George Rafael Aguilar v. State ( 2018 )


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  • Opinion issued July 19, 2018
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-17-00320-CR
    ———————————
    GEORGE RAFAEL AGUILAR, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 174th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1497176
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    A jury convicted appellant, George Rafael Aguilar, of murder, and the trial
    court sentenced him to sixty-seven years’ confinement in the Institutional Division
    of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In his sole point of error, appellant
    contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish his guilt as a party.to
    the offense of murder. We affirm.
    Background
    On December 4, 2012, Officer Clinton Shafer with the Pasadena Police
    Department responded to a dispatch call regarding a shooting. When he arrived at
    the scene, Officer Shafer observed a maroon Scion parked in front of a Houston
    Garden Center, with both front doors open.
    When he approached the vehicle, Officer Shafer saw four individuals inside:
    Joe Aguilar, who was driving, Yolanda Aguilar, his wife, slumped over on his
    shoulder, three-year old Joe Aguilar, III, behind the driver’s seat, and Kimberly
    Aguilar, the child’s mother, in the rear passenger seat. Officer Shafer testified that
    Yolanda was not moving and did not appear to be breathing. Based on Joe’s
    information, Officer Shafer broadcast a call for a Jeep Cherokee occupied by
    appellant and his brother, Adrian Aguilar.
    Detective Sylvia Trevino with the Pasadena Police Department, who assisted
    in the investigation, testified that she went to the La Quinta hotel across the street to
    determine if there was any video surveillance of the incident. Officer Trevino
    recovered video footage which showed appellant’s SUV following Joe’s vehicle.
    Detective Raymond Sorrell with the Pasadena Police Department testified that
    he and his partner received information that the suspects’ vehicle might be at a trailer
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    park in Pasadena or La Porte and they began checking trailer parks for a brown Jeep
    Cherokee. After the suspect’s vehicle was located, Officer Sorrell followed the Jeep
    Cherokee as it left the trailer park. He observed a female, later identified as Elaine
    Garza, driving the vehicle and testified that she later pulled into a Valero gas station
    in La Porte. Officer Sorrell testified that La Porte police officers arrived at the gas
    station and instructed the driver to exit the vehicle with her hands up and walk toward
    the officers. He further testified that as the female was complying, appellant came
    around from behind the gas station with his hands up, as if to surrender, and yelled
    to get the officers’ attention. Officer Michael Cooper, Detective Sorrell’s partner,
    testified that the man who came from behind the building with his hands up said,
    “I’m George. I’m the one you’re looking for.” Appellant was then handcuffed and
    placed in the back of a police car.
    Elaine Garza testified at trial that she and appellant had been living together
    in appellant’s trailer for five years at the time of the shooting. Garza testified that,
    on the morning of the shooting, appellant had returned to the trailer and was upset
    after seeing Joe and Yolanda, Garza’s aunt. Appellant told Garza that they had
    laughed at him and that he was “tired of it.” Garza testified that she made breakfast
    while appellant went to the trailer next door to get Adrian, his brother. After
    breakfast, appellant told Garza that he and Adrian were going to town, and they left
    together in appellant’s Jeep. Later, Garza’s mother called her, crying, and told her
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    that Yolanda had been killed. Garza testified that she called appellant to tell him
    what happened, and that appellant was not upset and told her that he did not know
    anything. Appellant and Adrian returned home and later left again in another
    vehicle.
    Sometime later, appellant called Garza and told her to pick him up at a Valero
    gas station and bring some clothes. When she arrived at the gas station, appellant
    asked her to return to the trailer and get some bullets from the living room cabinet.
    Garza returned to the trailer but was unable to get in because she did not have the
    key. When Garza called appellant to tell him, appellant told her to return to the gas
    station. As Garza was driving the Jeep back to the gas station, she noticed a La Porte
    police car behind her with its siren activated. Garza called appellant back to tell him
    about the police car, and appellant told her to continue driving to the gas station.
    When she arrived, police instructed her to get on the ground. Appellant then
    emerged and was arrested.
    Joe Aguilar testified that he and appellant had had a verbal altercation on the
    morning of the shooting. Joe testified that he was driving behind appellant when
    appellant stopped in the middle of the intersection and began “cussing [him] out real
    bad.” As Joe began to drive around him, appellant said, “I’m going to cap you, son-
    of-a-bitch, mother fucker.” Joe then told appellant, “fuck you,” and Yolanda said,
    4
    “Let’s go, let’s go.” Joe testified that appellant then gestured to him which Joe
    understood as a threat that appellant was going to shoot him.
    A short time later, Joe and Yolanda went to pick up their daughter-in-law,
    Kimberly, and her son, “Baby Joe,” and take Kimberly to work. As they were
    driving, Joe noticed that appellant was following them in his Jeep. Joe testified that
    appellant followed him for at least fifteen minutes and then drove up on the driver’s
    side of Joe’s car. Joe then saw Adrian, who was in the backseat of appellant’s Jeep,
    hang out of the Jeep and fire four or five rounds at the driver’s side of Joe’s vehicle.
