2018-06

in the Matter of the Marriage of Herman Tyeskie and Inger Tyeskie ( 2018 )

Menu:

ACCEPTED
06-18-00020-CV
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
6/1/2018 11:21 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
NO. 06-18-00020-CV
FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS
6/4/2018 9:29:00 AM
FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
AT TEXARKANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF
HERMAN TYESKIE AND INGER TYESKIE
On appeal from the 307TH Judicial District Court Gregg County, Texas
In Cause No.2015-1636-DR
________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
________
Counsels of Record
William T. Hughey, Esq.
P.O. Box 2012
Marshall, Texas 75671
Hugheylaw@sbcglobal.net
Ph. 903-935-5550
Fax 866-823-7185
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following constitutes a list of all parties to the trial court’s judgment and the
names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel:
LIST OF PARTIES
Appellant Inger Hall
Appellate Counsel William T. Hughey, Esq.
P.O. Box 2012
Marshall, Texas 75671
Appellee Herman Tyeskie
P.O. Box 651
Gladewater, Texas 75647
Appellee Counsel Myla Mayberry, Esq.
2770 Main Street
Longview, Texas 75601
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES………………………………………………ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………..iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE…………………………………..1
ISSUE PRESENTED…………………………………………….2
1. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by failing to Credit $52,576.21
of Appellant’s Separate funds from Saving to be reimbursed out
of funds associated with the Sale of the Homestead Property.
2. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by failing to provide Notice to
Appellant before signing order Turnover order and appointing
Receiver pursuant to Sec. 31.002 of the Texas Civil Remedies and
Practice Code said abuse constituting a violation of Appellant’s
Due Process Right under the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the taken of her property by order dated March 22,2018
and her illegal imprisonment.
STATE OF FACTS………………………………………………2-5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT…………………………………..5-6
ARGUMENT…………………………………………………….6-13
PRAYER…………………………………………………………13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE………………………………….. 14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE……………………………..14
APPENDIX……………………………………………………….15
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
iv
Appellant respectfully submits the instant brief. This is an appeal from The
1307th Judicial District Court Gregg County, Cause No. 2015-1636-DR
Statement of the Case
Appellants Inger (Hall) Tyesie is the Respondent in an Original Petition for
Divorce filed by Appellee Herman on September 2, 2015. (CR-p5) On August 8,
2017,a Bench Trial was conducted in which the Trial Count on September 19,
2017 prepared a written decision on the confirmation of separate property and the
division of the martial estate.(CR-p104) Appellants trial counsel on October 10,
2017 filed a Premature Motion to modify, Correct, or Reform Judgment and/or
Motion for New Trial . (CR-p113) The trial court on January 2, 2018 signed a
Final Decree of Divorce. (CR-p118)
After the previous reference event on January 8, 20181, trial counsel for
Appellee filed a “Motion for Post Judgment Receivership Pursuant Section 31.002,
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” (CR-p 130) The trial court on January 19,
2018 signed an “Order Appointing Receiver and Compelling Discovery. The trial
court on March 9, 2018 signed an “Order Holding Respondent (Appellant) In
Contempt and For Commitment to County Jail (CR-p 203) On March 22, 2018, the
1
trial court signed an “Order Approving Final Account, Order directing Receiver to
Make Disbursement of Funds Collected and Discharging Receiver. (CR-p 215)
On March 29, 2018 Respondent /Appellant filed a Pro Se Notice of Appeal. (CR-p
217) Respondent after retaining counsel through counsel filed a Motion to Set
Supercedeous Bond. (CR-p 231)
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by failing to Credit $52,576.21
of Appellant’s Separate funds from Saving to be reimbursed out
of funds associated with the Sale of the Homestead Property.
2. The Trial Court Abused its Aiscretion by failing to provide Notice to
Appellant before signing order Turnover order and appointing
Receiver pursuant to Sec. 31.002 of the Texas Civil Remedies and
Practice Code said abuse constituting a violation of Appellant’s
Due Process Right under the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the taken of her property by order dated March 22,2018
and her illegal imprisonment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 8, 2017, the case was called for trial counsel parties announced. (RR-
v2-p5) The Court heard and denied a Motion for Continuance filed by Counsel for
Appellant. (RR-v2-p 10)
Direct Examination Herman Tyeskie: Witness proved up jurisdiction questions
parties married January 3, 2009 ceased living together fall of 2015. (RR-v2-p 11)
