Toby Longoria v. State ( 1998 )

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN



NO. 03-97-00205-CR



Toby Longoria, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee



FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 0964973, HONORABLE JON N. WISSER, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Toby Longoria was convicted of murder. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02 (West 1994). His punishment, enhanced by an affirmative finding that Longoria was an habitual felony offender, was ordered by the trial court at fifty-six years imprisonment. Id. at § 12.42(d). We will affirm the judgment.

THE CONTROVERSY

In August 1995, the body of a woman was found under the old Montopolis Bridge where it crosses the Colorado River in Austin. The body was identified as that of Margaret Rose Adams. Adams had lived in a small campsite under the bridge. Medical evidence indicated Adams had been struck in the face with a blunt instrument that fractured her skull. While she was on the ground, a heavy object was thrown on her head, possibly a rock. Blood was found at the campsite under the bridge.

Investigators arrived at an opinion of what happened to Adams after she was assaulted under the bridge. A trail of blood began under the bridge, where Adams was hit, and led to the top of the bridge, where it ended in a smear of blood on a railing. Adams's body was found in the river directly below the blood smear. Police found what looked like drag marks on the ground under the bridge, and medical investigators found abrasions on Adams's lower body. The medical examiners concluded that after Adams had been hit she had been lifted by the arms and dragged over a rough surface. A shopping cart was found in the river near the body. On the paremont at the top of the bridge were found marks apparently made by narrow wheels. The trail of blood curved with the path of the wheels and ended at the blood smear on the railing. The railing was scraped. Police concluded that someone pulled Adams, took her to the top of the bridge, put her in a shopping cart, wheeled her onto the bridge, and cast her over the railing and into the river. A medical examiner concluded that the causes of death were a skull fracture and drowning.

A local resident who regularly jogged past Adams's campsite testified that Adams had lived there for at least six months. He thought she was the only person who lived there. He had seen the campsite a few times and been surprised how neat and tidy it was. He brought the police to the campsite after the murder. Adams's pots and pans, Bible, clothing, newspapers, and bedding were strewn around the area. The jogger identified a straw hat at the campsite as one worn by Adams.

Investigators found the words "Gato Negro," a roman numeral "VII," and a backwards numeral seven spray-painted under the bridge. This graffiti was found on both sides of the girder that supported the "ceiling" or overhead of Adams's sleeping area. Additional graffiti appeared on the bridge; "Gato Negro" was painted on top of the other graffiti, leading investigators to conclude it was the most recent. Another spray-painted "seven" was found on the bridge railing near where Adams had apparently been cast over the railing and into the river.

Appellant Toby Longoria's mother lived in a house located about one hundred yards from the murder scene. According to police files, Longoria was known on the street as "Gato Negro." Police records indicated that Longoria was associated with a gang known as the "seventh-street gang." Police arrested Longoria at his mother's house on an outstanding forgery warrant. After further investigation, Longoria was indicted for Adams's murder.

At trial the prosecution's evidence consisted primarily of the physical evidence previously described and the testimony of several of Longoria's friends. The testimony concerned statements made by Longoria, about two weeks after the murder, in which Longoria spoke of killing a woman under the Montopolis bridge. We will summarize the testimony.

Joe Esparza, a long-time friend of Longoria, told police that Longoria had visited him one afternoon about two weeks after the murder. Esparza testified Longoria told him he had been spray-painting under the bridge when a woman approached him and told him to stop painting, and Longoria said he "swung" at the lady.

Longoria spoke afterwards at a party to several friends about the incident. Louis Arispe testified that while at the party he heard Longoria say he killed a woman and threw her "in the lake." Jesse Hernandez, another friend, testified he heard Longoria say he had been spray-painting under the bridge when a woman told him to leave because "it was her little house or something." Longoria said he got angry with the woman and hit her with a "can" and was "dragging her around." Finally, Hernandez heard Longoria say he threw the woman off the bridge, and that her body made a "big old swish" when it hit the water. Victor Coronado testified he heard Longoria say that he "messed a woman up" and "choked" her. In their testimony, however, Esparza and Arispe both added that Longoria had a reputation for bragging.

In addition to testifying about Longoria's inculpatory statements, Esparza and Arispe verified that Longoria used the nickname "Gato Negro." Arispe had seen Longoria's name spray-painted around East Austin. ⁽¹⁾ Esparza also testified that Longoria was a member of the "seventh-street gang," a gang whose "tag" was a number seven or a roman numeral seven. Esparza had seen Longoria spray-paint numeral sevens like the ones found on the bridge.

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, a jury convicted Longoria of the murder. He now appeals, contending in two points of error that the evidence was neither legally nor factually sufficient to support his conviction.

DISCUSSION AND HOLDINGS

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view it in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence without that prism and set aside the verdict only if it is so against the weight of the evidence as to be clearly unjust. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 406-408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App.1996)). The court should be appropriately deferential in order to avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134-35; Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd untimely filed). The court is authorized to set aside the jury's determination, even if supported by some probative evidence, when the jury finding is "manifestly unjust." Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

The evidence here is unusual because aside from the evidence of the spray-painted words and numbers, little directly connects Longoria to Adam's death other than the statements he made to his friends. Nevertheless, we believe the evidence shows a very strong concurrence of the physical circumstances of the murder, Longoria's statements, and matters proved about him. Considered together, these sufficiently support the conviction.

