Ron Devor Barrett v. State ( 2017 )

ACCEPTED
12-16-00289-CR
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
11/28/2017 6:39 PM
Pam Estes
CLERK
CAUSE NO. 12-16-00289-CR
IN THE 12th DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS TYLER, TEXAS
11/28/2017 6:39:33 PM
RON DEVOR BARRETT, PAM ESTES
Clerk
APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
D. Matt Bingham
Criminal District Attorney
Smith County, Texas
Sarah K. Bales Mikkelsen
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Bar I.D. No. 24087139
Smith County Courthouse
100 N. Broadway
Tyler, Texas 75702
ph: (903) 590-1720
fax: (903) 590-1719
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S POINTS OF ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
COUNTERPOINT: BARRETT DID NOT CONFESS TO THE CHARGED
CONDUCT, SO HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE
OF PROPERTY INSTRUCTIONS. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
REFUSED TO INCLUDE THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, THERE IS NO
NEED TO CONDUCT HARM ANALYSES.
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
APPLICABLE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTE/RULES PAGE
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (West 2015)
art. 36.14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Tex. Penal Code Ann. (West 2015)
§ 22.01 (a)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tex. R. App. P.
9.4 (i)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
STATE CASES PAGE
Clifton v. State, 21 S.W.3d 906
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ex parte Nailor, 105 S.W.3d 272
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ex Parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim
Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Holloman v. State, 948 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, CONTINUED
STATE CASES PAGE
Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 12
Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 11
Rodriguez v. State, 392 S.W.3d 859
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8
iv
CAUSE NO. 12-16-00289-CR
IN THE 12th DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
RON DEVOR BARRETT,
APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF
The State of Texas respectfully urges this Court to overrule appellant
Ron Barrett’s alleged errors and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 20, 2015, Ron Devor Barrett was charged by information
with misdemeanor assault family violence in Cause No. 002-83264-15, filed
in County Court at Law #2, Smith County, Texas. Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 22.01 (a)(1) (West 2015); (1 C.R. at 2). Barrett retained Clifton Roberson to
represent him and pleaded not guilty. (1 C.R. at 4, 67.) On October 18, 2016,
the jury convicted Barrett and sentenced him to six months’ confinement in the
county jail, with a $2,000 fine. (C.R. at 44.) On June 28, 2017, the court
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appointed appellate counsel Austin Jackson. (Supp. C.R. at 1.) He filed a brief
on October 12, 2017, and the State’s response is due by November 28, 2017.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 2015, Tiffany Pinkerton begrudgingly drove to an
auto shop in Tyler to return the Suburban that Ron Barrett had loaned
her earlier that fall. (2 R.R. at 157.) Incensed over losing access to Barrett’s
vehicle, Pinkerton stepped out with a combination axe/sledgehammer
and began to attack the hood. (2 R.R. at 161.) At some point after Barrett
disarmed Pinkerton, he repeatedly punched her in the face with a closed fist.
(2 R.R. at 163; 3 R.R. at 30.) From across the street, Jeffrey Hayes watched
as Barrett doggedly pursued his victim down the street, kicking, punching,
and choking her when she tried to escape. (3 R.R. at 46, 51.) After
Officer Robert Main arrived in response to Hayes’s 911 call, Barrett angrily
complained about the property damage to his Suburban. (2 R.R. at 216.) And
while he acknowledged that they fought after he took the axe from Pinkerton,
Barrett never admitted to striking or injuring her. (2 R.R. at 217, 222.)
At trial, Barrett did not take the stand. However, his friend,
Cedric Nobles, claimed that Barrett was trying to protect himself when he
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grabbed Pinkerton during their initial struggle over the axe. (3 R.R. at 75, 80.)
However, Nobles never indicated that Barrett struck or injured Pinkerton.
What’s more, he denied seeing or hearing any aspect of the second incident.
(3 R.R. at 82.) And according to Pinkerton, the deep gash over her forehead
was caused not by being punched, but by the axe striking her during their
initial struggle. (3 R.R. at 90.) In fact, she maintained that Barrett did not
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause her injuries. (2 R.R. at 202.)
Beyond that, Pinkerton claimed not to remember whether he had kicked, hit,
or choked her during the second incident. (3 R.R. at 91.) Instead, she merely
acknowledged that he laid hands on her after she took a swing at him.
(3 R.R. at 91, 100.)
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S POINTS OF ERROR
COUNTERPOINT: BARRETT DID NOT CONFESS TO THE CHARGED CONDUCT, SO HE WAS
NOT ENTITLED TO SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
INSTRUCTIONS. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
INCLUDE THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, THERE IS NO NEED TO
CONDUCT HARM ANALYSES.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In his first and second issues, Barrett complains about the trial court’s
refusal to include his requested self-defense and defense of property
instructions in the jury charge. To be entitled to either of these instructions, he
must have admitted to the act alleged in the information—that he
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly injured Tiffany Pinkerton by striking her
with his hands. Instead, Barrett claimed that Pinkerton was accidentally injured
by the axe. Therefore, the confession and avoidance doctrine was not satisfied,
and he was not entitled to his requested instructions.
