Tammy Kay Taylor v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                           ACCEPTED
    06-14-00222-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    2/25/2015 2:34:30 PM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    No. 06-14-00222-CR
    ____________________________________________
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    IN THE                  2/26/2015 11:52:00 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS                   Clerk
    AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    ____________________________________________
    TAMMY KAY TAYLOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    ____________________________________________
    APPEAL FROM
    TH
    THE 8 DISTRICT COURT OF HOPKINS COUNTY, TEXAS
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1423993
    ____________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    ____________________________________________
    Wade A. Forsman
    P.O. Box 918
    Sulphur Springs, TX 75483-0918
    903.689.4144, f. 903.689.7001
    wade@forsmanlaw.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    Tammy Kay Taylor
    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
    Appellant’s Brief
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38(a), the following is a list of all
    parties to the trial court’s judgment and the names and addresses of all trial and
    appellate counsel:
    Appellant                                   Appellant’s appellate counsel
    Tammy Kay Taylor                            Wade A. Forsman
    P.O. Box 918
    Sulphur Springs, TX 75483-0918
    903.689.4144 telephone
    903.689.7001 facsimile
    wade@forsmanlaw.com
    Appellant’s trial counsel
    Ron Ferguson
    Roland M. “Ron” Ferguson, Jr.
    1804 Woodbridge Drive
    Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
    903.335.8412 telephone
    Appellee                                    Appellee’s trial & appellate counsel
    The State of Texas                          Will Ramsay
    Hopkins County District Attorney
    114 Main Street
    Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
    903.885.0641 telephone
    903.885.0640 facsimile
    willramsay@suddenlinkmail.com
    Appellant’s Brief                                                             Page i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Identity of Parties and Counsel ……………………………………………………. i
    Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………                                         ii
    Index of Authorities …………………………………………………………… iii
    Statement of the Case …………………………………………………………….. 1
    Issues Presented …………………………………………………………………... 2
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred in admitting testimony
    concerning an extraneous offense which the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Higginbotham v. State, 
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d).
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred in making a “Hardesty
    inference” because the allegedly stolen property was found in a place
    where at least two persons other than Appellant had an equal right and
    facility of access.
    Statement of Facts ……………………………………………………………….. 3
    Summary of the Argument………………………………………………………. 5
    Argument …………………………………………………………………............ 6
    Prayer …………………………………………………………………………….. 9
    Certificate of Word Count ………………………………………………………. 10
    Certificate of Service……………………………………………………………...10
    Appellant’s Brief                                                              Page ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Blevins v. State,
    
    6 S.W.3d 566
    (Tex. App. – Tyler 1999, pet. ref’d)…………………………. 9
    George v. State,
    
    890 S.W.2d 73
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)…………………………………….. 7
    Hardesty v. State,
    
    656 S.W.2d 73
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)…………………………………….. 8
    Higginbotham v. State,
    
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d)……………………………… 7
    Pardee v. State,
    2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6823
    (Tex. App. – Texarkana Aug. 16, 2012, pet. ref’d)……………………….. 8,9
    Poncio v. State,
    
