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Timothy Bill Sahs v. State ( 2006 )


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  • In The

    Court of Appeals

    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


    ______________________________


    No. 06-05-00123-CR

    ______________________________



    TIMOTHY BILL SAHS, Appellant

     

    V.

     

    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


                                                  


    On Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court

    Lamar County, Texas

    Trial Court No. 15374


                                                     




    Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss



    MEMORANDUM OPINION


                In 1994, Timothy Bill Sahs and a confederate stole an automobile in Lamar County. When it appeared they would be caught, they set the car on fire, which spread to and damaged a county-owned bridge. After being convicted of both theft and arson, Sahs was sentenced, in a separate case, to confinement for the arson and, in this case, to ten years' community supervision for the theft. In addition to some common conditions, including regularly reporting to his community supervision officer, Sahs' community supervision was conditioned on his making monthly restitution payments to Lamar County for the cost of the burned bridge.

                In 1998, Sahs figuratively burned his own bridge when he violated several conditions of his community supervision. In 1999, the State moved to revoke Sahs' community supervision alleging that he failed to submit monthly report forms to the community supervision and corrections department and also failed to make monthly payments on court costs, restitution, and court-appointed attorney's fees. Sahs was not apprehended until he was stopped for speeding in 2005, after the period of his community supervision expired. Sahs appeals from the May 26, 2005, revocation of his community supervision and the resulting judgment, which imposes a seven-year sentence and an order for Sahs to pay $22,065.00 in restitution to Lamar County.

                Sahs' attorney has filed an appellate brief in which he concludes, after a review of the record and the related law, the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief contains a professional evaluation of the record and contains two points of error that arguably support reversal. This meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

                Counsel  provided  a  copy  of  his  brief  to  Sahs  November  14,  2005.  Sahs  has  not  filed a pro se response to his counsel's Anders brief, nor has the State filed a response.

                Counsel's brief first discusses the trial court's jurisdiction, the adequacy of pretrial proceedings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the effective assistance of trial counsel. The brief appropriately dismisses those subjects because they contain no arguable issues. Then counsel raises two arguable issues: (1) whether the State was diligent in prosecuting Sahs on its motion to revoke, and (2) whether it was permissible to condition Sahs' community supervision on his paying restitution to Lamar County.

    1.         There Is No Evidence the Motion to Revoke Was Not Prosecuted Diligently

                Because the revocation hearing was held after Sahs' community supervision expired and one of the bases for revocation was failure to report, we address the issue of due diligence. But because there is no evidence of lack of due diligence on the part of the State—in fact there is affirmative evidence that Sahs absconded from supervision not withstanding the State's efforts to locate him—we conclude the State's motion was diligently prosecuted. See Wheat v. State, 165 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd).

    2.         Impermissibly Conditioning Sahs' Community Supervision on Paying Restitution to Lamar County Is Not Appealable and Is Harmless Error

                One of the conditions of Sahs' community supervision was his paying restitution of $29,000.00, an amount which is obviously for Lamar County's bridge burned as a result of Sahs' arson offense, which was charged in a separate case—not for the private citizen's automobile which was the object of the theft involved in this case and supporting the community supervision.

                A condition of community supervision imposed at the time of the original sentencing is not appealable with a judgment revoking that community supervision, unless the condition had been objected to when it was originally imposed. Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hull v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). There is no evidence any objection was made at the time the condition was originally imposed. The condition of community supervision that Sahs pay restitution to Lamar County is not now properly appealable.

                Even if it had been appealable, the error would be harmless. While restitution may be ordered as a condition of community supervision, it may not be ordered paid to anyone other than the victim of the crime charged in the case. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 676–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (limiting terms of community supervision restitution to "the victim"). As such, conditioning Sahs' community supervision on his paying restitution to Lamar County was improper.

                But because Sahs' community supervision was revoked on sufficiently established bases other than his failure to pay restitution, such error was harmless. Therefore, it would not be reversible error, even if it had been appealable.

    3.         The Portion of the Judgment Requiring Sahs to Pay Restitution to the County Is Without Authority

                The judgment revoking Sahs' community supervision and sentencing him also requires his payment to Lamar County of the restitution remaining unpaid. While restitution may be ordered in conjunction with a criminal sentence, it is limited to a "victim of the offense." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). That language is equivalent to the community supervision limitation set out in Article 42.12, Section 11(b) mentioned above. Therefore, ordering restitution to Lamar County, though of praiseworthy intent, was unauthorized and, therefore, error.             When an error can be corrected by modifying a judgment, we are authorized to do that. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2 (b); see Hankins v. State, No. 03-04-00018-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6465 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 10, 2005, no pet. h.).

