78). Appellant told officers that his family had been
kidnapped by police and held in the hotel against their will (4 R.R. at 76,
115, 122).
Appellant was charged with two counts of robbery (C.R. at 8). His
counsel requested a jury instruction on “temporary use,” arguing that
Appellant lacked the intent to permanently withhold the vehicle from the
owner (4 R.R. at 28; 5 R.R. at 14-19). The trial court denied the request,
and the jury found Appellant guilty as to both counts (4 R.R. at 134;
5 R.R. at 6-7, 25-26; C.R. at 89).
4
SUMMARY OF THE STATE’S ARGUMENTS
State’s Reply To Appellant’s Issue One
The trial judge did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a jury
instruction as to “temporary use” because the affirmative defense was not
raised by any testimony or evidence at trial.
State’s Reply To Appellant’s Issue Two
Based upon his words and actions, the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Appellant intended to permanently deprive the owner of
his property.
5
STATE’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE ONE
(JURY CHARGE)
Appellant’s Contention
The evidence supported that Appellant only had the intent to
temporarily use the property at issue; the trial court erred when it denied
Appellant’s request for a jury instruction as to “temporary use.”
State’s Reply
The trial judge did not err by denying Appellant’s request for a jury
instruction as to “temporary use” because the affirmative defense was not
raised by any testimony or evidence at trial.
Argument And Authorities
The Trial Judge Did Not Err by Denying the Requested Charge
1. Standard of Review – Jury Charge Error
Alleged jury charge error is reviewed in two steps. Cortez v. State,
469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). First, the appellate court
determines whether error exists in the charge. Id. Secondly, if there is
error, the appellate court reviews the record to determine whether the
error caused sufficient harm to warrant reversal. Id.; Ngo v. State,
175 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In assessing the degree
of harm, the appellate courts look at “the entire jury charge, the state of
6
the evidence (including the contested issues and the weight of the
probative evidence), the arguments of counsel, and any other relevant
information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Nava v. State,
415 S.W.3d 289, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)).
If the error was preserved by objection, as in this case, any error
that is not harmless will constitute reversible error. Price v. State,
457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Almanza,
686 S.W.2d at 171 (if error in the jury charge was subject of timely
objection in the trial court, reversal is required if there is “some harm to
the accused from the error”). The record must disclose “actual rather than
theoretical harm,” and the error must have affected the very basis of the
case, deprived the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affected a
defensive theory. Id.
2. Applicable Jury Charge Law
“[T]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, but it is bound to
receive the law from the court and be governed thereby.” Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (West 2007). “A trial court must submit a
charge setting forth the ‘law applicable to the case.’” Lee v. State,
7
415 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West 2007)). “The purpose of the
jury charge . . . is to inform the jury of the applicable law and guide them
in its application.” Id. (quoting Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
Under Texas law, the judge must provide the jury with “a written
charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case; not
expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up
the testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge
calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury.”
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West 2007). This law requires the
trial judge to instruct the jury on statutory defenses, affirmative
defenses, and justifications whenever they are raised by the evidence,
regardless of whether the evidence is strong, feeble, unimpeached, or
contradicted, and even when the trial court thinks that the testimony
is not worthy of belief. Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 208-09
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Booth v. State, 679 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984); Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);
Warren v. State, 565 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).
8
3. Affirmative Defense of Temporary Use
The defense of temporary use has been recognized for over one
hundred years, as has a defendant’s right to an affirmative instruction,
when the evidence raises the issue. Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159
(Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (citing Blackburn v. State, 44 Tex. 457,
463-64 (1876); 3 Texas Annotated Penal Statutes 434-35
(Branch’s 3d ed. 1974)).
4. There Is No Evidence Raising the Affirmative Defense
Here, Appellant argues that he raised the affirmative defense of
temporary use by questioning witnesses which resulted in testimony that
Appellant was confused, erratic, aimless, and unstable on the evening of
the robbery (Appellant’s Brief at 12). Several witnesses testified that
Appellant was “mumbling about his family being kidnapped and held
hostage by the police in a room at the hotel” (Appellant’s Brief at 12-13).
Appellant asserts that because he argued that he was having a “mental
health episode,” Appellant was “only thinking in temporary terms,” and
wanted only to use the victim’s vehicle to “escape the hotel with his
family” (Appellant’s Brief at 13). Thus, Appellant argues that the
evidence warranted a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of
temporary use.