    185 S.W.3d 904
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)…………………………………….8
    Statutes
    TEX. PENAL CODE §31.03(c)(1)…………………………………………………. 6,7
    Court Rules
    Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3) …………………………………………………………. 9
    TEX. R. APP. P. 38(a) ……………………………………………………………… i
    Appellant’s Brief                                               Page iii
    No. 06-14-00222-CR
    ____________________________________________
    IN THE
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    ____________________________________________
    TAMMY KAY TAYLOR,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    ____________________________________________
    APPEAL FROM
    TH
    THE 8 DISTRICT COURT OF HOPKINS COUNTY, TEXAS
    TRIAL COURT NO. 1423993
    ____________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    ____________________________________________
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary of a habitation, a second-
    degree felony, for which the trial court sentenced Appellant to fifteen (15) years of
    confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice (“TDCJ”).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                              Page 1
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred in admitting testimony
    concerning an extraneous offense which the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Higginbotham v. State, 
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d).
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred in making a “Hardesty
    inference” because the allegedly stolen property was found in a place
    where at least two persons other than Appellant had an equal right and
    facility of access.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                              Page 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Mr. Jitendra Patel and his wife Ms. Jaya Patel have owned and operated a
    hotel in Sulphur Springs, Texas called the Royal Inn since February 1992 (Vol. 3; p.
    34; l. 12, 21-24). The Patels also live there (Vol. 3; pp. 37-38; l. 15-3).
    Beginning on October 22, 2013, Mr. Patel employed the defendant, Ms.
    Tammy Kay Taylor, to work at the front desk (Vol. 3; p. 36; l. 15, 21-22)(Vol. 3; p.
    87; l. 12-15).
    Mr. Patel went to India on December 3, 2013 (Vol. 3; p. 36; l. 25), and Ms.
    Patel went to India on December 20, 2013 (Vol. 3; p. 87; l. 20). Mr. Patel told his
    employees, including Taylor, that he was going to be gone until January 17, 2014
    (App. 3; p. 37; l. 1-14).
    Some time in December 2013 Taylor met Ms. Wanda Henderson. There was
    an ice storm at that time and Henderson, who had been taking care of an individual
    named Mr. Ron Hansen for about 10 years, put Hansen up at the Royal Inn because
    Hansen’s home had no heat (Vol. 3; p. 122; l. 17-23). Henderson met Taylor while
    she was checking Hansen out of the Royal Inn and taking him back home (Vol. 3; p.
    123-24; l. 13-20). It was at that time when Henderson broached the subject of Taylor
    and her husband working as live-in caretakers for Hansen, to which Taylor expressed
    an interest.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                             Page 3
    Sometime in January 2014, Taylor, who was accompanied by her husband,
    drove to Hansen’s home in a pickup truck and spent two days “unload[ing] things”
    there (Vol. 3; p. 125; l. 1-18). According to Henderson, “On the second day when
    they [i.e., Taylor and her husband] unloaded the suitcases, she [i.e., Taylor] said they
    would be back Saturday to start the job [as live-in caretaker]” (Vol. 3; p. 134; l. 15-
    17).
    When the Patels returned from India on January 17, 2014, they discovered
    that their dwelling place at the Royal Inn was in “chaos” (Vol. 3; p. 39; l. 21-25)
    (Vol. 3; p. 44; l. 11-15)(Vol. 3; pp. 88-89; l. 2-7, 23-19). Mr. Patel discovered that
    the bedrooms, as well as the back office, living room, and kitchen, had all been gone
    through or burglarized (Vol. 3; p. 40 l. 5-8).
    Upon his return on January 17, 2014, Mr. Patel believed Taylor was still one
    of his employees (App. 3; p. 41; l 21-24). However, Taylor was not at the front desk
    (Vol. 3; p. 41; l. 25), and Mr. Patel never saw Taylor at the Royal Inn again (Vol. 3;
    pp. 66-67; l. 25-2), although Taylor informed Mr. Patel by telephone that she was
    out of town attending to some non-work-related matters (Vol. 3; p. 42; l. 3-10).
    Taylor was later indicted for burglary of a habitation, a second-degree felony
    (Vol. 3; p. 8; l. 9-10)(Vol. 3; p. 25; l. 4-23). Trial was held on October 15, 2014 (Vol.
    3; p. 1). Trial was before the Court instead of a jury (Vol. 3; p. 8; l. 11-17).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                  Page 4
    At trial, the State called an individual named Mr. Rupinderit Singh as a
    witness (Vol. 3; p. 181; 1; 7-8). Singh testified that he owns a convenience store in
    Sulphur Springs named Family Mart (Vol. 3; p. 182; l. 15-18). Singh also testified
    that Taylor worked there (Vol. 3; p. 183; l. 20), and that Taylor had stolen money
    from that business (Vol. 3; p. 183; l. 22-23).
    The trial court found Taylor guilty of burglary of a habitation (Vol. 3; p. 216;
    l. 1). On November 10, 2014, the trial court sentenced Taylor to 15 years
    confinement with TDCJ (Vol. 4; pp. 20-21; l. 22-8).
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred in admitting testimony
    concerning an extraneous offense which the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Higginbotham v. State, 
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d).
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred in making a “Hardesty
    inference” because the allegedly stolen property was found in a place
    where at least two persons other than Appellant had an equal right and
    facility of access.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                               Page 5
    ARGUMENT
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred in admitting testimony
    concerning an extraneous offense which the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Higginbotham v. State, 
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d).
    Taylor was indicted for burglary of a habitation. TEX. PEN. CODE §30.02. To
    be found guilty, the State had to prove that Taylor entered the habitation of another
    – in this case, the habitation of Mr. and Mrs. Patel -- with the intent to commit a
    felony there – in this case, theft. 
    Id. at §30.02(a)(1).
    Theft is defined in Section 31.03 of the Penal Code. Subsection (a) states, “A
    person commits an offense if [s]he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to
    deprive the owner of property.” Subsection (b)(1) states, “Appropriation of property
    is unlawful if it is without the owner’s effective consent.”
    Subsection (c)(1) is what is at issue here. Subsection (c)(1) states that for
    purposes of defining the word “appropriation” in subsection (b), “[E]vidence that
    the actor has previously participated in recent transactions other than, but similar to,
    that which the prosecution is based is admissible for the purpose of showing
    knowledge or intent and the issues of knowledge or intent are raised by the actor's
    plea of not guilty[.]”
    What TEX. PEN. CODE §31.03(c)(1) does not do is identify the level or
    quantum of extraneous offense evidence necessary for purposes of Subsection (c)(1).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                 Page 6
    Thus, the statute does not say whether an actual conviction is necessary, whether
    mere gossip or innuendo is necessary, or whether something in between is necessary.
    Fortunately, this Court of Appeals addressed and answered this question in
    Higginbotham v. State, 
    356 S.W.3d 584
    (Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d). That case was
    brought by a certain Mr. Billy R. Higginbotham, Jr., who appealed his conviction
    for theft. In that case, this Court of Appeals was called upon to resolve the following
    dispute:
    Higginbotham argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony
    concerning an extraneous offense, which the State failed to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt. The State responds that neither TEX. PENAL
    CODE ANN. § 31.03(c)(1) nor TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) requires such
    extraneous offenses to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. . . The
    State claims it was not obligated to prove the extraneous offenses
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    
    Id. at 590-91.
    The dispute in Higginbotham arose in pertinent part from the State’s
    proffer of a witness named Randall Allen York, who testified about similar events –
    namely, construction work – to those forming the basis of Higginbotham’s theft
    conviction. This Court then ruled:
    Although . . . TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(c)(1) . . . [does not]
    explicitly provide that extraneous evidence at the guilt/innocence phase
    must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is well-established that
    such a requirement is implied. See, e.g., George v. State, 890 S.W.2s
    73, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (extraneous offenses introduced at
    guilt/innocence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                Page 7
    We agree with Higginbotham that the extraneous offense of theft . . .
    was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court erred in
    admitting York's testimony.
    
