Michael W. Peters v. State ( 2016 )

Opinion issued March 15, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00130-CR
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MICHAEL W. PETERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 176th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1413407
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court convicted Michael W. Peters of possession with intent to
deliver more than four grams and less than 200 grams of methamphetamine,1 and
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TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.112(a), (d) (West 2010).
assessed his punishment at ten years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In one issue, appellant complains that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the State did not prove
that the deputy conducted the inventory search according to standard police
procedure. We affirm.
Background
Deputy K. Cornelius with the Harris County Precinct 3 Constable’s Office
stopped appellant for driving with an expired registration sticker. After he learned
that there were six open warrants for appellant’s arrest, Deputy Cornelius arrested
appellant and called a tow truck to pick up appellant’s vehicle. The deputy then
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Cornelius testified that when a driver is
arrested and his vehicle is towed, Precinct 3’s policy requires the arresting officer to
“conduct an inventory of the vehicle for any valuable property.” The purpose of the
inventory search is to safeguard the arrested person’s property, and to protect the
deputy from any accusations of wrongdoing. According to the deputy, Precinct 3’s
inventory policy requires the arresting officer to complete a “carbon copy tow slip
form,” listing any pertinent or valuable property found within the vehicle, including
property found inside any unsecured or unlocked containers. A copy of the inventory
policy was admitted into evidence.
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Deputy Cornelius testified that he filled out the tow slip and that his search
complied with Precinct 3’s inventory search policy. When asked if he found any
valuables in the vehicle, Deputy Cornelius testified that he recalled there being some
speakers in the back of the vehicle, but he could not recall anything else without
looking at the tow slip.
During the inventory search, Deputy Cornelius found a glass pipe wrapped up
in a towel inside the vehicle’s unlocked center console. Based on his training and
experience, the deputy concluded that the pipe contained fresh methamphetamine
residue. Deputy Cornelius testified that, at that point, his inventory search also
became a probable cause search of the vehicle for any other narcotics. While
conducting his dual-purpose search, the deputy found a small, unlocked, safe on the
back seat of the vehicle that contained five clear plastic baggies with a crystal-like
substance he later determined to be methamphetamine, a digital scale, baggies with
assorted types of pills, a baggie with a green leafy substance that smelled of
marijuana, and a baggie with a rolled cigarette that smelled of burnt marijuana. On
cross-examination, Deputy Cornelius expressly denied that he was “searching for
drugs because [he] knew [appellant] was on parole for methamphetamine,” and he
testified, “[i]n the beginning I was conducting an inventory of the vehicle’s
contents.”
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The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress without issuing any
findings of fact or conclusions of law. Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
bargain with the State. The trial court found appellant guilty and, in accordance with
appellant’s plea agreement, assessed his punishment at ten years’ incarceration.
Discussion
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the State failed to demonstrate that Deputy Cornelius complied with
Precinct 3’s inventory policy. According to appellant, the trial court could not have
reasonably determined that Deputy Cornelius conducted a valid inventory search
because the deputy omitted valuable items from his inventory, and the descriptions
of the items he did include lacked the detail and specificity required by the policy.2
Specifically, appellant argues that the tow slip, which generally identifies the
vehicle’s contents as a “cell phone,” a “bag of change,” “misc clothes,” and “misc
tools,” does not include the two speakers, the towel, the pipe, or the safe and its
contents.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We
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The policy requires that the deputy maintain “detailed notes as to the type, amount,
and disposition of the [arrested person’s] property.”
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review the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, and review
de novo the court’s application of the law to the facts. See id. When, as in this case,
the trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, we must infer the necessary
findings that support the trial court’s ruling if the record supports the implied
findings. State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The
trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007). The trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve any part or all
of a witness’s testimony. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A trial court ruling will be sustained if it is reasonably supported by the record and
correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854,
857 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
A police officer’s inventory of the contents of an automobile is permissible
under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, section 9 of the Texas Constitution
if the inventory search is conducted pursuant to a lawful impoundment of the vehicle.
Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref’d); see also Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, no pet.). Inventory searches have several legitimate purposes, including
protecting: (1) the owner’s property while it is in police custody, (2) the police
against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and (3) the police from
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potential danger. See Moskey, 333 S.W.3d at 700. To be legal, an inventory search
must be conducted in good faith and pursuant to reasonable, standardized police
procedure. Id. The search cannot be a “ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence.” Id. (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110
S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990)). The State has the burden of establishing the legality of an
inventory search and it can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that: (1) an
inventory policy exists, and (2) the officer followed the policy. Moskey, 333 S.W.3d
at 700. An officer’s testimony, standing alone, can be sufficient to meet this burden.
See Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998,
pet. ref’d) (holding that officer’s testimony regarding substance of inventory policy
and procedure used was sufficient to show that policy existed and was followed).
B. Analysis
Deputy Cornelius testified that when a driver is arrested and his vehicle is
towed, Precinct 3’s policy requires the arresting officer to search the vehicle and list
on a tow slip any valuable property found in the vehicle, including items found inside
any unsecured or unlocked containers. He also testified that after he called for a tow
truck, he began to inventory the contents of appellant’s vehicle by filling out a tow
slip form provided by the Constable’s office. While conducting his inventory search,
the deputy discovered a methamphetamine pipe inside the vehicle’s unlocked center
console that prompted him to search the vehicle for other narcotics and, in doing so,
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he found an unlocked safe containing five baggies of methamphetamine. Deputy
Cornelius also testified that, until he found the methamphetamine pipe, he was only
searching the vehicle in order to inventory its contents.
This testimony is sufficient to establish that an inventory policy existed, and
that Deputy Cornelius conducted the inventory search in good faith and pursuant to
the policy. See Josey, 981 S.W.2d at 843 (holding that officer’s testimony regarding
substance of inventory policy and procedure used was sufficient to show that policy
existed and was followed). Although the inventory list does not strictly comply with
the policy, strict compliance is not required in order for a search to be lawful. See
Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 (stating that inventory searches need not be
conducted in “totally mechanical ‘all or nothing’ fashion”); Greer v. State, 436
S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, no pet.) (holding that omission of gun and
bullet from inventory and failure to itemize items of clothing were insufficient to
establish that trial court abused its discretion by determining that inventory search
was lawful); see also United States v. Garreau, 658 F.3d 854, 858 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that minor deviations from inventory policy are insufficient to render search
unlawful). We further note that inventory searches are intended to protect a
defendant’s property while the items are in police custody and to protect the police
from undue complaints, and there has been no suggestion of any irregularity with
regard to the handling of appellant’s property.
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As the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility, the trial court
could have reasonably found based on the deputy’s testimony and the policy that
despite the list’s deficiencies, there was sufficient evidence establishing that the
inventory search was not a pretext to search for narcotics. Cf. State v. Stauder, 264
S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d) (affirming suppression
when trial court could have concluded that inventory search was ruse based on
officers’ complete failure to fill out any inventory form as required).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied appellant’s motion to suppress because the trial court could have reasonably
determined that the inventory search was lawful.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Russell Lloyd
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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