John Cores v. Carroll F. Laborde, Barbara Laborde and Laborde Properties, LP, a Texas Limited Partnership ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00011-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JOHN CORES, Appellant,
v.
CARROLL F. LABORDE,
BARBARA LABORDE AND
LABORDE PROPERTIES, LP,
A TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellees.
On appeal from the 2nd 25th District Court
of Gonzales County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Benavides and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By six issues, which we construe as three, appellant John Cores challenges the
trial court’s declaratory judgment in favor of appellees Carroll LaBorde,1 Barbara LaBorde,
and LaBorde Properties, L.P. (collectively LaBorde) regarding an easement by estoppel.
1 Carroll LaBorde died on July 7, 2015, as this suit was pending.
Cores alleges that: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support a finding of an
easement by estoppel; (2) that the trial court improperly transferred venue from Hays
County to Gonzales County; and (3) that the trial court erred in entering a declaratory
judgment that was duplicitous of claims already made. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This dispute arises between two property owners regarding an easement road.
Cores owns an 89.96-acre tract of land in Gonzales County. LaBorde owns a 386.60-acre
piece of land adjacent to Cores’s. To the southeast of Cores’s property are tracts of land
that are landlocked. An easement road was constructed to allow access to the landlocked
properties. The easement road runs along the northern boundary of Cores’s property,
turns, and then continues south towards the landlocked properties. The western part of
the LaBorde tract also butts up against the easement road and a gate was constructed on
the LaBorde fence line. Cores filed suit to stop the LaBordes from using the easement
road to access their land. Cores claims that the LaBorde property is not landlocked, that
they have access to their property from other roads, and the LaBorde land was not
included as part of the easement properties. The LaBordes argue the former landowners
have continually had access to the easement road and an easement by estoppel was
created due to the access.
2
A. History
Initially, the undivided tract of land that now comprises the LaBorde and Cores
properties was jointly owned by the Francis and Brown families. The families ran a cattle
operation on their land, with the cattle pens being housed on what is now the LaBorde
property. In 1979, the families divided the land. Cores’s property was owned by the Brown
family, and the LaBordes property was owned by the Francis family. However, even after
the land was divided, the cattle operation continued to run, with both families having
access to the cattle pens via the easement road. In 1986, the Brown family divided their
land into multiple tracts, with each separate tract going to members of the Brown family.
In 2004, Rafe Jackson purchased the Francis tract (LaBorde property) as it stands now.
3
In 2008, Cores purchased his tract of land from members of the Brown family. In 2010,
the LaBordes bought Jackson’s land from him.
B. Dispute Develops
Based on testimony presented at the bench trial, all prior owners of both the
LaBorde and Cores’s land had used the easement road to access their properties. Issues
developed once the two parties to this suit became neighbors. Both sides put on
deposition testimony from Jackson, Gail Brown Schauer2, and Rebecca Connell3. Based
on the testimony of these three witnesses, the trial court held that an historical use of the
easement road existed. The trial court denied Cores’s petition for a temporary and
permanent injunction and attorney’s fees and granted LaBorde’s request for a declaratory
judgment and held that an easement by estoppel existed on behalf of the LaBordes. This
appeal by Cores followed.
II. PROPER VENUE
By what we construe as his second issue, Cores alleges it was error to transfer
venue from Hays County to Gonzales County. Cores originally filed suit in Hays County,
where the LaBordes have a residence. The LaBordes filed a motion to transfer venue to
Gonzales County because that is where the property at issue is located.
A. Applicable Law and Discussion
An easement confers upon one person the valuable right to use the land of another
for a specific purpose. Hubert v. Davis, 170 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no
2 Gail Brown Schauer previously owned Cores’s property but later traded for a different piece of
property with an aunt, Pat Brown Eckols.
3 Rebecca Connell is Gail Brown Schauer’s sister and owned landlocked property south of the
LaBorde land.
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pet.). Since an easement is an interest in land, the grant of an easement should be drawn
and executed with the same formalities as a deed to real estate. Id. The doctrine of
equitable estoppel, or easement by estoppel, provides an exception to prevent injustice
and protect innocent parties from fraud. Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2008, pet. denied).
