Deere & Company v. Francisco Bernal, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Gilbert Bernal, Maria Bernal, Lourdes Bernal, And Jasentha Bernal ( 2023 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed January 17, 2023
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00916-CV
DEERE & COMPANY, Appellant
V.
FRANCISCO BERNAL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF GILBERT BERNAL, DECEASED, MARIA BERNAL,
LOURDES BERNAL, AND JASENTHA BERNAL, Appellees
On Appeal from the 95th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15383
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
This interlocutory appeal arises from the trial court’s order denying
appellant’s motion to transfer venue from Dallas County, Texas. Because we
conclude appellees met their burden to establish appellant maintained a principal
office in Dallas County, we affirm the trial court’s order.
Appellant Deere & Co. (“Deere”) designs, manufactures, and markets
products, including tractors and rotary cutters. Its corporate headquarters is situated
in Moline, Illinois. It has a 230,000 square-foot regional distribution center situated
in Dallas County, Texas. The regional distribution center distributes parts to Deere
dealers in several states. The manager of the regional distribution center supervises
more than fifty-five employees, including several supervisors. The manager of the
regional distribution center does not have a supervisor situated in Texas.
In November 2019, Gilbert Bernal (Bernal) was mowing beside Highway
591 in Comanche County, Texas. Deere manufactured the tractor and large rotary
cutter Bernal operated. Bernal fell from the tractor and onto the ground. The tractor
and the large rotary cutter it towed continued to move in a circular pattern and ran
over Bernal, who died from his injuries.
Francisco Bernal, Gilbert Bernal’s father, sued Deere and Bernal’s
employer, Square G., Inc., in Dallas County, Texas, individually and in his
capacity as representative of Gilbert Bernal’s estate. Other plaintiffs include
Gilbert Bernal’s mother, Maria Bernal, and his children Lourdes Bernal and
Jasentha Bernal.1 They alleged Deere was strictly liable; negligent; and grossly
negligent. They alleged Square G, Inc., Bernal’s employer, was negligent and
grossly negligent. They alleged damages pursuant to the common law, the Texas
wrongful death statute, and Texas survival statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 71.002, 71.004, 71.021.
The Bernals’ original petition alleged venue is proper in Dallas County
pursuant to section 15.002(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
1
We refer to plaintiffs collectively as “the Bernals.”
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“because one or more defendants have a principal office in the State in Dallas
County, Texas.” See id. § 15.002(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ first amended petition specified,
“Deere & Company maintains a ‘principal office’ in Dallas County, Texas.”
Deere filed a motion to transfer venue asking the trial court to transfer this
lawsuit to Lamar County, where co-defendant Square G., Inc.’s principal office is
alleged to be situated, or to Comanche County, where Bernal’s death is alleged to
have occurred. Id. § 15.002(a)(1), (3).
On August 30, 2022, the trial court heard Deere’s motion to transfer venue,
and denied the motion in an order signed August 30, 2022.
Deere filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on September 19, 2022, pursuant
to section 15.003 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code and Rule 28.1 of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. § 15.003; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1.
Deere contends the trial court erred by denying its motion to transfer venue
because Deere specifically denied the Bernals’ venue facts; the Bernals did not
present proper prima facie proof to support venue in Dallas County; the Bernals
did not produce prima facie proof that Deere’s regional distribution center in
Dallas County is a “principal office” for venue purposes; and the Bernals failed to
specifically deny Deere’s venue facts establishing proper venue in Lamar County
or Comanche County.
The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that venue is proper:
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(1) In the county in which all or a substantial part of the events of omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred;
(2) In the county of defendant’s residence at the time the cause of action
accrued if defendant is a natural person; or
(3) In the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the
defendant is not a natural person; or
(4) If Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) do not apply, in the county in which the
plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action.
Id. § 15.002(a)(1)-(4).
The Bernals rely on section 15.002(a)(3) of the civil practice and remedies
code to argue venue is proper in Dallas County. See id. § 15.002(a)(3). “Principal
office” is defined as “a principal office of a corporation ... in this State in which the
decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily affairs of
the organization. The mere presence of an agency or representative does not
establish a principal office.” Id. § 15.001(a).
A corporation may have more than one principal office in this state. See In
re Mo. Pac. R.R., Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
However, even though “a principal office” suggests there can be more than one
office, the word “principal” indicates some sort of primacy. See id. To establish
venue based on a principal office, the Bernals must show the employees in the
county where the lawsuit was filed (1) are “decision makers” for the company, and
(2) have “substantially equal responsibility and authority” relative to other
company officials within the state. See Union Pac. R.R., Co. v. Stouffer, 420
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S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013 pet. dism’d) (citing In re Mo. Pac. R.R.,
Co. at 217, 220). “Decision makers” who conduct the daily affairs are different
kinds of officials than agents or representatives, and “daily affairs” does not mean
relatively common, low-level management decisions. Id. at 240 (citing In re Mo.