Longoria admitted at a party that he had killed a woman. Longoria said he "swung" at a woman under the bridge, and hit her with a can. The medical and other physical evidence showed that Adams had, indeed, been struck under the bridge by a blunt instrument. Longoria revealed by his statements his knowledge that after the woman was assaulted, she was taken to the top of the bridge and cast into the river--a highly unusual event. He told friends he "dragged" the woman, a statement consistent with the drag marks found under the bridge and the abrasions found on Adams's lower body. Longoria's rather detailed description of events coincides exactly with the physical evidence found under the bridge, on top of the bridge, and on Adams's body.

Longoria's attorney attempted to diminish the effect of Longoria's inculpatory statements by emphasizing the witnesses' testimony that Longoria was a known braggart. ⁽²⁾ As stated previously, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134-35. Under the circumstances, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Longoria's statements were nothing more than bravado; and the jury reasonably could have disbelieved that theory, concluding such testimony was given by the reluctant witnesses to protect Longoria. ⁽³⁾ That the jury evidently made the latter conclusion is fully justified under the evidence.

In addition to the coinciding factors just described, other circumstantial evidence corroborates Longoria's inculpatory statements. Longoria used the street name "Gato Negro." The words "Gato Negro" were the freshest words painted on the bridge, found under the bridge where the first blood stain was found. The defense emphasized that other people might use the street name "Gato Negro," precluding a sound conclusion that Longoria and no one else had "tagged" the bridge. The graffiti did, however, constitute circumstantial evidence of Longoria's guilt. The number seven, shown to signify Longoria's gang, was painted both near Adams's bed and atop the bridge at the spot where Adams's body was thrown into the river.

The defense attempted to persuade the jury that the acts depicted by the prosecution could not be accomplished by one person acting alone. Although there were drag marks under the bridge where someone probably pulled Adams across the ground, there were no marks up the steep slope to the top of the bridge. Longoria's counsel argued that a man of Longoria's size could not by himself carry a 130-pound woman up the slope without dragging her. We do not believe the jury was required to draw the conclusion suggested by counsel; they may well have concluded that Longoria had the strength to carry a small woman, estimated to be between five-foot-one and five-foot-three in stature, up the incline to the bridge.

Given the combined effect of Longoria's exceptional knowledge (revealed in his statements to friends) of the specific physical details of the assault and murder, combined with the circumstantial evidence of the spray-painted words that match Longoria's nickname and gang affiliation, we conclude the evidence was neither legally insufficient to support the jury verdict nor was the verdict so against the weight of the evidence as to be clearly unjust.

We affirm the judgment of the trial-court.

John Powers, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Kidd and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: September 11, 1998

Do Not Publish

1. Arispe did not make clear whether he had seen the name "Gato Negro" or some other name associated with Longoria spray-painted around town.

2. Longoria's incriminating statements are best classified as statements against penal interest. Statements tending to expose a defendant to criminal liability are not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements. McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Tex. R. Evid. 803(24). Longoria does not complain that the statements were erroneously admitted.

3. Esparza admitted, however, that Longoria had never before bragged about a murder. And Arispe stated that despite Longoria's reputation for bragging and "being psychotic," Arispe "kind of figured [Longoria] was the one . . . ."

All of Longoria's friends expressed that they were in court against their will.

the abrasions found on Adams's lower body. Longoria's rather detailed description of events coincides exactly with the physical evidence found under the bridge, on top of the bridge, and on Adams's body.

Longoria's attorney attempted to diminish the effect of Longoria's inculpatory statements by emphasizing the witnesses' testimony that Longoria was a known braggart. ⁽²⁾ As stated previously, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134-35. Under the circumstances, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Longoria's statements were nothing more than bravado; and the jury reasonably could have disbelieved that theory, concluding such testimony was given by the reluctant witnesses to protect Longoria. ⁽³⁾ That the jury evidently made the latter conclusion is fully justified under the evidence.

In addition to the coinciding factors just described, other circumstantial evidence corroborates Longoria's inculpatory statements. Longoria used the street name "Gato Negro." The words "Gato Negro" were the freshest words painted on the bridge, found under the bridge where the first blood stain was found. The defense emphasized that other people might use the street name "Gato Negro," precluding a sound conclusion that Longoria and no one else had "tagged" the bridge. The graffiti did, however, constitute circumstantial evidence of Longoria's guilt. The number seven, shown to signify Longoria's gang, was painted both near Adams's bed and atop the bridge at the spot where Adams's body was thrown into the river.

The defense attempted to persuade the jury that the acts depicted by the prosecution could not be accomplished by one person acting alone. Although there were drag marks under the bridge where someone probably pulled Adams across the ground, there were no marks up the steep slope to the top of the bridge. Longoria's counsel argued that a man of Longoria's size could not by himself carry a 130-pound woman up the slope without dragging her. We do not believe the jury was required to draw the conclusion suggested by counsel; they may well have concluded that Longoria had the strength to carry a small woman, estimated to be between five-foot-one and five-foot-three in stature, up the incline to the bridge.

Given the combined effect of Longoria's exceptional knowledge (revealed in his statements to friends) of the specific physical details of the assault and murder, combined with the circumstantial evidence of the spray-painted words that match Longoria's nickname and gang affiliation, we conclude the evidence was neither legally insufficient to support the jury verdict nor was the verdict so against the weight of the evidence as to be clearly unjust.

We affirm the judgment of the trial-court.

John Powers, Justice

Before Justices Powers, Kidd and B. A. Smith

Affirmed

Filed: September 11, 1998

Do Not Publish

1. Arispe did not make clear whether he had seen the name "Gato Negro" or some other name associated with Longoria spray-painted aroun