State v. Timothy Wayne Smith ( 2017 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-16-00296-CR
NO. 09-16-00297-CR
____________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
V.
TIMOTHY WAYNE SMITH, Appellee
_________________________________ ______________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause Nos. 16-24980, 16-24981
____________________________________________ ____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two separate cases, the State of Texas appeals the trial court’s order
granting appellee Timothy Wayne Smith’s motion to quash and dismiss the
indictments. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016).1
In each case, the State argued that the trial court erred in granting Smith’s motion to
1
Because the subsequent amendment does not affect the outcome of this
appeal, we cite to the current version of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
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quash and in refusing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the
trial court’s orders.
BACKGROUND
In July 2015, the Jefferson County District Attorney, Bob Wortham, filed a
motion to appoint a Criminal District Attorney Pro Tem to review, and if necessary,
present and prosecute allegations of tampering with physical evidence and tampering
with a governmental record alleged to have been committed by Sergeant S.
Broussard and John Chad Kolander on or about June 5, 2013. Judge John Stevens
signed the order appointing Josh Schaffer as the District Attorney Pro Tem on July
29, 2015, and that same day, Schaffer took the oath of office. In April 2016, Schaffer
filed a motion requesting that Judge Stevens expand the scope of the grand jury
investigation and amend his order of appointment to allow Schaffer to investigate
whether Smith had committed the offenses of tampering with physical evidence and
tampering with a governmental record, and to determine whether to file and present
the allegations to the grand jury for potential prosecution. Judge Stevens signed an
amended order expanding the scope of the grand jury investigation to include the
allegations against Smith.
On May 11, 2016, a grand jury indicted Smith for the offense of tampering
with physical evidence in cause number 16-24980 and for tampering with a
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governmental record in cause number 16-24981. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§
37.09, 37.10 (West Supp. 2016).2 The indictment for the offense of tampering with
physical evidence alleged that on or about June 5, 2013, Smith
did then and there, knowing that an investigation was in progress, make,
present, and use, a document, namely: a probable cause affidavit for a
search warrant, attached hereto as Exhibit A, with knowledge of its
falsity and with intent to affect the course and outcome of the
investigation.
The indictment for tampering with a governmental record alleged that on or about
June 5, 2013, Smith
did then and there, intentionally and knowingly make, present, and use
a governmental record, namely: a probable cause affidavit for a search
warrant, attached hereto as Exhibit A, with knowledge of its falsity, and
the actions of the Defendant were done with the intent to defraud and
harm another, namely: Judge Bob Wortham.
Exhibit A, which is attached to both indictments, is an evidentiary search warrant in
which John Chad Kolander is the affiant. In the search warrant, Kolander, upon his
oath deposed and stated:
Affiant JOHN CHAD KOLANDER is a certified peace officer
with the State of Texas and has been an officer for the past 22 years.
Affiant is currently employed with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s
department and is currently assigned to the Criminal Investigation
division.
2
Because the subsequent amendments do not affect the outcome of this appeal,
we cite to the current version of section 37.10 of the Texas Penal Code.
3
On or [about] the 28th day of May, 2013, Jefferson County
Sheriff Sgt. S. Broussard, Bailiff for the 252nd, arrested a man named
STEPHEN HARTMAN, for the offense of disrupting a meeting and
interference with the duties of a public servant. This offense occurred
in the 252nd courtroom, in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas. District
Judge Layne Walker was presiding in a criminal case.
In a search subsequent to the arrest, Sgt. Broussard discovered in
the pocket of HARTMAN a black fountain pen. This pen appeared to
be a normal fountain pen but upon closer inspection Sgt. Broussard
noticed that this pen was flashing a continuous blue light. Broussard
then notices that this pen is actually a digital audio and video recorder.
It also appears that this pen was activated and could have captured the
events leading up to this arrest.
It is Affiant’s belief that recorded on this pen camera could be
actual footage of what occurred prior to HARTMAN’S arrest. Affiant
requests that this warrant be issued so that investigators can download
and record these audio and visual images if they are available. Affiant
further believes that these recordings will depict the defendant’s
conduct to support the offense of disrupting a meeting.
