Geronimo Scott Aguilar v. State ( 2017 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00373-CR
GERONIMO SCOTT AGUILAR APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1327533D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Geronimo Scott Aguilar appeals his convictions for two counts of
aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age, three counts of
sexual assault of a child under seventeen years of age, and two counts of
indecency with a child by contact. In four issues, Aguilar argues that the trial
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts and
testimony that allegedly constituted backdoor hearsay. Although Aguilar’s four
issues are thoroughly briefed, our review of the record reveals—as argued by the
State—that Aguilar’s alleged errors were not preserved in the trial court for our
review; accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.2
II. BACKGROUND3
When Aguilar was around eighteen or nineteen years old, he got involved
in the music ministry and youth ministry at Set Free in Anaheim, California.
While with Set Free, Aguilar met the complainant’s mother and stepfather and
later moved in with them and their three daughters. Aguilar would sleep on the
couch behind the eleven-year-old complainant, “spooning” with her while his
penis was erect.
When Aguilar’s uncle asked him to move to Texas to perform music for
Kenneth Copeland Ministries, Aguilar agreed. While Aguilar was volunteering
with Kenneth Copeland Ministries, he worked on staff with a ministry called New
Beginnings. Aguilar talked to the pastor of New Beginnings about opening up a
rehab home for the addicts that they were ministering to and volunteered the
complainant’s mother to oversee a women’s rehab home. The pastor gave his
2
Aguilar’s appellate attorneys are not the same attorneys who represented
him at trial.
3
Because Aguilar does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his convictions, we include only a brief background here. Additional
facts, when necessary, are set forth under each issue.
2
blessing, and the complainant’s family moved to Fort Worth in August 1996 when
the complainant was thirteen years old. Within a few months, the pastor of New
Beginnings was unhappy with the way that the complainant’s mother was running
the women’s rehab home, so Aguilar and his wife moved into the women’s rehab
home with the complainant’s family to help oversee it.
While Aguilar’s wife was on a trip to California, Aguilar took the
complainant and her eleven-year-old sister to a house owned by someone
affiliated with New Beginnings and played strip poker with them. On various
occasions, Aguilar “dry humped” the complainant while they both had clothes on.
Aguilar and the complainant also often watched movies together, including Lolita
and Great Balls of Fire.
On Halloween night in 1996, Aguilar came into the complainant’s bedroom
and had sex with her. The complainant was thirteen years old at the time. After
that night, Aguilar and the complainant had “a lot of sex in a lot of different
places.”
When Aguilar, his wife, and the complainant’s family left New Beginnings
and moved to a house in Grapevine, Aguilar and the complainant continued to
have sex, though it was less frequent. The complainant recounted a
conversation that took place in Aguilar’s bedroom in Grapevine when “[h]e was
crying, and he was on his knees, and begging [the complainant] to forgive him
and he was so sorry, he loved [her].”
3
After Aguilar and his wife moved to another house and after the
complainant’s family moved to Euless, Aguilar continued to have contact with the
complainant; he picked her up and took her to motels so that they could have
sex. The last memory that the complainant had of Aguilar was when he picked
her up, took her to his house in Forest Hill, and had sex with her there. The
complainant said that she had sex with Aguilar beginning on Halloween night in
1996 and continuing through 1997 when she was almost fifteen years old.4
In September 1998, Aguilar and his wife moved to Richmond, Virginia,
where he ultimately started his own ministry. As Aguilar’s ministry grew, he “lost
his way,” and by 2006 or 2007, he was involved in a number of extramarital
affairs with parishioners and with females on staff at his ministry. When rumors
of the affairs came to light, C.H., a sixteen-year-old girl who was on Aguilar’s staff
and with whom Aguilar had an inappropriate relationship, confronted Aguilar
about the affairs.
The complainant learned that C.H. wanted to come forward with her
allegations against Aguilar, and that convinced the complainant to come forward
with her allegations against Aguilar that dated back to 1996 and 1997.
Based on the complainant’s allegations, Aguilar was indicted in 2014, and
after a five-day trial, the jury convicted Aguilar of two counts of aggravated sexual
assault of a child under fourteen years of age, three counts of sexual assault of a
4
The complainant was born in January 1983.
4
child under seventeen years of age, and two counts of indecency with a child by
contact. The trial court sentenced Aguilar to forty years’ imprisonment on each of
the two counts of aggravated sexual assault, to twenty years’ imprisonment on
each of the three counts of sexual assault, and to twenty years’ imprisonment on
each of the two counts of indecency and ordered the seven sentences to run
concurrently. Aguilar then perfected this appeal.
III. NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION SHOWN REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF
THE COMPLAINED-OF EVIDENCE
In his first three issues, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts. In his fourth issue,
Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony
that allegedly constituted backdoor hearsay. We discuss each of these
evidentiary challenges below.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence, as well as its decision
regarding the relative weight of the probative value of the evidence, under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 727 (2011); De La Paz v. State, 279
S.W.3d 336, 343–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “The rules of evidence favor the
admission of relevant evidence and carry a presumption that relevant evidence is
more probative than prejudicial.” Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d). As long as the trial court’s ruling falls within
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the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Martinez, 327 S.W.3d at 736; Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003).
B. The Law on Preservation of Error
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the
trial court a timely request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds
for the desired ruling if they are not apparent from the context of the request,
objection, or motion. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Douds v. State, 472 S.W.3d
670, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1461 (2016). A party
must continue to object each time the objectionable evidence is offered.
Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Clay v. State, 361
S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). Any error in the
admission of evidence is cured when the same evidence comes in elsewhere
without objection. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Most complaints, “whether constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, are
forfeited by failure to comply with Rule 33.1(a).” Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d
334, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A reviewing court should not address the
merits of an issue that has not been preserved for appeal. Ford v. State, 305
S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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C. Analysis of Complaints Regarding the Admission of Evidence of
Extraneous Bad Acts
1. Testimony that Aguilar Had an Inappropriate Relationship with C.H.
In the defense’s case in chief, Aguilar was asked whether there was “ever
any time that [he] ever had any inappropriate sexual contact with [the
complainant],” and he responded, “No, sir, never ever in my life and never even
[been] accused of having sex with a child until this [case].” On cross-
examination, the State asked Aguilar without objection whether he had fondled
C.H. and whether he had touched her breasts or her vagina; Aguilar denied any
such touching of C.H. other than giving her hugs. The State then called C.H. to
testify on rebuttal. C.H. testified without objection that Aguilar had expressed
feelings for her when she was sixteen years old5 and had told her to let him know
when she was ready for sex and where she wanted to meet and that he would be
there. C.H. further testified that her relationship with Aguilar progressed from
hugs, to a peck on the lips, and to kissing with tongues and that he then started
touching her butt and her breasts under her bra and “dry humped” her on her
“privates.” When C.H. heard rumors about Aguilar’s affairs with other women,
she confronted Aguilar about the affairs and told him that she was mad at him for
bringing her into this “sick, twisted relationship in the first place”; Aguilar started
5
C.H. testified that she was born in July 1993; she would have turned
sixteen years old in 2009. Aguilar testified that he was born in February 1970;
thus, Aguilar would have been thirty-nine or forty years old when C.H. was
sixteen years old.
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“bawling,” apologized, and admitted that he had a problem. Several weeks later,
C.H. told her godparents that Aguilar had touched her inappropriately. C.H.’s
godfather testified without objection that after he confronted Aguilar about what
he had done to C.H., Aguilar went to counseling.
In his second issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by permitting the State to question him, C.H., and her godfather about his
inappropriate sexual contact with C.H. on the basis that the State was allowed to
clear up the false impression Aguilar had created during his testimony—that he
had never had inappropriate sexual contact with the complainant or any other
child. Aguilar cites to over sixty pages of the record without pointing to a specific
overruled objection that forms the basis of his complaint on appeal.
We have reviewed C.H.’s entire testimony and note that of the five
objections made by the defense, one objection was sustained before the answer
was completed, and no adverse ruling was pursued; three objections were
general objections that preserved nothing for review; and one leading-relevancy
objection about whether Aguilar was crying was not re-urged later when C.H.
testified about Aguilar bawling. Because Aguilar did not lodge specific objections
to the bulk of C.H.’s detailed testimony about their relationship and because
evidence of Aguilar’s reaction to being confronted came in later without objection,
no complaint to C.H.’s testimony regarding Aguilar’s inappropriate relationship
with her is preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Fuller v. State,
253 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding appellant’s failure to object
8
to witness’s testimony at trial waived appellate review of any error associated
with witness’s testimony), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1105 (2009); Valle, 109 S.W.3d
at 509–10 (holding any error in the admission of the objected-to testimony was
cured when the same or similar evidence came in elsewhere without objection).
Moreover, to the extent Aguilar complains that the trial court erred by overruling
unspecified objections during his testimony and C.H.’s godfather’s testimony
about Aguilar’s relationship with C.H., any error in overruling such unspecified
objections was cured when the same or similar evidence came in without
objection during C.H.’s testimony. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509–10.
Accordingly, we overrule Aguilar’s second issue.
2. Testimony Regarding the Complainant’s Motivation to Come Forward
In his first issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence that the complainant came forward with her allegations
against Aguilar only after hearing that there was a sixteen-year-old girl from
Virginia—C.H.—who wanted to come forward with allegations against Aguilar.
