Joe Anthony Rodriguez v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                           NUMBER 13-17-00189-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    JOE ANTHONY RODRIGUEZ,                                                 Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                    Appellee.
    On appeal from the 24th District Court
    of Victoria County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Longoria, and Hinojosa
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
    Appellant Joe Anthony Rodriguez appeals from the revocation of his community
    supervision.   By one issue, Rodriguez contends that the assessment of two years’
    incarceration in a State Jail facility was cruel and unusual. See U.S. CONST. amends.
    VIII, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13. We affirm.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    Rodriguez was indicted on five counts of forgery, each count a state jail felony.
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). On
    May 1, 2015, Rodriguez pleaded guilty to Count 5.1 See 
    id. The trial
    court sentenced
    Rodriguez to two years’ confinement in a state jail facility, suspended to four years’
    community supervision. It also assessed a $500 fine and court costs against Rodriguez
    and ordered him to pay $1,800 in restitution. On December 7, 2016, the State filed a
    motion to revoke Rodriguez’s community supervision. In its motion, the State alleged
    that Rodriguez committed a new criminal offense by violating a protective order, left his
    county of approved residency, and failed to pay supervisory fees, court costs, restitution,
    and a fee to the local Crime Stoppers program.
    At the March 9, 2017 hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, the State called
    Sally Rodriguez to testify. Ms. Rodriguez established that she had a protective order in
    place against Rodriguez. The trial court admitted a copy of that protective order into
    evidence. Ms. Rodriguez also testified that for ten years Rodriguez had repeatedly
    physically assaulted her, had shot at her house, had vandalized her friends’ automobiles,
    had threatened to burn her home down, and had made harassing and threatening
    telephone calls to her, even from jail after his arrest.
    The State called Deputy Glen Grasham of the Refugio County Sheriff’s
    Department as a witness at the hearing. Deputy Grasham testified that on October 25,
    1   The judgment reflects that the State abandoned Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
    2
    2016, he observed Rodriguez traveling in the same automobile with Ms. Rodriguez,
    although a protective order prohibited him from being within 200 yards of Ms. Rodriguez.
    Danielle Hilscher, Rodriguez’s community supervision officer, also testified. She
    explained that Rodriguez owed child support and other probation financial obligations
    because he had been incarcerated for not paying child support, had his wallet stolen, had
    payments to make “on his bed, his TV, and his laptop,” and had paid for repairs to
    Ms. Rodriguez’s car. Hilscher reported that Rodriguez told her that his work had been
    slow. In response to the court’s question of whether Rodriguez was “still amenable on
    probation,” Hilscher responded, “My personal recommendation would be that he may
    remain on probation but possibly sentenced to ISF[, an Intermediate Sanctions Facility
    Alcohol Treatment Program,] for his violations.”
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the allegations in the State’s
    motion to revoke to be true. The trial court also found Ms. Rodriguez’s testimony to be
    credible. It revoked Rodriguez’s community supervision, sentenced him to two years’
    confinement in a state jail facility, and assessed a $500 fine, restitution of $1,800, and
    court costs. Rodriguez did not object to the sentence imposed by the trial court and later
    filed no motion for new trial challenging the constitutionality of his sentence. This appeal
    followed.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive
    bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
    inflicted.”   U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13.             The Eighth
    3
    Amendment applies to punishments imposed by state courts through the Due Process
    Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. A punishment within
    the limits prescribed by a valid statute “is not, per se, prohibited as cruel, unusual, or
    excessive.” Trevino v. State, 
    174 S.W.3d 925
    , 928 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005,
    pet. ref’d). And when a sentence is within the prescribed statutory range set down by
    the legislature, sentencing authorities have nearly unfettered discretion to impose any
    punishment within that range. Ex parte Chavez, 
    213 S.W.3d 320
    , 323 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006).