Parties purchase home in November 2013. (RR-v2-15) Witness stated that at a
point relationship started to deteriorate, wife hit and spit on him. (RR-v2-15-16)
2
Witness testify that a point in time he found a tacking device in his truck (RR-v2-
17-20) parties at time start living in separate part of house. (RR-v2-20) The stated
that wife has trashed his room. (RR-v2-25) Witness state that at one point in time
wife took his truck and he must get someone to take him to the doctor because of
his disability. (RR-v2-29) In November 2015 was hit in head by wife with iron.
(RR-v2-35) Witness stated was taken to hospital. (RR-v2-34) Witness stated that
on questioning that he thought wife was obsessed with the thought that you have
cheated on her. (RR-v2-36) Attorney covered prior discovery attempts with
attorneys for wife and non-compliance. (RR-v2-37-54) Witness stated that value of
community home was about 245,00 and that $52,576.21 was down payment. And
300,000 Cashier check wife had taken out of her saving account. (RR-v2-50-55)
witness stipulated that wife has 162,168.61 in her saving account in January 2009.
(RR-v2-58) Witness acknowledged that wife 299,681.93 was taken out of her
account. (RR-v2-59) Witness informed court what he wants out divorce as to
separate and community property. (RR-v2-59-69)
Cross Examination of Witness
Witness stated that his Monthly income was a disability payment of $1081. (RR-
v2-71) Witness testify to damage to his truck done by his wife. (RR-v2-72)
Counsel sought to introduce tape and affidavit about paramour that were not
admitted. (RR-v2-73-76) Witness passed (RR-v2-78)
3
Limited Redirect
Direct Examination Respondent Inger Renee Tyeskie
Witness testified that she had give a gift of 3000.00 to her daughter in2015. (RR-
v2-83) Witness stated that her bank was Citizen Bank on the transaction. (RR-v2-
84) Witness was questioned about community funds. (RR-v2-85-) Witness that she
has $162, 000 in saving when she married petitioner. (RR-v2-86) witness stated
she had no knowledge of the amount of check husband received after his first wife
death. (RR-v2-87) witness question about husband deposit of check in an account
after wife death witness never seen item. (RR-v2-88-99) Witness stated she want to
buy husband out of house. (RR-v2-92) Witness passed
Cross Examination
Witness stated she damages husband truck because he was having an affair. (RR-
v2-95) Witness testified she caught Husband with girlfriend. (RR-v2-96) Witness
stated that when she hit husband with iron he has lunged at her after argument
about girlfriend. (RR-v2-97) Witness tracked husband for two week and knew he
was at girlfriend house(RR-v2-99) Witness stated that husband had lawn service,
but did money did not go in her account. (RR-v2-100) witness stated that she and
husband have a lovely marriage but due to his infidelity and adultery it ended.
(RR-v2-101 Witness testified about various arguments. (RR-v2-102-103)
4
Redirect
Witness testified that she makes about $65,000.00 a year. (RR-v2-104)
Witness question and response to her pay. (RR-v2-105-107)
Petitioner Rested (RR-v2-108) Respondent Rested (RR-v2-109)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE :1
Appellant tenders in summary the trial court abused its discretion by failing
considered the testimony presented in this matter that first reflected that
Respondent testified that all funds for the down payment on the community
property home were proceeds taken directly from non- community saving , and
that the Petitioner who was disable, receiving $1048 a month in disability with a
lawn service that no income presented himself to the court as a victim while
admitting under oath that he cheated on Appellant his paramour and that he clearly
was a non-factor in accumulating any funds that grew the community however he
was awarded on a theory of equitable distribution one half of the post sell equity
that included $52,576.21 dollars of Respondent Separate Funds a factor that runs
counter to all principles of equitable distribution of the community estate for a
party who adulterous act and action cause the divorce in the case at hand. The
5
placing of Petitioner on the same footing as Respondent is a windfall for Petitioner
and a reward for destroying the martial relationship.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE :2
Appellant tenders in summary that the trial court granting of an Ex Parte
Turnover Order with Receiver under Sec. 31.002 of the Texas Civil Remedies
and Practice Code, was an abuse of discretion based on the Final Decree in
Appellant Divorce and constituted a violation of Appellant’s Due Process Right
of Notice under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution that produce
the taking of her property and illegal imprisonment.
ARGUMENT 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In a divorce proceeding, the trial court is charged
with dividing the community estate in a "just and right" manner, considering the
rights of both parties. TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon Supp.
2006); Boyd v. Boyd,

