Melissa Ann Villarreal v. State ( 2018 )

NUMBER 13-17-00645-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
MELISSA ANN VILLARREAL, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 377th District Court
of Victoria County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Melissa Ann Villarreal appeals the revocation of her community
supervision. She argues on appeal that the State failed to meet its burden of proof that
she violated the terms of her community supervision. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Villarreal was indicted for one count of manufacture-delivery of a controlled
substance in penalty group 1 in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams
(count 1), see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West, Westlaw through
2017 1st C.S.), and one count of possession of a substance in penalty group 3 in an
amount of twenty-eight grams or more but less than 200 grams (count 2). See id.
§ 481.117(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). She pled guilty to count 1, and the
State agreed to abandon count 2. Villarreal was fined $1,000 and sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment. Her sentence was suspended and she was placed on community
supervision for five years.
On January 11, 2017, the State filed a motion to revoke, based on Villarreal’s
alleged violation of conditions 1, 2, 3, and 8 of her community supervision. 1 The State
alleged that Villarreal violated conditions 1 and 2 by committing the offense of delivery of
a controlled substance. The State alleged Villarreal violated condition 3 by associating
1 Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 8 of her community supervision stated:
(1) Commit no offense against the laws of this State or of any other state or of the
United States of America.
(2) Do not purchase nor have in your possession alcoholic beverages, illegal
drugs or narcotics. Stay away from liquor stores and any place where alcoholic
beverages are consumed, except bona fide eating places, and abstain from
the use of alcoholic beverages of any kind or any substance capable of or
calculated to cause intoxication.
(3) Avoid association with persons who violate or have a reputation for violating
the laws of this State or any other state or of the United States of America.
....
(8) Not leave the State of Texas or the County of approved residence without first
obtaining permission in writing from the Officer showing that the Court
authorized such removal.
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with a convicted felon, Kervin Eugene Bryant. The State alleged that Villarreal violated
condition 8 by leaving the county of her approved residence, Victoria County, without
permission.
On October 26, 2017, a hearing was held on the State’s motion to revoke. Mark
Angel, a Victoria County probation officer, testified first. He confirmed that Villarreal is on
community supervision and that one of the terms of her community supervision was that
she could not leave Victoria County without permission. He testified that she did not have
permission to leave Victoria County on September 20, 2016, the date on which Villarreal
was arrested in Wharton County while with Bryant. Angel further testified that Villarreal
admitted to him that she was aware that Bryant was a convicted felon.
Officer Nathan Kubes of the El Campo Police Department testified that he
encountered Villarreal in Wharton County on September 20, 2016. She was in the
passenger seat of the vehicle Bryant was driving. Officer Kubes testified that Villarreal
had 1.06 ounces of marihuana and 55.58 grams of cocaine on her person.
Villarreal testified that Bryant had been physically abusive to her in the past. She
admitted to leaving Victoria County without permission to travel with Bryant to El Campo,
Texas in Wharton County. She claimed that Bryant was holding the drugs but passed
them to her when the police pulled them over. According to Villarreal, she informed the
police officer that she was afraid of Bryant. However, she also acknowledged that Bryant
had not threatened her or her child in any fashion to get her to leave Victoria County.
The trial court found the allegations that Villarreal had violated conditions 1, 2, 3,
and 8 of her community supervision to be true. The trial court revoked her community
supervision and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
In her sole issue, Villarreal contends that the State failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she violated the terms of her community supervision.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review revocation of community supervision for abuse of discretion. See
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To revoke a defendant’s
probation, the State need only prove a violation of a condition of the probation by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). Preponderance of the evidence means “that greater weight of the credible
evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a
condition of his probation.” Id. A single proven violation is all that is needed to affirm a
trial court’s order revoking a defendant’s community supervision. See Smith v. State, 286
S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, we view all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at
865. The trial court as fact-finder is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the
weight to be given to their testimony. See id. Thus, if the record supports conflicting
inferences, it must be presumed that the trial court resolved any such conflict in favor of
its findings. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
B. Analysis
Appellant argues that the State failed to show by a preponderance of evidence
that she violated the conditions of her community supervision. More specifically, her
entire argument simply reads that the State failed to meet its burden “because the four
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allegations against Appellant were defended on the grounds that she was compelled to
do what had been alleged to protect her child from its abusive parent.” The record
establishes that Villarreal was found to be in possession of 1.06 ounces of marihuana
and 55.58 grams of cocaine. Villarreal does not contest these facts. This alone is enough
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Villarreal violated conditions 1 and
2. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.112(d), 481.117(c); Temple, 390 S.W.3d
at 360; Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
Furthermore, Villarreal admitted to violating conditions 3 and 8. It is undisputed
that Villarreal was located in Wharton County on September 20, 2017. It is also
undisputed that Villarreal, as a condition to her community supervision, was not to leave
Victoria County without permission. Villarreal admits that she did not have permission to
leave Victoria County. Additionally, Villarreal admits that she was aware that Bryant was
a convicted felon. This is sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she
violated conditions 3 and 8. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865.
Despite this evidence, Villarreal contends that on September 20, 2017, she was
acting under duress out of fear that Bryant would hurt her child. She argues that this
duress defense prevented the State from meeting its burden. However, Villarreal never
raised a sufficient duress defense during trial. She testified generally that she was afraid
of Bryant and that he had been abusive in the past; however, she specifically admitted
that Bryant had made no specific threats to hurt her or her child in relation to the trip to El
Campo. A general fear of an individual without evidence of a specific, objective threat is
insufficient to raise a defense of duress. See Cameron v. State, 925 S.W.2d 246, 250
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1995, no pet.).
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More importantly, even had Villarreal raised sufficient evidence to support a
possible duress defense, the trial court was not under any obligation to believe her
testimony. The trial court is the fact-finder and the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. A trial
court may choose to believe all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony. See Rodriguez
v. State, 834 S.W.2d 488, 489-490 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.). We
presume the trial court disbelieved any possible defense of duress that Villarreal raised.
See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360.
In summary, there was sufficient evidence to support, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Villarreal violated conditions 1, 2, 3, and 8 of her community supervision.
See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. And the trial court was under no obligation to believe
her duress defense testimony, assuming she had even raised evidence of duress. See
id. As fact-finder, the trial court could have chosen not to believe her testimony. See
Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d at 489. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
revoking her community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. We overrule
Villarreal’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
26th day of July, 2018.
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