in the Interest of M.W. ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-18-00211-CV
_______________________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.W.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CIV30744
MEMORANDUM OPINION
K.F. appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter,
M.W.1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory
grounds exist for termination of K.F.’s parental rights and that termination of his
rights would be in M.W.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(O), (P), (2) (West Supp. 2017).
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To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and her
parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). The Order of Termination also terminated the
parental rights of M.W.’s mother, T.W., who signed an affidavit of relinquishment
of parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(K) (West Supp. 2017).
T.W. is not a party to this appeal.
1
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which
counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record. Counsel certified that Appellant was served with a copy of
the Anders brief filed on his behalf. This Court notified Appellant of his right to file
a pro se response, as well as the deadline for doing so. This Court did not receive
a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the appellate
record and counsel’s brief, and we agree that any appeal would be frivolous. We
find no arguable error requiring us to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief
this appeal. Compare Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating K.F.’s parental
rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by K.F.’s court-appointed appellate
attorney because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of
all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2017); In re
P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event that K . F . decides to pursue
an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, counsel may satisfy counsel’s obligations
to K.F. “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders
brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28.
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AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on September 4, 2018
Opinion Delivered September 20, 2018
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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