Ex Parte Christopher Cruz Montemayor ( 1999 )


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    TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN








    NO. 03-98-00618-CR


    Ex parte Christopher Cruz Montemayor, Appellant









    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY, 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

    NO. 98-404-C26, HONORABLE BILLY RAY STUBBLEFIELD, JUDGE PRESIDING


    Christopher Cruz Montemayor is incarcerated pending trial on an indictment accusing him of aggravated sexual assault. He applied for a writ of habeas corpus seeking release because of delay in the State's readiness for trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.151 (West Supp. 1999). The writ issued and relief was denied following a hearing. By two points of error, Montemayor contends the evidence does not support the court's finding that the State was ready for trial within the time allowed by statute.

    A defendant who is detained pending trial of a felony must be released either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required if the State is not ready for trial within ninety days from the commencement of the detention. Id. § 1(1). Montemayor was arrested on June 16, 1998. He was indicted on September 8, and the State filed a written announcement of readiness for trial on September 10. This announcement constitutes a prima facie showing of readiness. Jones v. State,

    803 S.W.2d 712
    , 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  Montemayor contends
    this prima facie showing was rebutted because he was not served with a copy of the indictment
    until September 23, after the ninety-day time limit had expired.

    A defendant has an absolute right to be served with a copy of the indictment against him at least ten days before trial begins. Johnson v. State,

    567 S.W.2d 214
    , 215 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1978); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 25.01, 25.02, 27.12 (West 1989).  Montemayor
    argues that because he could not be tried until at least ten days after service of the indictment, the
    State could not have been ready for trial within the statutorily prescribed time period.  He cites
    no authority directly supporting this argument.

    Article 17.151 by its terms is concerned only with the State's readiness for trial. See May v. State,

    738 S.W.2d 261
    , 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Phillips v. State, 
    651 S.W.2d 745
    , 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).  The State's failure to serve Montemayor with a copy of the
    indictment would have entitled him to a continuance had this cause been called for trial on
    September 10.  See 
    Johnson, 567 S.W.2d at 216
    .  This does not mean, however, that the State was
    not in fact ready for trial on that date.  See 
    May, 738 S.W.2d at 271-72
    (State's failure to comply
    with discovery order did not rebut presumption of readiness); Ward v. State, 
    659 S.W.2d 643
    , 647
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (defect in indictment did not rebut presumption of readiness).  The State's
    timely announcement of ready was not rebutted, and supports the district court's order denying
    relief under article 17.151.  The points of error are overruled. (1)



    The district court's order is affirmed.





    Bea Ann Smith, Justice

    Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel

    Affirmed

    Filed: March 25, 1999

    Do Not Publish

    1. Several of the cited opinions were decided under the now defunct Speedy Trial Act, of which article 17.151 was originally a part. Cases decided under the act are instructive under article 17.151.

    Jones, 803 S.W.2d at 717
    .