The State responds that resolution of Aguilar’s second issue moots his first issue.
We agree. Because we have held that no complaint to C.H.’s testimony
regarding Aguilar’s inappropriate relationship with her was preserved for our
review and because C.H.’s testimony was more detailed than the complainant’s
testimony about C.H.’s desire to come forward, any error in admitting the
complainant’s testimony that she came forward after learning that C.H. wanted to
come forward was cured. See id. We overrule Aguilar’s first issue.
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3. Testimony that Aguilar Had Extramarital Affairs
During the State’s case in chief, Aguilar sought to expose the bias of two of
the State’s witnesses—Jamie Chasteen and Amber Baker—by asking about their
affairs with him. On redirect, the State questioned both witnesses about the
details of the affairs.
Additionally, during Aguilar’s case in chief, his wife Samantha testified that
his affairs were exposed in 2012 or 2013, a former parishioner named Melissa
Dixon testified that Chasteen had admitted to her that she had an affair with
Aguilar, and Aguilar testified in his own defense and admitted that he had
engaged in several affairs. The State cross-examined Samantha, Dixon, and
Aguilar about his affairs.
In his third issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the details of his extramarital affairs through his testimony as well as
the testimony of Chasteen, Baker, Samantha, and Dixon because such testimony
went beyond the scope of the evidence that defense counsel had elicited and
was not relevant. We will evaluate the testimony of each of these witnesses
below.
a. Jamie Chasteen
With regard to Chasteen, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by permitting her to testify, over defense counsel’s relevance objection,
that Aguilar once described her during sex as “look[ing] like a 12-year-old” and
that Aguilar compared their relationship to the movie Lolita. The record
10
demonstrates that Aguilar’s comment about Chasteen “look[ing] like a 12-year-
old” referred to the fact that her makeup came off during sex; Chasteen was not
a minor but rather twenty-three years old when she first had sex with Aguilar.
Aguilar cites no case law, and we have found none, in which making a comment
similar to his or watching Lolita with a woman in her twenties constitutes
evidence of an extraneous bad act. Moreover, earlier in the State’s case in chief,
the complainant had testified without objection that she and Aguilar had watched
Lolita together and that she had noticed that there were similarities between the
movie and her relationship with Aguilar. Because this evidence—which is similar
to but more damaging than the complained-of evidence—came in without
objection, any error in overruling Aguilar’s objection to the State’s redirect
examination of Chasteen on this topic was cured. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at
509–10.
b. Amber Baker
With regard to Baker, Aguilar cites to four pages of the record during which
the State questioned her on redirect about her affair with Aguilar and elicited
testimony that he had also had an affair with Baker’s mother. Aguilar did not
object to this testimony, and there was no running objection in place. Thus, no
complaint about Baker’s testimony regarding her affair with Aguilar and his affair
with her mother is preserved for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Fuller,
253 S.W.3d at 232.
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c. Samantha Aguilar
With regard to Samantha’s testimony, Aguilar complains about the State’s
questioning on pages 123 through 137 of volume 9 of the reporter’s record. The
fifteen cited pages contain twelve objections. Of those twelve objections, Aguilar
specifically challenges on appeal only one objection that was overruled—“I object
to the specificity of the affairs now that the affairs have been acknowledged.
Now I assume we’re going to go through them one at a time”—which was urged
in response to the State’s question about whether Samantha knew that her
husband had an affair with Baker. Any error in the admission of Samantha’s
testimony about Aguilar’s affair with Baker was harmless because the same
evidence was previously admitted by Aguilar during his cross-examination of
Baker. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 509–10.
d. Melissa Dixon
With regard to Dixon’s testimony, Aguilar argues generally that “the State
freely cross-examined her about several other affairs” and cites us to six pages
of the record. On those six pages, only two objections appear, both of which
were sustained by the trial court. Dixon did not give answers to the two
objectionable questions. Aguilar thus fails to identify any objectionable evidence
that came in as a result of the State’s cross-examination of Dixon.
e. Aguilar
With regard to his own testimony, Aguilar cites to pages 96, 97, 140, 146,
184, 191 to 193, and 203 to 204 of volume 10 of the reporter’s record and argues
12
that the State relentlessly questioned him about the details of his extramarital
affairs. Of the pages cited by Aguilar, pages 96, 97, 140, and 184 contain no
objections. Page 146 contains an objection regarding a repetitive question,
which was made and sustained after Aguilar answered; no motion to strike or
disregard was made. Pages 191 to 192 contain an overruled objection to the
question regarding how many women Aguilar brought to the parsonage to have
sex.6 After Aguilar answered the question, the State asked three related follow-
up questions, and Aguilar failed to object to those questions. Thus, any error in
overruling Aguilar’s objection to the State’s question about how many other
women he had sex with in the parsonage was cured. See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at
509–10. On pages 203 to 204, the State asked Aguilar about his presence at a
slumber party where minors were in attendance, and Aguilar answered the
question in the negative before his attorney objected that the question was
cumulative, prejudicial, and “beyond any remote relevance to the case.” The
untimely objection preserved nothing for our review. See Tex. R. App. P.
