in the Interest of J.L.M., V, H.E.M., and V.R.M ( 2023 )

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed February 13, 2023
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-22-00758-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF J.L.M., V, H.E.M., AND V.R.M.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-53475-2018
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Kennedy
Opinion by Justice Kennedy
This accelerated interlocutory appeal arises in the context of a suit to modify
the parent–child relationship between the parties and their children. April S. Miller
(Mother) appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss appellee
James L. Miller’s (Father) claim for violations of the Texas Wiretap Act. We affirm.
Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. See TEX. R. APP. 47.2(a), 47.4.
BACKGROUND
Mother and Father were married in 1997 and had three children before a final
decree of divorce was entered in 2012.
In 2018, Father filed suit to modify the parent–child relationship, in particular
seeking appointment as the person who has the right to designate the primary
residence of the children, equal possession of the children, and a decrease in the
amount of his support obligations. The following year, Mother and Father agreed to
an order appointing a counselor Grace Chen Graham for the children. That same
year, Mother and Father agreed to an order modifying their possession rights and
support obligations to the children.
In 2022, Father filed a counterpetition seeking further modification of
conservatorship, possession, and access to the children, as well as his support
obligations, and asserting claims against Mother and the court-appointed counselor
Graham for violations of the Texas Wiretap Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 123.002 (a)(2) (party to sue communication may sue a person who divulges
information that he knows was obtained by interception of communication). In his
counterpetition, Father alleged one of the children recorded Father without his
consent and that the child was not able to give consent to the recording as a minor
such that the recording was illegally obtained. See id. § 123.001 (2) (defining
“interception” to mean acquisition of communication through use of device without
consent of party to communication). Father further alleged that child “divulged” the
recordings to Graham who then “divulged” the records to Mother who then
“divulged” the recordings to her current husband and her attorneys.
–2–
Mother and Graham both filed motions to dismiss Father’s wiretap claims
under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. In her motion, Mother urged that while
she did “not plead the content of these recordings, they are believed to contain
Plaintiff’s outcry to her therapist concerning incidents of psychological and verbal
abuse at the hands of Plaintiff.”1 Mother further urged that the statements were made
to Graham and then relayed to Mother and to her lawyers “in furtherance of—and
as a result of—the instant judicial proceeding.” Mother concluded that Father’s suit
is thus based on or in response to her exercise of her right to petition. The trial court
conducted a hearing on both motions to dismiss and ultimately denied both.
Mother’s appeal followed. Graham’s appeal is a companion case and is addressed
in a separate opinion. See Graham v. Miller, No. 05-22-00766-CV.
THE TCPA AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is an “anti-SLAPP
statute,” meaning that the legislature enacted it to curb “strategic lawsuits against
public participation.” Locke Lord LLP v. Retractable Techs., Inc., No. 05-20-00884-
CV, 2021 WL 1540652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem.
op.). Its main feature is a motion-to-dismiss procedure that allows defendants at an
early stage to seek dismissal, attorney’s fees, and sanctions for the filing of a
meritless suit in response to a defendant’s proper exercise of a protected right. Id.1
We presume that Mother meant to allege that the recordings contained the child’s outcry regarding abuse
by Father.
–3–
A Chapter 27 movant bears the initial burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence “that the legal action is based on or is in response to the party’s
exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association.”
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b); see also Brenner v. Centurion
Logistics LLC ex rel. Centurion Pecos Terminal LLC, No. 05-20-00308-CV, 2020
WL 7332847, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(holding amendments to TCPA do not change burden of “preponderance of the
evidence” established by Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017)). If the
movant carries his or her initial burden, the nonmovant must then establish “by clear
and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in
question.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c). Notwithstanding the nonmovant’s proof
of a prima facie case, however, the court shall dismiss a legal action against the
movant if the movant establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. § 27.005(d).
We review de novo the trial court’s determinations that the parties met or
failed to meet their respective burdens under section 27.005. See id. § 27.005 (b),
(c); see also Brenner, 2020 WL 7332847, at *3 (holding amendments to TCPA do
not change de novo appellate standard of review). In conducting this review, we
consider, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the pleadings and any
supporting and opposing affidavits and other evidence stating the facts on which the
claim or defense is based. See Fishman v. C.O.D. Capital Corp., No. 05-16-00581-
–4–
CV, 2017 WL 3033314, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op.); see also CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a). However, the plaintiff’s pleadings are
generally “the best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action.” Hersh,
526 S.W.3d at 467.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues Father’s claims against her are based on or in response to her
exercise of the right to petition. More particularly, she urges the communications
that made the basis of Father’s claims were made in and pertained to an ongoing suit
to modify the parent–child relationship.
