Anthony John Liberto v. State ( 2016 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-16-00063-CR
    ANTHONY JOHN LIBERTO, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 13th District Court
    Navarro County, Texas
    Trial Court No. D34945
    Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In a bench trial involving scant evidence on key elements of proof, Anthony John Liberto
    was convicted in Navarro County1 of theft of property valued at between $1,500.00 and
    $20,000.00.2 While there is no question that Liberto removed an air conditioning unit and
    compressor, a stove, and a dishwasher from a residence he had occupied but that had been
    purchased by Louis Edwin Hash, Jr., the question on appeal is whether legally sufficient evidence
    supports the trial court’s necessary findings that the items of property Liberto removed from the
    premises were owned by Hash and that they were valued at or above $1,500.00. We affirm the
    judgment of the trial court because, based on legal precedent, we find that (1) legally sufficient
    evidence supports a finding that the air conditioning unit and compressor were fixtures and thus
    owned by Hash and (2) legally sufficient evidence supports a finding that the air conditioning unit
    and compressor were valued at or above $1,500.00.
    Liberto’s mother, Silvia Ellis, had previously lived in the residence in question until her
    poor health required her to be placed in a nursing home. The property was owned by James Ellis.
    Liberto became the sole occupant of the residence after Silvia left, but Ellis failed to pay the
    mortgage on the residence, and foreclosure ensued. Liberto received a notice of eviction on
    December 26, 2012, but ignored it.
    1
    Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas
    Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). We
    follow the precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals in deciding this case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
    2
    After Liberto’s conviction, the trial court sentenced him to thirteen months’ confinement in state jail and ordered him
    to pay $1,325.00 in restitution. See Act of May 9, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 120, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 608, 609,
    amended by Act of May 31, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1251, § 10, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 4209, 4214 (codified at TEX.
    PENAL CODE § 31.03).
    2
    On January 8, 2013, Hash purchased the residence “as is,” sight unseen, at an online
    auction. Hash drove around the property and noticed that it was occupied. On January 10, Hash
    posted a notice to vacate on the front door and, armed with a video camera, had a discussion with
    Liberto about leaving the property.               Later, Hash moved in, but discovered that the stove,
    dishwasher, HVAC air conditioning unit, and outdoor compressor for the air conditioning unit had
    been removed from the residence.
    As a result of Hash’s report to police about the missing items, local police found the
    dishwasher, air conditioning unit, and compressor at neighbor Paul Hooper’s residence. Hooper
    testified that he purchased the dishwasher from Liberto for $300.003 and later discovered the air
    conditioning unit hidden in his storage shed. According to Hooper, Liberto had taken the items
    from the residence because “he felt like he had spent his money . . . to buy [the items] himself to
    put [them] in that home that wasn’t his.”
    During a visit to the neighborhood, Mark Wyle testified that he witnessed Liberto loading
    items into a trailer. Because he had just purchased a new camera, Wyle photographed Liberto,
    documenting the removal of the items from the house with the assistance of his friend, James Elton
    Johnson.
    At trial, Liberto took the position that all of the items that he took from the residence
    belonged to him. He testified that he paid for the dishwasher and the stove, which were not
    attached to the residence, and that he had also paid for the air conditioning unit and compressor.
    He introduced a receipt demonstrating that “Discount Svc Maint.” paid $1,183.84 for the
    3
    During cross-examination, Hooper testified that he paid $300.00 for the dishwasher and a washer and dryer.
    3
    compressor and HVAC air conditioning unit, which was shipped to the residence in 2007. Liberto
    further testified that he had an “International Mobile Air Conditioning License” and that “Discount
    Svc Maint.” was his company.
    Liberto testified that the air conditioner was not attached to the residence or the air ducts.
