Mary Catherine Walters v. State ( 2018 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-18-00148-CR
    MARY CATHERINE WALTERS                                             APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE
    ----------
    FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. CR13070
    ----------
    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
    ----------
    A jury rejected her self-defense claim and convicted Appellant Mary
    Catherine Walters of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.          The jury
    assessed her punishment at four years’ confinement in the Institutional Division
    of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJID), and the trial court
    sentenced her accordingly.        Appellant brings a single issue on appeal,
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s rejecting her self-
    defense claim. Because, on the record before this court, a rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a
    reasonable doubt and rejected Appellant’s claim of self-defense, we affirm the
    trial court’s judgment.
    Brief Facts
    Appellant was the mother-in-law of Complainant Cody Sudderth, who at
    the time of the offense was married to Appellant’s daughter, Stephanie.
    Appellant lived in Mineral Wells with her husband and ran a bail bond business.
    Stephanie and Complainant lived in Granbury with their three children.
    Stephanie would call her mother to complain when she and Complainant were
    fighting and ask her to pick up the children or the children and her. Complainant
    testified that there was “no stress with Stephanie at all,” but he was planning to
    leave her and take the children with him to Houston. He told the jury he was
    having no problems with Stephanie; their love had just failed.
    But Complainant also appeared to testify that he and Stephanie had fought
    the day of the offense. Although at first he testified that he and Stephanie had
    not been quarrelling or fighting that day because they had just lost a daughter, in
    response to the question, “What were you talking about, then?” he replied, “Just
    we were fighting.” Then the following confusing exchange took place:
    Q: Sir?
    A: We were fighting.
    2
    ....
    Q: Are you telling this Court and telling this jury that you and
    Stephanie got along fine?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Complainant denied knowing who Christie Meeks, Stephanie’s cousin who
    cleaned their house regularly, was. He remembered an Easter celebration at
    their house with his wife, in-laws, and children. He denied getting angry that day.
    He denied threatening to kill Appellant. He denied that Appellant was in the habit
    of taking the children to give Stephanie and them a place to stay while
    Complainant and Stephanie were fighting.        He testified he had never done
    Stephanie or her family wrong. When asked why Appellant would attack him if
    he had never done any of them wrong, he responded,
    A: Either for my dad’s money, or me, I was saying that I wanted to
    take the kids.
    Q: What do you mean, you wanted to take the kids?
    A: It wasn’t working between me and [Stephanie], because our ––
    our love failed . . . .
    ....
    A: There was no problems.
    ....
    Q: Where were you going to take the kids, then?
    A: Back home.
    Q: Where was back home?
    3
    A: Alvin, Texas.
    Q: Is that what you wanted to do?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: Was Stephanie happy about that?
    A: No.
    ....
    Q: Had you told her that’s what you were going to do?
    A: No, sir.
    Q: Were you doing it, then, without her knowledge?
    A: No, sir.
    He admitted he had not told Stephanie he was leaving and taking the
    children, but he denied he had a plan to leave: “It wasn’t planned. It was in my
    mind.”
    Complainant testified that on the night of the offense he was on the bed,
    sleeping on his stomach in a T-shirt and some night pants when he was “woken
    up to a bat to the head, and all [he] heard was the ping, and [he] stood up.” He
    started to fight Appellant off of him. She was still swinging the bat, but he finally
    managed to take the bat from her and push her out the bedroom door and lock it.
    He grabbed his deer rifle, a .300 Weatherby, out of his closet and chambered a
    shell, and when he opened the bedroom door, Appellant “came out of the laundry
    closet and started slicing and dicing.” Complainant claimed they fought for the
    4
    rifle, and Appellant was trying to take it from him, so he fired it “[d]ownward, on