Under section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, it states:
Actions for the recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real
property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title
to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to
real property shall be brought in the county in which all or a part of the
property is located.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.)
(emphasis added). Although Cores contends that venue was proper in Hays County
because the LaBorde homestead was located there, because an easement is an interest
in real property, venue was proper in Gonzales County, where the property in question
was located. The trial court properly transferred venue from Hays to Gonzales County.
We overrule Cores’s second issue.
III. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
By multiple sub-issues which we construe as one issue, Cores challenges the legal
sufficiency of the trial court’s finding of an easement by estoppel. By his sub-issues, Cores
argues that (1) alleged prior permissive use of an express easement did not give rise to
an easement by estoppel for future property owners, (2) a later-created express easement
precluded a finding of an easement by estoppel, and (3) an owner’s silence regarding use
of an easement is not enough to establish an easement by estoppel.
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A. Standard of Review
In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings have the same force and
dignity as a jury’s verdict upon questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d
791, 794 (Tex. 1991). A trial court’s findings may be reviewed for legal and factual
sufficiency under the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence to support a
jury’s answers. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881
S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). When the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, as
it does here, findings of fact are not conclusive and are binding only if supported by the
evidence. Horner v. Heather, 397 S.W.3d 321, 324 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, pet. denied).
We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. Id. The standard of review for
conclusions of law is whether they are correct. Id. We will uphold conclusions of law on
appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory the evidence supports. Id.
A party who challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an issue on
which it did not have the burden of proof at trial must demonstrate on appeal that there is
no evidence to support the adverse finding. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58
(Tex. 1983). When considering a legal sufficiency challenge after a bench trial, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, “credit[ing] favorable
evidence if reasonable [fact finders] could, and disregard[ing] contrary evidence unless
reasonable [fact finders] could not.” Horner, 392 S.W.3d at 324 (quoting City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005)). We must indulge every reasonable inference
that would support the trial court’s findings. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822. “The final
test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the decision under review.” Id. at 827.
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B. Applicable Law
1. Easement by Estoppel
“The doctrine of easement by estoppel holds that the owner of the alleged servient
estate may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations
that have been acted upon by the owner of alleged dominant estate.” Ingham v. O’Block,
351 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, review denied) (quoting Holden v.
Weidenfeller, 929 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied)). Three
elements are necessary for the creation of an easement by estoppel: (1) a representation
communicated, either by word or action, to the promisee; (2) the communication was
believed; and (3) the promisee relied on the communication. Id. These elements apply at
the time the communication creating the alleged easement is made. Holden, 929 S.W.2d
at 131. An easement by estoppel, once created, is binding upon a successor in title if
reliance upon the existence of the easement continues. Id.
The gravity of a judicial means of acquiring an interest in land of another solely by
parol evidence requires that equitable estoppel be strictly applied. Horner, 397 S.W.3d at
325. The estoppel should be certain, precise, and clear. Id. Texas case law supports the
notion that for easements, the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais as it is
sometimes called, operates as an exception to the statute of frauds, which requires a
writing for all transactions involving land, to prevent injustice and to protect innocent parties
from fraud. See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet.
denied) (citing Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Drye v. Eagle Rock
Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962)).
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The doctrine of easement by estoppel is not applied as strictly as the doctrine of
implied easement. Id. Being an equitable doctrine, it has not been clearly defined and its
application must depend on the unique facts of each case. Id.
C. Discussion
In order for the LaBordes to establish their entitlement to an easement by estoppel,
they had to meet three elements.
1. Representation Communicated by Word or Action
Cores alleges in his brief that there was no evidence of any act of reliance prior to 2004
by the LaBorde property. We disagree.
To establish the first element of easement by estoppel, the LaBordes must show a
representation was communicated, either by word or action, to the promisee. Ingham, 351
S.W.3d at 100. “It is well-settled that estoppel may arise from conduct or from a failure to
act.” Wallace v. McKinzie, 869 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied).
During the bench trial, both parties put on deposition testimony from two members
of the Brown family and a prior owner of the LaBorde property. Schauer testified that she
believed the original families (the Brown and Francis families) would allow access to the
properties on any of the surrounding roads. She also stated that the easement road from
Dam Road had been used by her family in the past to access the cattle pens on the
LaBorde property. Schauer explained that she had previously owned the Cores property,
but traded land with her aunt and that the initial easement went through the property. 4
Schauer testified that no prior owners of the Cores property had restricted use of the
4 Testimony showed that when Schauer and Eckols traded land, they re-located the easement road
to its current location along the property line, rather than running through the now Cores property.
