Martin Herrera v. State ( 2018 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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MARTIN HERRERA, No. 08-17-00043-CR
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Appellant, Appeal from
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v. 41st District Court
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THE STATE OF TEXAS, of El Paso County, Texas
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Appellee. (TC # 20140D05440)
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OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant Martin Herrera of evading arrest or detention by use of a
vehicle. Appellant’s sole complaint on appeal is that the evidence is insufficient to support the
conviction. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of what could have been a routine traffic stop. Instead, the
circumstances led the State to indict Appellant for evading arrest or detention in a vehicle. The
State also indicted Appellant for retaliation when he later made threatening statements to the
arresting police officer. The guilt-innocence phase of the trial featured just one witness--the police
officer who pulled Appellant over, and against whom Appellant made the threats. The jury was
also aided by a dashcam video that showed Appellant twice come to a stop and then twice pull
away from a marked police unit with its emergency flashers engaged. The jury returned a guilty
verdict on the evading charge by use of a vehicle. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
retaliation charge, which has subsequently been dismissed.
The felony evading charge was enhanced through two prior felony convictions. The
punishment phase, tried to the judge, included the State’s evidence of Appellant’s several prior
convictions, a family assault/breaking and entering event, and Appellant’s gang affiliation. In
response, Appellant offered evidence showing a positive relationship with his family. The trial
judge found both enhancement paragraphs true and sentenced Appellant to a prison term of sixty
years.
Appellant’ sole point of error contends the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the
jury’s verdict on the evading charge.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Evidence is legally sufficient when, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, any
rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks
v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010)(establishing legal insufficiency under
Jackson v. Virginia as the only standard for review of the evidence).
The jury is the sole judge of credibility and the weight attached to the testimony of each
witness. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014). It is the fact finder’s duty
“to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts.” See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.
2007), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. The jury also may choose to believe or
disbelieve that testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Belton v.
State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 897 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d). When the record supports
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conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and
we defer to that determination. Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99
S.Ct. at 2789.
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170;
Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 n.20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013), citing Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the
guilt of the appellant, so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
sufficient to support the conviction. Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We remain mindful that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil,
and there is no higher standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.“
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). Nonetheless, if a rational fact finder could
have found the defendant guilty, we will not disturb the verdict on appeal. Fernandez v. State, 479
S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016).
EVADING
Section 38.04 of the Penal Code criminalizes “intentionally flee[ing] from a person [the
actor] knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or detain
him.” TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a)(West 2016). The misdemeanor offense is elevated to a
felony, when among other things, the person uses a “vehicle or watercraft while the actor is in
flight[.]” Id. at § 38.04(b)(1)(B).
The offense has three essential elements: (1) the actor knows that a law enforcement officer
(2) is lawfully attempting to arrest or detain him, and (3) the actor flees. Id. The act of fleeing
does not require a high-speed chase, nor even that the effort to flee is effectual. Mayfield v. State,
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219 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.). “It requires only an attempt to get
away from a known officer of the law. Thus, under the law, fleeing slowly is still fleeing.” Id.
Stated otherwise, fleeing “is anything less than prompt compliance with an officer’s direction to
stop.” Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet). Speed, distance,
and duration of the pursuit are all factors in determining whether the actor intentionally fled, but
“no particular speed, distance, or duration is required to show the requisite intent.” Griego v. State,
345 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
The actor must also know that a police officer is trying to arrest or detain him. Jackson v.
State, 718 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Duvall v. State, 367 S.W.3d 509, 511
(Tex.App.--Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d). We may infer an actor’s mental state from his actions
and statements during and after the incident. Cf. Griego, 345 S.W.3d at 753 (finding no
circumstances supported knowledge element) with Blozinski v. State, 14-07-00664-CR, 2009 WL
7098572, at *1 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 2, 2009, no pet.)(mem op. on rehearing, not
designated for publication)(defendant’s actions in moving car once stopped and statement “I’m
sorry. I’m sorry. . . . I just wanted to get away from you” supported finding that defendant had
intentionally fled from the officer trying to effectuate stop).
