City of San Antonio v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. ( 2023 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-22-00603-CV
CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
Appellant
v.
DHL EXPRESS (USA), INC.,
Appellee
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2022-CI-02683
Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Beth Watkins, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 25, 2023
REVERSED AND RENDERED
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying the City of San
Antonio’s plea to the jurisdiction. The City argues that its lease agreement with DHL to use City-
owned airport property does not waive the City’s immunity, and DHL’s claims for breach of
contract, declarations, and attorney’s fees are barred. We agree.
We reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment dismissing DHL’s suit for want of
jurisdiction.
04-22-00603-CV
BACKGROUND
DHL Express (USA), Inc., an international express transportation company, has been a
tenant at the San Antonio International Airport since 1990.
A. Lease Agreement
In May 2020, DHL executed a five-year lease agreement for property at the eastern edge
of the San Antonio International Airport. The agreement restricted the leased airport property to
“only be used for aeronautical activities or those that directly support the aeronautical activities.”
On August 6, 2020, the City Council of the City of San Antonio approved a city ordinance
authorizing the five-year lease.
B. Alleged Default
About three weeks later, the City notified DHL by letter that DHL was in default under the
lease agreement. The City claimed that DHL had stopped receiving air freight from flights landing
in San Antonio. Instead, DHL’s flights landed at Austin-Bergstrom International Airport and then
the freight was trucked to San Antonio International Airport for processing and distribution. The
City insisted that DHL was violating the lease provision that the “Leased Premises shall only be
used for aeronautical activities or those that directly support the aeronautical activities.” After
some discussions, the parties could not agree on whether DHL was violating the lease’s terms.
C. Declaratory Judgment Action; Plea to the Jurisdiction
DHL sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether it was in violation of the lease.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting its immunity from suit, and DHL filed its
response. The parties agreed to reset the hearing on the City’s plea to give DHL time to amend its
pleadings. The City amended its plea to the jurisdiction, and DHL amended its suit to add a claim
for breach of contract.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the City’s plea, and the City appeals.
-2-
04-22-00603-CV
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The jurisdictional facts in this case are undisputed. Neither party challenges (1) the
existence or validity of the lease agreement or (2) the City’s status as a local governmental entity,
and both sides agree the City’s lease of the airport property to DHL is a governmental function.
The parties’ dispute centers on whether DHL may sue the City for breach of contract, declaratory
relief, and attorney’s fees.
A. DHL’s Arguments
DHL argues that the City’s immunity from suit is waived under section 271.152 of the
Local Government Code because two lease agreement provisions show DHL will provide goods
or services to the City. Thus, with the City’s immunity waived, DHL may seek declaratory
judgment regarding whether it has violated the lease agreement and seek an award of its attorney’s
fees.
B. City’s Arguments
The City insists its immunity has not been waived. First, it argues that the Declaratory
Judgments Act does not waive its immunity in this case. Second, it argues that the Local
Government Code’s waiver of immunity for a suit for breach of contract does not apply because
the lease agreement does not require DHL to provide goods or services to the City.
Before we address the parties’ arguments, we briefly recite the standard of review for the
trial court’s order denying a plea to the jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Governmental immunity generally protects local governmental entities against both
lawsuits and legal liabilities.” Dallas/Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Vizant Techs., LLC, 576
S.W.3d 362, 366 (Tex. 2019).
-3-
04-22-00603-CV
A local governmental entity is immune from suit for a breach of contract claim if the
contract is for the performance of a governmental function and no statutory waiver of immunity
applies. See San Antonio River Auth. v. Austin Bridge & Rd., L.P., 601 S.W.3d 616, 622–23 (Tex.
2020); Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville (Wasson I), 489 S.W.3d 427, 439 (Tex. 2016)
(applying the “common-law distinction between governmental and proprietary acts . . . in the
contract-claims context).