33.1(a); Luna v. State, 268 S.W.3d 594, 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (holding
untimely objection, which was made after the question was asked and answered,
did not preserve error for appeal), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 883 (2009).
6
Page 193 contains a sustained objection to the question of who else
Aguilar had sex with outside of his marriage. Because Aguilar did not answer
this question, no objectionable evidence came in.
13
f. Disposition of Issue 3
Having reviewed each of the portions of the record cited by Aguilar during
which he and four witnesses testified about his extramarital affairs and having
determined that no error occurred or that no error was preserved for our review,
we overrule Aguilar’s third issue.7
D. Analysis of Complaint Regarding Alleged Backdoor Hearsay
During its case in chief, the State called Elinor Lutine Martinez (Lou), who
knew Aguilar when he ministered in Fort Worth. The State questioned Lou about
a frantic call that she received from the complainant’s mother in the middle of the
night sometime in 1997. Lou testified without objection that after she convinced
the complainant’s mother to calm down, the information she received from the
complainant’s mother “blew [her] mind a little.” The following colloquy then
transpired:
Q. Based upon what she [the complainant’s mother] told you,
without saying what she said, did you give her instructions on what
she needed to do?
A. I asked her what her plans were.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Objection.
Objection.
7
Aguilar also argues that harm from the alleged errors in his first three
issues should be considered cumulatively. Because we have held in each of his
first three issues that no error occurred or that no error was preserved for our
review, there is no harm or not enough harm to accumulate. See Murphy v.
State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“Because we have found
little or no error in the above-alleged points, there is no harm or not enough harm
to accumulate.”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 940 (2004).
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THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Without knowing what was
said, the instructions would imply the answer to what was said,
which is not permissible. We don’t know, so that’s a backdoor
hearsay, and I just object to that. Her giving instructions is not
relevant to the case.
A bench conference followed, during which the parties explained what testimony
might be elicited in response to the question set forth above, and the trial court
ultimately overruled defense counsel’s backdoor hearsay objection. The State
then resumed its questioning of Lou:
Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) Ms. Martinez, what instructions did you
give to [the complainant’s mother] with how she needed to proceed?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Object, Your Honor, for the
record.
THE COURT: All right. Your objection is noted, and it’s
overruled.
THE WITNESS: Do I answer?
Q. (By [PROSECUTOR]) Yes, ma’am. Yes, ma’am.
A. I told her, “You have to report this; you do know that.”[8]
On the following page of the record, the State asked Lou without objection
whether she saw anything being done by authorities—such as law enforcement
or CPS—with regard to the victim, and Lou said, “No . . . [nothing].” Lou testified
Although Aguilar contends on appeal that Lou advised the complainant’s
8
mother to call Child Protective Services, the record reflects that Lou told the
complainant’s mother only that she had “to report this.”
15
without objection that because nothing was being done, she called Pastor
Zaragoza, who was involved with Aguilar’s ministry.
Pastor Zaragoza testified that after he received the phone call from Lou, he
immediately called Aguilar and told him that they needed to have a meeting
“now.” When Aguilar came to Pastor Zaragoza’s house, Pastor Zaragoza
confronted him about the information he had received from Lou and told him that
they needed to do what was right for the girls and what was right for Aguilar,
including that Aguilar needed to get help. Pastor Zaragoza testified without
objection that in response to being confronted, Aguilar “became extremely
distraught, began to weep, cry” and grabbed Pastor Zaragoza’s knee and said
over and over, “I don’t want to go to jail over this.”
In his fourth issue, Aguilar argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting Lou’s testimony because it allegedly constitutes backdoor hearsay
that corroborates the complainant’s accusations. As set forth above, the record
reflects that more explicit evidence than the complained-of evidence came in
later without objection through Pastor Zaragoza. Accordingly, any error in
overruling Aguilar’s backdoor-hearsay objection was harmless. See Valle, 109
S.W.3d at 509–10; see also Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 898 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1994) (holding that erroneously admitted backdoor hearsay was harmless
because other testimony proved the same facts), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114
(1995). We therefore overrule Aguilar’s fourth issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Aguilar’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
SUDDERTH, J., concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 6, 2017
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