    III.   CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
    A.       Preservation
    The right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and almost every
    constitutional or statutory right can be waived by failure to object. See Smith v. State,
    
    721 S.W.2d 844
    , 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); Quintana v. State, 
    777 S.W.2d 474
    , 479 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref’d) (holding that the defendant waived
    his cruel and unusual punishment argument by failing to object); see also Noland v. State,
    
    264 S.W.3d 144
    , 151–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (concluding
    that by failing to object the appellant did not preserve an argument that the sentence was
    grossly disproportionate to offense); Maza v. State, No. 13-14-00128-CR, 
    2015 WL 3637821
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (disagreeing that appellant should be allowed to make his
    eighth amendment violation argument for the first time on appeal because he did not
    object in the trial court and thus his argument was not preserved).       To preserve a
    4
    complaint of cruel and unusual punishment, the criminal defendant must make a timely,
    specific objection to the trial court or raise the issue in a motion for new trial. See TEX.
    R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Kim v. State, 
    283 S.W.3d 473
    , 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet.
    ref’d) (citing Rhoades v. State, 
    934 S.W.2d 113
    , 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc));
    
    Noland, 264 S.W.3d at 151
    –52; see also 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927
    –28 (“Because the
    sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude that the
    rights [appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are not so fundamental as to have
    relieved him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial objection.”).
    Rodriguez did not object when the trial court imposed sentence and did not
    complain of the sentence in any post-trial motion that the sentence was excessive or
    violated the Eighth Amendment. Rodriguez failed to preserve this issue for our review.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; 
    Smith, 721 S.W.2d at 855
    ; 
    Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475
    ; 
    Noland, 264 S.W.3d at 151
    –52; 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927
    –28; 
    Quintana, 777 S.W.2d at 479
    .
    B.     Sentence within the Punishment Range Is Not Per Se Excessive
    Even had Rodriguez preserved error, his sentence of two years in a state jail facility
    for his state jail felony offense of forgery, although at the top of the punishment range
    authorized by statute for the offense, falls within the legal range set down by the state
    legislature for that offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.21(d); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    § 12.35 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (setting out punishment for a state jail
    felony as incarceration in the state jail for not less than six months or more than two years
    and up to a $10,000 fine). So his sentence was not prohibited as per se excessive, cruel,
    or unusual. See 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928
    ; see also Cowan v. State, No. 13-14-00358-
    5
    CR; 
    2015 WL 4381090
    , *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    not designated for publication).
    C.     Proportionality of the Sentence to the Offense
    Nevertheless, Rodriguez complains that the trial court neglected to consider the
    proportionality of his punishment for the forgery offense to his ability to meet the financial
    obligations. He contends that the trial court’s assessment of the maximum punishment
    of two years’ incarceration in a state jail facility for his forgery conviction was, thus, cruel
    and unusual. We disagree.
    1.      Solem v. Helm’s Proportionality Review
    Rodriguez relies on Solem v. Helm as his authority. See 
    463 U.S. 277
    , 291
    (1983).     In Solem, the United States Supreme Court established three factors for
    analyzing a sentence’s proportionality:      (1) the gravity of the offense relative to the
    harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed for other crimes in the jurisdiction;
    and (3) the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
    See 463 U.S. at 292
    . If we conclude under the first Solem factor that the sentence is not grossly
    disproportionate to the offense, we need not consider the remaining factors that compare
    the sentence received to sentences imposed for similar crimes in Texas and sentences
    imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See Sneed v. State, 
    406 S.W.3d 638
    ,
    643 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.) (citing McGruder v. Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    , 316
    (5th Cir. 1992)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
    And as we recognized in Trevino, “the viability and mode of application of the
    [Solem] proportionate analysis in non-death penalty cases has been questioned since the
    6
    Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan.” 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928
    (citing
    McGruder v. Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    , 315–16 (5th Cir. 1992); Harmelin, 
    111 S. Ct. 2680
    (1991)); Sullivan v. State, 
    975 S.W.2d 755
    , 757–58 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no
    pet.); see also Nealy v. State, No. 13-11-00288-CR, 
    2013 WL 1092417
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—
    Corpus Christi Mar. 14, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In
    Trevino, we assumed the viability of a proportionality review to analyze the issue brought
    on 
    appeal. 174 S.W.3d at 928
    . Now in this case, because Rodriguez premises his
    entire appellate argument on Solem, we will again assume the viability of Solem’s
    proportionality review. See 
    Solem, 463 U.S. at 292
    ; 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928
    .
