Jesus Daniel Hernandez v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  • Opinion filed January 19, 2023
    In The
    Eleventh Court of Appeals
    ___________
    No. 11-22-00345-CR
    ___________
    JESUS DANIEL HERNANDEZ, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 238th District Court
    Midland County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CR56108
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Jesus Daniel Hernandez, entered into a plea agreement with the
    State. Pursuant to that plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to the second-degree
    felony offense of burglary of a habitation, pled true to an enhancement allegation,
    and waived his right to appeal. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2019).
    The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment, in accordance with the terms of the
    plea agreement, at confinement for five years in the Institutional Division of the
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.
    We dismiss the appeal.
    This court notified Appellant and his court-appointed trial attorney by letter
    that the trial court had certified that Appellant waived his right of appeal and that
    this is a plea bargain case in which Appellant has no right of appeal. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (West
    2018). We requested that Appellant respond and show grounds to continue the
    appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a timely response, asserting that he had filed
    pretrial motions that were not ruled upon and that he had filed a motion to quash the
    indictment, which he claims was erroneously denied by the trial court. In his
    response, Appellant also requested a bond, mandamus relief regarding jail-time
    credit,1 and habeas relief.
    In a plea bargain case, Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
    limits a criminal defendant’s right to appeal. Rule 25.2 provides that, in a plea
    bargain case in which the punishment does not exceed the punishment agreed to in
    the plea bargain, “a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised
    by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s
    permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by
    statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Rule 25.2 also provides that, in the absence of
    the trial court’s certification showing that the defendant has a right of appeal, the
    appeal “must be dismissed.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). We note that Rule 25.2 does
    not permit a plea-bargaining defendant to appeal matters related to the voluntariness
    of the plea bargain—unless the defendant has obtained the trial court’s permission
    We note that, if Appellant is entitled to additional jail-time credit, the appropriate means for
    1
    Appellant to obtain such relief is to file in the trial court a motion for a nunc pro tunc judgment. See Ex
    parte Ybarra, 
    149 S.W.3d 147
    , 148–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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    to appeal.   See Cooper v. State, 
    45 S.W.3d 77
    , 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
    Carender v. State, 
    155 S.W.3d 929
    , 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
    Here, Appellant did not obtain the trial court’s permission to appeal. And
    even if the trial court did deny Appellant’s pretrial motion to quash, we observe that
    (1) the plea papers show that Appellant waived his right of appeal and (2) the trial
    court’s certification specifically states that Appellant has no right of appeal. Thus,
    the documents on file in this appeal show that Appellant entered into a plea bargain,
    that his punishment was assessed in accordance with the plea bargain, that he waived
    his right of appeal, and that he has no right of appeal. The plea agreement, the waiver
    of any right to appeal, and the trial court’s certification were each signed by
    Appellant, Appellant’s trial counsel, and the judge of the trial court. The documents
    on file in this court support the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we must dismiss this
    appeal without further action. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); Chavez v. State, 
    183 S.W.3d 675
    , 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
    This Court’s Ruling
    We dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 25.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
    Procedure.
    PER CURIAM
    January 19, 2023
    Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
    Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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