131 S.W.3d 605

, 610 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
Trial courts are afforded wide discretion in dividing marital property upon divorce;
therefore, a trial court's property division may not be disturbed on appeal unless the
complaining party demonstrates from evidence in the record that the division was
6
so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Jacobs v. Jacobs,

687 S.W.2d 731

, 733 (Tex.1985);

Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610

.
To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether
the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles; in other
words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v.
Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,

701 S.W.2d 238

, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert.
denied,

476 U.S. 1159

106 S. Ct. 2279

90 L. Ed. 2d 721

(1986). We must indulge
every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court's proper exercise of
discretion in dividing marital property.

Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610

. Accordingly, we
will reverse only if the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the error materially affected the just and right division of the
community estate.
In the case at hand the record reflects that Appellant possessed an ability to save
Money. The record further reflects that at point prior to the divorce she had
accumulated a total of $299,681.93, which the Court in it written decision noted.
(See App.1) The record is also clear on the factor that the funds in the account as to
all increases were associated with the acts and action of Appellant. Appellant also
note that all funds which were placed as the down payment on the community were
her funds Appellant would acknowledge that the issue of community property as
to the funds does come into place after marriage as to the funds placed into her
saving account however the record is clear that Appellee never placed funds into
the account, that in the trial of this matter he presented himself as a victim and that
on direct examination from his counsel. He admitted that he had been cheating on
Appellant and that he thought that was a factor for his mistreatment by Appellant.
7
(RR-V2-31) Appellant in a similar vain stated in summary that she and Appellee
has a good marriage before he started cheating on her. (RR-V2-101) The record
also reflects that based on the use of a tracking device while Appellant a Mail
Carrier was out working hard delivering the mail, Appellee a disabled individual
with limited income and no saving skills was getting up daily as Appellant
departed for work going to see his paramour. (RR-V2-99)
In Ohendalski v. Ohendalski,

203 S.W. 3d

-Tex: Court of Appeals, 9Dist. 2006, the
court noted that:
Generally, in a fault-based divorce, the court may consider the conduct of the
errant spouse in making a disproportionate distribution of the marital
estate.

Young, 609 S.W.2d at 761-62

. The grounds for a fault-based divorce
specifically include cruelty and adultery. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 6.002-.003
(Vernon 2006). (Ohendalski at 915)
In the case at hand Appellee clearly unforced by his counsel admitted in summary
that he felt that alleged violent acts and actions against him by Appellant were the
byproducts of his cheating on Appellant. (RR-V2-p31) Appellant admission and
the entirety of the record including the tracking of Appellee to his paramour home
by default placed this pending matter in a Fault Based Divorce which the record
clearly reflects and would not have been a question for the trial court to see, the
trial court however in an abuse of discretion gave the Appellee a windfall for
breaking up the union between Appellant and Appellee. In connection with the
position as stated Appellant prays that the matter be remanded by this Honorable
8
back to the trial to reassess the division of the $52,576.21 down payment as to the
parties upon the sell of the community property home.
ARGUMENT 2
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In Sivley v. Sivley v. The Hon. Richard Beacon
Judge of the 354th Judicial District Court of Rain County Texas Sitting A Probate
Court,

972 S.W. 2d

. 850 Crt. App.Texas Tyler, Texas (1998) the court stated that:
The granting of a turnover order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller,

806 S.W.2d 223

, 226 (Tex.1991); Dale v.
Finance America Corp.,

929 S.W.2d 495

, 497 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ
denied). A trial court may be reversed for abusing its discretion when the court
acted in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Dale, 929 860*860 S.W.2d at 497.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any
guiding rules and principles.