Pac. R.R., Co. at 217).
Generally, the plaintiff chooses the venue of the case, and the plaintiff’s
choice of venue cannot be disturbed if the suit is initially filed in a county of
proper venue. See Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260-61
(Tex. 1994). Once the defendant specifically challenges the plaintiff's choice of
venue, the plaintiff has the burden to present prima facie proof that venue is proper
in the county of suit. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 239. A
plaintiff satisfies this burden “when the venue facts are properly pleaded and an
affidavit, and any duly proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and
specifically setting forth the facts supporting such pleading.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
87(3)(a); Roach v. Jackson, No. 05-20-00762-CV, 2020 WL 7258061, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 10, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). This prima facie proof is not
subject to rebuttal, cross-examination, impeachment, or disproof. See Ford Motor
Co. v. Johnson, 473 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied)
(citing Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. 1993)). But if the plaintiff
fails to discharge its burden, the right to choose a proper venue passes to the
defendant, who must then prove that venue is proper in the defendant's chosen
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county. See In re Mo. Pac. R.R., Co., 998 S.W.2d at 216; Ford Motor Co., 473
S.W.3d at 928.
In an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s ruling under section 15.003, the
appellate court must “determine whether the trial court’s order is proper based on
an independent determination from the record and not under either an abuse of
discretion or substantial evidence standard.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
15.003(C)(1); Roach, 2020 WL 7258061, at *3. Accordingly, our review is de
novo. See Galindo v. Garner, No. 05-19-00061-CV, 2019 WL 2098689, at *3
(Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). In conducting this review,
we must consider the entire record, including any evidence presented at the
hearing. Id.; Roach, 2020 WL 7258061, at *3.
We first address whether Deere specifically denied the Bernal’s alleged
venue facts. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 239. In the trial
court, the Bernals argued that Deere did not specifically deny their venue
allegations.
On January 10, 2022, Deere filed a consolidated pleading that included a
motion to transfer venue, which referenced the Bernal’s venue allegations and
stated:
Deere denies these statements; denies Deere or any other defendant
has principal office in Dallas County; denies Deere or any other
defendant had principal office in Dallas County at the time the
incident occurred; denies substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred in Dallas County; and denies
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plaintiffs have pleaded valid basis for maintaining venue in Dallas
County. Plaintiffs have not met “the burden to present prima facie
proof” that venue is proper in Dallas County. See In re Mo. Pac. RR.
Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
Deere requested the trial court to transfer the case to Lamar County or, in the
alternative, to Comanche County.
Deere filed an amended motion to transfer venue on March 2, 2022, seeking
substantially the same relief sought in its original motion to transfer venue. The
amended motion incorporated the affidavit of Troy Schick, a consultant and former
Deere employee. His affidavit stated, among other things, that Deere did not have a
principal office in Dallas County or in Texas that conducts the daily affairs of
Deere within Texas. Schick averred there are no individual decision makers in
Texas who have authority to direct Deere’s business in Texas or otherwise.2
The Bernals filed a verified first amended petition on April 14, 2022. The
Bernals alleged Deere had a principal office in Dallas County. On August 1, 2022,
the Bernals filed a verified response to Deere’s motion to transfer venue. The
Bernals supported their verified response with three exhibits: excerpts from
Schick’s deposition, the affidavit of Peter J. Sullivan,3 and the Bernal’s verified
first amended petition.
2
The amended motion also incorporated the affidavit of Brenda Gibson, an employee of Square G.,
Inc. Her affidavit stated Square G., Inc.’s principal office was in Lamar County.
3
Deere objects here to the “Affidavit of Peter J. Sullivan, with Exhibits and CV.” The Bernals
respond, “The Court does not need to address these issues because the record evidence on which the
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On August 23, 2022, Deere filed a consolidated pleading that included a
denial of the Bernals’ venue facts. Deere continued to allege that it did not have a
principal office in Dallas County or in Texas at the time of Mr. Bernal’s death.
Also on August 23, 2022, Deere filed a reply in support of its amended motion to
transfer venue. In it, Deere denied the Bernals’ alleged venue facts. Deere argued
the Bernals failed to establish that (1) the Dallas warehouse is a principal office of
Deere, (2) the warehouse manager is a decision maker who conducts Deere’s day-
to-day operations, and (3) employees of the Dallas warehouse have equal or
superior responsibility or authority compared to other Deere employees in Texas.