9
Appellant relies on Galloway v. State to support his argument that
an instruction on temporary use is appropriate when the facts support
that the taking of a vehicle from the owner is not a robbery when the sole
reason for taking the vehicle was for a different reason (i.e., transporting
illegal beers). 71 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1934). However, the facts
don’t support such a theory in this case. In Galloway, the appellants told
the owner of the vehicle that they knew he was transporting illegal beer
and then took the car only after they verified that the beer was inside.
Id. The facts of that case indicate that it was not the car that the
appellants sought, but rather what was inside the car. To the contrary,
in this case, Appellant threatened to hurt the driver’s daughter if he did
not give Appellant the vehicle. And although some witnesses testified
that Appellant mumbled about his family being held hostage by police
inside the hotel, there is no relevant connection between Appellant’s
reference to his family and the victim’s vehicle.
Thus, the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in
Galloway (cited by Appellant). Appellant’s words and actions in this case
were aimed solely at the taking of the vehicle without a reason for his
10
actions. Unlike the facts of Galloway, there was no evidence to justify or
support a jury instruction as to “temporary use” in this case.
Finally, Appellant’s argument that the trial judge refused the
jury instruction because he did not believe Appellant’s theory fails.
(Appellant’s Brief at 12, 14). Appellant’s citation to the trial judge’s
statements is misconstrued (Appellant’s Brief at 15). The prosecutor
informed the trial judge that the instruction as to temporary use was only
appropriate if the instruction was raised by the evidence (4 R.R. at 131).
Appellant then discussed what facts he felt supported the instruction by
arguing that Appellant was trying to “assist” his family by taking the
vehicle (4 R.R. at 131-32). The trial judge summarized Appellant’s theory
and then asked the State for a response; the trial judge did not
summarize the facts and make a finding that he did not believe the facts,
as argued by Appellant (4 R.R. at 132; Appellant’s Brief at 15). In fact,
the trial judge specifically held that, “I do not believe that the evidence
has supported an instruction on temporary use” (4 R.R. at 134). Texas
law requires the trial court to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense
when it is raised by the evidence. See Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 208-09.
11
Because there is no evidence or testimony raising Appellant’s
requested jury instruction as to temporary use, the trial court did not err
in refusing to instruct on such. This issue should be overruled.
12
STATE’S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE TWO
(SUFFICIENCY)
Appellant’s Contention
The jury erred when it found Appellant guilty of two counts of
Robbery because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant had the intent to deprive the victim of his vehicle permanently.
State’s Reply
Based upon his words and actions, the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Appellant intended to permanently deprive the owner of
his property.
Argument And Authorities
Standard of Review – Sufficiency
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, all of the
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to
determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). The reviewing
court must give deference to “the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly
resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
13
reasonable inferences from the basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson,
443 U.S. at 318-19. On appeal, the same standard of review is used for
both circumstantial and direct evidence cases. Guevara v. State,
152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
The Evidence is Sufficient to Prove Appellant’s Intent
A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft and
with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he intentionally
or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily
injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §29.02(a)(2) (West 2006). In a
robbery prosecution, “intent to deprive the owner of property” is
an element of theft which the State must prove. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §31.03(a) (West 2006); Griffin, 614 S.W.2d at 158.
“Deprive” means “to withhold property from the owner permanently
or for so extended a period of time that a major portion of the
value or enjoyment of the property is lost to the owner.” Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §31.01(2)(A) (West 2006); Thomas v. State,
753 S.W.2d 688, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Roberson v. State,
821 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1991, pet. ref’d).
14
However, deprivation is not the crucial element that the State must
prove. See Draper v. State, 539 S.W.2d 61, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);
Kuczaj v. State, 848 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993,
no pet.). Rather, the State must prove the defendant’s intent to deprive
at the time of the taking. Draper, 539 S.W.2d at 68; Kuczaj, 848 S.W.2d
at 289. The intent to deprive is determined from the words and acts of
the defendant. Griffin, 614 S.W.2d at 159. The defense of temporary use
is available in a robbery prosecution. Id.