    After the shots were fired, appellant looked back at them before speeding up and
    driving away. When the police arrived, Joe told them that appellant and Adrian had
    done it.
    Detective Michael Young with the Pasadena Police Department testified that
    the Jeep Cherokee was registered to appellant. After appellant was arrested, he was
    taken back to the trailer and signed a consent form to search his trailer.
    Detective Jonathan Jernnigan with the Pasadena Police Department testified
    that he participated in the search of appellant’s trailer. In the course of the search,
    Detective Jerrnigan found a .410 shotgun, one box of .25-caliber ammunition, and
    two boxes of .22-caliber ammunition.
    Officer Matthew Britain with the Pasadena Crime Scene Unit arrived at the
    crime scene and processed Joe’s vehicle. He observed a bullet hole in the rear
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    passenger window, and he recovered one bullet from the driver’s side door pillar and
    one from the cargo area of the vehicle. Officer Britain also took DNA swabs from
    several locations in the vehicle.
    Diana Wolfshol, a DNA analyst with the Harris County Institute of Forensic
    Sciences (HCIFS), analyzed the DNA swabbings taken from appellant’s vehicle.
    She testified that appellant could not be excluded from the DNA profile found on
    the gear shift of the Jeep Cherokee.
    Jason Schroeder, an HCIFS trace evidence analyst, analyzed the results of
    appellant’s gunshot residue tests. Schroeder testified that the samples taken from
    appellant’s left hand, shorts, shirt, and a black plastic bag recovered from the cargo
    area of the Jeep revealed particles consistent with gunshot residue.
    Dawn LaPorte, an HCIFS firearms examiner, examined the five projectiles
    recovered during the investigation and determined that they were all fired from the
    same .25-caliber handgun. She testified that the box of .25-caliber ammunition
    recovered from appellant’s trailer contained bullets with the same weight and
    characteristics as the five projectiles recovered during the investigation.
    Dr. Dwayne Wolf, deputy chief medical examiner for Harris County, testified
    that the results of the autopsy showed that the complainant died from multiple
    gunshot wounds.
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    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    In his sole point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is legally
    insufficient to establish his guilt as a party to murder. Specifically, he argues that
    there was insufficient evidence of a prior or contemporaneous plan between
    appellant and the actual shooter to commit the complainant’s murder. He further
    argues that there was no evidence that appellant did anything to assist the
    commission of the offense.
    A. Standard of Review
    We review appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the
    standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    (1979). See
    Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We examine all of
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether
    “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789 (emphasis
    in original); see also Williams v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as
    long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to
    support the conviction.” Blackman v. State, 
    350 S.W.3d 588
    , 595 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011).
    7
    The jury may reasonably infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the
    witnesses it chooses, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered,
    and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. See Canfield v. State, 
    429 S.W.3d 54
    , 65 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). An appellate court determines “whether
    the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative
    force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.”
    Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In viewing the
    record, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally. 
    Id. at 13.
    An appellate
    court presumes that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the
    verdict and defers to that resolution. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2793.
    B. Applicable Law
    “A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is
    committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally
    responsible, or by both.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01 (West 2011). A person is
    criminally responsible for the conduct of another if, “acting with intent to promote
    or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or
    attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.” 
    Id. § 7.02(a)(2).
    Therefore,
    “to establish liability as a party, the State must show that, at the time of the
    commission of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing in
    some way to the execution of their common purpose.” Murchison v. State, 93
    
    8 S.W.3d 239
    , 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing Ex parte
    Welborn, 
    785 S.W.2d 391
    , 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc)).
    When a party is not the “primary actor,” the State must prove conduct
    constituting an offense plus an act by the defendant done with the intent to promote
    or assist such conduct. Beier v. State, 
    687 S.W.2d 2
    , 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en
    banc); Miller v. State, 
    83 S.W.3d 308
    , 313 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d).
    Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the law of parties if it shows that
    the defendant was physically present at the commission of the offense and
    encouraged the commission of the offense either by words or other agreement.
    Tarpley v. State, 
    565 S.W.2d 525
    , 529 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Hoang
    v. State, 
    263 S.W.3d 18
    , 22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Since
    an agreement between parties to act together in common design can seldom be
    proven by words, the State often must rely on the actions of the parties, shown by
    direct or circumstantial evidence, to establish an understanding or a common design
    to commit the offense. 
    Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 314
    . The agreement, if any, must be
    made before or contemporaneous with the criminal event, but in determining
    whether one has participated in an offense, the court may examine the events
    occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense. 
    Beier, 687 S.W.2d at 3
    –4; 
    Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 314
    . Circumstantial evidence may suffice to show that
    one is a party to an offense. Wygal v. State, 
    555 S.W.2d 465
    , 469 (Tex. Crim. App.
