Roger Pharris v. State ( 2006 )

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-05-00309-CR

Roger Pharris,

                                                                                    Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                                    Appellee

From the 272nd District Court

Brazos County, Texas

Trial Court No. 05-00767-CRF-272

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

            On a plea of guilty in open court, a jury convicted appellant Roger Pharris of the aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than seventeen, a second-degree felony, and then assessed a fifteen-year prison sentence.  Pharris’s counsel on appeal has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).  Counsel, in his brief, considers issues in areas relevant to an appeal of a conviction of aggravated sexual assault:  (1) the indictment; (2) the guilty plea and the sufficiency of the evidence; (3) pretrial motions; (4) objections to evidence; (5) closing argument; and (6) the punishment phase, including the jury’s punishment decision.[1] See Sowels v. State, 45 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.), overruled on other grounds by Meza v. State, ---S.W.3d ---, ---, 2006 WL 2686519, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2006).  Counsel’s brief contains references to both the record and applicable statutes, rules, and cases and discusses why counsel concludes that the record does not present any arguable issues.

We have conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether there are arguable grounds for appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We determine there are none.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Counsel must advise Pharris of our decision and of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  See Sowels, 45 S.W.3d at 694; see also Meza v. State, ---S.W.3d ---, --- n.23, 2006 WL 2686519, at *3 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 20, 2006); Ex parte Owens, --- S.W.3d ---, ---, 2006 WL 2619989, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 13, 2006).  We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, effective upon counsel’s advising Pharris of our decision and of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  See Meza, ---S.W.3d at ---, 2006 WL 2686519, at *3.

BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the result without a separate opinion.)

Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted

Opinion delivered and filed October 4, 2006

Do not publish

[CR25]

---

    [1]           Pharris has filed a pro se brief and claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects.  Without addressing the merits of this claim, we find that it does not present any arguable grounds for appeal.  See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[g]enerally the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the Strickland standard.  The reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts that do not appear in the appellate record.  A petition for writ of habeas corpus usually is the appropriate vehicle to investigate ineffective-assistance claims.”).

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BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)

Reformed and affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 10, 1005

[CV06]