    that side of the bed, the bottom half.” He said he fired it so Appellant could not
    pick up the rifle and shoot him.
    Complainant testified that as soon as he fired the rifle, he ran outside to his
    neighbor Calvin Sims’s house and banged on his door because he was bleeding
    a lot and afraid Appellant might “finish [him] off.” Sims brought Complainant into
    his house and called 911.
    Complainant did not know whether he was treated and released at the
    hospital or checked in. He did remember he had his baseball bats and bag
    outside in the back of his truck, even though it was raining.
    Sims testified that he awakened around midnight because Complainant
    was pounding on his door, screaming, “Let me in.” He also testified Complainant
    said, “Let me in, she’s going to kill me if I can’t hide . . . .” The recording of the
    911 call reveals Sims’s concern about the amount of blood on Complainant and
    the rate of Complainant’s blood loss.         Photographs show cuts on both of
    Complainant’s hands.
    Christie Meeks Santiago testified she is Stephanie’s cousin by marriage
    and did not get to know Complainant particularly well because she had issues
    with him. But she did clean their house on occasion to help Stephanie and the
    children out.   She also made a practice of going to Stephanie’s house with
    Appellant because she did not feel it was safe for Appellant to go alone because
    of Complainant. On Saturday of Easter weekend she went to Stephanie’s and
    5
    Complainant’s house to clean it at Stephanie’s request.         Appellant took the
    children out of the house. Stephanie helped very little and Complainant, not at
    all.
    Christie testified that on Easter Sunday, Complainant was angry and was
    taking his anger out on Appellant: “He had told her that he would kill her, and
    said that he would kill Stephanie as well.” His conduct “ruined” the Easter plans,
    so Christie and Appellant left. Stephanie refused to leave. In the two to three
    years before the offense, Christie had gone with Appellant to pick up either the
    children or Stephanie and the children about twice a week, and the children
    might stay with Appellant the entire weekend or the entire summer.
    On the night of the offense, however, Christie had other plans, and instead
    of going with Appellant to pick up the children when Stephanie called, she went
    to Fort Worth with her date. Appellant asked a bail-bond client to go with her
    instead. Christie saw Appellant the next morning. Appellant had powder burns
    on her face.
    Appellant testified on her own behalf. Her view of the events of the night of
    the offense and of the surrounding circumstances was quite different from that of
    Complainant, and her testimony both supported and contradicted other
    witnesses’ testimony. Appellant testified that she was 52 years old, was married
    to her second husband, and had only one child, Stephanie, with her first
    husband. She had worked as a bail bondsman since she was 23. The family
    had moved from Houston and lived together in Appellant’s house for a year and a
    6
    half.   One grandchild had died, and she described her relationship with her
    remaining grandchildren as more than close. When Complainant and Stephanie
    had at one point lost custody of the children, the children lived with Appellant for
    two months until the parents could pass drug tests.         According to Appellant,
    Stephanie and Complainant moved to Granbury because Complainant had
    “jerked [Appellant’s granddaughter] up[ and] broke her arm.”
    Appellant testified she had to go to Granbury to pick up the children all the
    time because of domestic disputes. The children would stay with Appellant from
    two days to two weeks.        On the Saturday before Easter, Appellant and her
    husband took the children and Complainant fishing at Lake Granbury while
    Christie and Stephanie were supposed to clean the house.            There were no
    problems during the fishing trip. But Appellant testified that she and her husband
    went back to Granbury on Easter Sunday for an Easter egg hunt for the children.
    Appellant and Stephanie were talking in the kitchen when Complainant came into
    the kitchen from the bedroom and said Stephanie would die of an overdose
    within five months and he would kill Appellant. Appellant and her husband left
    without finishing the Easter egg hunt.
    The following Thursday night, Stephanie called Appellant to come to
    Granbury to get the children.         Appellant left her house to pick up her
    grandchildren. Her husband did not go. She took one of her bail-bond clients
