State v. Daniel Dewain Drury ( 2018 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-17-00273-CR
    ___________________________
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    V.
    DANIEL DEWAIN DRURY, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 30th District Court
    Wichita County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 58190-A
    Before Meier, Gabriel, and Kerr, JJ.
    Opinion by Justice Meier
    OPINION
    I. INTRODUCTION
    In this appeal from the trial court’s order sustaining Appellee Daniel Dewain
    Drury’s motion to suppress, we consider (1) whether an object searched by police was
    “immediately associated” with Drury and (2) whether police were capable of
    conducting a valid search incident to arrest when the search was justified by neither
    officer safety nor evidence preservation.       We conclude that the object was
    immediately associated with Drury and that no additional justification beyond the
    lawful arrest was necessary to justify the search. We will reverse and remand.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Early in the morning on June 15, 2016, Officer Christina Flores was dispatched
    to a residence in Wichita Falls to execute a felony capias warrant for Drury.1 After
    two other police officers arrived (Officers Skates and Carter), the officers approached
    the residence and observed a female sitting in a vehicle parked in the driveway. The
    person identified herself as Lori Drury, stated that she lived at the residence,
    confirmed that Drury was home, and agreed to permit the officers to speak to him.
    Lori unlocked the front door and led the officers inside. The officers did not have a
    warrant to search the residence.
    1
    The capias stated that the trial court had forfeited Drury’s bond for failing to
    appear for trial.
    2
    When Officer Flores asked about Drury, Lori walked Officers Flores and
    Skates down a hallway and to a bedroom but said that Drury was not home. Officer
    Flores asked Lori for permission to look in the bedroom, and Lori agreed and stepped
    aside.       Officer Flores entered the bedroom, opened a sliding closet door, and
    discovered Drury standing inside holding a small blue tin can in his right hand.2
    Officer Flores ordered Drury to exit the neatly organized closet and to turn around.
    Drury complied, and as Officer Flores placed handcuffs on him, she noticed that he
    was no longer holding the tin can. Officer Flores then looked in the closet and saw
    the tin can on the floor. After checking Drury for weapons (he had none), Officer
    Flores picked up the tin can, opened it, and saw wrapped tinfoil and a yellow pill that
    had been cut in half inside. Officer Flores closed the tin can, escorted Drury outside,
    and put him in a patrol car.3 Officer Flores then opened the tin can again and found
    methamphetamine inside of the tinfoil.4
    A grand jury indicted Drury for possession of less than one gram of
    methamphetamine. Drury moved to suppress the methamphetamine but did not
    challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. At the hearing on the motion, Officer Flores
    The tin can resembled the one that was later admitted into evidence at the
    2
    hearing on Drury’s motion to suppress—a small tin designed to hold Camel
    smokeless tobacco.
    Around that time, Drury made statements like, “That’s not mine. That’s my
    3
    daughter’s. Do not put that on me.”
    The pill was Xanax.
    4
    3
    confirmed that Drury was holding the tin can when she opened the closet door
    because she had immediately looked at his hands to check for a weapon. Officer
    Flores testified that she did not believe a weapon could have been located inside of
    the tin can, nor was Drury standing in such a place that he could have “lunged into
    the closet and obtained some sort of weapon” when Officer Flores retrieved the tin
    can from the closet floor. The trial court granted Drury’s motion and issued findings
    of fact and conclusions of law, including the following conclusion: “Even though
    [Drury] had possession of the tin can at the time Officer Flores saw him and placed
    [Drury] under arrest, her search of the tin can was not a proper search incident to
    arrest.”
    III. VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
    In its only issue, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
    suppressing the methamphetamine found in the tin can because it was obtained
    pursuant to a valid search incident to arrest, which allows police to search not only an
    arrestee, but also objects that are “immediately associated” with the arrestee. The
    State contends that like wallets, purses, backpacks, and other items that people carry,
    the tin can that Drury was holding when Officer Flores discovered him in the closet
    was immediately associated with him.