                After our review of the record, we agree with appellate counsel that Sahs' revocation and sentence is without reversible error and that the arguable issues counsel has raised are not meritorious. But—because the trial court's judgment, without authority, orders Sahs to pay restitution to Lamar County, not to the victim of the theft for which Sahs was convicted in this case—we modify the judgment by striking the order that Sahs pay restitution of $22,065.00 to Lamar County, and affirm the judgment as modified. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw as Sahs' counsel.

     

                                                                                        Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                        Chief Justice


    Date Submitted:          February 3, 2006

    Date Decided:             February 10, 2006


    Do Not Publish

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    In The

      Court of Appeals

                            Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

     

                                                    ______________________________

     

                                                                 No. 06-10-00147-CR

                                                    ______________________________

     

     

                                     WILLIE KELTON TAYLOR, Appellant

     

                                                                    V.

     

                                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

     

     

                                                                                                     Â

     

     

                                           On Appeal from the 217th Judicial District Court

                                                               Angelina County, Texas

                                                             Trial Court No. CR-28819

     

                                                                                                      

     

     

     

                                              Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

                                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

     

                Following a major vehicle collision, Willie Kelton Taylor was charged in the same indictment for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and intoxication assault.  Taylor was found guilty of both offenses in the 217th Judicial District Court of Angelina County.[1]  After pleading “true” to an enhancement paragraph, Taylor was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.  As to intoxication assault, the trial court imposed the following sentence:

    UPON COMPLETION OF THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I, THEN DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED AS FOLLOWS FOR COUNT II AND THE SENTENCE BEGINS UPON DEFENDANT’S RELEASE ON PAROLE OR OTHERWISE, FROM TDCJ-INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION IN COUNT I: TEN (10) YEARS INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, TDCJ, PROBATED FOR TEN (10) YEARS.

     

    Taylor contends the consecutive sentence is void.  The State, with professional candor, concedes that the trial court erred in “stacking” the sentences.[2]  We modify the judgment, and we affirm the modified judgment.

                Generally, a trial court has authority to order sentences to run concurrently or consecutively.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 2010).  However, a trial court’s discretion is limited by Section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code, which reads:

    When the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single criminal action, a sentence for each offense for which he has been found guilty shall be pronounced.  Except as provided by Subsection (b), the sentences shall run concurrently.[3] 

     

    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03 (Vernon Supp. 2010); LaPorte v. State, 840 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Jackson v. State, 157 S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.).  “If the facts show the proceeding is a single criminal action based on charges arising out of the same criminal episode, the trial court may not order consecutive sentences.”  LaPorte, 840 S.W.2d at 415.  In this case, there is no question that both offenses arose from the same criminal episode, culminating in the vehicle collision. The consecutive sentence was unlawful. Id.; see Robbins v. State, 914 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).  The proper remedy for an improper cumulation order is to delete the cumulation order.  Beedy, 250 S.W.3d at 113. 

                The State suggests that we consider whether Taylor was required to object at trial to the consecutive sentence in order to preserve error.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court have held that a contemporaneous objection is not required to preserve a claim of error for an improper cumulation order.  LaPorte, 840 S.W.2d at 415; Jackson, 157 S.W.3d at 517.

                Accordingly, we modify the judgment to delete the language cumulating the sentences.  As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

     

                           

     

                                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                                        Justice

     

    Date Submitted:          December 6, 2010      

    Date Decided:             December 7, 2010

     

    Do Not Publish          

     

     


    [1]Originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts.  See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005). We are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue.  See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.

     

    [2]This was not a plea bargain case, and the State does not otherwise contend there was a voluntary waiver of the right to concurrent sentences.  See Ex parte McJunkins, 954 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that a defendant may waive a claim of error regarding a cumulation order by entering a binding negotiated plea agreement).  Here, the cumulative sentence is not classified as a reversible error, but is an unlawful order.  Beedy v. State, 250 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

     

    [3]Subsection (b) allows consecutive sentences if “each” of the convictions is for intoxication manslaughter or intoxication assault.  Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 3.03(b)(1)(A).  Here, one of the convictions was for aggravated assault, and subsection (b) does not apply to Taylor’s case.