Richard Gross v. State ( 2016 )

NO. 12-15-00280-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
RICHARD GROSS, § APPEAL FROM THE 3RD
APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard Gross appeals his conviction for assault on a public servant, for which he was
sentenced to imprisonment for sixty years. In one issue, Appellant argues that his sentence
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by indictment with assault on a public servant and pleaded “not
guilty.” The State later filed a notice of enhancements to be submitted to the factfinder at the
punishment phase. This notice included allegations that Appellant had three prior felony
convictions.
A jury found Appellant “guilty” as charged, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on
punishment. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for sixty years, and
this appeal followed.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the sixty year sentence imposed by the trial court
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. However, Appellant made no timely objection to the
trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, failed to preserve
any such error. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waiver with
regard to rights under the Texas Constitution); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) (waiver with regard to rights under the United States Constitution); see also Tex R.
App. P. 33.1; Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). (“Preservation of error
is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should ordinarily review on its own
motion[;] . . . it [is] incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error preservation as a threshold
issue.”). But even despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we conclude that the sentence
about which he complains does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. This provision was made applicable to the states by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420–21,
8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)).
The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See
Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons v.
State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that
punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or
unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495
S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664.
In the case at hand, Appellant was convicted of assault on a public servant, the punishment
range for which, considering enhancements, is twenty-five to ninety-nine years, or life. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.32(a), 12.42(d), 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2015). Thus,
the sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the legislature.
Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se.
Nonetheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three part test originally set forth in
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the
proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and
(3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463
U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas
courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin
2
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a threshold
determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the
remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v. State, 989
S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
We first must determine whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate. In so
doing, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estell, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed.
2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an
appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual
offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 266,
100 S. Ct. at 1135. A life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior felony
convictions––one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or services
and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct.
at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as felonies and,
further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined that the
appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 445 U.S.
at 285, 100 S. Ct. at 1145.
In the case at hand, the offense committed by Appellant––assault on a public servant––is
far more serious than the combination of offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while
Appellant’s sixty year sentence is less severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme Court
in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in Rummel was not
unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in the
case at hand. Therefore, since we do not find the threshold test to be satisfied, we need not apply
the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice
Opinion delivered July 20, 2016.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
3
COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
JULY 20, 2016
NO. 12-15-00280-CR
RICHARD GROSS,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
Appeal from the 3rd District Court
of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 32004)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.