    Instead, he testified that the outdoor compressor was still bolted to the shipping pallet and that the
    air conditioning unit was located in the middle of the living room. Liberto testified that, to get the
    air conditioner to work, he simply plugged it into an electrical outlet. Testifying on Liberto’s
    behalf, Johnson said that he visited Liberto in the residence many times, that the air conditioning
    unit was in the middle of the living room, and that it was not hooked up to the duct work. Johnson
    also said that the stove had not been working for months and that they sold it to the scrap yard for
    $6.00. He further testified that they did not cause damage to the residence in removing the
    dishwasher or stove.
    Liberto’s and Johnson’s parts of the testimony were inconsistent with Hash’s testimony.
    Hash testified that, although he did not go inside the residence on January 10, he walked outside
    and found the outdoor compressor for the air conditioning unit. According to Hash, Liberto “said
    . . . he had it replaced. In other words, inside and out” and that he had recently installed the air
    conditioner himself. Hash testified, “I remember asking if the AC worked all right. And he said
    it worked good.” The video corroborated Hash’s testimony. On the video recording, the
    compressor appears to be hooked up and not on a shipping container. The video shows that Liberto
    told Hash (1) that he recently installed the air conditioner after paying $1,600.00 for it, (2) that he
    installed the “H coils” himself, (3) that he “put in the air handler . . . with electric,” and (4) that
    4
    “[t]he air conditioner work[ed] good.” When Liberto was interviewed by officer Michael Perry,
    he said in a recorded statement, “I hooked up my air conditioning unit for [Silvia and James].”
    When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we are to use the standard of review
    stated in Jackson v. Virginia, that is, to ask not what we would decide based on the record before
    us, but whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
    rational fact-finder could have found as this fact-finder did, that the elements of the charged crime
    have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 912 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2010) (plurality op.); Mechell v. State, 
    374 S.W.3d 454
    , 456–57 (Tex. App.—Waco 2011,
    pet. ref’d); see Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979). The province of the fact-finder is
    to judge witness credibility, and it may believe certain witnesses and disbelieve others. Chambers
    v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 459
    , 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); 
    Mechell, 374 S.W.3d at 456
    –57.
    We review the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the elements of the offense as defined
    by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1997); Jackson v. State, 
    399 S.W.3d 285
    , 290 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, no pet.). The
    State alleged that Liberto, on or about January 11, 2013, unlawfully appropriated “AN HVAC
    UNIT AND COMPRESSOR, A DISHWASHER AND A STOVE, of the value of $1500 or more
    but less than $20,000 from Louis Edwin Hash, Jr., the owner thereof,” without his effective consent
    and with the intent to deprive Hash of the property.
    We now address each of Liberto’s two evidence-based arguments that the property
    belonged to him and that the State failed to prove the value of the property.
    5
    (1)         Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports a Finding that the Air Conditioning Unit and
    Compressor Were Fixtures and thus Owned by Hash
    Liberto first argues that the dishwasher, stove, air conditioning unit, and compressor were
    his personal property because they were not affixed to the realty. However, Hash’s testimony, the
    videotape, and the audio recording of Perry’s interview all contained evidence that Liberto said he
    had installed the air conditioner in the residence and that it “worked good.” Thus, the evidence
    was legally sufficient for the trial court to conclude that, at a minimum, the air conditioning unit
    and compressor were attached to the residence as fixtures when Hash purchased it January 8 and
    that these items belonged to Hash.4
    While the evidence is conflicting and we might not make the same findings as the trial
    court, our role is to determine whether legally sufficient evidence supports the finding that Hash,
    not Liberto, owned the air conditioner and compressor. The video evidence and the reported
    utterances from Liberto’s mouth constitute evidence that, if believed, establish that the air
    conditioner and compressor had been installed as fixtures to the residence and that, thus, title to
    those items passed to Hash when he purchased the residence.
    (2)         Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports a Finding that the Air Conditioning Unit and
    Compressor Were Valued at or above $1,500.00
    Liberto also questions the proof of the fair market value of these items. Under Section
    31.08 of the Texas Penal Code, value is: “(1) the fair market value of the property . . . at the time
    and place of the offense; or (2) if the fair market value of the property cannot be ascertained, the
    cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the theft.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
    4
    For purposes of this analysis, we need only focus on the air conditioning unit and compressor.
