Ex Parte R.W.M. ( 2012 )


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  •                                   IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-11-00379-CV
    EX PARTE R.W.M.
    From the County Court at Law No. 2
    Johnson County, Texas
    Trial Court No. F201100018
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant R.W.M. appeals from a judgment of involuntary commitment for in-
    patient mental-health services for a period not to exceed ninety days and an order to
    administer psychoactive medication. In two issues, Appellant argues that the evidence
    is legally and factually insufficient. We will affirm.
    In his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence supporting the trial
    court’s judgment of involuntary commitment is legally and factually insufficient. In
    particular, Appellant asserts that the State did not present evidence of a recent overt act
    or a continuing pattern of behavior confirming that he poses a likelihood of causing
    serious harm to himself or others. Appellant further asserts that the State did not
    present expert testimony demonstrating the need for further in-patient treatment.
    The burden of proof for an involuntary commitment is clear and convincing
    evidence. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (West 2010). The same burden
    applies to an order to administer psychoactive medication. See A.S. v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 69
    , 71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Clear and convincing evidence is that “degree
    of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
    to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” State v. Addington, 
    588 S.W.2d 569
    , 570 (Tex. 1979); see A.S., 
    286 S.W.3d at 70
    . And, because the State’s burden of proof
    is clear and convincing evidence, we apply a heightened standard of review. In re C.H.,
    
    89 S.W.3d 17
    , 25 (Tex. 2002).
    In reviewing a legal-sufficiency claim, we look at all the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have
    formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. In re J.F.C., 
    96 S.W.3d 256
    ,
    266 (Tex. 2002). On the other hand, when reviewing a factual-sufficiency claim, we
    must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have
    found to be clear and convincing and then determine whether, based on the entire
    record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the allegations
    in the petition were proven. 
    Id.
    Section 574.034(a) of the Health and Safety Code provides that a trial court may
    order temporary inpatient mental-health services if it finds by clear and convincing
    evidence that the patient is mentally ill and at least one of three criteria results from that
    mental illness. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a). Two of the alternative
    criteria are that the patient is likely to cause serious harm to himself or others. Id. §
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                         Page 2
    574.034(a)(2)(A)-(B).   The third alternative criterion requires clear and convincing
    evidence that: (1) Appellant is suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or
    physical distress; (2) Appellant’s mental or physical deterioration impacts his ability to
    function independently, “which is exhibited by the proposed patient’s inability, except
    for reasons of indigence, to provide for [his] basic needs, including food, clothing,
    health, or safety”; and (3) Appellant is unable to make rational and informed decisions
    as to whether or not to submit to treatment. Id. § 574.034(a)(2)(C).
    For the State to satisfy its burden of clear and convincing evidence, section
    574.034 states that the evidence must include expert testimony and, unless waived,
    evidence of a recent overt act or a continuing pattern of behavior that tends to confirm:
    (1) the likelihood of serious harm to the patient or others; or (2) the patient’s distress
    and the deterioration of the patient’s ability to function. Id. § 574.034(d). The recent
    overt act or continuing pattern of behavior must relate to the criteria on which the
    judgment is based. T.G. v. State, 
    7 S.W.3d 248
    , 252 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.).
    The expert’s opinions and recommendations must be supported by a showing of the
    factual bases on which they are grounded. 
    Id.
    It is undisputed that Appellant, a fifty-year-old male, suffers from severe mental
    illness and is being cared for by staff at Pecan Valley Centers for Behavioral Health and
    Intellectual Disability in Johnson County.      Psychiatrists William Beatty, M.D. and
    Zahida Syed, M.D. both opined that Appellant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and
    schizoaffective disorder. In her report, Dr. Syed indicated that Appellant:
    is paranoid, delusional, and grandiose. He believes he is telepathic and
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                     Page 3
    his mind projecting thought broadcasting. He believes his wife “Nicole”
    was kidnapped by MHMR and they amputated her three fingers.
    [Appellant] stopped taking his medications and has poor insight and
    judgment. He has been calling APS and the Chief of the Fire Department
    and leaving messages that are delusional in nature.
