Whiskey Williams v. State ( 2017 )


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  •                            COURT OF APPEALS
    SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    FORT WORTH
    NO. 02-16-00200-CR
    WHISKEY WILLIAMS                                                  APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                     STATE
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    FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
    TRIAL COURT NO. F-2013-1198-D
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    MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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    I. INTRODUCTION
    In three issues, Appellant Whiskey Williams appeals the trial court’s
    judgment adjudicating him guilty of manslaughter and sentencing him to thirteen
    years’ confinement. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2011). We will
    affirm.
    1
    See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
    II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Williams was indicted for manslaughter after he struck Edron Slaughter in
    the head with a loaded firearm causing the firearm to discharge, hitting and killing
    Ashley Walters. Williams pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a five-
    year term of deferred adjudication community supervision. The State later filed a
    motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, alleging that Williams had violated
    the following conditions of his community supervision:
    (a) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other
    state or of the United States;
    ....
    (s) . . . complete 200 hours of Community Service Restitution at a
    community service project or projects for an organization or
    organizations approved by the judge and designated by the Denton
    County Supervision Department to be completed at a rate of not less
    than four hours per week starting by but not later than 60 days from
    the date of community supervision;
    (t) Submit to testing for alcohol or drug usage at the request of a
    community supervision officer. Pay the cost for these tests within
    thirty (30) days of giving the specimen;
    (u) Within sixty (60) days, . . . complete a drug/alcohol evaluation
    through an agency which offers such services and approved by
    his/her community supervision officer and provide written proof of
    compliance to the supervision officer within 10 days of completion. If
    treatment is deemed necessary, the defendant shall abide by any
    and all treatment directives, comply with the rules and regulations of
    the approved agency, pay all costs incurred for such services.
    Continue in said treatment until successfully completed as stated by
    the counselor with the agreement of his/her community supervision
    officer; [and]
    ....
    2
    (cc) [Attend] Individual counseling, no less than three (3) sessions
    specifically addressing the offense.
    Williams’s probation officer, Christy Martin, testified at the hearing on the
    State’s motion to proceed to adjudication. Martin testified that Williams did not
    complete the community service hours required by condition (s) of his community
    supervision. She testified that Williams failed to perform the required four hours
    of weekly community service for the months of July, September, October, and
    November of 2014, as well as for the month of January 2015.            Martin also
    testified that Williams did not submit to testing for drug usage as required by
    condition (t) of his community supervision. She testified that Williams did not
    submit to drug testing that she requested on October 10, October 31, November
    13, December 18, and December 30, 2014. Martin also testified that Williams
    failed to timely submit to the drug/alcohol evaluation required by condition (u) of
    his community supervision. She further testified that Williams failed to attend the
    three counseling sessions specifically addressing the manslaughter offense as
    required by condition (cc) of his community supervision.
    The State also presented evidence regarding Williams’s alleged violation
    of condition (a) of his community supervision—that he commit no offense against
    the laws of Texas or any other state. Terry Brooks testified that he was a deputy
    with the Kerr County Sheriff’s Department and a former officer of the Denton
    Police Department. Deputy Brooks testified that on January 12, 2015—while
    working as a Denton police officer—he conducted a traffic stop on Williams.
    3
    During the stop, Deputy Brooks observed Williams pull into a parking lot, and he
    saw a clear bag fly out of the window of Williams’s vehicle. Williams was the sole
    occupant of the stopped vehicle. Deputy Brooks testified that he walked over to
    the bag and saw that it contained “a green, leafy substance consistent with
    marijuana” and that based on the smell and appearance of the substance, in his
    opinion, the bag contained marijuana.
    Officer Craig Fitzgerald of the Denton Police Department testified that he
    was with Deputy Brooks during Williams’s traffic stop and that he picked up the
    bag that came from Williams’s vehicle. Officer Fitzgerald testified that the bag
    contained “a green, leafy substance [he] believed to be marijuana” and that, in
    his opinion, the contents of the bag contained marijuana. He further testified that
    the marijuana collected during the traffic stop weighed one ounce.
    Detective Jeffrey Laughlin of the Denton Police Department testified that
    on December 30, 2014, he set up a controlled buy for narcotics between Williams
    and a confidential informant. Detective Laughlin testified that he outfitted the
    informant with a live wire so that he could hear the narcotics transaction taking
    place, and he verified prior to the transaction that there was no contraband on
    the informant or in the informant’s vehicle.       He testified that he set up
    surveillance on the location of the transaction, and he observed Williams arrive in
    a vehicle. Detective Laughlin then observed the informant exit his vehicle and
    get into Williams’s vehicle, and Detective Laughlin heard a conversation between
    Williams and the informant in which Williams sold marijuana to the informant.
    4
    Detective Laughlin then observed the informant get back into his vehicle, and he
    followed the informant to a nearby location where he was handed a bag
    containing what he recognized to be marijuana. The marijuana collected from
    the controlled buy weighed fourteen grams.
    After the parties rested their respective cases-in-chief, Williams’s counsel
    brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that Williams had not entered a plea
    to the State’s motion.    Williams then waived the reading of the motion and
    entered a plea of not true to the allegations contained in the State’s motion. The
    trial court then found the State’s allegations (a-1), (a-2), (s), (t-4), (t-6), (t-8),
    (t-11), (t-12), (u), and (cc) to be true. After a subsequent punishment hearing,
    Williams was adjudicated guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to thirteen years’
    confinement.
    III. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT THAT THE TRIAL COURT
    HEARD TESTIMONY BEFORE HE ENTERED HIS PLEA
    In his first issue, Williams argues that his due-process rights were violated
    because the trial court heard testimony before he entered his plea. He contends
    that this circumstance brings into doubt whether he was fully aware of the
    allegations against him and whether he was properly able to defend himself, but
    he cites nothing in the record indicating that he was confused by or unaware of
    the allegations. Citing Detrich v. State, 
    545 S.W.2d 835
    , 837 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1977), Williams candidly acknowledges that “the current status of the law
    provides that due process was afforded [him] even though his plea came after
    5
    the evidence was submitted,” but he “submits that this current status ought to be
    reexamined.”
    In Detrich, the court of criminal appeals held that due process does not
    require that a plea be entered in a probation revocation 
    hearing. 545 S.W.2d at 837
    . Other Texas courts, including our own, have followed Detrich and extended
    its holding to situations involving motions to proceed with an adjudication of guilt.
    See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. 14-14-00350-CR, 
    2015 WL 4141100
    , at *3 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 9, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication) (“[T]here is no requirement that a defendant on community
    supervision enter a plea to the allegations in the motion to adjudicate.”); Licerio v.
    State, No. 13-04-00211-CR, 
    2005 WL 2560228
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
    Oct. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[W]e conclude
    there was no error in the trial court’s failure to elicit a plea from appellant
    regarding the violations of community supervision.”); Anthony v. State, 
    962 S.W.2d 242
    , 246 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“[D]ue process does not
    even require appellant be given the right to enter a plea to an alleged community
    supervision violation.”).
    Because the court of criminal appeals and this court have held that due
    process does not require a defendant to enter a plea to the allegations contained
    in a State’s motion to adjudicate and because Williams has not raised any
    convincing reasons for us to reexamine those holdings, we decline Williams’s
    invitation to reexamine precedent on this issue, and we hold that there was no
    6
    error here when Williams’s plea was entered after testimony was presented. See
    