    instead.   Appellant testified that when she arrived at Stephanie’s house, she
    tapped on the door and went inside. The children’s backpacks were lined up in
    7
    the hall, and Appellant was standing in front of the bedroom door talking to
    Stephanie when Complainant came forward and knocked Stephanie out of the
    way. He was “coming over the top of [Stephanie] with –– with a stick or bat or
    something.” Appellant thought he was going to knock her in the head with the
    baseball bat so she reached up, grabbed the bat, and shoved him back with it.
    She “popped him with it and threw the bat down.”
    Appellant testified Complainant did a back flip onto the bed and that she
    was trying to get out of the house, but kept tripping over clothes on the floor
    because she had a bad leg. She fell and was trying to stand up but by then,
    Complainant had grabbed a knife, and Appellant and Complainant started
    fighting over the knife. He managed to jab at her about seven times before she
    grabbed his arm and threw all her weight into him. They fell down onto the floor,
    and suddenly Complainant had a gun. He was screaming that he would kill her
    and called her “cuss words.”
    Appellant testified she was using the foot of the bed to try to pull herself off
    the floor when he put his knee on her. He pushed the barrel of the gun at her
    face, hitting her face, when she shoved the barrel over just as the gun
    discharged next to her head. She managed to hit him with the butt of the gun
    and throw it down.
    Appellant testified she threw the gun on the bed and told Stephanie to get
    the backpacks and come with her. Stephanie refused. Appellant said she was
    leaving anyway, and Stephanie responded, “Please don’t call the cops and put
    8
    him in jail, Mama.” Appellant said she told Stephanie, “Whatever, I’m not doing
    this anymore,” and left. She also testified that she had no injuries or cuts when
    the police arrived at her house the next morning.
    Sylvia Vila is the bail-bond customer and friend who went to Stephanie’s
    house with Appellant. On the night of the offense, Sylvia went to Appellant’s
    house to borrow money. Appellant was ill with a cold and in a panic because of
    an “incident that had happened with –– the daughter and her husband or
    boyfriend or whatever.” Appellant asked Sylvia to drive her in Appellant’s car to
    Stephanie’s house to pick up Stephanie and her children. Sylvia testified the
    goal was to act quickly to avoid any confrontation whatsoever. Appellant had
    nothing in her hands when she went into the house. Soon she ran out of the
    house “in a panic” and said, “Go, go, go.” When they drove off, Sylvia realized
    Appellant had a big gun in her hands.
    Sylvia testified Appellant appeared to be in shock and kept repeating that
    there had been gunshots. Sylvia told Appellant she had been to prison and could
    not be around guns, and that they would have to get rid of the gun. The next
    morning the police contacted Sylvia, and she lied to them and told them she had
    had the car all night. Sylvia also admitted that there had come a time when she
    began paying her bond fees to Appellant in methamphetamine and that she and
    Appellant would use methamphetamine together.
    9
    Self-Defense Burden of Persuasion
    In her sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
    support the jury’s verdict because the evidence of self-defense precluded her
    conviction.2 A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support
    a claim of self-defense.3 The State has the burden of persuasion to disprove
    self-defense.4   This burden does not require the State to produce evidence
    refuting the self-defense claim; rather, the burden requires the State to prove its
    case beyond a reasonable doubt.5          Self-defense is an issue of fact to be
    determined by the jury.6 A jury verdict of guilty is an implicit finding rejecting the
    defendant’s self-defense theory.7
    A person commits aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if she
    intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or
    exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. 8 The Penal
    Code also provides that “a person is justified in using force against another when
    2
    See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.31–.32 (West 2011).
    3
    Zuliani v. State, 
    97 S.W.3d 589
    , 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
    4
    Saxton v. State, 
    804 S.W.2d 910
    , 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
    5
    