Deere relied on the affidavit and deposition testimony of Schick.
On August 30, 2022, the Bernals filed a sur-reply to Deere’s amended
motion to transfer venue. The sur-reply cited the deposition testimony of Schick.
The Bernals argued, in part, that Deere failed to specifically deny “all” of their
alleged venue facts but “only some of the venue facts, which is insufficient.”
Consequently, they argued, Deere’s motion to transfer venue “cannot be heard and
must be denied outright . . . .” They cited to Rule 87(3)(a) of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3). Rule 87(3)(a) provides, in part,
All venue facts, when properly pleaded, shall be taken as true unless
specifically denied by the adverse party. When a venue fact is
Plaintiffs rely in this Brief is (1) Schick’s testimony and affidavits and (2) a screenshot of a map on John
Deere’s website, which Schick did not dispute came from John Deere.”
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specifically denied, the party pleading the venue fact must make prima
facie proof of that venue fact . . . .
Id. 87(3)(a).
Case law does not support the Bernals’ argument that Rule 87(3)(a) required
Deere to specifically deny all its venue allegations. Rather, “If the defendant
specifically denies any of the venue facts pleaded by the plaintiff, the plaintiff must
make prima facie proof of the venue facts(s) denied.” See State v. Life Partners,
Inc., 243 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (per curiam)
(emphases added); In re Stroud Oil Props., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 18, 22-23 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2002, orig. proceeding) (emphasis added). “If the defendant fails to
specifically deny any of the pleaded venue facts, they are taken as true.” In re
Stroud Oil Props., Inc., 110 S.W.3d at 23 (emphasis added). The Bernals offer no
contrary authority.
Based on the venue pleadings and evidence summarized above, we conclude
Deere specifically denied the Bernals’ venue allegations. See id.Consequently, it became the Bernals’ burden to establish a prima facie case
that venue is proper in Dallas County because Deere maintains a principal office
there. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 239. We first consider
whether the Bernals established the Dallas regional distribution center had a
decision maker who conducted the “daily affairs” of Deere and who ran the
company from day to day. See In re Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220.
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Deere’s amended motion incorporated an affidavit from Troy Schick, a
tractor-engineering consultant and former Deere employee. Schick’s affidavit
describes Deere’s structure and operations in Texas. Schick avers Deere does not
maintain a principal office in the State of Texas, and does not establish a principal
office in each state where its products are sold. Deere’s operations are centralized
and controlled from its headquarters located in Moline, Illinois. The decision
makers with responsibility for day-to-day operations of Deere throughout the
United States work at Deere’s headquarters in Moline, Illinois. All decisions
affecting Deere as an organization in Texas or otherwise—relating to design,
manufacture, sale, or distribution of products—are made outside of Texas.
Contracts are negotiated, policies and procedures are prepared, and financial
strategies are formulated at Deere’s headquarters in Moline.
Schick’s affidavit stated there is no district, regional, or principal office of
Deere situated in Dallas County—or in any other Texas County—that conducts the
daily affairs of Deere within the State of Texas or otherwise. There are no
individual decision makers within the State of Texas who have authority to direct
Deere’s business within the State of Texas or otherwise.
The affidavit states that as of November 22, 2019, Deere’s presence in
Dallas County consisted of the ownership and operation of a parts warehouse and
dealer training center. The warehouse is one of several regional warehouses
distributing parts to dealers in a specific region. About fifty-five employees
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worked at the warehouse. The employees include a depot manager who manages
the warehouse; an office administrator; three supervisors who run the warehouse
floor; warehouse workers; an inventory analyst who handles restocking parts; two
shipping coordinators who manage inbound and outbound parts; truck drivers; and
maintenance employees. The manager of the parts warehouse reports to Deere in
Illinois. The dealer training center, which consisted of systems training for dealer
technicians, closed in October 2021. The parts warehouse is Deere’s only physical
presence in Dallas County.
The affidavit further stated that the regional distribution center does not
receive orders directly from dealers, or deal directly with individual consumers.
Dealers place orders on an online application, and the application information is
transmitted to one of several parts distribution centers based on parts inventory and
other factors. Parts orders from dealers in Texas are often fulfilled by parts centers
outside of Texas and not necessarily by the parts warehouse in Dallas County.