“[T]he assertion of . . . governmental immunity implicates the trial court’s jurisdiction and
may therefore be asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.” Chambers-Liberty Cntys. Nav. Dist. v.
State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex. 2019); accord Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex. 2004).
To withstand the defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction, the plaintiff must plead facts that
show the governmental entity’s immunity has been waived. Town of Flower Mound v. Rembert
Enters., 369 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (citing Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 226).
Whether the governmental entity’s immunity has been waived—which affects the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction—is a question we review de novo. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at
226; City of San Antonio v. Alamo Aircraft Supply, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2014, no pet.).
WAIVING IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
The legislature has waived governmental entities’ immunity from suit in certain
circumstances. For example, “[a] local governmental entity that . . . enters into [an authorized]
contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of
adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this
subchapter.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152; accord Vizant Techs., 576 S.W.3d at 367.
-4-
04-22-00603-CV
A “‘[c]ontract subject to this subchapter’ means . . . a written contract stating the essential
terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is
properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 271.151 (emphasis added); accord Lubbock Cnty. Water Control & Imp. Dist. v. Church & Akin,
L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2014) (recognizing that “the provision of goods and services
[does] not [have to be] the primary purpose of the contract”).
But “[w]hen a party has no right under a contract to receive services, the mere fact that it
may receive services as a result of the contract is insufficient to invoke chapter 271’s waiver of
immunity.” Church & Akin, 442 S.W.3d at 303 (citing Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City
Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. 2010)).
Further, “the UDJA does not enlarge the trial court’s jurisdiction but is ‘merely a
procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction.’” Tex. Dep’t of Transp.
v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621–22 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer
Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011) (“While the DJA waives sovereign immunity for certain
claims, it is not a general waiver of sovereign immunity.”)). Specifically, “sovereign immunity
will bar an otherwise proper DJA claim that has the effect of establishing a right to relief against
the State for which the Legislature has not waived sovereign immunity.” Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d
at 388 (citing City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)).
DISCUSSION
Here, the jurisdictional facts are undisputed, and we review the questions of law de novo.
See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; Alamo Aircraft Supply, 448 S.W.3d at 510. The City argues the
trial court erred by denying its plea to the jurisdiction because its immunity from suit was not
waived. Having reviewed the undisputed evidence and the law, we agree.
-5-
04-22-00603-CV
A. Airport Lease a Governmental Function
The Texas Legislature has determined that “the planning, acquisition, establishment,
construction, improvement, equipping, maintenance, operation, regulation, protection, and
policing of an airport” is a governmental function. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 22.002(a); accord
Vizant Techs., 576 S.W.3d at 367; Elizabeth Benavides Elite Aviation, Inc. v. City of Laredo, No.
04-19-00717-CV, 2020 WL 2044678, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2020, no pet.)
(mem. op.); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.0215(a)(10) (including airports as
a governmental function).
The lease between DHL and the City allows DHL to process air cargo at the airport, and it
expressly states that the “Leased Premises shall only be used for aeronautical activities or those
that directly support the aeronautical activities.”
We conclude, as do the parties, that the lease agreement is a contract for the performance
of a governmental function. See Vizant Techs., 576 S.W.3d at 367; Elizabeth Benavides Elite
Aviation, 2020 WL 2044678, at *3. Thus, the City has immunity from suit—unless a statutory
waiver of immunity applies.
B. Waiver of Immunity under Chapter 271
The City argues its immunity from suit is not waived by Chapter 271 of the Local
Government Code; it notes that “generally, contracts for land leases—such as the contract at issue
[in the Wasson case]—are not covered by Chapter 271.” Wasson I, 489 S.W.3d at 437 (citing TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)(A)).
DHL argues the City’s immunity from suit is waived under section 271.152 because the
lease agreement requires DHL to provide goods and services to the City. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 271.152 (“Waiver of Immunity to Suit for Certain Claims”).
