Stephanie Sanford, Donald Bowdy and All Occupants v. DC2 Holdings, Ltd. ( 2018 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-18-00059-CV
STEPHANIE SANFORD, DONALD BOWDY AND ALL OCCUPANTS, Appellants
V.
DC2 HOLDINGS, LTD., Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2018-002032-1
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stephanie Sanford appeals from the trial court’s June 15, 2018, agreed judgment. 1 The
agreed judgment recites that “[b]oth sides announced in open court that an agreement between the
parties had been reached to enter judgment.” The judgment then set out the terms of the agreement,
as represented to the court by the parties. The judgment further states, “Defendant waives her right
to appeal this judgment.”
“A party cannot appeal from a judgment to which [she] has consented or agreed absent an
allegation and proof of fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation.” Leeper v. Woodrick, No. 2-04-
371-CV, 2005 WL 1475614, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citing Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ)). “A party’s consent
to the trial court’s entry of judgment waives any error, except for jurisdictional error, contained in
the judgment, and that party has nothing to properly present for appellate review.” Id. (citing
Posey v. Plains Pipe Line Co., 39 S.W.2d 1100, 1101 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1931, writ
dism’d)). If a party wishes to repudiate an agreement, she must do so before the rendition of
judgment. See Giles v. Giles, 830 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
Further, as part of the agreement, Sanford waived her right to appeal the trial court’s judgment.
1
Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013). We are unaware
of any conflict between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
By letter dated August 3, 2018, we informed Sanford of this potential defect in our
jurisdiction and afforded her the opportunity to demonstrate proper grounds for our retention of
the appeal. Sanford did not file a response to our letter.
Considering the foregoing, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: September 11, 2018
Date Decided: September 12, 2018
3