Mitchell Sean Babineaux v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-21-00085-CR
___________________________
MITCHELL SEAN BABINEAUX, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1659321
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
In a single point, Appellant Mitchell Sean Babineaux challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to support a conviction for misdemeanor “assault[–]bodily injury to a
family member or household member or [person] with whom [he] had a dating
relationship.” We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s
conviction and therefore affirm the judgment.
II. Procedural and Factual Background
Appellant was charged by information with assaulting Complainant with whom
he was in a dating relationship. A jury found Appellant guilty of the offense and
assessed his punishment at ninety days’ confinement and no fine. The jury also
recommended that the sentence be probated. The trial court pronounced a sentence
of ninety days’ confinement in the Tarrant County Jail and then suspended the
sentence and placed Appellant on community supervision for twenty-four months.
The following bullet points paraphrase and supplement a similar itemized list in
the State’s brief that details the evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction for assault:
• Shortly after Complainant met Appellant, they began dating.
• Complainant moved in with Appellant within a couple of months after they
began dating.
• A few months into the relationship, Complainant and Appellant went out for
dinner and drinks with friends to celebrate a friend’s birthday.
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• While they were at a bar, Appellant became angry with Complainant for
dancing with a friend. Appellant left the bar and returned home without
Complainant.
• When Complainant returned home, she was locked out of the house and had
to beat on the front door to wake Appellant so that he would let her in.
• Appellant awoke and opened the front door, and Complainant pushed her
way into the house.
• Once inside, Complainant and Appellant began arguing in the master
bedroom.
• Complainant laid down on the bed during the argument, and Appellant
turned the mattress over.
• While Complainant was sitting on the floor, Appellant grabbed her by the
back of her hair and wrapped his hand around her hair to obtain a solid grip.
• Appellant pulled Complainant across the carpet in the bedroom into the
kitchen, a distance of approximately ten feet.
• Complainant put one hand down on the ground in an attempt to stop
Appellant from pulling her; she used her other hand to grab Appellant’s wrist.
• Complainant grabbed at Appellant’s wrist in an effort to alleviate the pain
caused by Appellant’s dragging her by her hair.
• Complainant felt that Appellant had acted intentionally in dragging her by the
hair.
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• Complainant received a scratch on her wrist when she was attempting to get
Appellant to stop dragging her.
• While Appellant dragged her, a few of the artificial nails that Complainant was
wearing were torn off.
• When one of the artificial nails was torn off, it also pulled off Complainant’s
real fingernail.
• Complainant’s real fingernail was pulled off down to the nailbed, causing
Complainant’s finger to bleed.
• Complainant was in pain when her fingernails were torn off, and the pain
continued for weeks after the assault.
• Due to Appellant’s pulling Complainant’s hair, her head was sore for a week
or two after the assault.
• Complainant felt that her arms had been bruised while being dragged.
• Following the assault, blood was found on the door leading from the house to
the garage; Complainant stated that the blood was from having her fingernails
torn off.
• Appellant testified that Complainant had assaulted him; that he had grabbed
Complainant to stop the assault; and that he had never touched her hair,
dragged her, or assaulted her.
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III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found
the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at
2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute
our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine
whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative
force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569
S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the
evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
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in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at
608.
To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,
622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568,
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The essential elements of an offense are determined by
state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the
State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which
the defendant was tried. Hammack, 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the
indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging
instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
see Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads
a specific element of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element,
the sufficiency of the evidence will be measured by the element that was actually
pleaded[] and not any alternative statutory elements.”). A victim’s testimony is
sufficient, in and of itself, to provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See
Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
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B. Elements of the Offense
Appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor assault under Penal Code
Section 22.01(a)(1), which sets out the elements of the offense: “[a] person commits
an offense if the person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily
injury to another, including the person’s spouse.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1).
There is sufficient evidence to support each element of the offense.
1. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant was the
one who committed the charged offense.
“The State must prove that the accused is the person who committed the crime
charged” and may do so by means of direct or circumstantial evidence. Bin Fang v.
State, 544 S.W.3d 923, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.).
Complainant identified Appellant in open court and testified that he was the person
who had assaulted her.
2. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant acted
with the necessary culpable mental state.