The clerk’s record shows that Smith, who was employed as the Chief Investigator
of the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office, assisted in preparing the search
warrant affidavit by serving as the typist while Kolander related the facts then known
to Kolander as the criminal investigator.
In May 2016, the presiding judge of the 252nd District Court, Judge Raquel
West, voluntarily recused herself, and that same month, a visiting judge was
assigned to Smith’s cases. In June 2016, Smith filed a pretrial application for writ of
habeas corpus seeking dismissal of his indictments and challenging Judge Stevens’s
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authority to act as the judge and Josh Schaffer’s authority to act as the criminal
district attorney pro tem. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 2.07 (West 2005),
11.01 (West 2015). According to Smith, Judge Stevens’s act of appointing Schaffer
as the criminal district attorney pro tem is a nullity because Judge Stevens was
disqualified from acting in this matter. Smith also complained that Schaffer was not
duly sworn as an attorney pro tem and concluded that the indictments brought by
Schaffer are a nullity since the State of Texas was not properly represented before
the grand jury. Smith filed a motion to quash and dismiss the indictments and a
motion to adopt the writs of habeas corpus and other motions filed by similarly-
situated defendants.
The Jefferson County District Attorney’s office (Jefferson County) filed an
Amicus Curiae Brief in Smith’s case, arguing that the District Attorney did not
voluntarily recuse himself from Smith’s case and was not disqualified from any
matters related to the investigation and prosecution of Smith. Jefferson County
argued that the trial court may not expand the authority of a district attorney pro tem
to investigate and prosecute matters from which the district attorney has not been
disqualified or recused. Jefferson County concluded that it retained the exclusive
authority to prosecute Smith, Schaffer never requested the authority to investigate
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and prosecute Smith, and Judge Stevens did not have the authority to expand
Schaffer’s authority to include the allegations regarding Smith.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Smith’s habeas corpus applications.
The trial court heard arguments challenging Schaffer’s authority to act as the
criminal district attorney pro tem. Schaffer argued that because a pretrial habeas
corpus application was not a proper method to challenge an order appointing an
attorney pro tem or the authority of the judge who made the appointment, the trial
court should refuse to issue the writs without conducting an evidentiary hearing on
the merits of the applications. Smith’s counsel argued that a writ of habeas corpus
should be issued, because Schaffer had no authority to act since Wortham was not
recused or disqualified from investigating and prosecuting Smith. After hearing
arguments concerning whether the writs should issue, the trial court refused to issue
writs of habeas corpus. The trial court also found that there were no grounds to
dismiss Schaffer as the criminal district attorney pro tem. The trial court then
considered Smith’s motions to quash.
The reporter’s record from the hearing indicates that Smith’s counsel adopted
all of Kolander’s counsel’s arguments concerning the motions to quash because
Smith’s and Kolander’s indictments are exactly the same other than their names.
Kolander’s counsel explained that Schaffer attached a search warrant affidavit,
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which had been prepared by Kolander, to the indictments. According to Kolander’s
counsel, Schaffer has “somehow alleged that that affidavit was false and that by
Kolander presenting that false affidavit, Judge Wortham was defrauded or harmed
in some way.” Kolander’s counsel argued that Kolander has an absolute right to
know what Schaffer claims is false within the four corners of the indictment;
otherwise, the indictments fail to allege a crime against which Kolander can defend.
Kolander’s counsel further argued that Schaffer’s act of attaching the affidavit to the
indictments is insufficient to allege what Kolander supposedly did to tamper with
evidence or a governmental document. According to Kolander’s counsel, the
indictment also fails to allege how Judge Wortham was harmed by Kolander signing
the probable cause affidavit; Kolander has a constitutional right to know with what
he is being charged; and, if the prosecutor alleges that a falsity exists, the defendant
is entitled to notice of what the claimed falsity is. Kolander’s counsel maintains that
even if Schaffer amended the indictments to include a known fact that Kolander and
Smith omitted from the affidavit—that fact being that another officer had taken
home and viewed the evidence that was the subject of the search warrant—the
additional fact would not negate the probable cause to issue the search warrant.
