Kevin Manuel v. State ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00079-CR
KEVIN MANUEL APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1419285W
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In exchange for three years’ deferred adjudication community supervision,
Appellant Kevin Manuel pleaded guilty to felony assault of a family member—Iris
Lambert, the mother of his infant son—which was enhanced to a third-degree
felony by a prior family violence conviction involving the mother of his two
daughters.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Approximately one year later, the State petitioned to proceed to
adjudication on three alleged violations of Manuel’s community supervision.
Manuel pleaded “not true” to all of the State’s allegations. The trial court found
two of the State’s allegations “true,” adjudged Manuel’s guilt, and revoked his
community supervision. After hearing additional evidence during the punishment
phase, the trial court sentenced Manuel to ten years’ confinement. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 12.34 (West 2011) (stating that the punishment range for a
third-degree felony offense is two to ten years’ confinement and up to a $10,000
fine).
In his single point on appeal, Manuel argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding that he violated the terms of his deferred adjudication
community supervision, adjudicating him guilty, and sentencing him to ten years’
confinement. We affirm.
We review an order revoking community supervision for an abuse of
discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a revocation
proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision. Cobb v.
State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof by a preponderance
of the evidence of any one of the alleged violations of the conditions of
community supervision is sufficient to support a revocation order. Moore v.
State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Sanchez v.
2
State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The trial court is
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172,
174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
One of the allegations that the trial court found true was that on or about
October 14, 2016, Manuel intentionally threatened to commit murder or
aggravated assault with the intent to place Lambert in fear of imminent serious
bodily injury, a violation of the community supervision requirement that he
commit no offense against the laws of Texas, any other State, or of the United
States.2 To support this allegation, the State offered—and the trial court
admitted—profanity-laced messages that Manuel admitted that he sent to
Lambert. These messages leave little doubt that Manuel was threatening
Lambert with bodily injury. For example, one message read, “I’m snap you small
neck you dirty nasty b----.” Another stated, “B---- I’ma kill you.”
Although Manuel denied that he was trying to threaten Lambert and
professed that he had no intent to hurt her, when asked whether he meant to put
Lambert in fear that she would get hurt, Manuel replied, “I guess you could say
2
Christina Livingston, the business records custodian for probationers
supervised by the 396th District Court of Tarrant County, testified about the terms
and conditions of community supervision that Manuel was alleged to have
violated. She also testified that the terms and conditions were amended to
provide for no contact with Lambert and to require that Manuel wear an ankle
monitor.
3
that, yes.” Manuel claimed that Lambert had provoked him and offered the
excuse that he had been under the influence of alcohol when he sent the
message about snapping her neck.3 Lambert confirmed that the messages had
indeed placed her in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Additionally, when
asked if it was “fair to say [he had] a history of being abusive to women,” Manuel
agreed.4 Because the above evidence is sufficient to support by a
preponderance of the evidence the trial court’s “true” finding with regard to the
State’s first allegation, we overrule this portion of Manuel’s sole point. See
Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926 (requiring only proof by a preponderance of any one
of the alleged violations to support revocation).
Manuel further argues that the trial court assessed excessive punishment
by sentencing him to a maximum sentence, which he contends shows that the
trial court did not take into consideration his testimony that his mother’s death
when he was twelve was a mitigating factor.5 But Manuel did not raise this
3
During Lambert’s cross-examination, Manuel’s counsel offered, and the
trial court admitted, complete text messages between Manuel and Lambert from
October 14 to October 17. These messages provide more context for the parties’
complex relationship but do not contradict Manuel’s above testimony about the
messages.
4
Manuel’s previous assault-family violence conviction had involved his
daughters’ mother, who had also been the victim in his interfering-with-an-
emergency-phone-call conviction and his violation-of-protective-order conviction.
5
During the guilt-innocence phase, Bob Ray Sanders, a former Star-
Telegram reporter, testified that he had known Manuel for eighteen years, when
he wrote a story on Manuel and his family after Manuel discovered his mother
“murdered in her bed.” Sanders said that in October 2016, Manuel had
4
complaint about excessive punishment when his sentence was imposed or in a
motion for new trial. See Laboriel-Guity v. State, 336 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d); Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Banister v. State, No. 02-16-00320-
CR, 2017 WL 1536207, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 27, 2017, no pet.)
(“We have held on numerous occasions that disproportionate-sentence claims
must be preserved at the trial court level.”). Accordingly, he has failed to
preserve this portion of his complaint for our review. We overrule the remainder
of Manuel’s sole point.6
contacted him about turning himself in, and he accompanied Manuel to jail when
Manuel surrendered himself to the authorities.
6
Further, the trial court had wide latitude to determine the appropriate
punishment for the conviction within the statutory guidelines for the criminal
conduct at issue. See Laboriel-Guity, 336 S.W.3d at 756–57. The fact that the
trial court imposed the maximum sentence does not demonstrate that it failed to
consider Manuel’s mitigating evidence; the trial court is in the unique position to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to assess the weight of the evidence
during the punishment phase. See Garrett, 619 S.W.2d at 174. During the
punishment phase, when his counsel attempted to ask him about his mother,
Manuel testified that he had been twelve years old but then became unable to
discuss it. His attorney asked, “Can I ask the record to reflect that it appears that
he’s rather upset?” The trial court agreed that the record would so reflect. The
rest of Manuel’s testimony consisted of assertions that he had not dealt with his
mother’s death, that he had never been treated for any mental problems, and
that he had anger issues; that he had three children and his life was stressful
because he was paying child support to the girls’ mother, who kept them away
from him; and that when he drank alcohol, he said things that he wished he had
not said and that he never meant any of it. Lambert testified during the
punishment phase that she needed time to relocate herself and her children but
that any amount in the two-to-ten-year punishment range would suffice to
accomplish that.
5
Having overruled Manuel’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
BONNIE SUDDERTH
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: SUDDERTH, C.J.; GABRIEL and KERR, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: February 1, 2018
6