    6
    § 31.08(a) (West Supp. 2016). At trial, Hash testified that he did not attempt to reuse the recovered
    items, but decided to replace them instead. Hash testified that it cost $7,000.00 to replace the air
    conditioning unit.5 Detective Mark Nanny, without objection, testified that he did not research the
    value of the air conditioning unit, but that the value for the outdoor compressor alone was “[$]1490
    to almost $3,600 depending on the size.”
    Liberto argues that Hash’s and Nanny’s testimony established replacement value of the
    outdoor compressor if purchased as new, not fair market value of the property, which should have
    taken into account the age of the items. He further contends that, because the State did not
    introduce evidence that the fair market value of the air conditioning unit and compressor could not
    be ascertained, the trial court could not consider replacement value.
    “Fair market value” has been held to mean the amount the property would sell for in cash,
    giving a reasonable time for selling it. Keeton v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 304
    , 305 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1991). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has written,
    When an owner testifies, the presumption must be . . . that the owner is testifying
    to an estimation of the fair market value. Certainly the owner may reasonably be
    understood to be testifying as to the fair market value of the property either in terms
    of the purchase price or the cost to him of replacing the stolen property.
    Sullivan v. State, 
    701 S.W.2d 905
    , 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). In other words, for purposes of
    calculating fair market value of stolen property in a theft prosecution, “[a]n owner may testify
    either in terms of purchase price or replacement cost, and is presumed to be testifying to an
    estimation of fair market value.” Uyamadu v. State, 
    359 S.W.3d 753
    , 759 (Tex. App.—Houston
    5
    Hash also testified that it cost $1,200.00 to replace the stove and $350.00 to replace the dishwasher.
    7
    [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Valdez v. State, 
    116 S.W.3d 94
    , 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2002, pet. ref’d); see Drilling v. State, No. 10-01-00343-CR, 
    2005 WL 428850
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—
    Waco Feb. 23, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication).6 Because Liberto did not object to
    Hash’s or Nanny’s testimony regarding value, the trial court was free to consider that testimony in
    making its determination of whether the “value” of the stolen items, as that term is defined by
    Section 31.08, was $1,500.00 or more. See Moff v. State, 
    131 S.W.3d 485
    , 492 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2004).
    “If the appellant wishes to rebut the owner’s opinion evidence he must . . . offer
    controverting evidence as to the value of the property.” 
    Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909
    . Liberto
    presented such controverting evidence. Pointing to the receipt that he introduced into evidence
    showing that “Discount Svc Maint.” paid $1,183.84 for the air conditioning unit and compressor
    in 2007, Liberto argues that the fair market value of these items in 2013 could not have been more
    than $1,183.84. The serial numbers from the recovered air conditioning unit and compressor
    matched the serial numbers on the invoice introduced into evidence by Liberto. Although Liberto
    testified that he paid fair market value for the items, the items were purchased by Liberto’s
    business, and, in light of Hash and Nanny’s testimony, the trial court could have disbelieved
    Liberto or concluded that Liberto did not pay the full retail fair market price.7
    The question is whether, in light of all of the evidence, which we view in the light most
    favorable to the conviction, the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    6
    Although this unpublished case has no precedential value, we may take guidance from it “as an aid in developing
    reasoning that may be employed.” Carrillo v. State, 
    98 S.W.3d 789
    , 794 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. ref’d).
    7
    On video, Liberto told Hash that he had paid $1,600.00 for the air conditioning unit and compressor.
    8
    value of the air conditioning unit and compressor was $1,500.00 or more. See 
    id. Based on
    the
    evidence at trial, we answer the question in the affirmative. Accordingly, we conclude that legally
    sufficient evidence supported Liberto’s conviction.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:       October 26, 2016
    Date Decided:         November 29, 2016
    Do Not Publish
    9