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easement road to any of the landowners and all the prior owners of the LaBorde property
had used the easement road without any issue.
Connell testified that her two relatives had switched properties and created the new
location of the current easement. Connell had leased an acre of her land to the LaBordes’
so they could continue to use the easement road after the dispute with Cores began.
Connell agreed that wording in a document creating the easement for the southern
landlocked properties did not include the LaBorde property. However, Connell also agreed
that the Brown and Francis families had used the easement road to access the LaBorde
property in the past. She also stated that the Browns continued to use the easement road
after Francis sold his property to Jackson and that she was not aware of any complaints
regarding use of the easement road prior to the LaBordes’ purchase.
Jackson also testified that he spoke to the Schauer family regarding the cattle pens
and was told he could use the easement road. He stated they told him the easement road
had “been used for years” and whoever leased the LaBorde property had been allowed to
use the road. Jackson explained that he replaced the cattle pens within sixty days of
purchasing the LaBorde property and would enter his land through a gate off the easement
road. Jackson had also allowed the Schauers to take gravel off the LaBorde property for
maintenance and repair of the easement road. Jackson did not believe there had been
complaints about the use of the easement road, except one time when Cores told Jackson
he could not use the gate to get to the easement road.
The trial court’s findings of facts found:
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13. Joy Gail Brown Schauer and Rebecca Ann Connell are sisters and
members of the Brown family. Both Ms. Schauer and Ms. Connell
testified at trial. The Court finds the testimony of these witnesses to
be credible and to have personal knowledge of the events they
testified to.
....
15. In 1979, the Cattle Pens and LaBorde Property were regularly
accessed by a road that crossed the Cores Property (the “Easement
Road”). At some point the Easement Road was relocated, but has
always run over the Cores Property from Dam Road to the LaBorde
Property.
16. At the time that the Single Tract was divided in 1979, the Brown family
believed that the Francis family would be able to continue to use the
Easement Road in order to access the Cattle Pens and the LaBorde
Property.
....
18. Between 1979 and 2004, while the Francis family owned the LaBorde
Property, the Easement Road was regularly and openly used to
access the LaBorde Property, particularly the Cattle Pens, with no
objection from the owner of the Cores Property.
....
The findings of law stated:
6. The LaBordes have established, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the first element of easement by estoppel. For more than 30 years
the owners of the Cores Property did not challenge the open and
obvious usage of the Easement Road to access the LaBorde
Property. The owners of the Cores Property thus engaged in
representations by their conduct.
Because Cores challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an issue
on which he did not have the burden of proof at trial, he must demonstrate that there is no
evidence to support the adverse finding. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. However, the
testimony presented shows factual evidence of prior use and reliance that support the trial
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court’s findings. Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the LaBordes’
established the first element.
2. Communication was Believed
Cores next alleges as a sub-issue that Jackson’s reliance was not based upon an
affirmative statement by an owner of the Cores property.
The second element the LaBordes were required to establish was that the
communication was believed by the promisee. Ingham, 351 S.W.3d at 100. An easement
by estoppel, once created, is binding upon a successor in title if reliance upon the
existence of the easement continues. Id.
Jackson’s testimony at trial also explained that he had an interest when he
purchased the LaBorde property in re-building the cattle pens, located in the southwest
corner of his property. When he spoke to members of the Schauer family5, Jackson
believed, based on representations of past use, that he was entitled to use the easement
road. Jackson rebuilt the cattle pens, openly using the easement road to move supplies,
without any objection from the surrounding landowners. Jackson’s use of the easement
road was prior to Cores’s purchase of his land.
In relation to Jackson, the trial court’s findings stated:
19. Rafe Jackson purchased the LaBorde Property from the Francis
family in 2004. Mr. Jackson testified at trial. The Court finds Mr.
Jackson’s testimony to be credible.
....
