Ronald Dean Strickland v. Iheartmedia, Inc., Stephen L. Schaefer, and John and Jane Does ( 2023 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
OPINION
No. 04-21-00284-CV
Ronald Dean STRICKLAND,
Appellant
v.
IHEARTMEDIA, Inc., and Stephen L. Schaefer
Appellees 1
From the 198th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas
Trial Court No. CVDO-XX-XXXXXXX
Honorable M. Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 11, 2023
AFFIRMED
Appellant Ronald Dean Strickland sued Appellees iHeartMedia, Inc. and Attorney Stephen
L. Schaefer for defamation based on a statement contained in a judicial pleading. The appellees
moved to dismiss the lawsuit under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure for failing to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed Strickland’s causes of
action, and it awarded attorney’s fees to Appellees. Strickland appeals.
1
Appellant also listed “John and Jane Does” as defendants but did not state any allegations related to unknown persons.
04-21-00284-CV
BACKGROUND
Strickland is a musician who entered iHeartMedia’s “Don’t Mess with Texas Song Search
Contest” in December 2020. The winner of the contest was determined by public online votes.
During the initial online voting period, Strickland identified a problem on the website, which
iHeartMedia resolved by holding a second voting period. Strickland objected to iHeartMedia’s
solution. Ultimately, Strickland lost the contest.
Strickland sued iHeartMedia in small claims court over the voting dispute. In its original
answer, iHeartMedia alleged that Strickland had threatened employees, stating, “He even
threatened to find the employees and come after them when the contest was over.”
Based on this statement in iHeartMedia’s answer, Strickland sued iHeartMedia and
Schaefer in Bandera County District Court alleging defamation, negligence, and conspiracy.
iHeartMedia and Schaefer moved to dismiss Strickland’s complaints under Rule 91a. They
also requested attorney’s fees and submitted a supporting affidavit.
The trial court dismissed the suit and awarded attorney’s fees. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo.” City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494
S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 75–76 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)). Under Rule 91a, we consider whether the
pleadings, liberally construed, allege sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate that the pleader
is entitled to the relief requested. Id. at 724‒25.
RULE 91A DISMISSAL
A. Parties’ Arguments
Strickland argues that iHeartMedia’s statement about him in its answer was defamatory
and his causes of action were valid. He insists that the trial court erred in dismissing his suit.
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iHeartMedia and Schaefer argue that the statement in their answer was protected by the
judicial-proceedings privilege and therefore could not be the basis for Strickland’s claims.
Accordingly, the trial court properly granted their Rule 91a motion to dismiss.
B. Rule 91a
Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure “authoriz[es] dismissal of a cause of action
that has no basis in law or fact.” Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a). This
determination is made without considering evidence. Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 80 (citing TEX. R.
CIV. P. 91a.6).
A cause of action may be dismissed if the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition establish
the defendant’s affirmative defense. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.,
595 S.W.3d 651, 656 (Tex. 2020). For example, statements made in a judicial proceeding are
privileged against defamation claims. See Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Watson v. Kaminski, 51 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.). This includes statements made in written pleadings. See Landry’s Inc. v.
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (citing James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914,
916–17 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam)). So if a plaintiff cites statements from a court proceeding as the
basis for a defamation suit, the suit is subject to dismissal under Rule 91a. See In re Canfora, No.
01-21-00128-CV, 2021 WL 4095580, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 9, 2021, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Wilkinson v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank Tr. Servs., No. 14-13-00111-CV, 2014
WL 3002400, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 1, 2014, pet. denied)) (granting
mandamus relief after the trial court improperly denied a Rule 91a motion to dismiss defamation
suit).
Rule 91a also provides for attorney’s fees. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7. When the moving
party requests attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and presents supporting evidence, the trial court
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may award “all costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred with respect to the
challenged cause of action.” See id.; In re Commercial Credit Group Inc., No. 05-21-00115-CV,
2021 WL 1884657, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 11, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Fiamma
Statler, LP v. Challis, No. 02-18-00374-CV, 2020 WL 6334470, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Oct. 29, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
C. Analysis
Strickland sued iHeartMedia and Schaefer in the Bandera County District Court based on
a statement contained in their original answer from a separate lawsuit, which caused Strickland’s
defamation suit to be dismissed. See In re Canfora, 2021 WL 4095580, at *9.
On appeal, Strickland argues that the trial court erred when it “exclud[ed] and fail[ed] to
consider evidence that was presented,” i.e., the trial court failed to consider the allegedly
defamatory statement. But the trial court’s order granting the dismissal expressly states it
considered the pleadings—which included the complained-of statement from iHeartMedia’s
answer in the small claims court breach of contract case. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Bethel, 595
S.W.3d at 655. Appellees’ statement was protected by the judicial-proceedings privilege, and
dismissal under Rule 91a was proper. See Landry’s, 631 S.W.3d at 46; Jenevein, 114 S.W.3d at
745; In re Commercial Credit Group, 2021 WL 1884657, at *6.
Strickland also argued that there was “no factually sufficient evidence to support the
judgment of the trial court.” However, under Rule 91a, the trial court could not have considered
evidence in deciding whether to grant the motion to dismiss. See Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 80 (citing
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6).
The trial court could only consider evidence concerning iHeartMedia and Schaefer’s
request for attorney’s fees, which it did. See id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.7). Schaefer submitted
an affidavit detailing his qualifications, his hourly rate, the amount of time spent on the case, how
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that time was apportioned, and how much he dedicated in other office resources to the case. The
trial court granted Schaefer’s request for $7,582.45. See Fiamma, 2020 WL 6334470, at *17.
Strickland complains that he cannot afford to pay the attorney’s fees award, but he has not
presented any legal argument against the award. Contra TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Bolling v.
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).
Although we construe a pro se litigant’s brief liberally, see Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.,
767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989), an appellate issue unsupported by argument or legal authority
presents nothing for review. See Anderson, 2022 WL 7180376, at *2 (citing Fredonia State Bank
v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 285 (Tex. 1994)).
We conclude that the trial court did not err by granting iHeartMedia and Schaefer’s Rule
91a motion to dismiss Strickland’s suit and awarding $7,582.45 in attorney’s fees to the appellees.
See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. Strickland’s issue on appeal is overruled.
FAILURE TO PRESERVE A COMPLAINT
Strickland complains that the trial court did not provide him with findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but even if they were otherwise required in this case, the record does not show
that he requested them. Strickland’s complaint is waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Garcia v.
Mireles, 14 S.W.3d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.); Guerrero v. Salinas, No. 13-
05-323-CV, 2006 WL 2294578, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 10, 2006, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 296, 297)).
CONCLUSION
Because Strickland based his defamation suit on a statement from a judicial proceeding, he
failed to plead a claim that would entitle him to relief. Accordingly, under Rule 91a of the Texas
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not err in granting iHeartMedia and Schaefer’s motion
to dismiss and request for attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s order.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
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