According to the affidavit, no one at the Dallas parts warehouse or the dealer
training facility participated or participates in day-to-day decisions with respect to
Deere’s operations in Texas or elsewhere. No Dallas County Deere employee is a
decision-making official. The sole function of the Dallas warehouse is to receive
and distribute orders to dealers based on information provided online by the dealer
and transmitted to the Dallas regional parts center. None of the warehouse
employees control, manage, or have authority over any other Deere distribution
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warehouse, office, or other facility in Texas or elsewhere. No decisions regarding
any of the daily operations of Deere’s business—including the design,
manufacture, testing, marketing, or sale of Deere products—are made in the Dallas
parts warehouse, the former Dallas dealer training facility, or any other facility in
Texas.
Last, Schick’s affidavit states that all other Deere employees in Texas—
including sales representatives and territory customer support—operate throughout
the State of Texas, and their presence in Dallas County is no more significant than
their presence in any other Texas county. All Deere’s agents and representatives in
Texas report to their department heads who work outside of Texas.
Deere and the Bernals also relied on Schick’s deposition testimony. His
deposition testimony generally overlapped his affidavit testimony although it
supplemented it. He testified Deere initially receives parts and components at its
North American parts distribution center in Moline, Illinois. The parts are received,
inventoried, and stored there. The North American parts distribution center ships
parts to the Dallas regional distribution center by truck. When a regional
distribution center receives shipments from the main warehouse in Moline,
shipping coordinators and inventory personnel at the Dallas regional distribution
center inventory the part(s) and place them in bin or rack. The dealers order part(s)
from Deere electronically. The dealers’ orders are received by Deere in Moline.
Deere decides which regional distribution center will fill the order and
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electronically notifies the regional distribution center that has the part(s) in stock.
Workers at the Dallas regional distribution center receive an electronic file that
identifies the part(s), the quantity, the location of the part(s) in the regional
distribution center, and where the part(s) needs to be shipped. Employees at the
Dallas regional distribution center subsequently locate the part(s) and provide it to
a local carrier who then ships the parts(s) to particular Deere dealers.
Schick testified that the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center
does not make product-distribution decisions. The depot manager is “a link” in a
larger process. The job of the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center is
to make sure the orders that come in from Illinois are executed at the Dallas
regional distribution center. Schick said, “I couldn’t call it coordinating. He’s
given a job to do and that’s what he does.”
However, Schick testified the manager of the Dallas regional distribution
center manages the center’s employees and the warehouse facilities. He does not
have a supervisor located in Texas. He is the highest-level employee at the regional
distribution center. His job is to operate the regional distribution center. The
employees report to him. He is responsible for daily operations of receiving orders,
sending them out, and running the regional distribution center. He is responsible
for managing the physical facility, the building, and the employees. Concerning the
extent of actual day-to-day decision making that takes place by decision makers in
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Illinois and imposed on the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center,
Schick testified:
Q: Is anybody actually in charge of parts distribution at all at these regional
locations or is it all handled remotely?
A: It’s not remote in that the decisions are handled by the higher level
management but the system itself, it’s it – it runs in real time through the
Milan (sic) North America distribution center, so those computers are all
connected and orders are pushed out. That’s all handled in real time from
Milan (sic).
In arguing the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center was not a
decision maker, Deere relies, in part, on this Court’s opinion in Roach v. Jackson.
2020 WL 7258061, at *1. In Roach, the defendant argued it had no principal office
in Texas. Id. at *5. The defendant maintained that all its “decision makers” were in
its Virginia corporate headquarters. Id. It contended that even its top employees in
Dallas lacked authority or discretion to be “decision makers” and instead
performed only routine, lower-level tasks that could not be fairly categorized as the
company’s “daily affairs.” Id.
Deere makes several arguments in support of its claim that the manager of
the Dallas regional distribution center is not a “decision maker” for venue
purposes. First, Deere argues that the manager performs several low-level
management duties identified in Roach, such as ensuring that payroll is correct and
on time, maintaining the safety and reliability of equipment, implementing training
programs, enforcing compliance with company standards, managing shop
operations, and similar responsibilities. See id. at *6.
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However, Schick testified the manager of the Dallas regional distribution
center supervises more than fifty-five Deere employees, including supervisors and
others, is responsible for a 230,000 square foot facility, and serves Deere
dealerships and their customers in several states. Schick’s affidavit and deposition
testimony, described above, identified numerous areas—other than the routing of
particular parts—in which the manager of the regional distribution center is the
authoritative figure in managing the regional facility and its layers and departments
of employees. Schick did not identify a decision maker of higher authority in
Texas who made day-to-day decisions in running the company, the employees, and
the facility than the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center.
In Roach, the defendant’s second-highest-ranking employee in Texas
directed managers and activities within various terminals in the district. Id.