5 While Jackson did not speak to Eckols herself, he did speak to members of the Schauer family,
who previously had owned the Cores land. There was no objection by Eckols to Jackson’s use of the
easement road testified to.
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21. When Rafe Jackson purchased the LaBorde Property, he believed
the owner of the LaBorde Property had a right to use the Easement
Road to access the LaBorde Property, particularly the Cattle Pens.
....
23. Rafe Jackson rebuilt the Cattle Pens in reliance upon what he
believed to be his right to use the Easement Road.
....
36. Barbara LaBorde testified at trial. The Court finds her testimony to be
credible.
....
38. At the time that LaBorde Properties, L.P. purchased the LaBorde
Property, the LaBordes believed that they had a right to enter the
LaBorde Property by way of the Easement Road, including to access
the Cattle Pens.
The trial court’s findings of law state:
7. The LaBordes have established, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the second element of easement by estoppel. The owners of the
LaBorde Property, including the Francis Family, Rafe Jackson, and
the LaBordes, reasonably believed that they had a right to use the
Easement Road to access the LaBorde Property.
Again, Cores must show there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that the second element was met by the LaBordes. See Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. The
evidence presented by Jackson supports the trial court’s findings that the communication
was believed by Jackson. In addition, the information Jackson received was relayed to
him by a prior owner of the Cores property. The LaBordes believed they were entitled to
use the Easement Road based on the prior use by Jackson and prior owners. We again
agree with the trial court that the LaBordes established the second element.
3. Communication was Relied On
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Cores’s third sub-issue states that the alleged acts of reliance during the LaBorde
period of ownership were not a result of specific affirmative representation.
The third element the LaBordes were required to establish was that the
communication was relied on by the promisee. Ingham, 351 S.W.3d at 100. However, as
stated above, an easement runs to the successors in title once it is created. See id.
The trial court’s findings of fact stated:
24. While Rafe Jackson was rebuilding the Cattle Pens, including by
openly bringing materials to the LaBorde Property via the Easement
Road, no one challenged his right to do so.
25. During the time that he owned the LaBorde Property, Rafe Jackson
openly used the Easement Road to access the LaBorde Property,
including the Cattle Pens.
26. During the time he owned the LaBorde Property, Rafe Jackson
permitted gravel from the LaBorde Property to be used to repair
potholes in the Easement Road. Rafe Jackson did so relying upon
what he believed to be his right to use the Easement Road.
....
30. During the time that Rafe Jackson owned the LaBorde Property, he
never received any complaints from Cores about his regular and open
use of the Easement Road, and Cores never made such complaints.
31. Cores knew at the time that he purchased the Cores Property that the
owners of the LaBorde Property had been using the Easement Road
to access the LaBorde Property, particularly the Cattle Pens. Among
other things, Cores knew that the Easement Road had been and was
being used regularly to move cattle onto and off of the LaBorde
Property.
....
34. During the time that Cores has owned the Cores Property, he has not
personally spent any money or resources to repair or maintain the
Easement Road.
....
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39. The LaBordes purchased the LaBorde Property relying on the use of
the Easement Road to access the LaBorde Property, including the
Cattle Pens.
....
41. The LaBordes purchased the LaBorde Property relying upon their
ability to use the Easement Road to access the Cattle Pens and the
Modular Home.
....
43. Cores did not dispute that the LaBorde Property could be accessed
by the Easement Road until late in 2010 when he became upset that
the LaBordes were constructing the Modular Home on the LaBorde
Property but within sight of the Cores Property.
....
46. The evidence clearly established that since before 1979 until 2010,
no one (including no owner of the Cores Property) had ever
challenged the right of any person to access the LaBorde Property by
crossing the Cores Property via the Easement Road, despite the fact
that the Easement Road was openly used for such purpose.
The trial court’s conclusions of law stated:
8. The LaBordes have established, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the third element of easement by estoppel. The owners of the
LaBorde Property, including the Francis Family, Rafe Jackson, and
the LaBordes, made numerous decisions in reliance upon their ability
to use the Easement Road, including their decisions to purchase the
property and to use, and in some cases improve, the Cattle Pens.