In this case, Appellant walked up to Keeley and asked her to give
him the car keys (4 R.R. at 19). Keeley tapped on her mom’s window as
Appellant grabbed Keeley’s arm (4 R.R. at 20-21, 26). Appellant told
Keeley, “give me the keys or I will hurt you” (4 R.R. at 21). His other hand
was behind his back (4 R.R. at 21).
Robert told his wife to get out of the car, and then he reached for
his gun (4 R.R. at 34, 43-44). But the gun was in the hotel room (4 R.R.
at 43-44). Robert told Appellant he could have the car if he would just let
Robert’s family go (4 R.R. at 34-35, 95-96, 100). As Robert got out of the
car, Appellant and Keeley walked around the backside of the car to the
driver’s side (4 R.R. at 22, 34). Appellant told Robert, “give me your
15
fucking keys to your car or I’m going to hurt your daughter” (4 R.R. at 33,
93, 95, 100). After Robert gave Appellant the keys, Appellant started to
get inside the car, but Robert slammed the car door on him (4 R.R. at 22,
26, 36, 40, 97). Appellant aborted his efforts at this point, however “the
fact that the deprivation later became temporary does not automatically
mean there was no intent to deprive permanently . . .” Griffin, 614 S.W.2d
at 159.
In the Griffin case, the appellant hailed a taxi cab driven by the
victim and got inside, became upset at the victim, pointed a gun at the
victim, and then the victim exited the cab and ran away. Griffin,
614 S.W.2d at 156. Appellant drove away in the cab and was arrested
about fifteen minutes later; the car had been parked about a mile away.
Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals found evidence of intent to deprive
sufficient to support the conviction. Id. at 159. The Court also noted that
the issue of intent was contested and the appellant might have been
entitled to an instruction on temporary use, but he failed to request one.
Id. at 160. But the facts of Griffin are distinguishable because the vehicle
was a taxi, which is generally a vehicle of temporary usage, and the
16
appellant’s words and actions indicated that he sought to use the cab for
that sole purpose.
In this case, however, Appellant’s reference to his family was vague
and did not support Appellant’s argument on appeal that he only needed
the vehicle temporarily to assist his family. Rather, Appellant sought to
take a personal vehicle from the victim, and threatened to hurt the
victim’s daughter if the victim did not give him the keys. Thus, the record
contains no evidentiary support that Appellant sought only the
temporary use of the vehicle. “Based on appellant’s actions and conduct
at the time, including his use of physical force, the jury would have had
ample evidence from which to infer that appellant intended to
permanently deprive [the victim] of his car.” Williams v. State,
Nos. 01-03-01295-CR, 01-03-01296-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2059,
at *25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] March 17, 20015, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (citing Flores v. State, 888 S.W.2d 187, 191
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (noting that “intent
to deprive” element of auto theft is not proved when all evidence
presented indicates it was taken for temporary use); Baum v. State,
848 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no pet.);
17
also citing Rowland v. State, 744 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
(noting intent to permanently deprive can be inferred from manner in
which property is taken)); Griffin. 614 S.W.2d at 155 (holding evidence
sufficient to prove intent to permanently deprive, where defendant stole
taxicab at gunpoint, despite fact that defendant only drove a few miles).
In conclusion, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict, Appellant’s actions and words were sufficient evidence from
which a rational trier of fact could have inferred an intent to permanently
deprive the victim of his property. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912. This
issue should be denied.
18
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant’s trial was without reversible error. The State prays that
Appellant’s conviction and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL JOHNSON
Criminal District Attorney
Denton County, Texas
CATHERINE LUFT
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Chief, Appellate Division
/s/ Andrea R. Simmons
ANDREA R. SIMMONS
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 24053478
1450 East McKinney, Suite 3100
Denton, Texas 76209
(940) 349-2600
FAX (940) 349-2751
andrea.simmons@dentoncounty.com
19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The State certifies that the State’s Brief in the instant cause
contained a word count of 3177, said count being generated by the
computer program Microsoft Word that was used to prepare the
document.
/s/ Andrea R. Simmons
ANDREA R. SIMMONS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true copy of the State’s brief has been sent by electronic service
through efile.txcourts.gov notification, to counsel for Appellant,
Grace Wren, LAW OFFICE OF TIM POWERS, 215 West Oak, Denton,
Texas 76201, at grace@timpowers.com, on this, the 1st day of June 2018.
/s/ Andrea R. Simmons
ANDREA R. SIMMONS
20