    Id. at 591-92
    (emphasis added). Similarly here, there is no finding from the trial
    court that Taylor had committed theft at the Family Mart. Nor is there any evidence
    that Taylor was ever convicted, indicted, or even arrested for any theft from Family
    Mart.
    POINT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred in making a “Hardesty
    inference” because the allegedly stolen property was found in a place
    where at least two persons other than Appellant had an equal right and
    facility of access.
    In Pardee v. State, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 6823, *4 (Tex. App. – Texarkana
    Aug. 16, 2012, pet. ref’d), this Court wrote, “It is well established that when a
    suspect is found in possession of recently-stolen property and he fails to provide a
    reasonable explanation for his possession of that property, the fact-finder is
    permitted to draw an inference of guilt.” 
    Id. at *4
    (citing Poncio v. State, 
    185 S.W.3d 904
    , 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Hardesty v. State, 
    656 S.W.2d 73
    , 76-77 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1983)).
    Unfortunately for the State, that does not end the analysis. That is because this
    Court went on to state the following in Pardee:
    No inference of guilt can be raised where police found the stolen
    property in a place where others have an equal right and facility of
    access.
    Appellant’s Brief                                                                  Page 8
    Pardee, 2012 Tex. App. at *4 (emphasis added)(citing Blevins v. State, 
    6 S.W.3d 566
    , 569-70 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1999, pet. ref’d)).
    In this case, the evidence is uncontroverted that at least two other individuals
    – Hansen and Henderson – had access that, at a minimum, was equal to Taylor’s.
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, premises considered, Appellant, Tammy Kay Taylor,
    respectfully requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and remanded
    for new trial, and/or for such other and further relief to which he may establish
    himself entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    By: __/s/ Wade A. Forsman_
    Wade A. Forsman
    State Bar No. 07264257
    P.O. Box 918
    Sulphur Springs, TX 75483-0918
    903.689.4144 East Texas
    972.499.4004 Dallas/Fort Worth
    903.689.7001 Facsimile
    wade@forsmanlaw.com
    Attorney for Appellant
    Tammy Kay Taylor
    Appellant’s Brief                                                               Page 9
    CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
    Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), this document contains 2,190 words.
    __/s/ Wade A. Forsman_
    Wade A. Forsman
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    This is to certify that on February 25, 2015, I served a true and correct copy
    of the above and foregoing Appellant’s Brief by email on Will Ramsay, District
    Attorney, at 114 Main Street, Sulphur Springs, Texas 75482.
    __/s/ Wade A. Forsman_
    Wade A. Forsman
    Appellant’s Brief                                                             Page 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-14-00222-CR

Filed Date: 2/26/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2016