Based on the testimony presented and the trial court’s findings, the evidence
supported the LaBordes assertion that the easement by estoppel was created due to the
reliance of past owners of the property and their actions. The LaBordes acted in a manner
that followed the actions of Jackson and the Francis family. Cores cannot show there was
no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the third element was met by the
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LaBordes. See Croucher, 660 S.W.2d at 58. We again agree with the trial court that the
LaBordes established the third element of easement by estoppel.
D. Conclusion
In order to show lack of sufficient evidence, Cores had to show there was no
evidence to support the trial court’s findings in favor of the LaBordes. However, the trial
court found factually:
35. During the time that Rafe Jackson owned the LaBore Property and
Cores owned the Cores Property, Cores did not challenge Rafe
Jackson’s right to use the Easement Road to access the LaBorde
Property. Cores testified at trial. The Court finds Cores’s testimony
that he was generally unaware of Mr. Jackson’s use of the Easement
Road not to be credible, and finds Cores’s testimony generally not
credible when it conflicted with the testimony of other witnesses.
....
44. The evidence clearly established that since before 1979, up until
Cores brought this lawsuit, the Easement Road crossing the Cores
Property has been used openly and regularly to access the LaBorde
Property, including the Cattle Pens.
Legally, the trial court found:
9. Accordingly, LaBorde Properties, L.P. established by a
preponderance of the evidence all the essential elements of its
declaratory judgment claim. LaBorde Properties, L.P. has the right to
an easement by estoppel over that part of the Easement Road
extending from Dam Road roughly westward to the gate entering
LaBorde Properties, L.P.’s land, as set forth on the plan and legal
description. . . .
Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
findings and indulge every reasonable inference to support the findings, we hold that the
evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See Horner, 392 S.W.3d at 324; City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822.
We overrule Cores’s first issue.
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IV. COUNTERCLAIMS
By his third issue, Cores alleges that the trial court erred in entering a declaratory
judgment that was duplicative of claims already before the court.
A. Applicable Law
“Texas’s Declaratory Judgments Act (“the Act”) is based upon the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act.” Garden Oaks Maintenance Organization v. Chang, 542
S.W.3d 117, 123 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The Act’s purpose is to
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and
other legal relations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.). The Act is to be liberally construed and administered. Id. Under
the Act:
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings
constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
Id. § 37.004(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). A court of record within its
jurisdiction has power to declare rights, status, or other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. Id. § 37.003(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st
C.S.).
Although the Act generally is not available to settle disputes already pending before
a court, the Supreme Court of Texas has recognized that “in certain instances, . . . a
defensive declaratory judgment may present issues beyond those raised by the plaintiff,”
such as where “there is an ongoing and continuing relationship.” Garden Oaks, 542
S.W.3d at 123 (quoting BHP Petroleum Co. Inc. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841–42 (Tex.
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1990)); Drexel Corp. v. Edgewood Dev., Ltd., 417 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“[I]n certain instances, a ‘defensive’ declaratory judgment will
survive a nonsuit when there are continuing obligations between the parties.”). To qualify
as a claim for affirmative relief, a defensive pleading must allege that the defendant has a
cause of action, independent of the plaintiff’s claim, on which he could recover benefits,
compensation or relief, even if the plaintiff abandons his cause of action or fails to establish
it. Garden Oaks, 542 S.W.3d at 124.
B. Discussion
In response to Cores’s allegation that the LaBordes’ declaratory judgment was
duplicitous of claims before the court, LaBorde responds by stating that they were required
to assert a counterclaim for declaratory judgment in order to receive affirmative relief.
In Cores’s first amended petition, he asked for a temporary and permanent
injunction to deny the LaBordes from using the Easement Road. In addition, Cores
requested attorney’s fees. In the LaBordes’ first amended answer and counterclaim, they
generally deny the allegations set forth in Cores’s petition. The LaBordes then raise a
counterclaim in which they seek a declaratory judgment allowing use of the Easement
Road under the theories of easement by estoppel or implied easement.
Here, even if Cores dismissed his case, because the LaBordes raised an issue
beyond those raised by Cores, the LaBordes would be entitled to a ruling on their request
for an easement by estoppel. See Garden Oaks, 542 S.W.3d at 123. Therefore, we hold
the trial court did not err in ruling on the LaBordes’ request for a declaratory judgment. We
overrule Cores’s third issue.
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V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
21st day of June, 2018.
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