    Based on her evaluation of Appellant, Dr. Syed determined that he is suffering from
    severe and abnormal emotional or physical distress and substantial mental or physical
    deterioration of his ability to function independently. She also noted that Appellant
    presents a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others if not immediately
    restrained.
    Dr. Beatty testified at trial that Appellant’s illness has gotten worse in the last
    year or so. Dr. Beatty stated:
    [Appellant] is likely to get himself hurt in the sense of being arrested. He
    is a danger to others, in that he is very disruptive to his caregivers, very
    discourteous. He curses them. He has said that his roommate is trying to
    poison him, and that could conceivably lead to a violent confrontation.
    He has pestered one particular individual, woman, to the degree that her
    husband has said that he has a gun and he will shoot him if he continues.
    Dr. Beatty also testified that he does not believe that Appellant can provide for his basic
    needs without supervision or assistance. According to Dr. Beatty, Appellant does not
    believe that he is ill and, as such, refuses to control himself or take any medication. In
    his report dated August 31, 2011, Dr. Beatty noted the following: “Patient [Appellant]
    has the psychotic delusion that he has a wife and daughter who are repeatedly
    kidnapped, requiring him to make frantic phone calls to the FBI, Fire Chief, Police,
    MHMR, DHS Austin, ect. [sic]. He cannot or will not stop this and does not agree to
    take recommended medications.”
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                       Page 4
    On cross-examination, Dr. Beatty admitted that Appellant has not taken any
    direct action to harm others or himself. Dr. Beatty also acknowledged that he is not
    aware of Appellant engaging in violent confrontations. On re-direct, Dr. Beatty recalled
    an incident where Appellant harassed a television-news reporter in Dallas, which
    resulted in Appellant’s arrest and incarceration for forty-five days. Dr. Beatty believed
    this to be an overt act demonstrating Appellant’s mental illness.
    The State also presented testimony from caseworkers at Pecan Valley. Becky
    Phillips, a care coordinator at Pecan Valley, recalled an incident where Appellant
    stalked a nurse in Weatherford. And based on her interactions with Appellant, Phillips
    believes that Appellant will be harmed or will harm others if he is not moved from his
    current placement. Phillips also testified that she does not know if Appellant has any
    family members, and she recounted that Appellant has been hospitalized twenty-eight
    times in the last thirty-three years. Finally, she thought that Appellant’s mental or
    physical condition had deteriorated to the point that he cannot function independently.
    David Collier, a case manager at Pecan Valley, testified that he has closely
    monitored Appellant’s progress.      According to Collier, Appellant’s condition has
    deteriorated to include the following:
    Belligerence, agitation, insulting to just about everyone including myself
    [Collier] and other staff, neighbors. I will say he’s never been physically
    aggressive toward anyone although he will rare up as if he were wanting
    to attack someone, but I’ve never known him to actually strike or hit
    anyone. But he is verbally aggressive on frequent occasions.
    Collier also described that Appellant has unusual preoccupations with sex and torture.
    Appellant has acknowledged that he has engaged in bestiality in the past and has
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                      Page 5
    alleged that he is frequently anally raped in his sleep, though medical evaluations do
    not support Appellant’s rape allegations. Moreover, Collier has heard Appellant talk
    about “hurting someone, stabbing, killing, all these kinds of things, but I don’t know
    whether or not he would ever actually act on them.” Further, Collier has observed
    Appellant be “very aggressive and threatening toward” a previous roommate. Collier
    also stated that “Nicole” does not exist and speculated that Appellant’s delusions about
    “Nicole” may pertain to a previous caseworker that he was fond of. In addition, Collier
    recalled that Appellant has been arrested for making a terroristic threat against a church
    in North Carolina that he believed to be sheltering “Nicole.” Appellant has also spent
    time in jail in Johnson and Collin Counties. Furthermore, Appellant repeatedly calls
    911 and various governmental agencies to report the alleged abduction of “Nicole.”
