Ronnie Lee Hackett Jr. v. State ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-17-00461-CR
________________
RONNIE LEE HACKETT JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 221st District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 17-05-06184-CR
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The trial court denied appellant Ronnie Lee Hackett Jr.’s (Hackett) motion for
enforcement of a purported plea agreement. Hackett filed an accelerated appeal with
this Court. The State filed a motion to dismiss this accelerated appeal in which the
State argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the State’s motion and
dismiss the appeal.
1
Underlying Facts
Hackett was indicted for injury to a child. The caption stated that the offense
is a first-degree felony, but the body of the indictment alleged that Hackett recklessly
caused bodily injury to the child victim. After being admonished regarding a first-
degree felony punishment range, Hackett entered an open plea of guilty on October
26, 2017. On November 8, 2017, the trial judge conducted another hearing, at which
the trial judge noted that when Hackett was charged, the indictment included an
allegation that Hackett was “reckless[,]” which would be a second-degree felony,
yet Hackett had pleaded and waived his rights on a first-degree felony. The State
proposed that the trial court reconsider accepting Hackett’s guilty plea because it
was not made knowingly, freely, and voluntarily. The trial judge stated, “I will . . .
withdraw the plea and I will find that it didn’t appear to be freely and voluntarily
made because . . . this involved a first degree felony due to the nature of the death of
a child.” The trial judge rejected the plea on Hackett’s behalf and entered a plea of
not guilty. The State moved to amend the indictment by striking the word
“recklessly” and changing the indictment’s language to allege that Hackett
“intentionally and knowingly” caused serious bodily injury. Defense counsel stated
that he had no objection. The trial court granted the State’s motion for leave to amend
the indictment.
2
On November 14, 2017, Hackett filed a motion for enforcement of plea
agreement and notice of double jeopardy. In the motion, Hackett alleged that he and
the State had entered into a plea bargain agreement that was enforceable as a
contractual arrangement. Hackett asserted that the trial judge erred by withdrawing
the plea on her own and ordering a new trial, and Hackett argued that jeopardy
attached “when the plea agreement was accepted by the Court.” On November 14,
2017, the trial judge conducted a hearing on Hackett’s motion. During that hearing,
defense counsel argued that Hackett’s previous guilty plea constituted a bench trial,
and that Hackett is entitled to have the plea enforced. The judge stated, “Well, here
is the problem though. It wasn’t a plea agreement. It was an open plea.” The
prosecutor stated that although the parties had engaged in plea negotiations on the
original indictment, the State never intended to treat the offense as anything other
than a first-degree felony. The trial judge denied Hackett’s motion, and Hackett
appealed. The State filed a motion to dismiss Hackett’s appeal, in which the State
argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Analysis
We lack jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has
been expressly granted by law. Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991). Although a trial court may construe a motion asserting double jeopardy
3
as an application for habeas corpus by looking to the motion’s essence, intermediate
Courts of Appeals may not do so. Ex parte Cantu, 913 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1995, pet. ref’d). In the instant case, nothing in the record
suggests that the trial court treated Hackett’s motion as an application for writ of
habeas corpus. The order from which Hackett appeals is an interlocutory order, and
we therefore lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See Apolinar, 820 S.W.2d at 794; Ex
parte Cantu, 913 S.W.2d at 704. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
_________________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on February 13, 2018
Opinion Delivered February 14, 2018
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
4