Velez, Manuel ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                           AP-76,051
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    November 5, 2015                                                     Transmitted 11/5/2015 8:26:01 AM
    Accepted 11/5/2015 8:46:54 AM
    ABEL ACOSTA
    NO. AP-76,051                                                CLERK
    MANUEL VELEZ                            §       IN THE
    VS.                                     §       COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    STATE OF TEXAS                          §       STATE OF TEXAS
    STATE’S MOTION TO PUBLISH
    TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    The State, by and through its District Attorney, 268th Judicial District, Fort
    Bend County, asks this Court to reconsider its decision to not publish its opinion in
    the above-referenced case, Velez v. State, No. AP-76,051, 
    2012 WL 2130890
     (Tex.
    Crim. App. June 13, 2012).
    In Velez, this Court distinguished Garcia v. State, 
    15 S.W.3d 533
    , 536 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2000), in which a de novo suppression hearing was ordered because a
    judge, other than the judge who heard the hearing, made findings of fact and
    conclusions of law on a cold record. Garcia, 15 S.W.3d at 534-35. In Garcia,
    testimony was taken from the officer who took Garcia’s confession and from Garcia.
    Id. at 535. “Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that [Garcia’s] statement was voluntary
    was based on a direct evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id.
    In Velez, the judge who held the suppression hearing was succeeded by a new
    trial judge. Velez, 
    2012 WL 2130890
    , at *13. The new trial judge prepared findings
    1
    and conclusions based on the record of the suppression hearing and the prior judge’s
    ruling that the statement was voluntarily made. Id. This Court distinguished Garcia,
    “In Garcia, however, we did not specifically address the rare situation that presents
    itself here, wherein the prior judge cannot be appointed to prepare findings of fact and
    conclusions of law because of unavailability or ineligibility.” Id. This Court took
    note of the “peculiar circumstances” of the case:
    While the record does not include the reason the presiding judge of the
    Fifth Administrative Region did not appoint the prior judge to prepare
    findings and conclusions, we take note of the readily available public
    information indicating that the prior judge is currently unavailable for
    appointment. In such a situation, where the prior judge is unavailable or
    ineligible for an appointment, we find it appropriate that there be an
    exception to the rule laid out in Garcia. In the event that the judge who
    presided over a suppression hearing is unavailable or ineligible to be
    appointed to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, the current
    trial judge may prepare findings and conclusions based on the prior
    judge's ruling on the record and the transcript of the suppression hearing
    regarding whether a defendant's statement was voluntarily made.
    We recognize that the original trial judge, who is uniquely situated to
    observe the demeanor of witnesses first-hand, is generally in the best
    position to assess the credibility of witnesses. See Ex parte Reed, 
    271 S.W.3d 698
    , 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In this rare circumstance, the
    trial judge making the findings and conclusions did not observe the
    demeanor of the witnesses because she did not preside over the
    suppression hearing. However, she refrained from making any explicit
    credibility determinations. Thus, we will accept the new trial judge's
    findings and conclusions, and we will review the record to determine if
    they are supported by the evidence.
    Velez, 
    2012 WL 2130890
    , at *13.
    2
    If published, Velez could be cited as precedential authority for allowing a
    successor trial judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when (1) the
    judge who heard the suppression hearing is deceased or otherwise unavailable, and (2)
    no explicit credibility determinations need be made.
    In Luis Carlos Rodriguez v. State, No. 01-14-00774-CR, the trial judge who
    heard the suppression hearing, Hon. Thomas Culver III, passed away in September
    2015. Mr. Rodriguez did not testify at the suppression hearing, and the facts are
    undisputed. No explicit credibility determinations need be made. The two Velez
    factors that would allow a successor judge to make findings and conclusions are met.
    However, as shown in the attached motion to abate the appeal, Mr. Rodriguez
    is asking for a de novo suppression hearing because Judge Culver is deceased. [Mtn
    at 2] The State would like to cite Velez as precedential authority in response.
    However, Rule of Appellate Procedure 77.3 provides that this Court’s “[u]npublished
    opinions have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority by counsel or
    by a court.” Tex. R. App. P. 77.3. The Court’s holding in Velez has not been adopted
    by this Court in a published opinion, and thus should not be cited.
    This Court’s holding in Velez was applicable in at least one other case, Pavon-
    Maldonado v. State, No. 14-13-00944-CR, 
    2015 WL 1456523
    , at *4 n.5 (Tex. App.--
    Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for
    3
    publication).
    “The Court of Criminal Appeals may, at any time, order that a “do not publish”
    notation be changed to “publish.” Tex. R. App. 47.2(b) (albeit with regard to opinions
    of the courts of appeals). The State believes that Velez, established an exception to
    Garcia that will save scarce state and judicial resources when a defendant has been
    afforded a pre-trial hearing on his suppression motion, the trial judge passes away, or
    is otherwise unavailable, and the facts adduced at the suppression hearing are
    undisputed and no explicit credibility determinations need be made.
    4
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State asks this Court to grant
    its motion to publish that part of its opinion in this cause addressing Point of Error
    Ten so that the opinion may be cited for its precedential value.
    Respectfully submitted,
    John F. Healey, Jr.
    SBOT # 09328300
    District Attorney, 268th Judicial District
    Fort Bend County, Texas
    /s/ Gail Kikawa McConnell
    Gail Kikawa McConnell
    SBOT # 11395400
    Assistant District Attorney
    301 Jackson Street, Room 101
    Fort Bend County, Texas 77469
    (281) 238-3205 / (281) 238-3340 (fax)
    Gail.McConnell@fortbendcountytx.gov
    5
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that on November 5, 2015, a copy of the State's motion to
    publish was served on :
    L.J. Rabb, Assistant District Attorney, Cameron County, by e-service or email
    ;
    Brian W. Stull, Attorney for Manuel Velez, by first class mail, return receipt requested
    # 7013 0600 0002 2111 7188, 201 W. Main St, Ste 402, Durham, N.C. 27701-3228;
    Mr. Stephen Doggett, Attorney for Louis Carlos Rodriguez, by e-service or email
    ;
    Ms. Lisa McMinn, State Prosecuting Attorney, by e-service or email,
    
    /s/ Gail Kikawa McConnell
    Gail Kikawa McConnell
    6
    Velez v. State
    Point of Error Ten
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AP-76,051

Filed Date: 11/5/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/30/2016