Peyronel, Bobby Joe ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                          PD-1274-14
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 1/15/2015 9:16:42 AM
    January 15, 2015                    No. PD-1274-14                      Accepted 1/15/2015 9:35:49 AM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    CLERK
    In the
    Court of Criminal Appeals
    
    No. 01-13-00198-CR
    In the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas at Houston
    
    No. 1254877
    th
    In the 174 District Court of Harris County, Texas
    
    BOBBY JOE PEYRONEL
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    Appellee
    
    STATE’S BRIEF ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    
    DEVON ANDERSON
    District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    TBC No. 796910
    kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
    LISA COLLINS
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    Tel.: 713-755-5826
    FAX: 713-755-5809
    Counsel for Appellee
    ORAL ARGUMENT NOT PERMITTED
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    This Court has not permitted oral argument in this case.
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
    Counsel for the State:
    Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
    Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
    Lisa Collins  Assistant District Attorney at trial
    Appellant or criminal defendant:
    Bobby Joe Peyronel
    Counsel for Appellant:
    Frances Bourliot  Assistant Public Defender on appeal
    Richard Oliver; Alan Cohen  Counsel at trial
    Trial Judge:
    Hon. Vanessa Velasquez  Presiding Judge
    i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ..................................................i
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................i
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... v
    ISSUE PRESENTED ................................................................................................. 1
    The court of appeals erred in finding that the public-trial issue was preserved for
    review when the appellant did not ask the trial court to do anything and did not
    alert the trial court to the specific grounds that he would raise on appeal. ............1
    STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 4
    ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 4
    PRAYER .................................................................................................................... 8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE............................................... 9
    ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES
    Addy v. State,
    
    849 S.W.2d 425
    (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) .........................................................................6
    Blue v. State,
    
    41 S.W.3d 129
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)..................................................................5
    Broxton v. State,
    
    909 S.W.2d 912
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ................................................................5
    Cameron v. State,
    PD-1427-13, 
    2014 WL 4996290
    (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2014) .........................7
    Coble v. State,
    
    330 S.W.3d 253
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................................................................7
    Dixon v. State,
    
    2 S.W.3d 263
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ....................................................................5
    Espada v. State,
    No. AP–75,219, 
    2008 WL 4809235
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ................................7
    Fuller v. State,
    
    253 S.W.3d 220
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ................................................................5
    Levine v. United States,
    
    362 U.S. 610
    (1960) ...............................................................................................6
    Martinez v. State,
    
    22 S.W.3d 504
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)..................................................................5
    McEntire v. State,
    
    265 S.W.3d 721
    (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 2008, no pet.) ........................................................................................6
    iii
    Mitchell v. State,
    No. 10–10–00307–CR, 
    2011 WL 5994154
    (Tex. App.–
    Waco 2011, no pet.) ................................................................................................6
    Peyronel v. State,
    No. 01–13–00198–CR, 
    2014 WL 4109589
    (Tex. App.–
    Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2014, pet. filed) ........................................................v
    Rodriguez v. State,
    No. 04–04–00230–CR, 
    2005 WL 899963
    (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio Apr. 20, 2005, pet. ref’d) ...................................................................7
    Saldano v. State,
    
    70 S.W.3d 873
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)..................................................................5
    Waller v. Georgia,
    