Finally, Barrett complains in his third ground that he was harmed by the
trial court’s failure to include his requested instructions. But the trial court’s
refusal to include the instructions was proper, and harm analyses are only
conducted if there is charge error.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. The standard of review for when a trial court improperly denies a
requested instruction depends on whether the defendant preserved error.
On appeal, the court reviews alleged charge error by considering
(1) whether error existed in the charge; and (2) whether sufficient harm
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resulted from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In cases where the evidence fails to raise a defensive
issue, the trial court commits no error in refusing a requested instruction, and
the reviewing court will not conduct a harm analysis. Id. at 743;
Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435, 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
When the trial court improperly refuses a requested instruction, the
degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant
preserved the error by objection. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. Under Almanza, jury
charge error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the
charge and the reviewing court finds “some harm” to his rights. Ibid. However,
when the defendant either fails to object or affirmatively states that he has no
objection to the charge, reversal is not required unless the error caused the
defendant “egregious harm.” Id. at 743-44.
2. Barrett properly preserved his jury charge complaints for appellate
review. Therefore, reversal will be required if this Court finds charge
error that caused “some harm” to his rights.
In his argument, Barrett expresses concern that the Court will find that
he failed to preserve error because (1) he did not submit his charge objections
in writing; and (2) the State’s proposed jury charge is not included in the
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record. (Appellant Br. at 5.) But his lawyer clearly explained his requests for
self-defense and defense of property instructions, and the trial court even
suspended the charge conference so that the lawyers could research and
present case law in support of their respective positions. (3 R.R. at 111, 119.)
Additionally, the record is clear that the State’s original proposed jury charge
contained self-defense instructions, and the requirement that charge objections
be in writing is satisfied if they are “dictated to the court reporter in the
presence of the court and the State’s counsel, before the reading of the court’s
charge to the jury.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (West 2015).
Therefore, the State concedes that Barrett properly preserved his objections to
the jury charge.
B. APPLICABLE LAW
1. A defendant must satisfy the confession and avoidance doctrine before
he is entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense.
Before an instruction on self-defense is warranted, the defendant has the
burden of coming forward with evidence that sufficiently raises the issue.
Clifton v. State, 21 S.W.3d 906, 907 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d).
Under the confession and avoidance doctrine, a self-defense instruction is only
6
appropriate when the defendant admits to every element of the offense,
including the culpable mental state, but introduces a justification that excuses
the otherwise criminal conduct. Ex Parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). Once this burden is met, the defendant has the right to a
self-defense instruction, whether the evidence is “weak or strong, unimpeached
or contradicted, and regardless of what the trial court may or may not think
about the credibility of the evidence.” Ibid. But if the evidence, viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant, does not establish self-defense, the
defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the issue. Ibid.
2. A defendant must satisfy the confession and avoidance doctrine before
he is entitled to a jury instruction on defense of property.
Like self-defense, defense of property is a confession-and-avoidance type
of defense in which a defendant claims that his conduct was immediately
necessary to prevent a crime against his property. Rodriguez v. State,
392 S.W.3d 859, 860-61 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.). But before he
is entitled to use the defense, he must admit to committing the act with the
requisite culpable mental state. Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). By definition, a justification defense does not rest upon the
7
negation of a specific element of the charged offense, but instead excuses what
would otherwise constitute criminal conduct. Rodriguez, 392 S.W.3d at 861.
C. ARGUMENT
1. Barrett’s case is distinguished from Holloman.
In his brief, Barrett cites Holloman v. State in support of his argument
that a defendant charged with assault is not required to admit to the “exact
manner and means alleged” to be entitled to a defensive instruction.
(Appellant Br. at 10.) But in that case, Holloman took the stand and admitted
to fighting with his wife, so the Seventh Court of Appeals found “evidence in
the record from which it could reasonably be said that he conceded striking
her.” Holloman v. State, 948 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no
pet.). In fact, the only real question in that case seemed to concern whether
Holloman injured his wife using his legs or hands. Ibid.
This case bears little resemblance to Holloman, because Barrett never
admitted to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly injuring Pinkerton.
(2 R.R. at 150, 202, 222; 3 R.R. at 149.) Instead, his defense consistently
maintained that Pinkerton’s injuries were caused by accident when she was
struck with the axe. (2 R.R. at 150; 3 R.R. at 90, 149.) By denying the
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applicable culpable mental state, Barrett’s discrepancies with the charges
against him extend well beyond mere quibbles over the “exact manner and
means alleged.” Consequently, Holloman is inapplicable.
2. In Ex parte Nailor, the defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense
but denied the act that the State alleged caused his victim’s injury
(striking her with his hand). As a result, the confession and avoidance
doctrine was not satisfied, and he was not entitled to a charge
instruction on necessity.
Another case clearly answers the question of whether Barrett was entitled
to his requested charge instructions. In that case, the State charged
Mark Nailor with misdemeanor assault after he punched his girlfriend,
Ella Vines. Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). At
trial, the defendant denied punching Vines and instead provided a version of
events that bore little resemblance to the charges laid out in the information.
Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). According to
Nailor, he raised his arms to protect himself when Vines raised a brass eagle
over her head and threatened him. Ex parte Nailor, 105 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). When he knocked the eagle out of her hands, Nailor claimed
that it accidentally struck and injured her face. Ibid.
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Based on Nailor’s testimony, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded
that he “did not, at least overtly, rely on the law of self-defense; he testified to
the lack of a culpable mens rea, and he denied that the act the State alleged as
causing her injury—striking Ella with his hand—was, in fact, the cause of her
injury.” Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In
other words, because Nailor’s position was that the victim was accidentally
injured and that he did not strike the victim with his hand as alleged by the
State, his defense was “more in the nature of a denial of two of the State’s
alleged elements, rather than an admission of those elements with a legal
justification for them.” Ibid. Therefore, Nailor was not entitled to a jury
instruction on the defense of necessity. Ibid.
3. In this case, Barrett claimed that he acted in self-defense and defense of
property. However, he denied the act that the State alleged caused his
victim’s injury (striking Pinkerton with his hand). As a result, the
confession and avoidance doctrine was not satisfied, and he was not
entitled to charge instructions on self-defense and defense of property.
The circumstances of Nailor and Barrett’s crimes are remarkably similar,
and this Court should likewise conclude that the trial court properly refused to
include Barrett’s requested instructions in the jury charge based on the
following:
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• Like Nailor, Barrett was charged by information with misdemeanor assault
for intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing bodily injury by striking
the victim with his hands. Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132-33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); (1 C.R. at 2).
• Like Nailor, Barrett’s defense denied that striking Pinkerton with his hand
caused her injury. Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 132-33 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004); (3 R.R. at 90).
• Like Nailor, Barrett’s position was that the victim was accidentally injured,
caused by the struggle over the axe. In that way, his defense was akin to a
denial of two of the State’s alleged elements, rather than an admission of
those elements backed by a legal justification for them. Ibid.
• Like Nailor, Barrett denied committing the charged offense when he denied
having the requisite intent or committing the act alleged in the information.
Ibid.
• Like Nailor, Barrett was not entitled to his requested charge instructions
because he failed to satisfy the confession and avoidance doctrine.
4. The trial court properly denied Barrett’s requested charge instructions,
so there is no need for harm analyses.
In his third and final point of error, Barrett complains that he was
harmed by the trial court’s refusal to submit his requested self-defense and
defense of property instructions. But in Ngo, the Court of Criminal Appeals
explained that it conducts a harm analysis only if it has already concluded that
the trial court committed charge error. Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. As previously
established, the trial court did not commit charge error because Barrett was not
11
entitled to his requested instructions after he denied committing the charged
offense. Therefore, there is no need for harm analyses, and Barrett’s third and
final point of error should be overruled. See Kunkle, 771 S.W.2d at 444.
CONCLUSION
In his first two issues, Barrett complains that the trial court erred when
it denied his requests for self-defense and defense of property instructions in
the jury charge. Although a defendant is entitled to a charge instruction on any
defensive issue raised by the evidence, certain conditions must be met.
Granger v. State, 3 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). First, the defendant
must admit not only to the act, but also to the requisite mental state. Juarez,
308 S.W.3d at 406. Therefore, Barrett was required to admit that he
intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly injured Tiffany Pinkerton by striking
her with his hand. But Barrett never admitted to striking Pinkerton with his
hand, and he contended that her injury was caused accidentally during a
struggle over the axe. As a consequence, the confession and avoidance doctrine
was not satisfied and Barrett was not entitled to self-defense and defense of
property instructions. Because the trial court properly refused to submit the
12
requested instructions, there is no need for a harm analysis. In conclusion, each
of Barrett’s three points of error is without merit and should be overruled.
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PRAYER
The State asks the Court to overrule Ron Barrett’s three points of error
and affirm the judgment of County Court at Law #2, Smith County, Texas.
Respectfully submitted,
D. Matt Bingham
Smith County Criminal District Attorney
Sarah K. Bales Mikkelsen
Asst. Criminal District Attorney
Bar No. 24087139
100 N. Broadway, 4th Fl.
Tyler, Texas 75702
(903) 590-1720
(903) 590-1719 (fax)
smikkelsen@smith-county.com
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 (i)(3), this
document contains 3,247 words.
Sarah K. Bales Mikkelsen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On November 28, 2017, the following have been completed:
(1) The original legible copy of the State’s Response to Appellant’s Brief in
the above numbered cause has been sent via electronic filing to the
Clerk of the Court of Twelfth Court of Appeals.
(2) A legible copy of the State’s Response to Appellant’s Brief in the above
numbered cause has been sent has been sent via electronic filing to
Austin Jackson at JLawAppeals@gmail.com
Sarah K. Bales Mikkelsen
Asst. Criminal District Attorney
Bar No. 24087139
100 N. Broadway, 4th Fl.
Tyler, Texas 75702
(903) 590-1720
(903) 590-1719 (fax)
smikkelsen@smith-county.com
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