    Drury does not directly respond to the State’s argument. Instead, he contends
    that Officer Flores could not have performed a valid search incident to arrest when
    4
    she examined the contents of the tin can “because there was no reasonable belief that
    a weapon would be found, that [Drury] could destroy evidence[,] or that evidence for
    the crime in which [Drury] was arrested could be found.” In other words, Drury
    contends that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement
    cannot apply because none of the justifications underlying the exception’s application
    existed.
    A.     Standard of review and relevant law
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
    bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 
    221 S.W.3d 666
    , 673 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2007); Guzman v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 85
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We give almost
    total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and application-
    of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but
    we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions that do not turn on credibility
    and demeanor. 
    Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673
    ; Estrada v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 604
    , 607 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 
    68 S.W.3d 644
    , 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
    The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures
    by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To suppress evidence because of an
    alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of
    producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. 
    Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672
    ; see Young v. State, 
    283 S.W.3d 854
    , 872 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert.
    5
    denied, 
    558 U.S. 1093
    (2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a
    search or seizure occurred without a warrant. 
    Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672
    . Once the
    defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is
    then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a
    warrant or was reasonable. 
    Id. at 672–73;
    Torres v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 899
    , 902 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005). Whether a search is reasonable is a question of law that we review
    de novo. Kothe v. State, 
    152 S.W.3d 54
    , 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
    A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls
    within one of the “specifically defined and well established” exceptions to the warrant
    requirement. McGee v. State, 
    105 S.W.3d 609
    , 615 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 
    540 U.S. 1004
    (2003); see Best v. State, 
    118 S.W.3d 857
    , 862 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,
    no pet.). One exception is the search incident to arrest. 
    McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 615
    .
    B.    The tin can was immediately associated with Drury
    A search incident to a lawful arrest requires no warrant if it is restricted to (1) a
    search of the person or of objects “immediately associated” with the person of the
    arrestee or (2) a search of objects in an area within the immediate control of the
    arrestee. Stewart v. State, 
    611 S.W.2d 434
    , 436 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).
    Among other things, purses, wallets, and certain types of bags have been held to be
    immediately associated with an arrestee, while luggage, guitar cases, a sealed cardboard
    box, and a foot locker—among other things—have not. See Lalande v. State, 651
    
    6 S.W.2d 402
    , 405 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1983), aff’d, 
    676 S.W.2d 115
    (1984); see also
    United States v. Chadwick, 
    433 U.S. 1
    , 15, 
    97 S. Ct. 2476
    , 2485 (1977). The court of
    criminal appeals has not articulated a bright-line rule for immediate association, and
    cases addressing the issue almost always turn on their own facts, but they do appear to
    share one fact in common—actual physical possession of the object at or immediately
    before the time of arrest.
    We find three cases particularly instructive: Curry v. State, 
    831 S.W.2d 485
    ,
    487‒88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d), in which the court of
    appeals concluded that an immediate association existed between appellant and a
    brown paper sack that he dropped while fleeing from police; Johnson v. State, 
    864 S.W.2d 708
    , 724 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993) (op. on remand), aff’d, 
    912 S.W.2d 227
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), in which the court of appeals concluded that an immediate
    association existed between appellant and a Crown Royal bag that he dropped while
    fleeing from police; and United States v. Nichols, No. 17-40007-01-DDC, 
    2018 WL 504634
    , at *4‒5 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2018), in which the federal district court concluded
    that an immediate association existed between the defendant and a container that was
    attached to his keys, which were dropped to the ground just as the defendant was
    handcuffed.
    Similarly, here, Officer Flores observed Drury holding the tin can when she
    opened the closet door, she retrieved the tin can from the floor immediately after
    7
    placing handcuffs on Drury, and she immediately searched the container, first in
    Drury’s presence and again after putting him in a patrol car. Though obviously not
    identical, we believe the tin can is more akin to the bags in Curry and Johnson and the
    container in Nichols than to a form of luggage or other untypical object legally
    incapable of immediate association with an arrestee. We agree with the State that the
    tin can was immediately associated with Drury.