    Id. 6 Id.
    at 913–14.
    7
    
    Id. at 914.
          8
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (West 2011).
    10
    and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately
    necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of
    unlawful force.”9    Self defense is a “confession and avoidance” justification
    defense.10
    In the case sub judice, Appellant was charged by indictment with
    aggravated assault of Complainant, a family member, by causing serious bodily
    injury to him by hitting him in the head with a baseball bat and by stabbing him in
    the ribs and cutting his hands with a knife. Alternatively, she was charged with
    aggravated assault of Complainant by causing bodily injury to him, using deadly
    weapons, by hitting him with a baseball bat, and by stabbing him with a knife.
    The jury charge, however, instructed the jury to convict of aggravated assault
    with a deadly weapon if the jury found Appellant knowingly and intentionally
    caused bodily injury to Complainant by hitting him in the head with a baseball bat
    and by stabbing him in the ribs and cutting his hand and fingers with a knife, and
    if they further found the bat or knife was a deadly weapon. The jury was also
    instructed to acquit if they found Appellant had acted in self-defense or if they
    had a reasonable doubt whether she had acted in self-defense.
    9
    
    Id. § 9.31(a).
          10
    Gamino v. State, 
    537 S.W.3d 507
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
    11
    Appellate courts apply the Jackson standard in conducting a due-process
    review of the sufficiency of the evidence.11 In that due-process review of the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
    doubt, including that Appellant did not act in self-defense.12
    The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the
    evidence.13 Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may
    not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for that of the factfinder.14         Instead, we determine whether the
    necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the cumulative force of the
    evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.15 We must
    presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the
    verdict and defer to that resolution.16
    11
    Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979).
    12
    
    Id., 99 S. Ct.
    at 2789; Jenkins v. State, 
    493 S.W.3d 583
    , 599 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2016).
    13
    See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Dobbs v. State,
    
    434 S.W.3d 166
    , 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
    14
    See Montgomery v. State, 
    369 S.W.3d 188
    , 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
    15
    Murray v. State, 
    457 S.W.3d 446
    , 448 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
    
    136 S. Ct. 198
    (2015).
    16
    
    Id. 12 The
    standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence
    cases; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in determining
    guilt.17    To determine the legal sufficiency of the evidence to disprove self-
    defense, the appellate court asks whether, after viewing all the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
    the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and
    also could have found against the appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a
    reasonable doubt.18
    Appellant traveled from her house in Mineral Wells to Complainant’s house
    in Granbury. Although there is evidence that she could have believed she was
    needed to remove her grandchildren from their home, there is no evidence she
    observed any threat to the children after she arrived at their house. Appellant
    offered testimony that Complainant had shot at her, but there was also evidence
    that she took the gun out of the house with her. She testified Complainant swung
    the baseball bat at her, but by her own testimony, she took the bat away from
    him and hit him with it. His blood spatter, indicating multiple injuries, was found
    on the wall. Only Complainant’s DNA was found on the bat. Appellant testified
    that she and Complainant struggled over the knife, but both her and
    17
    
    Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170
    ; Acosta v. State, 
    429 S.W.3d 621
    , 625 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2014).
    18
    Smith v. State, 
    352 S.W.3d 55
    , 62 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2011, no pet.)
    (citing 
    Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914
    ; Dotson v. State, 
    146 S.W.3d 285
    , 291 (Tex.
    App.––Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d)).
    13
    Complainant’s DNA was found on the knife’s handle and Complainant, not
    Appellant, suffered from knife wounds. Complainant was treated at the hospital
    for his multiple injuries.   Appellant appeared to have no injuries and did not
    suggest she was defending a third party.
    Holding
    Considering the entire record as a whole, and applying the appropriate
    standard of review, we hold the evidence sufficiently supports the jury’s rejection
    of Appellant’s defense of self-defense. We overrule her sole issue on appeal and
    affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /s/ Lee Ann Dauphinot
    LEE ANN DAUPHINOT
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: GABRIEL and BIRDWELL, JJ.; and LEE ANN DAUPHINOT (Senior
    Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment).
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: June 21, 2018
    14