Eugene Hernandez Salazar v. State ( 1996 )

Salazar v. State TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



NO. 03-94-00628-CR



Eugene Hernandez Salazar, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CALDWELL COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 94-107, HONORABLE DONALD V. HAMMOND, JUDGE PRESIDING

A jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (West 1994). ⁽¹⁾ Appellant raises points of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's findings on both guilt and whether a deadly weapon was used, as well as complaining of the trial court's ruling that appellant could be impeached with a prior felony conviction. We will affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

Frank Hernandez, the victim in this case, testified that he was robbed by two men outside a bar known as Lozano's Family Garden in Lockhart. Hernandez testified that appellant held him from behind while another man (later identified as appellant's brother Ernesto) demanded his wallet at knifepoint. The robbers took from Hernandez a one hundred dollar bill. Hernandez also testified that he was afraid the assailants were going to kill him, that he saw a portion of a gun, and that one of the assailants threatened to shoot him.

Responding to a dispatch call, Officer Baladez arrived at the scene, and Yolando Lozano, the owner of the bar, told him that the robbers had left in a red pickup truck. Shortly after the incident, Baladez arrested appellant and Ernesto. Baladez found a one hundred dollar bill on the floorboard of the pickup truck, and appellant was found in possession of a large lockblade knife.

When Baladez informed appellant and Ernesto that they were under arrest, Ernesto fled the scene on foot. Appellant, however, did not flee. Officers eventually chased down appellant's fugitive brother and brought him into custody.

Soon after the arrest, appellant volunteered the statement, "I just want you to know that my brother had nothing to do with it, that I did it all on my own." At a pretrial hearing, when Baladez testified about appellant's post-arrest incriminating statement, appellant nodded his head, indicating yes.

At the jail on the night of the offense, Hernandez identified appellant as one of the robbers. Hernandez again identified appellant as one of the assailants at trial.

DISCUSSION

In his first point of error, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove whether he robbed Hernandez. He does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. When conducting a factual sufficiency review of the evidence in criminal cases, an appellate court "views all the evidence without the prism of ``in the light most favorable to the prosecution,' . . . [and] set[s] aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Clewis v. State, No. 450-94 (Tex. Crim. App. January 31, 1996); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd, untimely filed).

Articulating the proper method of conducting a factual sufficiency review, this Court has stated:

Because the court is not bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it may consider the testimony of defense witnesses and the existence of alternative hypotheses. The court should set aside the verdict only if it so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Before reversing a conviction on this basis, the court should detail the evidence and clearly state why the jury's verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as to be manifestly unjust, why it shocks the conscience, or why it clearly demonstrates bias; and further state how the evidence contrary to the verdict overwhelmingly outweighs the evidence that supports the verdict.

Stone, 823 S.W.2d at 381.

Appellant argues that the verdict is clearly wrong and unjust because (1) the victim's testimony was incredible considering that he was intoxicated during the entire chain of events; (2) neutral, third-party eye-witnesses testified that appellant was not a party to the robbery; and (3) appellant's confession was unreliable. We disagree with appellant's interpretation of the evidence.

While Hernandez had been drinking that night, the jury heard evidence as to his state of intoxication and was entitled to resolve the factual dispute as to whether, or to what extent, Hernandez's faculties were impaired. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1978) (jury, as trier of fact, is judge of credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony). Given the record, we cannot conclude that the jury acted irrationally or unreasonably by choosing to believe Hernandez's testimony.

At the time of the robbery, Juanita and Ricky Arredondo lived across the street from the Lozano Family Garden. After returning home from shopping with their children on the evening of the robbery, the Arredondos stepped outside their van in front of their house and witnessed some of the events surrounding the robbery. Both Juanita and Ricky testified that (1) they saw Ernesto pushing and threatening Hernandez in the parking lot; (2) when they first began observing the events, appellant was not present; and (3) appellant later walked out of the bar and told Ernesto to leave Hernandez alone.

In summary, appellant posits the theory that he was not a party to the robbery, that he came onto the scene only after Ernesto had robbed Hernandez, and that he tried to prevent his brother from committing the robbery. However, Juanita admitted that when she first saw Ernesto and Hernandez, Ernesto was already in possession of Hernandez's wallet; she conceded that she did not know how the wallet was taken from the victim. Ricky also testified that he did not witness how the wallet was taken, nor was he aware of what occurred before he started to observe the events in the parking lot.

Appellant also attempts to discount his confession by arguing that it was reasonable to conclude that he confessed in order to protect his brother. While appellant's version might be one interpretation, the jury's finding of guilt is yet another. We cannot say that the jury's interpretation was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.

Given the record, we conclude that a rational jury could have inferred that appellant was a party to the robbery. The evidence entitled the jury to conclude that (1) both brothers robbed Hernandez; (2) appellant then went inside the bar; (3) the Arredondos witnessed the events in the parking lot only after the robbery occurred; (4) appellant urged his brother not to "mess with" Hernandez because they already had his money; and (5) appellant admitted the robbery because he was guilty. We overrule point of error one.

