Monica Misczak v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE1, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2002-HE1 ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00269-CV
MONICA MISCZAK APPELLANT
V.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL APPELLEE
TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE
FOR CDC MORTGAGE CAPITAL
TRUST 2002-HE1, MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2002-HE1
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 2015-001246-1
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Monica Misczak appeals from a forcible entry and detainer
judgment entered in favor of Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,
as Trustee for CDC Mortgage Capital Trust 2002-HE1, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-HE1 (Deutsche Bank). In one issue, Misczak
complains that the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law
constituted harmful error. We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
In 2001, Brian and Jennifer Dayton purchased certain real property in Fort
Worth using a promissory note secured by a deed of trust. The deed of trust
contained a provision stating that the Daytons, and any persons claiming by and
through them, would be considered tenants at will if they continued to hold
possession of the property after it had been purchased at a foreclosure sale.
The Daytons later deeded the property to Misczak. The note on the property
became outstanding, and Deutsche Bank subsequently purchased the property
at a foreclosure sale.
Deutsche Bank then sent a written notice to vacate the property to the
property’s occupants. When the occupants refused to vacate, Deutsche Bank
instituted a forcible entry and detainer action.2 The trial court held a bench trial
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Deutsche Bank originally brought suit in the Justice Court, Precinct 4 of
Tarrant County. After the justice court ruled in Deutsche Bank’s favor, Misczak
appealed to County Court at Law No. 1 of Tarrant County. When we reference
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on Deutsche Bank’s action on May 21, 2015. That same day, the trial court
entered judgment in Deutsche Bank’s favor. On June 9, 2015, Misczak filed a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both parties then filed
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the trial court to consider.
On July 8, 2015, Misczak filed a notice of past due findings. The trial court did
not file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
III. FAILURE TO FILE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In her sole issue, Misczak complains that the trial court’s failure to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted harmful error.
A. The Law
When properly requested, a trial court has a mandatory duty to file findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296, 297; Murray v. Murray, 276
S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism’d). If a trial court does
not file findings of fact and conclusions of law after a request has been properly
made, it is presumed harmful unless the record affirmatively shows that the
complaining party suffered no injury. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763
S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989); Landerman v. State Bar of Tex., 247 S.W.3d 426,
430 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
The general rule is that a complainant has been harmed if the failure to file
findings of fact and conclusions of law causes her to have to guess at the reason
the “trial court” throughout this opinion, we are referring to the county court, not
the justice court.
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the trial court ruled against her or prevents her from properly presenting her case
to the appellate court. R.H. v. Smith, 339 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2011, no pet.). When only a single ground of recovery or a single defense is
presented to the trial court, the complainant suffers no harm when the trial court
fails to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, as the complainant is not
forced to guess the reasons for the trial court’s decision. Pham v. Harris Cty.
Rentals, L.L.C., 455 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no
pet.); R.H., 339 S.W.3d at 766; Nev. Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch.
Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.).
B. Application of the Law to the Facts
In her brief, Misczak states that the trial court’s order denying her amended
motion to dismiss “forms the basis of this appeal” and claims that she “presented
several defensive theories at trial . . . .” Her brief—and our review of the
appellate record—demonstrate, however, that only one defensive issue was
raised at trial. The one defensive issue raised by Misczak, citing Rice v. Pinney,
51 S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.), was that the trial court
allegedly lacked jurisdiction because the issue of immediate possession was so
integrally linked to the issue of title that deciding the right to immediate
possession necessarily required the resolution of a title dispute. All points raised
by Misczak at trial related to that alleged jurisdictional issue. The record is clear
that the trial court rejected Misczak’s defensive issue on the ground that there
was not a “bona fide dispute as to title.” As only one defensive issue was raised,
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and as the trial court explained its reasoning for rejecting that issue, Misczak was
not left to guess as to why the trial court ruled as it did. See Pham, 455 S.W.3d
at 706; R.H., 339 S.W.3d at 766; Nev. Gold & Silver, 225 S.W.3d at 77.
Further, Misczak does not explain, and the record does not show, how she
was prevented from properly presenting her case to this court or how she has
otherwise suffered injury from the alleged error. Nor does Misczak identify any
issue she was unable to brief as a result of the trial court’s failure to file findings
of fact and conclusions of law. On this record, we conclude that findings of fact
and conclusions of law were not necessary, and therefore, any error by the trial
court in failing to file them was harmless. See Pham, 455 S.W.3d at 706; R.H.,
339 S.W.3d at 766; Nev. Gold & Silver, 225 S.W.3d at 77.
We overrule Misczak’s sole issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Misczak’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DELIVERED: April 7, 2016
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