    C.    The search of the tin can was justified by virtue of the lawful arrest
    “[T]he search incident to an arrest exception is premised upon promoting
    officer safety and preventing the destruction of evidence relating to the crime for
    which the person was arrested.” State v. Granville, 
    423 S.W.3d 399
    , 413 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2014). The trial court found that “Officer Flores did not believe that a weapon
    was contained inside of the tin prior to opening it,” and it made no finding, nor did
    Officer Flores otherwise testify, that she opened the tin can to preserve evidence of
    the offense for which Drury was being arrested (which is not surprising because
    Drury was arrested on a capias). We will therefore presume for purposes of our
    analysis that as Drury suggests, neither justification for permitting a search incident to
    arrest existed when Officer Flores opened the tin can.            But as the following
    authorities clarify, in the context of a search of the person of an arrestee, or of an
    object immediately associated with the person of the arrestee, it matters not.
    8
    In United States v. Robinson, the United States Supreme Court identified two
    types of searches incident to a defendant’s arrest: (1) a search of the arrestee himself
    (including an object immediately associated with the arrestee’s person), and (2) a
    search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. 
    414 U.S. 218
    , 224, 
    94 S. Ct. 467
    , 471 (1973). Speaking of a search of the arrestee, the Supreme Court clarified that
    a lawful custodial arrest is all the justification needed to perform such a search:
    But quite apart from these distinctions, our more fundamental
    disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that
    there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was
    present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the
    person incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long line of
    authorities of this Court dating back to Weeks, or what we can glean
    from the history of practice in this country and in England, requires such
    a case-by-case adjudication. . . . The authority to search the person
    incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm
    and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later
    decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or
    evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A
    custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under
    the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
    requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes
    the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
    arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
    requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search
    under that Amendment.
    
    Id. at 235,
    94 S. Ct. at 477 (emphasis added). Stated otherwise, “a search may be made
    of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.” 
    Id. at 224,
    94 S. Ct. at
    471. The Supreme Court echoed its reasoning in Robinson a few years later in Michigan
    v. DeFillippo: “The constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend
    9
    on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or
    evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.” 
    443 U.S. 31
    , 35, 
    99 S. Ct. 2627
    , 2631 (1979).
    In contrast to a search of the arrestee’s person and immediately associated
    object, a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate control must be supported
    by something more than just a lawful arrest. The Supreme Court identified those
    justifications in Chimel v. California, where it defined the area within an arrestee’s
    “immediate control” “to mean the area from within which he might gain possession
    of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 
    395 U.S. 752
    , 763, 
    89 S. Ct. 2034
    , 2040 (1969).
    The Supreme Court later revisited and clarified this standard in Arizona v. Gant:
    In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include “the
    arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—
    construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
    gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” That limitation,
    which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that
    the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its
    purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence
    of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. If
    there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law
    enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-
    incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.
    
    556 U.S. 332
    , 339, 
    129 S. Ct. 1710
    , 1716 (2009) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
    Importantly, “[t]he Court’s decision in Gant clarified and limited the ‘area within the
    immediate control’ type of automobile-search incident to arrest. Nothing in the
    Court’s opinion in Gant . . . suggested it was meant to limit or abrogate the Robinson
    10
    holding of a search of the arrestee incident to arrest.” State v. Mercier, 
    883 N.W.2d 478
    , 489 (N.D. 2016); People v. Cregan, 
    10 N.E.3d 1196
    , 1203 (Ill.), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 410
    (2014) (“In no prior case has the Supreme Court used the area of the arrestee’s
    control as a limit on the search of a person incident to arrest, and at no point in Gant is
    such a limit imposed.”).
    The Alaska Supreme Court recognized this justification dichotomy over forty-
    five years ago when addressing an issue almost identical to the one here:
    McCoy argues that even though a search of his jacket pocket may have
    been authorized as a search incident to arrest, the scope of the search
    became impermissibly intensive when Officer Weaver opened the plastic
    wrapped foil packet which the officer found in the pocket of his jacket.
    It is contended that once the foil packet was removed from McCoy’s
    control, the police officer was not endangered by any weapons that
    might have been concealed in the foil packet, and that any evidence in
    the foil packet was safe from destruction. In such circumstances,
    McCoy argues that in order to look inside the packet Officer Weaver
    should have first obtained a search warrant.