Id. Turnover orders

are governed by Section 31.002
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. That statute affords a judgment
creditor aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction to obtain satisfaction of a
judgment if the judgment debtor owns property that cannot be readily attached or
levied on by ordinary legal process, and is not exempt from attachment, execution
or seizure. TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (Vernon 1997). It
includes orders which the trial court enters to enforce an order that has been
refused or disobeyed. See TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 31.002(c)
(Vernon 1997).
The statute itself does not provide for notice or a hearing to be afforded a judgment
debtor in a turnover proceeding. TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 31.002
(Vernon 1997). See Ex parte Johnson,

654 S.W.2d 415

, 418 (Tex.1983) (although
judgment debtor received notice and his attorney appeared at the hearing, the court
in dicta observed that the statute allows ex parte entry of the order without notice
and hearing); Ross v. 3D Tower Ltd.,

824 S.W.2d 270

, 272 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (notice and opportunity to be heard was afforded
judgment debtor; however, in dicta, the court found that notice or opportunity to be
heard was not required by the statute).
9
The question before us, however, is whether the trial court's failure to provide prior
notice and a hearing before the issuance of the turnover order under Section 31.002
violated Don, Jr.'s constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury even though
the turnover statute does not require it. Due process of law requires that an
individual is entitled to notice and hearing before he is deprived of a property right.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Tex.Const. art. I, § 19. The issue of whether post-
judgment collection proceedings compromised constitutional due process
principles was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Endicott-
Johnson Corporation v. Encyclopedia Press,

266 U.S. 285

, 288-290,

45 S. Ct. 61

69 L. Ed. 288

(1924). In Endicott-Johnson, the judgment debtor contended that a
New York statute conflicted with the constitutional due process clause because it
authorized the issuance of a garnishment execution without giving notice to the
judgment debtor or affording him a hearing. In holding that due process was not
violated, the court reasoned as follows:
... the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a
defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in
court, should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further notice
and hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in
satisfaction of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is
not essential that he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his
tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what
will follow," no further notice being "necessary to advance justice."
Endicott-Johnson

Corporation, 45 S. Ct. at 62-63

.
Texas courts have adopted the analysis of Endicott-Johnson in upholding the
constitutionality of various post-judgment proceedings. In Ex parte Johnson, the
Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that the appellant had been given notice of
the hearing, but gave credence to the analysis and holding in Endicott-Johnson by
noting in a footnote that the judgment debtor was "not unfairly surprised" by the
court's turnover order. Citing Endicott-Johnson, the court stated that "the judgment
rendered against Johnson ... put him on notice that postjudgment collection
proceedings would follow." Ex parte

Johnson, 654 S.W.2d at 418

. In Pitts v.
Dallas Nurseries Garden Ctr., Inc.,

545 S.W.2d 34

, 37 (Tex.Civ. App.—
Texarkana 1976, no writ), a postjudgment garnishment proceeding, the appellant
challenged the constitutionality of the garnishment process. Citing Endicott-
Johnson, the Texarkana court of appeals rejected this challenge, stating that "after
the rendition of a valid final judgment, the defendant must take notice of what will
follow."