Notably, he did so “at the direction of” defendant’s corporate office in Virginia and
“in accordance with its ‘guidelines.’” Id. The employee in Roach supervised
defendant’s activities, including discussing the number of local drivers to be used
on a daily basis to pick up and deliver freight, controlling cost, and matching
drivers to the workload. Id. This Court concluded in Roach that these activities
were different from “low-level management decisions.” Id.
A second decision maker in Roach directed the district operations managers,
made decisions for defendant on a day-to-day basis according to guidelines “given
to him by the corporate office” in Virginia, coordinated and directed defendant’s
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activities within Texas ‘[a]t the direction of the corporate office” in Virginia, met
corporate goals of efficiency and productivity and things of that sort, matching
people to workloads pursuant to goals given by the corporate office. Id. at *6. The
facts in Roach closely resemble those here.
Second, Deere argues that the day-to-day responsibilities of the decision
makers in Roach, unlike the manager of the regional distribution center here,
“reached far beyond” the Dallas County facility where they worked. Deere fails to
cite to an opinion that requires a decision maker to manage personnel “far beyond”
his or her office. Moreover, Roach concerned a defendant transportation company
that served three states, was divided into six regions, and was further divided into
twelve districts. See Roach, 2020 WL 7258061, at * 6.
Third, Deere argues that the manager of the regional distribution center is
not “necessarily” a decision maker simply because he is the highest-ranking
employee at that location and is in charge of operations and employees there.
Deere’s argument fails in light of Schick’s testimony concerning the authority of
the manager of the regional distribution center.
We see no meaningful distinction from the facts described in Roach that
Deere’s system of routing certain parts to certain destinations preempts any higher-
level day-to-day decision making by the manager of the Dallas regional
distribution center. Schick’s affidavit and deposition testimony, described above,
identified numerous areas—other than the routing of particular parts—in which the
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manager of the regional distribution center is the authoritative figure in managing
the regional facility and its layers and departments of employees. Schick did not
identify a decision maker of higher authority in Texas who made day-to-day
decisions in running the company, the employees, and the facility than the manager
of the Dallas regional distribution center.
We conclude the manager of the Dallas regional distribution center was a
decision maker for purposes of establishing proper venue in Dallas County as a
principal office of Deere. Here, as in Roach, C-Suite decisions were not apparent,
and some actions in Texas were guided from out of state. Id. at *6. We must follow
materially indistinguishable decisions of earlier panels of this Court unless a higher
authority has superseded that prior decision. See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645
S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022) (“Typically, a higher authority includes a decision
from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court, or the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals; an en banc decision of the court of appeals itself; or an
applicable legislative or constitutional provision.”) (footnotes omitted). Roach has
not been demonstrated to be materially distinguishable from this case, and we
follow our precedent.
We next consider whether the Dallas regional distribution center was
“clearly” subordinate to and “controlled by” another Deere office in Texas. In re
Mo. Pac. R.R., Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220; Roach, 2020 WL 7258061, at *7. In his
affidavit, Schick averred there is no district, regional, or principal office of Deere
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situated in Dallas County—or in any other Texas County—that conducts the daily
affairs of Deere within the State of Texas or otherwise. He testified there are no
individual decision makers within the State of Texas who have authority to direct
Deere’s business within the State of Texas or otherwise. We conclude the Dallas
regional distribution center was not “clearly” subordinate to and “controlled by”
another Deere office in Texas. See In re Mo. Pac. R.R., Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220;
Roach, 2020 WL 7258061, at *7.
We conclude the Bernals established a prima facia case that venue is proper
in Dallas County pursuant to section 15.002(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(a)(3); In re Mo.
Pac. R.R., Co., 998 S.W.2d at 217-21.
Because the Bernals established proper venue in Dallas County under
section 15.002(a)(3) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, we do not
reach Deere’s contention that venue should be transferred to Comanche County or
to Lamar County.
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We affirm the trial court’s order denying Deere’s motion to transfer venue.
/Bill Pedersen, III/
BILL PEDERSEN, III
JUSTICE
220916F.P05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
DEERE & COMPANY, Appellant On Appeal from the 95th District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00916-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-15383.
Opinion delivered by Justice
FRANCISCO BERNAL, Pedersen, III. Justices Goldstein and
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS Smith participating.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF GILBERT BERNAL,
DECEASED, MARIA BERNAL,
LOURDES BERNAL, AND
JASENTHA BERNAL, Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the order of the trial
court denying appellant Deere & Company’s motion to transfer venue is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees FRANCISCO BERNAL, INDIVIDUALLY
AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GILBERT BERNAL,
DECEASED, MARIA BERNAL, LOURDES BERNAL, AND JASENTHA
BERNAL recover their costs of this appeal from appellant DEERE & COMPANY.
Judgment entered this 17th day of January, 2023.
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