    2.     Considerations
    Relying on Solem, Rodriguez argues that the record is devoid of any consideration
    of his financial situation in the court’s decision to impose the maximum sentence of two
    years in a state jail facility. He complains that the trial court’s analysis “neglects the
    proportionality of [his] punishment in relation to the offense to which he pled guilty
    originally, forgery, and his ability to meet the financial obligations of probation.” We are
    not persuaded by Rodriguez’s argument.
    While the evidence revealed that Rodriguez had financial difficulties, we do not
    look to the grounds for adjudication in a motion-to-revoke proceeding to determine if the
    sentence is cruel and unusual; “we look to the facts of the crime.” Mathews v. State, 
    918 S.W.2d 666
    , 669 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d). The record establishes that
    Rodriguez committed a forgery. Upon his plea of guilty, the trial court placed Rodriguez
    on community supervision for four years.
    7
    In addition, the State offered evidence, showing that Rodriguez had engaged in
    actions against Ms. Rodriguez and others for over ten years. The trial court apparently
    deemed this evidence relevant to sentencing and useful in deciding Rodriguez’s
    appropriate punishment. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (West,
    Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.) (“[E]vidence may be offered by the [S]tate and the
    defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing.”); Arthur v. State, 
    11 S.W.3d 386
    , 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (quoting Mendiola v.
    State, 
    924 S.W.2d 157
    , 163 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, pet. ref’d, untimely filed)
    (providing that one purpose of article 37.07 is for the factfinder to “learn ‘as much useful
    information as possible in deciding the appropriate punishment for the individual
    defendant’”); see also Peters v. State, 
    31 S.W.3d 704
    , 716–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
    Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (noting that article 37.07 encourages “truth in sentencing” by
    opening the doors to all relevant evidence in the punishment phase); Garza v. State, No.
    13-11-00076-CR, 
    2012 WL 1572206
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 3, 2012, pet.
    ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Finally, we note that the trial court
    revoked Rodriguez’s community supervision not only for failing to comply with his financial
    obligations, which he claims were complicated by his financial circumstances, but also for
    violating an order that was in place to protect Ms. Rodriguez. See Ex parte Lea, 
    505 S.W.3d 913
    , 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“After a defendant is placed on community
    supervision, it can be revoked based on a sole violation of a condition of that
    supervision.”).
    8
    Assuming the viability of the Solem factors, specifically the first factor that
    addresses the gravity of the offense relative to the harshness of the penalty, the trial
    court’s sentence of two years in a state jail facility is not a grossly disproportionate
    sentence for Rodriguez’s forgery offense. 2           We cannot conclude that the trial court
    abused its nearly unfettered discretion in imposing the two-year state jail sentence. See
    Ex parte 
    Chavez, 213 S.W.3d at 323
    .
    D.     Summary
    Even had Rodriguez preserved this issue, the sentence falls within the punishment
    range and is neither prohibited as per se excessive, cruel, or unusual nor disallowed as
    an abuse of discretion. See id.; 
    Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928
    . We overrule Rodriguez’s
    appellate issue.
    V.        CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the 11th
    day of January, 2018.
    2 Having concluded that Rodriguez’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the forgery
    offense, we do not consider the remaining Solem factors. See Sneed v. State, 
    406 S.W.3d 638
    , 643 (Tex.
    App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.). Further Rodriguez does not discuss the second and third Solem factors,
    so we do not consider them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 457.1.
    9