Pitts, 545 S.W.2d at 37

. In Merritt 861*861 v. Harris County,

775 S.W.2d 10

17, 21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied), the appellant
challenged the constitutionality of an eviction proceeding issued pursuant to a
forcible entry and detainer action. The court held that due process was not violative
because the judgment "afforded appellants with notice that post-judgment
proceedings would follow." Merritt,775 S.W.2d at 21, citing Endicott-
Johnson and Ex parte Johnson. (Sivley at 860-8860)
Appellant would note before moving forwarding that the cited Standard of Review
coupled would the expanded discuss Appellant Issue is without merit however
Appellant tenders to the Honorable that a review of the Final Decree in the case at
would not lead the Appellant to believe that:
“the judgment "afforded appellants with notice that post-judgment proceedings
would follow” In the case the following timeline is reflected in the Record:
1. Final Decree Signed on January 2, 2018 (CR-p 118 )
2. § 31.002 Turnover /Receiver Motion filed on January 8, 2018 (CR-p 130-
140)
3. Order to Distribute Funds and Cover Signed March 22, 2018 (CR-p)
It is the position of Appellant that she did not have notice that post-judgment
proceeding would follow based on the excerpts below from the Final Divorce
Decree signed on January 2, 2018 by the Trial Court:(CR-p )
1. THEREFORE, in consideration of the judgment amounts set forth above, the Court
grants a collective judgment in the total amount of seventy‐two thousand two hundred
seventy‐seven dollars and sixty‐six cents ($72,277.66) representing the sums set forth
above. For a just and right division of property made in this decree, IT IS
11
FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that Petitioner, Herman Tyeskie, is awarded judgment
of seventy‐two thousand two hundred seventy‐seven dollars and sixty‐six cents
($72,277.66) against Respondent, Inger Tyeskie, as and for Petitioner's community interest
in property, payable in accordance with the terms of the closing documents ordered
in this decree to be executed by Respondent, bearing interest at the rate of 6 percent
per year compounded annually from the date of judgment, for which let execution
issue. This judgment is part of the division of community property between the parties
and shall not constitute or be interpreted to be any form of spousal support, alimony, or
child support. (CR-p 124)
2. Respondent, INGER TYESKIE, is ORDERED to sign a vendor's lien note in the
amount of $72,277.66 payable to Petitioner, HERMAN TYESKIE. The note shall
bear interest at the rate of 6 percent per year, compounded annually. It is to
be payable according to the following terms: on demand; or if not on demand,
on or before 60 days from the date of signing of this Final Decree of Divorce.
(CR-p 125)
3. Transfer and Delivery of Property
IT IS ORDERED that Inger Tyeskie shall deliver the following property to Herman
Tyeskie on or before fifteen (15) days after the signing of this Decree:
1. Promissory note for the judgment in the amount of seventy‐two thousand
two hundred seventy‐seven dollars and sixty‐six cents ($72,277.66) attached hereto;
and
2. Security Agreement attached hereto. (CR-p 126)
As to what was to what follow the Judgment the “Bold Items Above” is what was
Ordered by the trial court to follows, however what followed was:
1. No Promissory Note is Found Attached to the Final Decree in the Clerk’s
Record.
2. Counsel for Appellee Filed 30.002 Turnover/Receiver Motion on January 8,
2018 at a point in time that prior to the 15-day demand made on Appellant
for the non-provide document or any due date on a Promissory Note or
Signed Security Agreement. (CR-p 130-140)
3. The trial court signed 31.002 Turner/Receiver Order on January 19, 2018.
12
(Cr-p 149-153)
In keeping the above the Final Decree was an Attachment to the § 31.002
Turnover /Receiver Motion filed on January 8, 2018. Appellant tenders to the
Honorable Court that the conduct of the trial court was a violation of Appellant’s
14th Amendment Due Process Right which resulted in of her property being taken
in an Order dated March 22, 2018, which included a $21,773.64 to a Receiver.
(CR-p 215-16) The acts and actions violated the trial court’s Final Decree a clear
abuse of discretion which also lead to Appellant being Jailed for multiple
weekends for Contempt based on a Motion filed by the Receiver. (CR-p 203-206)
In keeping with the abuse under this issue Appellant prays that the pending matter
be remanded to trial to make Appellant whole as it relates to the Violation of 14th
Amendment Right which produced the taking of her funds and illegal
imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
Appellant pray that upon review by this Honorable Court, the ruling of the trial
court be reversed and this matter Remand to the trial court to correct the errors
noted .
/s/ William T. Hughey
Counselors for Appellant
13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Appellant’s Brief was served via E-Serve on all Attorney of Record.
/s/ William T. Hughey
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Undersigned counsel certifies the contents of this brief comply with the Tex
.R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3). The number of words in this brief, as calculated by MSWord
Count and excluding portions as provided by Tex. R. App. P 9.4(i)(1) is 3486.
/s/ William T. Hughey
.
14
APPENDIX
1. FINAL DECREE
15
Electronically Submitted
1/2/2018 10:29 AM
Gregg County District Clerk
By: Elisha Calhoon ,deputy
NO.2015Ǧ1636ǦDR