    467 U.S. 39
    (1984) .................................................................................................5
    STATUTES
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.01 (4) (West 2010) ...................................................1
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.02(h) (West 2010) ....................................................1
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.03(d) (West 2010) ....................................................1
    RULES
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) ............................................................................................5, 8
    iv
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    The appellant was charged with the aggravated sexual assault of a child
    committed on October 27, 2009 (CR – 2). He pled “not guilty” to the charge, and
    the case was tried to a jury (CR – 248). The jury found the appellant guilty and
    assessed punishment at 50 years in prison (CR – 248).
    The court of appeals affirmed the conviction but issued a published opinion
    reversing the judgment on punishment; it held that the trial court improperly
    excluded the female members of the appellant’s family from the courtroom during
    the punishment phase after one of them had asked a juror, “How does it feel to
    convict an innocent man?” Peyronel v. State, No. 01–13–00198–CR, 
    2014 WL 4109589
    (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 21, 2014, pet. filed). This Court
    granted review on whether that issue was preserved for appeal.
    v
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    The court of appeals erred in finding that the public-trial issue
    was preserved for review when the appellant did not ask the
    trial court to do anything and did not alert the trial court to
    the specific grounds that he would raise on appeal.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Jane1 was a three-year-old girl with two older brothers (RR. IV – 52). Her
    mother had a master’s degree in counseling and worked as a school counselor, so
    she used Marie Payronel as her daycare provider (RR. IV – 50-51, 53) (RR. VI –
    80). By October 2009, Jane’s two older brothers had moved on to school, but Jane
    was still attending Marie’s daycare, which was set up in a section of Marie’s home
    (RR. IV – 56-57).
    Jane’s mother felt very close to Marie, but she did not feel close to Marie’s
    husband, the appellant (RR. IV – 57, 60) (RR. VI – 81). The appellant would often
    be done with his work by the time that Jane’s mother was picking her up from
    daycare (RR. IV – 59-60) (RR. VI – 92). According to Marie, the appellant might
    1
    A person “who has access to or obtains the name, address, telephone number, or other
    identifying information of a victim younger than 17 years of age may not release or disclose the
    identifying information to any person who is not assisting in the investigation, prosecution, or
    defense of the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.02(h) (West 2010). The term “victim”
    means a person who was the subject of: “(A) an offense the commission of which leads to a
    reportable conviction or adjudication under Chapter 62; or (B) an offense that is part of the same
    criminal episode, as defined by Section 3.01, Penal Code, as an offense described by Paragraph
    (A).” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.01 (4) (West 2010). The release or disclosure of such
    information to any person is a class C misdemeanor. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 57.03(d) (West
    2010). Therefore, the pseudonym “Jane” will be used for the victim in this case.
    sometimes play with the kids, but he “almost never” took them to the bathroom
    (RR. VI – 93). The appellant would, however, say “flirtatious things” to Jane’s
    mother that “creeped [her] out a little bit.” (RR. IV – 60).
    On October 27, Jane’s mother picked Jane up from daycare around 3:30 p.m.
    and was driving her home when Jane said, “Mommy, Bobby licked the owie on my
    vagina today.” (RR. IV – 64).         Jane’s mother was shocked and asked for
    clarification (RR. IV – 64). Jane repeated, “Bobby licked my vagina.” (RR. IV –
    64). The appellant was the only Bobby that they knew (RR. IV – 64-65). Jane
    stated that the assault occurred on the bed and that the appellant had pulled down
    her pants (RR. IV – 65-66). When they arrived home, Jane’s parents discussed the
    situation and decided to call Marie (RR. IV – 67-68) (RR. VI – 90-91). Marie had
    apparently been at the doctor that day, which allowed the appellant an opportunity
    to assault Jane (St. Ex. 20) (RR. VI – 89).
    After talking with Marie, Jane’s parents called the police (RR. IV – 69). The
    police told them that Jane needed to go to Memorial Hospital for a sexual-assault
    examination (RR. IV – 16, 71). On the way to the hospital, Jane said, “Mommy,