    9
    1977); 
    Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 314
    . While mere presence at the scene, or even flight, is
    not enough to sustain a conviction, such facts may be considered in determining
    whether an appellant was a party to the offense. Valdez v. State, 
    623 S.W.2d 317
    ,
    321 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); 
    Hoang, 263 S.W.3d at 22
    .
    C. Analysis
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier
    of fact could have found that appellant was a party to the offense of murder. The
    evidence shows that appellant had a verbal altercation with Joe on the morning of
    the shooting. During the altercation, appellant cussed at Joe and told him, “I’m going
    to cap you, son-of-a-bitch, mother fucker.” Appellant then gestured at Joe which
    Joe understood as a threat that appellant was going to shoot him. See Jaggers v.
    State, 
    125 S.W.3d 661
    , 669–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d)
    (finding testimony that defendant had talked about killing complainant was
    admissible to show his motive and intent to kill her). After appellant returned to his
    trailer, he was upset and told Garza that Joe and Yolanda had laughed at him and
    that he was “tired of it.” See 
    Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 310
    , 312 (finding evidence
    sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction as party to offense of deadly conduct
    where, among other things, evidence supported inference that shooter and defendant
    might have been angry or frustrated at driver of other car for swerving at defendant’s
    Jeep and that shooter had seen driver of other car laughing at them). Appellant then
    10
    had a conversation with Adrian in appellant’s trailer and they left together in
    appellant’s Jeep.
    Later, while Joe and Yolanda were driving Kimberly to work, Joe saw
    appellant driving behind him. Appellant followed them for at least fifteen minutes
    before driving up on Joe’s driver’s side. Adrian, who was in the backseat of
    appellant’s Jeep, was hanging out and fired four or five rounds at the driver’s side
    of Joe’s vehicle, killing Yolanda. After the shots were fired, appellant looked back
    at them before speeding up and driving away. The physical evidence also shows
    gunshots struck the driver’s side of Joe’s vehicle and multiple gunshot wounds to
    Yolanda. See 
    Hoang, 263 S.W.3d at 23
    (holding evidence was legally sufficient to
    sustain defendant’s conviction for murder as party to offense where evidence
    established defendant assisted shooter by giving him loaded firearm that killed
    complainant, driving his car parallel to, close to, and at about same speed as
    complainant’s car, and enabling shooter to be in position to shoot complainant
    accurately and repeatedly); 
    Miller, 83 S.W.3d at 314
    (finding evidence legally
    sufficient to establish defendant as party to offense of deadly conduct resulting in
    complainant’s death where witnesses testified that defendant pursued victim’s car
    and pulled up along left side of her car “very slowly” before passenger fired fatal
    shot).
    11
    The jury also heard testimony that appellant asked Garza to go to the trailer
    and get the bullets from the living room cabinet. The jury could infer this to be an
    effort to cover up the crime. See 
    Hoang, 263 S.W.3d at 23
    (finding evidence
    showing that defendant drove shooter away from location after shooting and tried to
    cover up crime by instructing shooter’s girlfriend not to tell anyone what had
    happened supported defendant’s conviction to murder as party to offense).
    Appellant contends that this case is similar to Gross v. State, 
    380 S.W.3d 181
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).      There, the defendant was convicted of murder and
    sentenced to ten years’ in prison. See 
    id. at 183.
    The court of appeals reversed the
    judgment of the trial court and rendered a judgment of acquittal. See 
    id. On petition
    for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of
    appeals’s judgment. See 
    id. at 189.
    It held that the court of appeals had properly
    determined that the evidence presented against the defendant was insufficient to
    support his conviction for murder under the law of parties. See 
    id. at 188.
    In
    particular, it noted that although the defendant was present at the crime scene and
    possessed the murder weapon, there was no evidence that (1) the defendant had
    anticipated that the person he was with would shoot the victim, (2) the defendant had
    assisted or encouraged the shooting, or (3) the defendant and the shooter had a prior
    or contemporaneous plan to commit the murder. See 
    id. at 186–88.
    12
    Gross is distinguishable from the present case. As discussed above, appellant
    made statements and took actions before, during, and after the shooting that
    demonstrates that he and Adrian were working together to accomplish their common
    purpose of shooting at Joe and Yolanda, and ultimately killing Yolanda. See 
    Beier, 687 S.W.2d at 3
    –4 (noting that, in determining whether one has participated in
    offense, court may examine events occurring before, during, and after commission
    of offense). Viewed cumulatively, we conclude that a rational jury could have found
    beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant encouraged and aided Adrian to commit
    the offense of murder. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789; 
    Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750
    .
    Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain
    appellant’s conviction for murder as a party to the offense. Appellant’s sole point
    of error is overruled.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Russell Lloyd
    Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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