    On cross-examination, Collier admitted that Appellant can shop for food at Wal-
    Mart and use public transportation by himself. Collier also admitted that he has never
    seen Appellant hit anyone despite the above-mentioned verbal aggression and that
    Appellant has never harmed himself or attempted suicide.
    Sharon Scott, a community-support specialist at Pecan Valley who has worked
    with Appellant, stated that Appellant threatened to kill his previous roommate and that
    Appellant regularly refuses to take his medications because they interfere with his
    ability to transmit his thoughts.
    Appellant testified on his own behalf and indicated that he believes that the staff
    at Pecan Valley has abducted “Nicole” and his daughter Josephine and that the staff
    amputated “Nicole’s” fingers and Josephine’s arms and left leg.                Appellant
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                     Page 6
    acknowledged that he has been arrested in the past for stalking a store clerk with whom
    he attempted to be romantically involved.       Appellant also acknowledged that his
    current roommate has tried to harm him. And finally, Appellant admitted to writing
    numerous letters to a “beautiful” female district attorney in Johnson County, though he
    explained that he thought the district attorney could help him with his case.
    The jury concluded that there is clear and convincing evidence that Appellant:
    (1) has a “mental illness”; (2) is likely to cause serious harm to himself and others; and
    (3) is suffering severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress and is
    experiencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of his ability to function
    independently and is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or
    not to submit to treatment. The trial court adopted the jury’s findings and signed the
    judgment for temporary in-patient mental-health services. The trial court also signed
    the order for customary administration of psychoactive medication.
    Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the State presented clear
    and convincing evidence such that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
    conviction that Appellant has engaged in a continuing pattern of behavior that tends to
    confirm the likelihood of serious harm to Appellant or others. Although the record
    does not reflect that Appellant has attempted to harm himself, the State presented
    evidence of Appellant’s threatening nature, Appellant’s delusions and preoccupation
    with sex and torture, and Appellant’s tendency to stalk and harass females—all of
    which constitute a continuing pattern of behavior that tends to confirm the likelihood of
    serious harm to Appellant and others. See G.H. v. State, 
    94 S.W.3d 115
    , 117 (Tex. App.—
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                     Page 7
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“Texas law does not require relatives or physicians
    of the mentally ill (or the courts) to stand idly by until serious harm occurs. Indeed, the
    purpose of temporary commitment is to avoid just such harm.”).            And in further
    support of our conclusion, the State presented evidence that at least one person—the
    husband of a Pecan Valley nurse—has stated that he will shoot Appellant if Appellant
    continues to stalk his wife.
    Furthermore, Dr. Beatty identified at least one recent overt act—Appellant’s
    harassment of a Dallas television reporter—that resulted in Appellant’s incarceration
    and supports temporary, involuntary commitment. See State v. K.E.W., 
    315 S.W.3d 16
    ,
    24 (Tex. 2010) (“In sum, the statute requires evidence of a recent act by the proposed
    patient, either physical or verbal, that can be objectively perceived and that is to some
    degree probative of a finding that serious harm to others is probable if the person is not
    treated. The overt act itself need not be of such character that it alone would support a
    finding of probable serious harm to others.”). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence
    supporting the trial court judgment for temporary in-patient mental-health services is
    legally and factually sufficient. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
    Appellant’s second issue pertaining to the trial court’s order to administer
    psychoactive medication is premised on the resolution of his first issue. Appellant
    argues that the trial court’s order to administer psychoactive medication is not
    supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence because the judgment of
    involuntary commitment is not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence.
    See J.M. v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 185
    , 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“In
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                      Page 8
    the absence of a valid order for temporary or extended mental[-]health services, the
    order authorizing the administration of psychoactive medication is not authorized by
    statute.”) (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.106(a)(1) (West 2010)).
    Because we have concluded that the trial court’s judgment of involuntary commitment
    is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, we overrule Appellant’s
    second issue.
    Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment
    of commitment and order to administer psychoactive mediation.
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before Chief Justice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed September 13, 2012
    [CV06]
    Ex parte R.W.M.                                                                   Page 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-11-00379-CV

Filed Date: 9/13/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/16/2015