    Bobby says my penis looks like a sucker.” (RR. IV – 76) (St. Ex. 20). On another
    occasion, her mother asked her, “Did you – did you touch Bobby’s penis?” (RR. IV
    – 79). Jane responded, “No. I licked it, but don’t tell the doctor.” (RR. IV – 79).
    2
    At the hospital, Jane told the nurse, “Bobby, he licked my gina,” and she
    pointed to her vagina (RR. IV – 149) (RR. V – 102). Jane also stated that the
    appellant had licked her buttocks (RR. IV – 150). The nurse took Jane’s clothing
    for analysis (RR. IV – 71-74, 132, 137, 151). The analysis revealed that there was
    no blood or semen on Jane’s clothing, but there was male DNA on the crotch area
    of her panties (RR. IV – 217, 231, 241). Furthermore, although Jane’s father and
    brothers were excluded as a source, the appellant could not be excluded as the
    depositor of that male DNA (RR. IV – 185, 236) (RR. V – 67). Specifically, the
    appellant’s Y-chromosome profile was present in 1 in 79 Caucasians, 1 in 154
    African-Americans; and 1 in 100 Hispanics (RR. IV – 232, 237, 239).
    Jane later told a forensic interviewer about the appellant’s assaults (RR. V –
    162-163) (St. Ex. 20). She stated that the appellant licked her vagina, her forehead,
    her leg, and her butt during the course of the assault (RR. V – 162-163) (St. Ex.
    20). She said that she did not have to lick the appellant and that she did not see
    any part of his body (St. Ex. 20). She also stated that at the end of the assault, the
    appellant said, “I’m going to get you down now.” (RR. V – 163) (St. Ex. 20).
    3
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The court of appeals held that the trial court improperly excluded the female
    members of the appellant’s family from the courtroom during the punishment
    phase after one of them had asked a juror, “How does it feel to convict an innocent
    man?” But the public-trial issue was not preserved for appellate review because
    the appellant not ask the trial court to do anything and did not alert the trial court to
    the specific grounds that he would raise on appeal.
    ARGUMENT
    During a break in the punishment-phase testimony, a woman who was “part
    of the defense in this case” approached one of the jurors and said: “How does it
    feel to convict an innocent man?” (RR. IX – 7). The trial judge stated that he
    would find out who it was and hold her in contempt (RR. IX – 7). The appellant’s
    counsel asked about potential character witnesses sitting in the courtroom, and the
    trial court decided to “invoke the Rule.” (RR. IX – 7-8). The appellant did not
    object (RR. IX – 8). The prosecutor also asked that female members of the
    appellant’s family be excluded from the courtroom during testimony because of
    concerns of “jurors being intimidated.” (RR. IX – 8-9). The appellant responded
    that it was “too broad to exclude [his] wife and daughter,” but the prosecutor
    answered that the family’s behavior had “crossed the line into…intimidation of a
    juror.” (RR. IX – 9). The trial court agreed and stated: “Nobody will stay in the
    4
    courtroom while we proceed with this matter. Instruct your prospective witnesses
    to wait outside until such time as they can come in.” (RR. IX – 9). The appellant
    never specifically objected to the closing of the courtroom.
    To preserve an error for appellate review, a party must present a timely
    objection to the trial court, state the specific grounds for the objection, and obtain a
    ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Blue v. State, 
    41 S.W.3d 129
    , 131 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2000). The purpose of requiring an objection is to give the trial court or the
    opposing party the opportunity to correct the error or remove the basis for the
    objection. Martinez v. State, 
    22 S.W.3d 504
    , 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Even
    constitutional guarantees can be waived by failure to object at trial. See Fuller v.
    State, 
    253 S.W.3d 220
    , 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Saldano v. State, 
    70 S.W.3d 873
    , 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Finally, arguments on appeal must comport with
    the objection at trial or the error is waived. Dixon v. State, 
    2 S.W.3d 263
    , 273 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1998); Broxton v. State, 
    909 S.W.2d 912
    , 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995);
    Wilson v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 346
    , 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
    A public trial enables the public to see that the accused is dealt with fairly
    and not unjustly condemned, and the presence of spectators ensures that the
    accused’s triers are aware of their responsibility and its importance. Waller v.
    Georgia, 
    467 U.S. 39
    , 46 (1984). 
    Id. A public
    trial also ensures that the judge and
    5
    prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, and it encourages witnesses to come