    Detrich, 545 S.W.2d at 837
    ; Moore, 
    2015 WL 4141100
    , at *3; Licerio, 
    2005 WL 2560228
    , at *2; 
    Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246
    .
    We overrule Williams’s first issue.
    IV. WILLIAMS’S COMPLAINT REGARDING EVIDENCE OF
    POSSESSION AND DELIVERY OF MARIJUANA
    In his second and third issues, Williams challenges the trial court’s finding
    that he violated condition (a) of his community supervision by possessing and
    delivering marijuana.     His second issue contends that there was no credible
    evidence that he possessed and delivered marijuana, and his third issue
    contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
    asked Officer Fitzgerald if a lab had confirmed that the substance taken from the
    January 12, 2015 traffic stop was marijuana. While he challenges the trial court’s
    finding that he violated condition (a), Williams does not challenge the trial court’s
    findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc).
    A. Standard of Review
    A trial court’s determination on a motion to adjudicate is reviewable in the
    same manner as the determination on a motion to revoke community
    supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (West Supp.
    2016).     We review an order revoking community supervision under an
    abuse-of-discretion standard. Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006); Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In a
    7
    revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision.
    Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The trial court is
    the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
    testimony, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
    court’s ruling. 
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    ; Garrett v. State, 
    619 S.W.2d 172
    ,
    174 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). If the State fails to meet its burden of
    proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision.
    
    Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493
    –94.
    Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged
    violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a
    revocation order. Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel
    Op.] 1980); Sanchez v. State, 
    603 S.W.2d 869
    , 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
    1980). Consequently, when there is one sufficient ground, we do not need to
    address the other contentions. See 
    Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871
    ; Long v. State,
    No. 02-12-00090-CR, 
    2013 WL 1337975
    , at *2 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.
    4, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    B. The Evidence is Sufficient to Support a Finding that Williams
    Violated the Conditions of His Community Supervision
    Here, Williams only challenges the trial court’s finding that he possessed
    and delivered marijuana. His second and third issues do not challenge the trial
    court’s findings that he violated conditions (s), (t), (u), and (cc).   The State
    8
    presented testimony from Williams’s probation officer to support the allegation
    that Williams had violated these conditions of his community supervision. His
    probation officer testified (1) that he failed to perform required community service
    for the months of July, September, October, and November of 2014, as well as
    for the month of January 2015; (2) that he did not submit to drug testing that she
    requested on October 10, October 31, November 13, December 18, and
    December 30, 2014; (3) that he failed to timely submit to drug/alcohol evaluation;
    and (4) that he failed to attend counseling sessions.
    Based on this evidence, the trial court could have found by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Williams violated a condition of his
    community supervision.      Because any one of these violations could have
    provided a legally sufficient basis for the trial court to adjudicate guilt, we need
    not address the merits of Williams’s second and third issues. See 
    Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926
    ; 
    Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871
    ; Pope v. State, No. 06-16-00128-
    CR, 
    2017 WL 378765
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 27, 2017, no pet.)
    (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Because Pope does not challenge all
    of the trial court’s violation findings, we must conclude a preponderance of the
    evidence supported the trial court’s findings with respect to those unchallenged
    violations.”); Chamberlain v. State, No. 02-10-00447-CR, 
    2011 WL 5009859
    , at
    *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication) (holding court need not address appellant’s arguments as to one
    9
    violation of community supervision when appellant did not challenge four other
    violations).
    We therefore overrule Williams’s second and third issues.
    V. CONCLUSION
    Having overruled Williams’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    SUE WALKER
    JUSTICE
    PANEL: WALKER, KERR, and PITTMAN, JJ.
    DO NOT PUBLISH
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    DELIVERED: April 27, 2017
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