INTHEMATTEROF                                        §   INTHEDISTRICTCOURT
THEMARRIAGEOF                                         §   
                                                        §   
HERMANTYESKIE                                          §   307THJUDICIALDISTRICT
AND                                                     §   
INGERTYESKIE                                           §   GREGGCOUNTY,TEXAS

FINALDECREEOFDIVORCE

ͺǡʹͲͳ͹Ǥ

Appearances

ǡ  ǡ        ǡ

ǤǡǤ

ǡǡǡ
ǡǤ

Record

                    ͵Ͳ͹
Ǥ

JurisdictionandDomicile


ǡ ǡ     Ǥ   ǡ  
ǡ                 
Ǥ

    ǡ       ǡ    
      Ǧ        
        Ǧ Ǥ     
Ǥ

Jury

       ǡǤ

Divorce

       ǡǡǡ
Page1of12

ǡ
Ǥ

ChildoftheMarriage

       
Ǥ

DivisionofMaritalEstate

       ̵
ǡǤ

       

      ǡ  ǡ   
ǡǡǡ
ǡǡǡǣ

       ǦͳǤ ǡǡǡǡǡǡ
ǡ             
ǲǳǤ

       ǦʹǤ  ǡ ǡ        
Ǥ

       Ǧ͵Ǥ ǡ
   ǡ      ǡ  ǡ 
ǡǡ̵
               
̵Ǥ

       ǦͶǤ  ǡ    ǡ   ǡ  
ǡǡǡ
   Ǧ ǡ  ǡ  ǡ  ǡ 
ǡͶͲͳȋȌǡǡǡ
ǡ        ̵ ǡ ǡ  
Ǥ

       ǦͷǤ 	ȋͷͲΨȌǡǡ
ǡ   ǡ     ǡ  
ǡǦǡǡ
ǡ  ǡ    ǡ ͶͲͳȋȌ ǡ   ǡ
  ǡ  ǡ        
̵ǡ
Page2of12

Ǥ

       Ǧ͸Ǥ ȋȌ̵Ǥ

       Ǧ͹Ǥ  ʹͲͳͶ    ǡ   
ͳ
͵ͳ͵͵Ͷ͹ǡǡǡǤ

       ǦͺǤ ǦǦǦ
ȋ̈́͸ͺǡ͹ͷʹǤ͸͸Ȍ̵ȋͷͲΨȌ
͓ͷͲͳ͸͸ͷ͹̵ǡǡ
ǡǡǡ
Ǥ

       ǦͻǤ Ǧȋ̈́ͳ͹ͷǤͲͲȌ
̵Ǥ

       ǦͳͲǤ Ǧȋ̈́ʹǡ͹ͷͲǤͲͲȌ
̵Ǥ

       ǦͳͳǤ       ȋ̈́͸ͲͲǤͲͲȌ     
̵Ǥ

       

      ǡ  ǡ   
ǡǡǡ
ǡǡǡǣ

       ǦͳǤ ǡǡǡǡǡǡ
ǡǡ
̶̶Ǥ

       ǦʹǤ  ǡ ǡ        
Ǥ

       Ǧ͵Ǥ              
ǡ    ǡ      ǡ  ǡ
 ǡ    ǡ     ̵
               
  ̵  ǡ       ̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸
       ǡ  ǡ  
Ǥ

       ǦͶǤ ǡǡǡ
ǡǡǡ
Page3of12

   Ǧ ǡ  ǡ  ǡ  ǡ 
ǡͶͲͳȋȌǡǡǡ
ǡ         ̵ ǡ ǡ  
ǡǤ

       ǦͷǤ      ȋ  Ȍ  ̵
Ǥ

       Ǧ͸Ǥ  ʹͲͲ͵    ǡ   
̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴ǡǡǡǤ

       Ǧ͹Ǥ  ʹͲͳͳ    ǡ   
̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴ǡǡǡǤ

       

       

ǡǡǡ
ǡǡ
ǡǡǣ

       ǦͳǤ   ǡ  ǡ ǡ    ǡ  

ʹͲͳͶǤ

       ǦʹǤ  ǡ ǡ ǡ       
ǯǤ

       