DISCUSSION
A reasonable jury could have concluded that Appellant knew a peace officer was
attempting to detain him, and that in the face of that knowledge, Appellant fled.
The State presented its case through the testimony of Patrol Officer Danny Conway. His
police cruiser was equipped with a camera that also documented the stop. Just after mid-night on
September 29, 2014, Officer Conway was patrolling on Dyer Street, a busy four lane road with
two lanes of travel in each direction. Officer Conway was in uniform, and his car was distinctively
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marked as an El Paso Police Department vehicle. As he passed a bar, he saw Appellant pull out
of the bar’s parking lot with his vehicle lights off. When Appellant did not turn his lights on,
Officer Conway executed a U-turn and accelerated his vehicle to catch up to Appellant.
Appellant had also accelerated his vehicle. He then attempted to make a left hand turn onto
Mountain Street, a side road leading into a residential neighborhood. Appellant missed the turn,
however, and swung wide jumping the curb, such that his car was stopped and partially protruding
onto Dyer Street. Officer Conway pulled up behind Appellant’s car with his overhead emergency
lights engaged. Appellant then drove his vehicle off the curb and he stopped about half-way down
the block of Mountain Street. Officer Conway’s cruiser pulled behind him, with its emergency
lights and a spotlight engaged.
After about five seconds, however, Appellant drove off. At the next cross street, Appellant
turned right without signaling. Officer Conway pursued, and Appellant then stopped a third and
final time almost at the end of the short block. Officer Conway exited his vehicle, drew his service
revolver, and had Appellant exit his vehicle. While doing so, Appellant repeatedly stated, “I know
I f**ked up. I’m drunk. I stole a car at the bar.”1
Much of Appellant’s argument on appeal turns on a misinterpretation of Officer Conway’s
testimony. Appellant argues that Office Conway unequivocally agreed that Appellant was not
fleeing. We simply do not read the record that way. When officer Conway was cross-examined
about the time when Appellant first came to a stop--as he was hung up on the curb on Dyer and
Mountain-- the officer conceded that it was not improper for Appellant to have pulled out of the
traffic flow on Dyer:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Now, right here, he’s right in the middle of the
street so he’s not going to stop there for police interrogation. Isn’t it reasonable
that he goes somewhere and pulls over along the side of the road?
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Subsequent investigation did not turn up any evidence that the vehicle was actually stolen.
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[OFF. CONWAY]: Well, off the curb and onto the -- yes, sir.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So that would be reasonable, for him to move.
Now, he doesn’t accelerate rapidly. Right?
[OFF. CONWAY]: Correct.
As counsel played the video, and questioned Officer Conway about later segments of the
encounter, he repeated the Officer’s earlier concession before asking some other question. In that
way, it might appear that Officer Conway was conceding that Appellant never evaded the stop.
Here are examples:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you’ve just said, ‘Hey, he’s not trying to run from
me. He’s not trying to permanently distance himself from me.’ And at this time
it’s 41:01. Is that correct?
[OFF. CONWAY]: Yes, sir.
...
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, up until this point, you’ve got a guy here. You said,
‘No, he wasn’t trying to get away from me, but yes, he was in his car, and he was
intoxicated.’ Is that about right?
[OFF. CONWAY]: Yes, sir.
But when defense counsel asked the question directly, Officer Conway stated that he did
believe that Appellant was fleeing:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So it’s not a felony stop, as you just testified, and
you just testified that he’s not trying to get away from you, and you just testified
that you stopped him because of his odd actions. So nothing so far from where the
car was operating to where the car came to its final resting point, nothing there
indicates evading. Does it?
[OFF. CONWAY]: Yes, sir, it does.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But you’ve just told me he wasn’t trying to get away from
you.