-6-
04-22-00603-CV
1. Applicable Sections
Section 271.152 waives a local governmental entity’s immunity from suit for a plaintiff to
adjudicate a claim for breach of contract—in some cases. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 271.152.
A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to
enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives
sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the
contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.152.
A “[c]ontract subject to this subchapter” must be “a written contract stating the essential
terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is
properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 271.151(2)(A).
2. Lease Agreement Elements
Here, the lease agreement is a written contract which states the essential terms of the
agreement and was properly executed on behalf of the City. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 271.151(2)(A); Elizabeth Benavides Elite Aviation, 2020 WL 2044678, at *3. The remaining
question is whether the lease is an agreement for providing goods or services to the City. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)(A); Elizabeth Benavides Elite Aviation, 2020 WL 2044678,
at *3.
3. Lease as a Contract for Goods or Services
DHL argues that the lease anticipates that DHL “would provide additional services to the
City through the operation of the lease.” Specifically, DHL points to two articles in the lease.
-7-
04-22-00603-CV
a. Lease Article 13
DHL first cites part of Article 13, but it paraphrases the article; we quote the DHL-
referenced portion of the article’s language:
13.01 Lessee shall have the right to erect, alter, remodel and renovate buildings and
other improvements on the Leased Premises, provided that it shall submit to the
Aviation Director plans and specifications prepared by registered architects and
engineers setting forth the renovations, construction, alterations or improvements
that Lessee desires to perform, in such detail as may be required by the Aviation
Director, and provided that approval of such plans and specifications by said
Director is obtained as set forth below. (Emphasis added).
Article 13 gives DHL the right to erect or modify buildings on the leased premises, subject to the
City’s approval, but no language in Article 13 requires DHL to do so.
Because the lease does not require DHL to build new facilities or upgrade existing ones,
“the mere fact that [the City] may receive services as a result of the [lease] is insufficient to invoke
chapter 271’s waiver of immunity.” See Church & Akin, 442 S.W.3d at 303 (citing Kirby Lake,
320 S.W.3d at 839).
Article 13 does not convert the lease agreement into a contract for providing goods or
services to the City. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)(A); Church & Akin, 442
S.W.3d at 303; E. Hous. Est. Apts., L.L.C. v. City of Houston, 294 S.W.3d 723, 736 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“If every contract that confers some attenuated benefit on a
governmental entity constitutes a contract for a ‘service,’ the limitation of contracts covered by
section 271.152 to ‘contract for goods or services provided to the entity’ loses all meaning.”).
b. Lease Article 15
DHL next points to Article 15’s Maintenance and Repair requirements to show that DHL
“would provide additional services to the City through the operation of the lease.” DHL cites Ben
Bolt to argue that we should consider “services” broadly, and thereby Article 15’s requirements
show DHL is required to deliver services to the City. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep.
-8-
04-22-00603-CV
Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 327
(Tex. 2006).
But Ben Bolt is distinguishable on its facts, and subsequent opinions from the supreme
court with more closely analogous facts have addressed the meaning of services and when a
contract requires them. See, e.g., Church & Akin, 442 S.W.3d at 303–05; Kirby Lake, 320 S.W.3d
at 839.
In this case, Article 15 states in relevant part as follows:
15.02 Except as may be otherwise provided herein, [DHL] shall, throughout the
term of this Lease Agreement and any extension hereof, assume the entire
responsibility, cost and expense, for all repair and maintenance of the Leased
Premises and all buildings and improvements thereon, whether such repair or
maintenance be ordinary, extraordinary, structural or otherwise.
The succeeding subparagraphs in Article 15 provide additional details about what aspects of the
leased premises DHL must maintain and repair, e.g., fixtures, equipment, windows, grass, etc., but
no language in Article 15 requires DHL to deliver goods or services to the City. Contra TEX. LOC.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)(A) (defining a “[c]ontract subject to this subchapter” as one “for
providing goods or services to the local governmental entity”).