In accordance with the elements of the offense stated in Section 22.01(a)(1) of
the Penal Code, the information in this case charged that Appellant “did intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to” Complainant. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 22.01(a)(1). The jury charge conformed to both the Penal Code and the
information by stating that “a person commits the offense of assault if the person
intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” See id.Moreover, the charge defined the statutory term “knowingly” as follows: “[a] person
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acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Thus, the charge
properly defined “knowingly” and highlighted the fact that assault is a result-oriented
offense:
“Assault by causing bodily injury is a result-oriented offense.” Darkins v.
State, 430 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.
ref’d); see also Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Accordingly, the State had to prove that appellant caused the
result of bodily injury with the requisite culpable mental state. See
Darkins, 430 S.W.3d at 565. A person acts knowingly with respect to the
result of the person’s conduct when the person is aware that the conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result. Tex. Penal Code [Ann.]
§ 6.03(b). Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on
circumstantial evidence. Gilder v. State, 469 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Lane v. State, 763
S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)); see also Balderas[ v. State], 517
S.W.3d [756,] 766 [(Tex. Crim. App. 2016)]. Intent may be inferred from
appellant’s words, acts, and conduct. See Gilder, 469 S.W.3d at 639.
Bin Fang, 544 S.W.3d at 928.
The record contains sufficient evidence to support an inference that Appellant
acted knowingly in his action of wrapping his hand around Complainant’s hair and
dragging her across the floor. A jury could clearly infer from this act that Appellant
was aware that his conduct would be reasonably certain to cause bodily injury to
Complainant.
Appellant claimed that he did not commit the assault. That denial left the issue
of whether the assault occurred as one for the jury to resolve, and the jury decided it
adversely to Appellant—as it was free to do. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614
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(Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Because the evidence—when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict—supports the jury’s finding that the assault took place and
because the act of assault itself supports an inference that Appellant acted knowingly,
the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant acted with the necessary culpable
mental state.
3. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant caused
bodily injury to Complainant.
The only argument that Appellant raises regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the bodily-injury element of the offense is that “[t]here is no
evidence that [Complainant] suffered any pain from the incident.” This conclusory
argument ignores both the standard for determining bodily injury and the evidence
contained in the record.
For purposes of the Texas Penal Code,
“[b]odily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition. [Tex. Penal Code Ann.] § 1.07(8) . . . . “Any physical
pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury.” Garcia v.
State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Evidence of a cut or
bruise is sufficient to show bodily injury. . . . Bin Fang . . . , 544 S.W.3d
[at] 928 . . . ; see Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 34–35 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (sufficient evidence of bodily injury
[existed] because the court could reasonably infer that a “lesion on the
bridge of [the complainant’s] nose would cause physical pain”); Arzaga v.
State, 86 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (noting
that the “existence of a cut, bruise, or scrape on the body is sufficient
evidence of physical pain”); Goodin v. State, 750 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi[–Edinburg] 1988, pet. [ref’d]) (sufficient evidence
[existed] although the complainant did not testify about physical pain
because there was a reasonable inference that “bruises and muscle strain
caused him ‘physical pain’”).
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Maples v. Maples, 601 S.W.3d 23, 30 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Because the experience of pain is subjective, a victim’s testimony that pain was
experienced is sufficient evidence of bodily injury. Jimenez v. State, No. 08-20-00003-
CR, 2022 WL 484548, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (“Physical pain is inherently subjective, and both this
[c]ourt and the Court of Criminal Appeals have held that a victim’s testimony—if
believed by the jury—that she felt pain is sufficient to establish the element of bodily
injury.”).
Here, Complainant testified that she had attempted to grab Appellant’s hand to
alleviate the pain caused by his dragging her by the hair. Being dragged by the hair
also caused Complainant to experience lingering pain in her arms. Complainant also
suffered an injury when an artificial nail that she was wearing was ripped off and torn
down to the nail bed. This caused her pain at the time of the injury and for weeks
afterward. This testimony is sufficient to support a finding that Appellant caused
bodily injury to Complainant.
4. Though not required to prove the manner and means of the
assault, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant
committed the offense by the manner and means alleged in
the information.