In his second and third points of error, appellant attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury's finding that a deadly weapon was used during the robbery.

Appellate review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining whether, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). The standard of review is the same in both circumstantial and direct evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury is the trier of fact and the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979). The jury is free to accept all or any part of the evidence presented by either party. See Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

It is not the reviewing court's duty to disregard, realign, or weigh the evidence. Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The appellate court must consider all the evidence admitted. Nickerson v. State, 810 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). If there is evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trier of fact believes the evidence, an appellate court is not in position to reverse the conviction due to legally insufficient evidence. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In the instant cause, the indictment alleged in part:

[S]aid Defendant did, then and there, and [sic] exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, and a knife that in the manner of its use and intended use was capable of causing death and serious bodily injury.

In cases of aggravated robbery involving a firearm, testimony from the victim regarding the use or exhibition of a gun is sufficient to support a conviction. Porter v. State, 601 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Moreover, the victim is not required to see the entire weapon in order to support an aggravated robbery conviction. Jones v. State, 810 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).

In cases of aggravated robbery involving a knife, whether a knife is considered a deadly weapon depends on (1) the size, shape, sharpness, use, or intended use of the knife; (2) words or threats made by the accused; and (3) the physical proximity of the accused to the victim. Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 113-115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on rehearing); Soto v. State, 864 S.W.2d 687, 691-692 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).

In the instant cause, Hernandez testified that (1) appellant held him from behind while Ernesto pointed a knife towards him and took his wallet from his pants pocket; (2) he thought that the two men were going to kill him with the knife; (3) the men threatened to shoot him with a gun; (4) he saw what he believed to be part of a pistol; and (5) he ran away because he feared that the robbers would shoot him. Arresting officer Baladez testified that he discovered a large pocket-knife on appellant's person. Baladez also recovered a toy plastic pistol from the pickup truck where appellant was arrested. However, Juanita Arredondo testified that the robbers did not use the toy gun recovered from the truck, but rather a "long, flat, skinny gun" -- an automatic, or semiautomatic. Given the record, we cannot say that there was legally or factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that a deadly weapon was used during the robbery. We overrule appellant's second and third point of error.

In his fourth and fifth points of error, appellant attacks the trial court's ruling that, pursuant to Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 609, he could have been impeached with a prior conviction had he testified. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 609. Specifically, in point of error four, appellant argues that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior conviction would outweigh its probative value. In point of error five, appellant contends that the state did not provide written notice of its intent to use the prior offense for impeachment purposes.

Appellant did not testify at trial. Because appellant did not testify, the objectionable evidence was not offered; therefore, any possible harm from the trial court's ruling would be entirely speculative on our part. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984). Accordingly, appellant has preserved nothing for review. Morgan v. State, 891 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Richardson v. State, 733 S.W.2d 947, 956 (Tex. App.--Austin 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 761 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (appellant must testify in order to raise and preserve claims of improper impeachment through a prior conviction). Therefore, we overrule points of error four and five.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled all of appellant's points of error, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

Marilyn Aboussie, Justice

Before Justices Aboussie, Kidd and Dally ^*  

Affirmed

Filed: March 6, 1996

Do Not Publish

^* Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1988).

1.   This offense took place before September 1, 1994 and is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense occurred. Because the code amendments effective September 1, 1994 have no substantive effect on this offense, we cite to the current code for convenience.

P>

In cases of aggravated robbery involving a knife, whether a knife is considered a deadly weapon depends on (1) the size, shape, sharpness, use, or intended use of the knife; (2) words or threats made by the accused; and (3) the physical proximity of the accused to the victim. Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 113-115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on rehearing); Soto v. State, 864 S.W.2d 687, 691-692 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).

In the instant cause, Hernandez testified that (1) appellant held him from behind while Ernesto pointed a knife towards him and took his wallet from his pants pocket; (2) he thought that the two men were going to kill him with the knife; (3) the men threatened to shoot him with a gun; (4) he saw what he believed to be part of a pistol; and (5) he ran away because he feared that the robbers would shoot him. Arresting officer Baladez testified that he discovered a large pocket-knife on appellant's person. Baladez also recovered a toy plastic pistol from the pickup truck where appellant was arrested. However, Juanita Arredondo testified that the robbers did not use the toy gun recovered from the truck, but rather a "long, flat, skinny gun" -- an automatic, or semiautomatic. Given the record, we cannot say that there was legally or factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that a deadly weapon was used during the robbery. We overrule appellant's second and third point of error.

In his fourth and fifth points of error, appellant attacks the trial court's ruling that, pursuant to Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 609, he could have been impeached with a prior conviction had he testified. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 609. Specifically, in point of error four, appellant argues that the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior conviction would outweigh its probative value. In point of error five, appellant contends that the state did not provide written notice of its intent to use the prior offense for impeachment purposes.

Appellant did not testify at trial. Because appellant did not testify, the objectionable evidence was not offered; therefore, any possible harm from the trial court's ruling would be entirely speculative on our part. See Luce v. United States