    forward and discourages perjury. 
    Id. The right
    to a public trial, however, is not absolute. Addy v. State, 
    849 S.W.2d 425
    , 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). A defendant’s
    right to a public trial is not one of the few “systemic requirements” that a trial court
    must follow even if the parties wish otherwise, nor is it a “waiveable” right which
    must be implemented unless expressly waived. Mitchell v. State, No. 10–10–
    00307–CR, 
    2011 WL 5994154
    at *7 (Tex. App.–Waco 2011, no pet.) (not
    designated for publication) (citing Mendez v. State, 
    138 S.W.3d 334
    , 340 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2004)).
    In the present case, the appellant never objected to the general exclusion of
    people from the courtroom during the punishment phase. Therefore, the appellant
    waived his right to present this complaint on appeal. Compare Levine v. United
    States, 
    362 U.S. 610
    , 619–20 (1960) (concluding that general objection to the
    nature of the proceedings was insufficient to alert the trial court to public trial
    objection, thus appellant did not preserve error for review); McEntire v. State, 
    265 S.W.3d 721
    , 723 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (“the San Antonio Court of
    Appeals found that this right fell into the third category and was forfeited by a
    failure to complain of exclusion of the public”); Rodriguez v. State, No. 04–04–
    00230–CR, 
    2005 WL 899963
    *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 20, 2005, pet.
    6
    ref’d) (not designated for publication) (“we hold that by failing to object at the
    time the trial judge excluded all spectators, Rodriguez forfeited his right to present
    this complaint on appeal.”); Coble v. State, 
    330 S.W.3d 253
    , 277 n.56 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2010) (citing Espada v. State, No. AP–75,219, 
    2008 WL 4809235
    at *4 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2008) (not designated for publication) (“The record reflects, however,
    that appellant failed to object at trial that he was being denied the right to a public
    trial. Therefore, he forfeited the right to raise this complaint on appeal.”) (not cited
    as authority but merely as a curiosity pursuant to Rule 77.3)); with Cameron v.
    State, PD-1427-13, 
    2014 WL 4996290
    (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2014) (holding that
    defendant preserved public trial issue for appeal when he brought issue to attention
    of trial court and then requested at least six separate times that court rule on
    defendant's objection, but court declined to do so).
    On appeal, the appellant characterized his response to the State’s request as
    an “objection.” (App’nt Brf. 10). But in the trial court, the appellant characterized
    it simply as a response, as follows: “we’d respond to that by saying that’s too broad
    to exclude Mr. Peyronel’s wife and daughter to create the impression in the jury’s
    mind that he has absolutely no support whatsoever here.” (RR. IX – 9) (emphasis
    added). This response did not ask the trial court to do anything. Moreover, it did
    not alert the trial court to the specific grounds that would be raised on appeal,
    namely, the right to a public trial. Rather, the response was couched in terms of
    7
    visible family support for the appellant rather than the benefits of the public’s
    observation of official proceedings. Therefore, it did not state the specific grounds
    for the objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The appellant did not preserve his public-
    trial complaint for appeal, and the court of appeals erred in holding that the issue
    was preserved.
    PRAYER
    It is respectfully requested that the opinion of the court of appeals should be
    reversed in part so that the punishment is affirmed.
    DEVON ANDERSON
    District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    /s/ Eric Kugler
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 755-5826
    kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
    TBC No. 796910
    8
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE
    This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program
    used to prepare this document reports that there are 1,590 words in it; and (b) a
    copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:
    Frances Bourliot                      Lisa McMinn
    Assistant Public Defender             State Prosecuting Attorney
    Harris County, Texas                  P.O. Box 13046
    1201 Franklin, 13th Floor             Austin, Texas 78711
    Houston, Texas 77002                  Lisa.McMinn@SPA.texas.gov
    frances.bourliot@pdo.hctx.net
    /s/ Eric Kugler
    ERIC KUGLER
    Assistant District Attorney
    Harris County, Texas
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    (713) 755-5826
    TBC No. 796910
    Date: January 15, 2015
    9