The information alleged that Appellant had committed the offense of assault
“by grabbing [Complainant] with the hand of [Appellant] and/or by grabbing her hair
with the hand of [Appellant] and pulling with force and/or by grabbing her hair and
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dragging her body on the floor with the hand of [Appellant].” As noted, the evidence
established that Appellant had dragged Complainant by the hair.
As a general proposition, the State is not required to prove the manner and
means of the assault alleged in an information. Bin Fang, 544 S.W.3d at 929.
However, even if proof of manner and means were necessary, the evidence in this
case is sufficient.
5. Though not an element of the offense, the evidence supports
the trial court’s finding that Appellant was in a dating
relationship with Complainant.
Here, the information charged that Complainant was “a member of
[Appellant’s] family or household or [a person] with whom [Appellant] had a dating
relationship.” However, Appellant was convicted of a Class A misdemeanor.
Because Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor assault, we need not determine
whether there was proof that Appellant and Complainant were in a dating relationship
because the dating allegation is not a part of a hypothetically correct charge:
[A]ppellant was charged with, and convicted of, a Class A misdemeanor
assault for causing bodily injury. For this type of misdemeanor assault,
the hypothetically correct jury charge would not include any element
related to a special relationship or association. See Tex. Penal Code
[Ann.] § 22.0[1](a)(1); see also Wert[ v. State], 383 S.W.3d [747,] 755 [(Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)] (omitting reference to a
dating relationship from the hypothetically correct jury charge for a
misdemeanor[-]assault conviction when the defendant assaulted his
girlfriend).
Id. at 929–30. The existence of a dating relationship becomes an element of the
offense only in certain felony assaults. Id. at 929 (stating that assault under Penal
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Code Section 22.01(b) is generally a Class A misdemeanor that may become a felony
of the third degree under Penal Code Section 22.01(b)(2) “if the State alleges and
proves, among other things, that the defendant and the victim had a relationship or
association described by certain sections of the Family Code—broadly speaking, a
dating relationship, a familial relationship, or membership in a household”).
The trial court’s judgment did contain an affirmative finding that Appellant had
committed an offense involving family violence. This finding, however, was made in
accordance with Article 42.013 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that “[i]n the trial of an offense under Title 5, Penal Code, if the court
determines that the offense involved family violence, as defined by Section 71.004,[1]
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Section 71.004 of the Family Code provides that “[f]amily violence” means . . .
dating violence, as that term is defined by Section 71.0021.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 71.004(3). Section 71.0021 provides,
(a) “Dating violence” means an act, other than a defensive measure to
protect oneself, by an actor that:
(1) is committed against a victim or applicant for a protective
order:
(A) with whom the actor has or has had a dating
relationship; or
(B) because of the victim’s or applicant’s marriage to or
dating relationship with an individual with whom the actor
is or has been in a dating relationship or marriage; and
(2) is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or
sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the victim
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Family Code, the court shall make an affirmative finding of that fact and enter the
affirmative finding in the judgment of the case.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
42.013 (footnote omitted). Article 42.013’s purpose is “to simplify the prosecution of
subsequent family[-]assault cases by making it unnecessary to relitigate the details of
the previous assault[;] the State may rely on the affirmative finding in the prior
judgment to prove that the victim of the defendant’s previous assault was a family
member.” State v. Eakins, 71 S.W.3d 443, 444 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
Thus, a finding under Article 42.013 is not an element of the offense of misdemeanor
assault. McCall v. State, 635 S.W.3d 261, 270 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (op.
on reh’g).
or applicant in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury,
assault, or sexual assault.
(b) For purposes of this title, “dating relationship” means a relationship
between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a
romantic or intimate nature. The existence of such a relationship shall
be determined based on consideration of:
(1) the length of the relationship;
(2) the nature of the relationship; and
(3) the frequency and type of interaction between the persons
involved in the relationship.
(c) A casual acquaintanceship or ordinary fraternization in a business or
social context does not constitute a “dating relationship” under
Subsection (b).
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 71.0021.
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In any event, the evidence establishes that Appellant was in a dating
relationship with Complainant, and Appellant does not contend otherwise.
IV. Conclusion
Having held that sufficient evidence supports each of the elements of
misdemeanor assault, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Dabney Bassel
Dabney Bassel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: January 12, 2023
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