Under the TCPA, the exercise of the right to petition includes a
communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding, in connection with an issue
under consideration or review by a judicial body, or that is likely to encourage
consideration or review of an issue by a judicial body. See CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.001(4)(A)(i), (B), (C). This Court has interpreted “a judicial proceeding” to
mean “an actual, pending judicial proceeding.” See Levatino v. Apple Tree Café
Touring, Inc., 486 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).
Here, the trial judge signed an agreed order for counseling appointing Graham
on March 21, 2019, and an agreed order in suit to modify parent–child relationship
on September 10, 2019. Subsequent to those orders, Father filed a second amended
counterclaim in which he asserted the instant wiretap claims against Mother, but that
pleading does not indicate when the recordings were made or later divulged.
–5–
Likewise, nothing in or attached to Mother’s motion to dismiss establishes when the
instant communications were made.2 At the hearing on the motion, no evidence was
offered, only attorney arguments.3 See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a) (defining
scope of review as the pleadings, evidence, and supporting and opposing affidavits).
Thus, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, we conclude
Mother failed to offer any evidence that there was a pending “judicial proceeding”
at the time the recordings were made or later divulged. Thus, we conclude these
communications were not an exercise of the right to petition as set forth in section
27.001(4)(A) or (B). On these facts, we conclude that the discussions pertaining to
children’s mental health between the parents and their coordinators were not related
to or meant to encourage judicial review. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(C).
We conclude Mother failed to establish Father’s claims were based on or in response
to her exercise of the right to petition. Accordingly, we conclude Mother failed to
establish the TCPA applied to Father’s claims.4
2
Nor does any pleading or motion or any evidence establish the content of the recordings beyond
Mother’s statement in her motion that while she did “not plead the content of these recordings, they are
believed to contain [the child’s] outcry to her therapist concerning incidents of psychological and verbal
abuse at the hands of [Father].” See, e.g., White Nile Software, Inc. v. Carrington, Coleman, Sloman &
Blumenthal, LLP, No. 05-19-00780-CV, 2020 WL 5104966, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2020, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (“Without pleadings or evidence of Carrington Coleman’s alleged ‘communications’
and their contents, it is difficult to determine that those communications were protected by and subject to
the TCPA.”).
3
Even were we to consider the arguments made at the hearing, we would note Graham’s attorney stated
that “the factual basis for [the tort claims] was in mid-December of 2020 [when] . . . [d]uring one of the
therapy sessions one of the children revealed that she had recorded Plaintiff and her stepmother having
certain conversations.”
4
Because we conclude Mother failed to establish the TCPA applied to Father’s claims, we need not
address any argument regarding whether his claims are exempted under Section 27.010(a)(6) of the TCPA,
–6–
We overrule Mother’s issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Mother’s motion to dismiss pursuant
to the TCPA.
/Nancy Kennedy/
NANCY KENNEDY
JUSTICE
220758F.P05
whether he established a prima facie case, or whether Mother established any affirmative defenses as a
matter of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.010(a)(6) (exempting
legal action filed under Title 1, 2, 4, or 5 of the family code or an application for protective order); see also
Temple v. Cortez Law Firm, PLLC, No. 05-21-00367-CV, 2022 WL 1955755, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas
June 3, 2022, no pet.) (concluding appellate courts may choose to consider movant’s step-one burden or
nonmovant’s exemption first).
–7–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
IN THE INTEREST OF J.L.M., V, On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
H.E.M., AND V.R.M., District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 366-53475-
No. 05-22-00758-CV 2018.
Opinion delivered by Justice
Kennedy. Justices Partida-Kipness
and Nowell participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial
court’s order denying Mother’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the TCPA.
It is ORDERED that appellee James L. Miller recover his costs of this
appeal from appellant April S. Miller.
Judgment entered this 13th day of February 2023.
–8–