Frederick Earl Washington v. State ( 2001 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-01-00003-CR
    Frederick Earl Washington, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY, 21ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 9560, HONORABLE JOHN L. PLACKE, JUDGE PRESIDING
    Appellant Frederick Earl Washington was convicted of robbery after pleading guilty.
    See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.02 (West 1994). His sole contention on appeal is that the forty-five
    year sentence imposed by the court is unauthorized by law and void. We agree.
    The indictment alleged two previous felony convictions for the purpose of enhancing
    punishment. See 
    id. § 12.42(d)
    (West Supp. 2001). On October 11, 2000, when Washington
    appeared before the district court and pleaded guilty to the alleged robbery, the parties agreed to
    reserve the enhancement issue for the sentencing hearing. With that, the court found Washington
    guilty and reset the cause for sentencing.
    Washington returned to court on November 28. He did not enter a plea to the
    enhancement allegations, the State offered no evidence to prove the enhancement allegations, and the
    court did not find the enhancement allegations to be true. Under the circumstances, appellant’s
    sentence was not subject to enhancement. In fact, the court’s written judgment reflects that no
    finding was made regarding the enhancement allegations. Nevertheless, the district court assessed
    punishment at imprisonment for forty-five years.
    Robbery is a second-degree felony. 
    Id. § 29.02(b).
    Washington’s forty-five year
    sentence exceeds that authorized for a second-degree felony. 
    Id. § 12.33
    (West 1994). A sentence
    not authorized by law is void. Levy v. State, 
    818 S.W.2d 801
    , 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Brown
    v. State, 
    14 S.W.3d 832
    , 833 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d); see Ex parte Seidel, 
    39 S.W.3d 221
    , 225 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment as to the
    finding of guilt, but reverse that portion of the judgment imposing sentence and remand the cause for
    reassessment of punishment within the range prescribed for a second-degree felony.
    __________________________________________
    Bea Ann Smith, Justice
    Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Puryear
    Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part
    Filed: September 20, 2001
    Do Not Publish
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-01-00003-CR

Filed Date: 9/20/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/5/2015