Alex Gonzalez v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-14-00434-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
1/13/2015 10:45:19 AM
No. 01-14-00434-CR CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
In the
Court of Appeals
For the
First District of Texas FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
At Houston HOUSTON, TEXAS
 1/13/2015 10:45:19 AM
No. 1368857 CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
In the 339th District Court
Of Harris County, Texas

ALEX GONZALEZ
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee

STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF

DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
TBC No. 796910
kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
JOHN LEWIS
ADETAYO ADEYIGA
Assistant District Attorneys
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel: (713) 755-5826
FAX: (713) 755-5809
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF GRANTED TO APPELLANT
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 39, the State requests oral argument only if oral
argument is granted to the appellant.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Counsel for the State:
Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
John Lewis; Adetayo Adeyiga  Assistant District Attorneys at trial
Appellant or criminal defendant:
Alex Gonzalez
Counsel for Appellant:
Nicole DeBorde  Counsel on appeal
Gary Polland  Counsel at trial
Trial Judge:
Hon. Leslie Brock Yates  Presiding Judge
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 2
A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
evaded from the police in a motor vehicle. ............................................................2
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE ............................................. 6
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ...............................................................3
Burgess v. State,
14-13-00219-CR, 2014 WL 4823781 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014, no pet.) ........................................................4
Chambers v. State,
805 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ...............................................................3
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307319 (1979) .........................................................................................3
Johnson v. State,
871 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ...............................................................3
King v. State,
29 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .................................................................3
Rogers v. State,
832 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1992, no pet.) ..............................................................................................4
Troff v. State,
No. 01-00-01173-CR, 2002 WL 31087321 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ..........................................................................4
STATUTES
TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04 (West 2010) .....................................................................3
RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 39....................................................................................................... i
iii
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with evading detention in a motor vehicle
committed on November 23, 2012 (CR – 13). He pled “not guilty” to the charge,
and the case was tried to a jury (CR – 152). The jury found him guilty, and the
trial court thereafter assessed punishment at 25 years in prison on May 22, 2014
(CR – 152). The appellant filed notice of appeal that same day, and the trial court
certified that he had the right to appeal (CR – 156-157).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 23, 2012, J. Laird with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office was
dispatched to the Christus St. Catherine Hospital in response to an assault call (RR.
III – 12-13). He spoke with the victim and learned that the appellant was the
suspect in the assault and would be returning to the hospital (RR. III – 13). When
the appellant pulled up to the emergency room exit, Deputy Laird approached him
in full uniform (RR. III – 15). Two other peace officers were behind the appellant
in their patrol car with their emergency lights already flashing (RR. III – 14-15)
(St. Ex. 1). Nevertheless, the appellant accelerated away and took off through the
parking lot (RR. III – 15).
Deputy B. Luce was one of the officers in the patrol car, and he took over
the pursuit of the appellant, which lasted for more than two minutes (RR. III – 22-
25, 26). Three patrol cars were involved in the chase (RR. III – 31). As Luce
followed the appellant, he observed that the appellant failed to stop at a few stop
signs as well as at a red light (RR. III – 25) (St. Ex. 1). The appellant finally
stopped when he was surrounded by the officers and had nowhere else to go (RR.
III – 31). The officers discovered that there was a one-or-two-year-old child in the
appellant’s vehicle (RR. III – 26-27).
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR
The appellant claims in his sole point of error that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he evaded the police (App’nt Brf. 8-11). This issue lacks
merit because any rational jury could have found the appellant guilty of evading
based on the mountain of testimonial and direct evidence.
A rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the appellant evaded from the police in a motor vehicle.
The standard of review in the present case is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally or
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knowingly fled from Deputy Luce in a motor vehicle while Luce was attempting to
detain him (CR – 13); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04
(West 2010). The jury was the sole judge of the weight of the evidence under this
review and could choose to believe all, some, or none of it. Chambers v. State, 805
S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Evidence can be legally sufficient for a conviction even if it is entirely
circumstantial. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The
standard of review for circumstantial and direct evidence is the same. Id. It is not
necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt;
it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force
of all the incriminating circumstances. Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
In the present case, the evidence showed that the appellant was a suspect in
an assault when he drove up to the hospital’s emergency room exit (RR. III – 12-
15). Deputy Laird approached the appellant in full uniform while other officers
pulled in behind the appellant with their emergency lights flashing (RR. III – 14-
15). Nevertheless, the appellant took off and led the police on a chase that lasted
until they were able to box him in (RR. III – 15, 22-25, 26, 31). Three patrol cars
3
were involved, and the appellant failed to stop at stop signs and a red light along
the way (RR. III – 25, 31) (St. Ex. 1).
From the above evidence, any jury would have been rationally justified in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rogers v. State, 832 S.W.2d 442, 444
(Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support
conviction for evading arrest where uniformed officer motioned for driver to pull
over and where driver accelerated and was traveling approximately 95 miles per
hour and passed two vehicles in no passing zones before being pulled over); Troff
v. State, No. 01-00-01173-CR, 2002 WL 31087321, *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding evidence legally and
factually sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for evading arrest where
officer noticed defendant weaving in and out of traffic, changing lanes without
signaling, tailgating, and flashing his lights at other drivers and where behavior
continued after officer turned on his lights and siren and where defendant stopped
only when traffic ahead of him came to a standstill); Burgess v. State, 14-13-
00219-CR, 2014 WL 4823781 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2014,
no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient for evading arrest with a motor vehicle
conviction, where officer activated his lights and siren while only a few car lengths
behind defendant with no vehicles in between them, defendant accelerated and led
officer on a high-speed chase while weaving through feeder traffic and attempted
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to flee onto another street and stopped only when forced to do so by another police
car and where defendant and his passengers had just committed a robbery).
The appellant claims that the “deputies did not have to block Appellant’s car
in order to get him to stop.” (App’nt Brf. 9). But Deputy Luce testified that the
appellant had nowhere else to go (RR. III – 31-32). Moreover, the patrol car video
clearly shows the appellant fleeing from Deputy Luce, hitting a speed bump at a
high clip, driving through a red light without stopping, and blowing through some
stop signs all while the emergency lights of the pursuing patrol car are reflected in
the appellant’s rear license plate (St. Ex. 1). Therefore, the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the conviction. Rogers, 832 S.W.2d at 444; Troff, 2002 WL 31087321,
*2; Burgess, 2014 WL 4823781 at *2. The appellant’s sole point of error should
be overruled.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the conviction
should be affirmed.
DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
/s/ Eric Kugler
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002-1923
(713) 755-5826
kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
TBC No. 796910
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program
used to prepare this document reports that there are 1,590 words in it; and (b) a
copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by efile.txcourts.gov to:
Nicole DeBorde
Attorney at Law
712 Main Street, Suite 2400
Houston, Texas 77002
Nicole@BSDLawFirm.com
/s/ Eric Kugler
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002-1923
(713) 755-5826
TBC No. 796910
Date: January 13, 2015
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