Article 15 merely requires DHL to not degrade the premises it has leased from the City or
any improvements to the premises that DHL may choose to make. Further, no language in Article
15 states or implies that the City will pay DHL to maintain and repair the leased premises. See
Church & Akin, 442 S.W.3d at 305 (“[T]he absence of any agreement by the governmental entity
to pay for goods or services may indicate that the claimant did not in fact agree to provide goods
or services to the governmental entity.”).
We conclude that the lease’s requirement that DHL maintain and repair the leased premises
is not a requirement to deliver goods or services to the City. See id.; City of Weslaco v. De Leon,
No. 13-20-00561-CV, 2022 WL 3652501, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 25,
-9-
04-22-00603-CV
2022, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“A lessee’s mere agreement to maintain the hangar free of trash and
weeds is not a contract for services . . . especially when the City did not agree to pay the lessee to
do so.”); Brazos River Auth. v. Brazos Elec. Power Co-op. Inc., No. 10-09-00403-CV, 2010 WL
2523438, at *1, *3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (recognizing that an
agreement to possess, operate, and maintain a hydroelectric facility was not a contract for the
lessee-operator to provide the river authority with goods or services).
Because the lease is not a contract for goods or services, 1 Chapter 271 does not apply: it
does not waive the City’s immunity from DHL’s breach of contract claims.
We turn now to DHL’s declaratory judgment claims, including attorney’s fees.
C. Waiver of Immunity under Chapter 37
The City argues that DHL’s declaratory judgment claims are not the type that waive
immunity under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–.011; id. § 37.004 (waiving immunity for a challenge to a municipal
ordinance), and DHL’s claims for declaratory relief and attorney’s fees are barred by the City’s
governmental immunity.
DHL does not expressly disagree that the UDJA does not waive the City’s immunity from
suit. Instead, it argues “the trial court had jurisdiction over [DHL’s] declarations based on the
Local Government Code waiver contained in Chapter 271.”
As we have explained above, the City’s immunity from suit for DHL’s breach of contract
claims has not been waived under Chapter 271. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 271.152,
.152; Church & Akin, 442 S.W.3d at 303. And even if it applied here, which it does not, Chapter
271 does not waive a governmental entity’s immunity from suit for declaratory judgment actions.
1
DHL does not argue that the lease agreement pertains to the sale or delivery of reclaimed water to the City. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.151(2)(B).
- 10 -
04-22-00603-CV
Cf. Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Boards Risk Mgmt. Fund v. Benavides Indep. Sch. Dist., 221 S.W.3d 732,
740 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (“If we had held that immunity from suit had not
been waived with respect to the contractual claims, then the Fund would have been correct—the
School District could not have circumvented immunity by characterizing their dispute as a
declaratory-judgment claim.”).
DHL has not shown how the City’s immunity from suit has been waived for DHL’s
declaratory judgment claims, including attorney’s fees. See Rembert Enters., 369 S.W.3d at 471
(citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226) (“To invoke the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
a claim arising out of a governmental entity’s contractual obligations, the plaintiff must allege a
valid waiver of immunity from suit and plead sufficient facts demonstrating the trial court’s
jurisdiction.”). Thus, DHL’s declaratory judgment claims, including its claim for attorney’s fees,
are barred. See Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d at 388.
D. City’s Immunity from Suit Not Waived
Because the City’s immunity from suit was not waived under Chapter 271 or under the
UDJA, the trial court erred in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
We sustain the City’s sole issue.
CONCLUSION
In this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying the City of San Antonio’s
plea to the jurisdiction, the undisputed evidence shows the lease agreement was not a contract for
goods or services, and Chapter 271 does not waive the City’s immunity from suit. Because Chapter
271 is the only basis to waive the City’s immunity from suit that DHL asserted, we conclude that
DHL’s breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims are barred. We reverse the trial court’s
order and render judgment dismissing DHL’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
- 11 -