Steven Arthur Hoskin v. State ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                                  NO. 12-16-00161-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    STEVEN ARTHUR HOSKIN,                          §      APPEAL FROM THE 369TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                             §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE                                       §      ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Steven Arthur Hoskin, appeals from his conviction for burglary of a building.
    In one issue, Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction.
    We reverse and render.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant was charged with committing burglary of a building, i.e., a barn. At trial, the
    evidence showed that Anita Lamb owned forty-three acres of land across U.S. Highway 84 from
    her residence in rural Anderson County. On December 11, 2013, Mrs. Lamb’s neighbor noticed
    two men loading items into an old pickup truck parked across the highway from the Lamb
    residence. Knowing that the Lambs were not home, the neighbor thought the activity suspicious
    and called 9-1-1.
    In response to the neighbor’s call, Sergeant Ryan Toliver of the Anderson County
    Sheriff’s Department arrived at the scene. He found Appellant and another man preparing to
    leave in a loaded old Dodge pickup. Appellant said that they loaded items that they assumed
    were “junk,” which they intended to sell for scrap. The items included (1) two fifty-five gallon
    barrels that were once used as burn bins, (2) an air conditioner that the Lambs had removed from
    a camper trailer when the unit quit working, and (3) a stainless steel soda cylinder that Mr. Lamb
    brought home from his work at the Coca-Cola Company.
    After detaining Appellant and the other man, Sergeant Toliver walked across the railroad
    tracks down a path or old driveway that led to “an old barn, maybe, an old shed.” The barn was
    in an advanced state of dilapidation and the door had fallen off.
    A jury found Appellant guilty of burglary of a building, and assessed his punishment at
    confinement for two years. The jury, finding that Appellant had never been convicted of a
    felony, recommended that the court suspend imposition of sentence and place Appellant on
    community supervision. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury’s
    recommendation. This appeal followed.
    Standard of Review
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must determine whether,
    considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally
    justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789, 61 l. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 899 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2010). Considering the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict” requires the
    reviewing court to defer to the jury’s determinations regarding the witnesses’ credibility and
    weight to be given their testimony. 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789; 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899
    . A court “faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting
    inferences must presume–even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record–that the trier of
    fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution. . . .” 
    Jackson, 449 U.S. at 326
    , 99 S.
    Ct. at 2793.
    The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by
    the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1997). Such a charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
    unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of
    liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” 
    Id. Applicable Law
           A person commits burglary of a building if, without the owner’s effective consent, the
    person enters a building with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault. TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 30.02(a)(1) (West 2011). “Building” means any enclosed structure intended for use or
    2
    occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament, or use. 
    Id. 30.01(2) (West
    2011). The structure itself must be of an enclosed character. Day v. State, 
    534 S.W.2d 681
    , 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). A structure that is merely enclosed by something, such
    as a chain link fence, is not an enclosed structure under the statute. 
    Id. Discussion Appellant
    contends that the uncontested evidence shows that the structure he was charged
    with entering, i.e., the barn, was not a “building” as defined in the penal code because it was not
    an enclosed structure. We agree.
    An unoccupied building in need of repair may constitute a “building” as contemplated by
    burglary statutes. In Ellett v. State, 
    607 S.W.2d 545
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), the court found an
    empty hotel to be a “building” within the meaning of the burglary statute. 
    Ellett, 607 S.W.2d at 548
    . Some windows had been broken out, requiring the owner to have the windows boarded up
    to secure the hotel. 
    Id. Additionally, the
    owner testified that “at all times, (the hotel) was
    supposed to have been locked. And securing of it, in a more firm way, was done to keep people
    from breaking in.” 
    Id. at 549.
           In Day, the court of criminal appeals held that a concrete block structure with three
    permanently open portals for the passage of trucks was not an “enclosed structure” as
    contemplated by the burglary statute. 
    Day, 534 S.W.2d at 684-85
    . The court found that the
    cutting and entry through a chain link fence that surrounded the premises on which the structure
    stood was not an entry into a “building” in violation of the burglary statute. 
    Id. at 683-84.
           In this case, the uncontested testimony shows that for at least twenty-five or thirty years,
    the barn had been as open and unsecured as the structure in Day. According to the record, the
    barn stood on the property for over seventy years. The barn door fell off twenty-five or thirty
    years before the offense and no effort had been made to replace the door or otherwise secure the
    barn against intruders. And unlike the hotel in Ellett, there was no evidence of effort or intent to
    secure the barn. Mrs. Lamb testified that she had not been to the barn in “three or four years.”
    She described the barn as dilapidated. The photographs in evidence show a structure in such an
    advanced state of disrepair as to appear near collapse. The barn’s condition makes it difficult to
    believe that it could now be secured. Accordingly, the jury could not reasonably conclude that
    the barn was an “enclosed structure” as contemplated by the penal code’s definition of a
    “building.” See 
    Day, 534 S.W.2d at 684-85
    ; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.01(2). For
    3
    this reason, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was not
    rationally justified in finding that Appellant committed burglary of a building beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also 
    Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899
    . Appellant’s sole issue is sustained.
    DISPOSITION
    Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we reverse the judgment and render a judgment
    of acquittal.
    BILL BASS
    Justice
    Opinion delivered March 31, 2017.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.
    (DO NOT PUBLISH)
    4
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    MARCH 31, 2017
    NO. 12-16-00161-CR
    STEVEN ARTHUR HOSKIN,
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 369th District Court
    of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 369CR-15-32,062)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, because it is the opinion of this court that there was error
    in the judgment of the court below, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this court
    that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and a judgment of acquittal be, and the same is,
    hereby rendered herein in accordance with the opinion of this court; and that this decision be
    certified to the court below for observance.
    Bill Bass, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
    sitting by assignment.