Schaffer argued that the indictments provided adequate notice because they
tracked the statutory language and identified the governmental record that allegedly
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was falsified and tampered with. According to Schaffer, based on Kolander’s
counsel’s argument, it was evident that Kolander knew that it was the material
omission of the statement that his counsel identified that rendered the affidavit false
in its entirety. In his response to Smith’s pretrial habeas corpus applications, Schaffer
argued that Kolander learned during his investigation that Broussard had removed
the pen from the chain-of-custody, took it home, viewed it, and then returned it to
evidence. According to Schaffer, Kolander then met with Smith and others
concerning the pen, and a decision was made to apply for a warrant to search the
pen. Schaffer contends that Smith wrote the affidavit in support of the search warrant
with Kolander’s assistance, and Smith and Kolander omitted material information
from the affidavit. According to Schaffer, it was the omission of information from
the affidavit that caused Judge Wortham to issue a search warrant, and had Judge
Wortham known of Broussard’s actions, he would not have issued the search
warrant. Schaffer concluded that Smith’s conduct in making a false affidavit forms
the basis of both indictments. The record shows Schaffer also requested that, in the
event the trial court found that the indictments failed to provide adequate notice, the
trial court grant him leave to consider amending the indictments.
Schaffer further explained that Wortham, who is now the elected Criminal
District Attorney, had requested the appointment of an attorney pro tem to
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investigate, and if necessary, present Kolander’s alleged offenses to a grand jury.
While the motion requesting the appointment of an attorney pro tem did not assert
the factual basis for Wortham’s request, Schaffer maintained that it is undisputed
that Wortham was conflicted from presiding over the investigation and prosecution
of any offense arising out of the Hartman incident because Wortham was a potential
witness. In April 2016, Schaffer and the grand jury discovered information that
caused the grand jury to conclude that good cause existed to expand the scope of its
investigation, and Schaffer presented a motion to Judge Stevens requesting the
expansion of the grand jury’s investigation to include investigating whether Smith
had tampered with physical evidence, tampered with a governmental record, and had
committed aggravated perjury. Schaffer presented the motion to Judge Stevens
because he had appointed Schaffer and because Judge Stevens was the presiding
judge over the grand jury that was investigating the case.
Schaffer explained that he did not give Wortham notice of his request to
expand the scope of the grand jury investigation, because Schaffer was not
authorized to disclose publicly the primary reason for not notifying Wortham and
because the proceedings of the grand jury should be secret. Schaffer argued that if
Wortham were to assert his constitutional right to represent the State in Smith’s case,
the trial court should determine why Wortham is conflicted from prosecuting
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Kolander but not Smith, because Wortham is the named complainant in both of their
indictments for tampering with a governmental record. However, during the hearing,
an assistant district attorney informed the trial court that Wortham did not want to
represent the State in Smith’s case, and that Wortham believed a special prosecutor
was necessary on all the cases.
After hearing arguments concerning the motions to quash, the trial court
granted Smith’s motions to quash the indictments and granted the State leave to
amend the indictments to “make a specific allegation of what the State will rely upon
to convict.” The trial court entered a written order granting Smith’s motions to
quash, subject to the State’s right to amend the indictments within ten days of the
entry of the order. Rather than moving to amend the indictments, the State filed
notices of appeal. In each case, the State filed a motion requesting that the trial court
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the trial court denied the State’s
requests.
ANALYSIS
In issue one, the State argues that the trial court erred in refusing to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law. According to the State, Smith raised multiple
grounds to quash the indictments, but the trial court refused to identify on which
ground it based its decision. In its motion requesting findings of fact and conclusions
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of law, the State mentions that the trial court gave it time to amend the indictments
and instructed the State to “make a specific allegation of what the State will rely
upon to convict.” The State admits that the trial court’s statement suggests that the
court granted the motion on the theory that the indictments were impermissibly
vague because they failed to identify what Smith falsified in the search warrant
affidavit. However, on appeal, the State contends that without findings and
conclusions, this Court cannot know with certainty the basis of the trial court’s
decision.