[OFF. CONWAY]: Here at this point. You asked me --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So up until now, he’s not evading.
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[OFF. CONWAY]: He was evading, in my opinion. And as --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But -- hold on. You didn’t say that before, though.
Before, you said that he wasn’t up until now, no, he’s not trying to get away from
me. That’s what you just said.
[STATE’S ATTORNEY]: I’m going to object. That’s a mischaracterization, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Appellant’s counsel in fact confronted the officer with what counsel believed was a flip-
flop in his testimony:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s not what you told me the first time I asked. I asked
you, ‘Is he intentionally trying to distance himself from you?’ And you said no.
Didn’t you --
[OFF. CONWAY]: At that point where he stopped, no, he was not, at that time.
From the time he moved his vehicle after stopping the first time until he stopped
then, yes, he was evading.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m thinking you’re changing your story now, Officer.
And I think the Jury realizes that. Bottom line is, not evading on the video. You
didn’t arrest him for evading at that point. You were arresting him for DWI.
[OFF. CONWAY]: No, sir.
In our reading of the record, Officer Conway never unequivocally stated over the sequence
of the entire encounter that Appellant did not flee. Rather, in context, he claims just the opposite.
But in any event, the testimony at most raises a dispute that turns on the officer’s credibility, an
issue vested solely with the jury. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (the fact finder resolves conflicts in
the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts).
Moreover, even if we did agree that the officer made the admission, it would not be binding on the
jury. The jury also had the videotape that shows Appellant stop and then move forward twice,
traveling about a block and half between the first stop and when he eventually came to a complete
and final stop.
Appellant also relies on the Amarillo Court of Appeals decision in Griego v. State, where
the court found the evidence insufficient to support an evading charge. The facts of that case are
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distinguishable. In Griego two squad cars with their lights flashing were headed in one direction
while Mr. Griego was driving in the opposite direction. 345 S.W.3d at 746. The squad cars
executed a U-turn, but by the time they caught up to Griego, he had already turned off the main
road and was on a side street. Id. at 747. He then made a signaled right-hand turn, and almost
immediately turned into a driveway. Id. A total of seventeen seconds elapsed from the time the
police cruisers were behind Griego with their lights engaged to the time that he stopped. Id. at
752. The court further noted that Griego probably only had eight seconds to react to the officers.
Id.
The court found the evidence insufficient to show that Griego was aware that the officers
were pursuing him--an issue that Appellant here does not raise. Instead, Appellant argues that he
was not fleeing. Moreover, the dashcam video in this case shows an elapsed fifty seconds between
the time Appellant was first stopped, to the time when he came to a final stop. And more
importantly, the video shows Appellant making an interim stop for five seconds with the police
cruiser pulled behind him. Officer Conway claims that as he opened his door to exit the police
cruiser, Appellant then drove away and made an un-signaled turn onto another street. Only when
Officer Conway continued to pursue him, did he come to a complete and final stop. Appellant’s
admission that he “f**ked up” and was intoxicated, driving a stolen car provides a reason why he
would attempt to flee, albeit briefly and ineffectually.2 See Blozinski, 2009 WL 7098572, at *1 (in
part, post-stop statement “I’m sorry. I’m sorry. . . . I just wanted to get away from you” supported
evading verdict).
2
One of Appellant’s defensive themes at trial was that this was a simple DWI case that the State elevated to a felony
because of the several threats Appellant made to the officer. As the jury was instructed, voluntary intoxication is not
a defense. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a)(West 2011); Thompson v. State, 426 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.App.--
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).
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As the District Attorney conceded in closing argument, “It’s not that O.J. Simpson car
chase that you see on the news.” Here, Appellant traveled a block and half over the course of fifty
seconds from the time he first stopped to when he eventually stopped for good. It was, nonetheless,
less than prompt compliance with an officer’s direction to stop. We overrule Appellant’s single
point and affirm the conviction.
September 26, 2018
ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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