ǡǡǡ
ǡǡ
ǡǡǣ

       ǦͳǤ   ǡ  ǡ ǡ    ǡ  
̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴
ʹͲͲ͵Ǥ

       ǦʹǤ   ǡ  ǡ ǡ    ǡ  
̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴
ʹͲͳͳǤ

       Ǧ͵Ǥ  ǡ ǡ ǡ       
ǯ              
Page4of12

Ǥ

       ǦͶǤ ǦǦǦ
 ȋ̈́͸ͺǡ͹ͷʹǤ͸͸Ȍ     ̵ Ǧ ȋͳȀʹȌ
̵͓ͷͲͳ͸͸ͷ͹Ǥ

       ǦͷǤ Ǧȋ̈́ͳ͹ͷǤͲͲȌ
̵Ǥ

       Ǧ͸Ǥ Ǧȋ̈́ʹǡ͹ͷͲǤͲͲȌ
̵Ǥ

       Ǧ͹Ǥ       ȋ̈́͸ͲͲǤͲͲȌ    
̵Ǥ

       

ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ

ProvisionsDealingwithSaleofResidence

  	         
    ͳ͵ǡ   ǡ    ǡ ǡ  
 
 ǡ ǡ      ʹͻͷ  ǡ
ǡ
ǡǡǤ
ǣ

       ͳǤ      
ǡ    ǡ ͻʹ͵ Ǥ  ʹͺͳǡ ǡ Ǣ
ͻͲ͵Ǥ͹Ͷ͸Ǥ͹ʹͺ͹Ǥ

       ʹǤ                    
Ǥ
ǡ
Ǥ

͵Ǥ      ǡ
ǡǡǤ
Ǥ

Ǥ
       Ǥ      
Ǥ
Page5of12

              
Ǥ

        ͶǤ     ȋ
Ȍ
    ǣ ͷͲΨ  ǡ ͷͲΨ  ǡ 
        ̈́͸ͺǡ͹ͷʹǤ͸͸  
 Ǧ ȋͳȀʹȌ          ̵
͓ͷͲͳ͸͸ͷ͹ͳͲͲΨǡ
̵Ǥ
            ǡ  
ǡǤ




              ǡ  
ǡǡ
 Ǧ    Ǧ   Ǧ  ȋ̈́͸ͺǡ͹ͷʹǤ͸͸Ȍ
 ǡ  ǡ    ̵    
͓ͷͲͳ͸͸ͷ͹̵ǡ
ǡ
͸ǡ
Ǥ

            
             ǡ ǡ 
Ǥ

              ǡ  
ǡǡ
   Ǧ  ȋ̈́ͳ͹ͷǤͲͲȌ  ǡ   
ǡ
         ǡ    
͸ǡ
Ǥ

            
             ǡ ǡ 
Ǥ

              ǡ  
ǡǡ
 Ǧ     ȋ̈́ʹǡ͹ͷͲǤͲͲȌ  ǡ 
ǡ̵ǡ
            ǡ 
Page6of12

͸ǡ
Ǥ

            
             ǡ ǡ 
Ǥ

              ǡ  
ǡǡ
ȋ̈́͸ͲͲǤͲͲȌǡǡ
̵ ǡ          
        ǡ       ͸
ǡ
Ǥ

            
             ǡ ǡ 
Ǥ

	ǡ         ǡ  
         Ǧ   
Ǧ   Ǧ  ȋ̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸Ȍ     
Ǥ	ǡ
ǡǡ
 Ǧ    Ǧ   Ǧ 
ȋ̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸Ȍǡǡ̵
ǡ
     ǡ       ͸   
ǡǤ

            
             ǡ ǡ 
Ǥ



              
Ǥǡ
              Ǥ  
̵       ̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸        
Ǥ

                    
ǣ
ǤͷͲͳǡǡǡǢ
Page7of12

ǣͳͶǡͳͲǡǡǡǤ

Ǥʹͻͷǡ
ǡ
ǡǡ
ǣͳ͵ǡ

Ǥ̵ǤǤ
ǡǢ

Ǥ         ǡ  ǡ  
Ǣ

Ǥ       ǡ  ǡ     
Ǥ

ǦǤ
Ǥ
Ǥ

ǡ
ǡ̵
̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸ǡǤ
  ͸   ǡ  Ǥ         
ǣǢǡ͸Ͳ
	Ǥ               

