State v. Andrew Bernwanger ( 2015 )

NUMBERS 13-15-00198-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
ANDREW BERNWANGER, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
The State brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order granting appellee
Andrew Bernwanger’s motion to suppress on grounds of collateral estoppel. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46, 2015 R.S.)
(permitting the State to bring an interlocutory appeal of an order granting a motion to
suppress). We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2012, the State charged appellee by information with the offense
of operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 49.04 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46, 2015 R.S.). The arresting officer also
issued traffic citations to appellee for failing to stop at a stop sign and driving in the wrong
direction on the street. A municipal-court jury later acquitted appellee of both traffic
violations.
Appellee filed a motion to suppress the traffic stop and all evidence gained from it
in the State’s criminal case against him. Appellee argued that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel prevented the State from relitigating whether there was reasonable suspicion to
detain appellee because the municipal court jury had already determined that fact against
the State.1 Appellee did not introduce the record of the municipal court trial or copies of
the judgments of acquittal. The State responded that the jury’s decision that the State
did not prove the traffic violations beyond a reasonable doubt was not a determination
that there were not sufficient facts to give rise to reasonable suspicion. The trial court
orally granted appellee’s motion at the end of the hearing. The trial court signed an order
the same day granting appellee’s motion to suppress expressly on the ground of collateral
estoppel. No formal findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested or filed.
II. DISCUSSION
The State argues in its sole issue that appellee failed to demonstrate that the State
1 Appellee’s counsel also stated that he wished to argue two other grounds in his motion to
suppress, but the trial judge informed the parties that he did not have sufficient time for a full evidentiary
hearing that day.
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was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues of reasonable suspicion because:
(1) appellee did not introduce a record of the trial in municipal court; (2) the municipal-
court trial determined different facts and imposed a higher burden of proof on the State
than the burden applicable to a motion to suppress; and (3) appellee did not show that
reasonable suspicion would be lacking even without the traffic violations.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion,
using a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). When no findings of fact are requested or filed, we imply the necessary fact
findings if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
supports those implied findings. Jones v. State, No. 13-14-00183-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___,
___, 2015 WL 730845, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 19, 2015, no pet.) (citing
State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). We review the trial court’s
conclusions of law and application of law to facts de novo unless they turn on
assessments of credibility and demeanor. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273. The trial court’s
decision to estopp the State from relitigating an issue is a question of law applied to facts
that we review de novo. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is embodied within the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy, but the two doctrines are not identical. Clewis v. State, 222
S.W.3d 460, 464–65 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. ref'd) (citing Ex parte Watkins, 73
S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). While double jeopardy protects against a
subsequent prosecution for an offense for which the defendant was acquitted, collateral
estoppel deals only with relitigation of specific factual determinations. Murphy v. State,
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239 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Collateral estoppel means that when a
valid and final judgment determines an issue of ultimate fact, that issue cannot be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit relating to the same event or situation. Id.
(citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
Both appellate and trial courts must examine the entire record of the prior
proceeding to determine precisely what specific facts were actually decided and whether
resolution of those facts necessarily forecloses further proceedings. Guajardo v. State,
109 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The burden is on the defendant to
demonstrate through an examination of the record of the first proceeding “that the [factual]
issue he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Id. at 460
(citations omitted). In the absence of a complete record, “no reviewing court can address
whether collateral estoppel might apply in a particular context or whether a trial court erred
in rejecting that claim in a specific case.” Id. at 457.
B. Discussion
Appellee candidly admits that he did not introduce any part of the record of the
proceedings in the municipal court. Without a complete record of the municipal-court trial
we can only speculate on what ultimate facts the jury in that court decided and whether
those facts necessarily bar further proceedings. We may not base a decision that
collateral estoppel applies on speculation as to what factual findings were made in the
prior proceeding. See id. at 461. While admitting that a record of the first proceeding is
required, appellee requests that we remand this case to the trial court for a full hearing
where appellee may introduce the complete record of the municipal-court trial. We reject
appellee’s request to the extent he asks us to remand without deciding the merits of the
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State’s issue. See Kombudo v. State, 171 S.W.3d 888, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)
(observing that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 requires the courts of appeals to
address “every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”).
We conclude that appellee failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that the State
is collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of reasonable suspicion in the suppression
hearing. We sustain the State’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress on the
grounds of collateral estoppel and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
27th day of August, 2015.
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