The State has not pointed this Court to any authority requiring a trial court to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its ruling on a motion to
quash an indictment. While the trial court is not required to specify the reasons for
its ruling when dismissing an indictment, it is a good practice for trial courts to
specifically overrule those grounds not granted; otherwise, the State must challenge
every ground raised in the motion. State v. Sandoval, 842 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d) (stating that when trial court granted motion
to dismiss indictment without specifying which of defendant’s legal theories were
meritorious, the State was required to challenge all of defendant’s legal theories);
see Sovey v. State, 628 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no
pet.). We conclude that the trial court did not err by refusing to make findings of fact
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and conclusions of law. We further conclude that under the circumstances presented
here, the State could have reasonably concluded that the trial court’s order granting
the motion to quash was based on the State’s failure to make a specific allegation of
what the State would rely upon to convict, namely what Smith allegedly falsified in
the search warrant affidavit. In both cases, we overrule issue one.
In issue two, the State complains that the trial court erred in granting Smith’s
motions to quash. The State argues that the indictments are legally sufficient because
they provide adequate notice of the conduct that allegedly constitutes crimes because
the language in the indictments tracks the statutory text of the applicable offenses.
The State identified the probable cause affidavit that Smith made, presented, and
used as the false document/governmental record, and the State attached the affidavit
to the indictments as an exhibit. According to the State, it is not required to allege
what about the affidavit is false because those facts are evidentiary. The State
contends that its response to Smith’s motions to quash put Smith on notice that it
was Smith’s omission of material information that rendered the affidavit false.
Whether an indictment sufficiently alleges an offense is a question of law
subject to de novo review. State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). To meet the accused’s right to notice under both the United States and Texas
Constitutions, the indictment “must be specific enough to inform the accused of the
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nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense.” Id. Article
21.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth requirements for an
indictment and specifically provides that the “offense must be set forth in plain and
intelligible words.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.02(7) (West 2009). Article
21.03 provides that “[e]verything should be stated in an indictment which is
necessary to be proved.” Id. art. 21.03 (West 2009). Article 21.04 provides that “[t]he
certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the
judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”
Id. art. 21.04 (West 2009). An indictment that tracks the statutory language generally
satisfies constitutional and statutory requirements, and the State need not allege facts
that are merely evidentiary in nature. State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998). The trial court should grant a motion to quash “only where the
language concerning the defendant’s conduct is so vague or indefinite as to deny the
defendant effective notice of the acts he allegedly committed.” DeVaughn v. State,
749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Here, both indictments track the language of the statute, but they do not
include the false statement the State would rely upon for conviction. When a
charging instrument fails to allege in what manner a defendant violated a criminal
statute, the omission is a defect in form. See Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385, 387
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(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that the indictment was deficient because it failed
to identify the specific false statement the State alleged the defendant made). A pre-
trial motion to quash is the proper means of bringing a defect in form to the court’s
attention. See Amaya, 551 S.W.2d at 387; State v. Borden, 787 S.W.2d 109, 110
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d). When a defect in form is brought
to the trial court’s attention, the State must respond by amending the indictment to
include a specific allegation of what the State will rely upon for conviction. Cook v.
State, 824 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d). “To
afford a defendant sufficient notice of an offense under section 37.10, the charging
instrument should allege the essential elements of the offense and identify the false
entry.” Id. at 338. Thus, to provide adequate notice of an offense under section 37.10,
the State was required to inform Smith of the precise facts in the affidavit that it
alleged were false. See id.
We conclude that Smith’s indictments are deficient because they fail to
identify the specific false statement that Smith made in the search warrant affidavit.
See Amaya, 551 S.W.2d at 387; Cook, 824 S.W.2d at 337. We further conclude that
the trial court did not err by granting Smith’s motions to quash because the
indictments did not provide Smith with adequate notice to prepare his defense. See
Cook, 824 S.W.2d at 338-39. In both cases, we overrule the State’s second issue. We
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note that in his brief, Smith asserted three cross-issues requesting alternative relief
“in the event this Court believes it has jurisdiction to determine the merits of this
appeal and finds the trial court’s order quashing the indictments in error[.]” Having
concluded that the trial court did not err by granting Smith’s motions to quash, we
need not address Smith’s cross-issues, since they would not result in greater relief.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Having overruled both of the State’s issues and having
concluded that we need not address Smith’s conditional cross-issues in each case,
we affirm the trial court’s orders.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on February 16, 2017
Opinion Delivered February 22, 2017
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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