        ̵	

                ̈́ͷǡͲͲͲǤͲͲ  
̵ǡǡǡǤ
         
Ǥ     
̈́ͷǡͲͲͲǤͲͲ̵ǡǡǡ͸
	Ǥ
 ǡ     ǡ     ǡ  
ǡǡǡ
Ǥ
ͶͲͺǤǡǡ͹ͷ͸Ͳͳǡ̵ǡ
ͷǣͲͲǤǤ͵ͳǡʹͲͳ͹Ǥ
Ǥ
ǡ ǡ     ̵        
Ǥ

        Ȁ

        ǡʹͲͳ͹ǡ
Ǥ

                 ʹͲͳ͹ǡ   
̵
Page8of12

̵

Ǥ


            ʹͲͳ͹  
ǡ
      ͳǡ ʹͲͳͺǤ     
ǡǤ

                    

	
                
̵Ǥ

       

       
      ǣ  ʹͲͲʹ   ǡ ͳͻͻͳ 
 ǡ ͳͻͻͲ  ǡ    ǡ  ͶͳͶ
 ǡ
ǡǤȋLT7&8BLK1STOKES,Gladewater,GreggCounty,Texas).

       
ǣͷͲͳǡǡǤȋͳͶǡ
ͳͲǡǡǡȌǤ

TransferandDeliveryofProperty

                   
ȋͳͷȌǣ

       ͳǤ              Ǧ 
ǦǦȋ̈́͹ʹǡʹ͹͹Ǥ͸͸ȌǢ

       ʹǤ      Ǥ

ChangeofRespondent'sName

̵Ǥ

CourtCosts

       
Ǥ
Page9of12

ResolutionofTemporaryOrders

       
            
ͳʹǡʹͲͳͷǤ

DischargefromDiscoveryRetentionRequirement

                   
            
ͳͻͳǤͶȋȌǤ

Indemnification


ǡǡǡ
    Ǥ            ǡ
ǡǡ
 ǡ  ǡ  ǡ           ǡ
ǡǡ       ǡ    ǡ   
̵  ǡ       ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ 
          ǡ    
ǡ         ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ 

Ǥ

ǡ     ǡ    ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǡǡ̵
Ǥ

           ǡ
ǡ
              
ǡǡ
Ǥ

              
            
Ǥ

ClarifyingOrders

      	   ǡ   
Ǥ

Page10of12

ReliefNotGranted
             
Ǥǡ
Ǥ
Ǥ

DateofJudgment
1/2/2018 10:28 AM

̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴   Ǥ






      



	ǣ

Ǥ
ͶͲͺǤ

ǡ͹ͷ͸Ͳͳ
ǣȋͻͲ͵Ȍ͹ͷͺǦ͸ͺͲͲ
ǣȋͻͲ͵Ȍ͹ͷͺǦ͸ͺͳʹ

Ǥ

Ǥͳ͵ʹ͹ʹ͸ʹͷ
̴̷Ǥ
Ǥǡ
ʹ͹͹ͲǡͳͲ͵
ǡ͹ͷͲ͵͵
ǣȋʹͳͶȌ͹ͲʹǦʹͷͷͳ
ǣȋͻ͹ʹȌͻͶ͹Ǧ͵ͺ͵Ͷ


ǤʹͶͲ͹ͳͲʹͶ
̷Ǥ
Page11of12

EXHIBIT"A"

ǡǣ







ͷͶ̶





Page12of12

Document Info

Docket Number： 06-18-00020-CV

Filed Date： 6/4/2018

Precedential Status： Precedential

Modified Date： 4/17/2021

Authorities (9)

Ross v. 3D Tower Ltd. ( 1992 )

Boyd v. Boyd ( 2004 )

Dale v. Finance America Corp. ( 1996 )

Ex Parte Johnson ( 1983 )

Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc. ( 1924 )

Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center, Inc. ( 1976 )

Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. ( 1985 )

Jacobs v. Jacobs ( 1985 )

Sivley v. Sivley ( 1998 )

View All Authorities »