    ....
    Our dissenting brothers suggest that [Justice] Frankfurter’s twin
    rationales also supply the analysis for judging the propriety of searches
    of the arrestee’s person as well as his environs. They reason that after
    the officer had taken possession of the packet there was no danger that
    McCoy might remove from it a weapon, an implement of escape, or
    destructible evidence.      Consequently, they argue, the exigency
    justification of the search evaporated and the warrant requirement
    attached.
    We do not believe that this is a correct interpretation of Chimel.
    While it is clear from Chimel that the twin rationales suggested by
    [Justice] Frankfurter supply the appropriate analytic scheme to define the
    area ‘within (the arrestee’s) immediate control’, it by no means follows
    11
    that they also supply the appropriate analysis for limiting searches of the
    arrestee’s person; further, there is language in Chimel which suggests that
    the court did not intend them to do so. Chimel was concerned not with
    searches of the person, but with the wideranging warrantless searches of
    dwellings which Rabinowitz had legitimized on the ground that it was the
    ‘place’ where the arrest occurred. . . .
    . . . [T]he Court did not intend to limit the intensity of searches of
    the person incident to a lawful arrest but was concerned instead only
    with limiting searches of the area surrounding him when he was
    arrested[.]
    McCoy v. State, 
    491 P.2d 127
    , 131‒33 (Alaska 1971) (footnotes omitted).
    Other state high courts have addressed the matter more recently, including the
    Washington State Supreme Court, which explained,
    There are two discrete types of searches incident to arrest: (1) a search
    of the arrestee’s person (including those personal effects immediately
    associated with his or her person—such as purses, backpacks, or even
    luggage) and (2) a search of the area within the arrestee’s immediate
    control. A valid search of the latter requires a justification grounded in
    either officer safety or evidence preservation—there must be some
    articulable concern that the arrestee can access the item in order to draw
    a weapon or destroy evidence. The former search does not; in analyzing
    the search of an arrestee, we utilize the United States Supreme Court’s
    rationale from [the] Fourth Amendment that “‘a search may be made of
    the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest.’” In such cases,
    we presume that safety and evidence justifications exist when taking
    those personal items into custody as part of the arrestee’s person.
    State v. Brock, 
    355 P.3d 1118
    , 1121 (Wash. 2015) (citations omitted, emphasis in
    original).
    The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned, “We therefore conclude that
    where the object searched is immediately associated with the arrestee, such that it is
    12
    considered a part ‘of the person of the arrestee’ that will be taken into custody with
    him, Robinson applies and no additional justification beyond the lawful arrest is
    necessary to justify the search.” 
    Mercier, 883 N.W.2d at 491
    .
    And finally, addressing the continued vitality of the distinction between a
    search of an arrestee’s person and a search of an area within an arrestee’s immediate
    control, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed,
    There is no question that the [Supreme] Court has required either a
    concern for officer safety or a concern over the preservation of evidence
    to support the constitutionality of a warrantless search of the area where
    the defendant was arrested or a search of items near the defendant. But
    the Court has not applied these concerns as a limitation on the
    warrantless search of the body of a person validly arrested.
    State v. Bernard, 
    859 N.W.2d 762
    , 769 (Minn. 2015).
    In light of all of the above, and having determined that the tin can was
    immediately associated with Drury, Officer Flores needed no additional, “Chimel”
    justification beyond the lawful arrest to search the tin can. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at
    
    235, 94 S. Ct. at 477
    (holding warrantless search of crumpled cigarette pack found on
    arrestee’s person was reasonable as part of search incident to arrest).
    The trial court erred by suppressing the contents of the tin can. We sustain the
    State’s issue.
    13
    IV. CONCLUSION
    Having sustained the State’s only issue, we reverse the trial court’s order
    granting Drury’s motion to suppress and remand this cause to the trial court for
    further proceedings.
    /s/ Bill Meier
    Bill Meier
    Justice
    Publish
    Delivered: September 27, 2018
    14