Justin Wayne Parris v. State ( 2016 )


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  • Opinion issued May 19, 2016
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-14-00502-CR
    ———————————
    JUSTIN WAYNE PARRIS, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 338th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1352699
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Justin Wayne Parris, waived his right to a jury trial and was
    found guilty by the trial court of the offense of murder.1 The trial court sentenced
    1
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1),(2) (Vernon 2011).
    Appellant to 70 years in prison. In one issue, Appellant contends that the evidence
    was not sufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
    We affirm.
    Background
    In June 2009, Appellant lived in a house with his 12-year-old sister,
    Danielle; his mother; and his 82-year-old grandfather, Johnnie Gonzales, who
    owned the home. Gonzales also owned the house next to his home and the house
    behind his home. Gonzales’s ex-wife and his son, Thomas, lived in the house next
    door. Gonzales’s son, Junior, and Junior’s wife, Mary, lived in the house behind
    Gonzales’s home.
    Danielle and Gonzales had a very close relationship. Gonzales would walk
    Danielle to her school bus stop in the morning, and he would be there waiting for
    her in the afternoon to walk her home. On November 6, 2009, Gonzales was not
    waiting for Danielle when she got off the school bus. Danielle walked to a nearby
    store and called home. Appellant answered the phone. Danielle asked Appellant
    where Gonzales was, and Appellant responded that he did not know. Appellant
    told Danielle to walk home. It took Danielle about 20 minutes to reach home.
    When she arrived at her house between 4:00 and 4:15, Danielle saw her
    Uncle Junior’s truck parked in front of her Uncle Thomas’s house next door.
    Junior’s wife, Mary, was in the passenger side of the truck. Junior was standing
    2
    outside the truck speaking with Danielle’s grandmother, who also lived in the
    house with Thomas. Danielle waived to them, but they did not waive back to her.
    Danielle would later tell police that Appellant was sitting on the front porch
    of their house when she came home.            Danielle asked Appellant where their
    grandfather was, and Appellant said he did not know.
    When she walked in the house, Danielle noticed that her grandfather’s
    recliner was tilted backwards, his footrest was flipped over, and mail was strewn
    across the floor. Although she feared that there had been a break-in, Danielle
    continued into the house. She walked through the dining room to the back patio
    door. There, on the floor next to the back sliding glass door, Danielle noticed a
    blanket on the floor.    She started to pick it up when she noticed that her
    grandfather’s left hand, with his watch, was sticking out from beneath the blanket.
    Danielle also saw that there was blood.
    Danielle called 9-1-1, and Houston police officers, D. Dodson and G.
    Rodriguez were dispatched to the scene. The Houston Fire Department (HFD) was
    also dispatched, and it reached the scene first. When the police officers arrived,
    Appellant was being treated by HFD personnel for a cut on his hand. The firemen
    told the police officers that there was a scene inside the house that they needed to
    check. The officers proceeded inside the house and went to the rear of the home to
    where Gonzales’s body was lying underneath a blanket.            One of the HFD
    3
    personnel pulled back the blanket to reveal Gonzales’s body. The officers saw that
    Gonzales had been decapitated. His head was lying one to two feet away from his
    body.
    Officer’s Dodson and Rodriguez then conducted a security sweep of the
    premises. The officers found no one else at home. The officers noticed that, not
    only was there blood around Gonzales’s body, there was blood in the kitchen, the
    bathroom, and throughout the backyard.       In the bathroom, there were blood
    droplets on the floor near the sink that were consistent with someone cleaning up.
    Officer Rodriguez noticed that there was clothing on the floor of the bathroom that
    appeared to have blood on them.       There was a blood trail leading from the
    bathroom to the backyard. The officers also noticed that Appellant had what
    appeared to be blood stains on his shorts and on his shirt. There also appeared to
    be blood on his shoes.
    The property had a detached garage in the backyard. The police found the
    door of the garage unlocked and entered to ensure that there were no other victims.
    There, the police found a pair of gardening shears. On the gardening shears was
    what Officer Rodriguez would later testify was “dried red material consistent with
    blood.”
    4
    Appellant voluntarily went to the downtown police station with Officers
    Dodson and Rodriguez.          There, Appellant agreed to give video-recorded
    statements to Detectives O. Chandler and J. Johnston of the homicide division.
    Appellant first spoke to Detective Chandler. He told her that he was 22-
    years old. Appellant said that he did not have a job but was receiving social
    security disability payments. Appellant had jobs in the past but either had quit or
    had been fired. Appellant stated that he was prescribed three or four medications,
    but he had not taken them for several weeks because he did not like how they made
    him feel.
    Detective Chandler asked Appellant what he had done that day. Appellant
    stated that he did not recall specifically what he had done but confirmed that he
    had been at home all day. He then stated that he had gotten up, smoked a cigar and
    had listened to music. Appellant said that he tried to “keep busy” doing work
    around the house. He told Detective Chandler that he had cut his hand doing the
    dishes. Appellant said that his mom, who also lived in the home, was in the
    hospital at the time. Appellant stated that he had spoken to her that day on the
    telephone. Appellant told Detective Chandler that no one had come to the house to
    visit that day. Appellant initially said that he did not see his grandfather, Gonzales,
    all day. He said that he did not know where Gonzales had been because he,
    Appellant, had been walking around outside the house that day listening to music.
    5
    Appellant told Detective Chandler that he did not know what had happened
    to his grandfather. Appellant said that he did not recall the last time he had spoken
    to his grandfather or the last time he had seen him.
    Appellant stated that he was sitting outside the house when his sister,
    Danielle, came home from school.        Appellant said Danielle had called 9-1-1
    because she saw Gonzales on the floor. Appellant acknowledged that he had seen
    Gonzales lying on the floor. He told Detective Chandler that he had covered
    Gonzales with a blanket because he “didn’t want to look at him no more.” When
    Detective Chandler asked him why he had not called 9-1-1 when he saw his
    grandfather’s body, Appellant stated it was because he did not want to talk about it.
    Detective Chandler asked Appellant what kind of relationship Appellant had
    with his grandfather, and he initially answered “distant.” Appellant then said that
    he had “nothing against” his grandfather.        Appellant denied that he and his
    grandfather had a fight that day, and he denied killing his grandfather. When
    Detective Chandler asked Appellant why he had blood on his shirt and on his
    shorts, Appellant said that he did not know and that he did not want to talk about it.
    After Detective Chandler concluded her interview, Appellant was also
    interviewed by Detective Johnston. The detective first asked Appellant how he
    had cut his finger. Appellant told Detective Johnston that he had cut his finger by
    cutting lemons from a tree in the yard with a saw.
    6
    Appellant then described what he had done that day. He indicated that he
    had gotten up around 9:00 that morning. He first smoked a cigar and listened to
    music. He said that he took a shower around 10:00. Appellant stated that his
    grandfather was not home when he woke up, but his grandfather came home later
    while Appellant was sitting outside. Appellant said that he and his grandfather did
    not speak that day. Appellant claimed that he sat outside until Danielle came home
    from school.
    Appellant told Detective Johnston that he and his grandfather never argued.
    When the detective asked Appellant how he felt about his grandfather’s death,
    Appellant stated that it would be sad not to have his grandfather around to help his
    family.   He was also concerned about where he and his family would live.
    Detective Johnston asked Appellant why he had covered his grandfather up with a
    blanket, and Appellant responded that “you don’t leave stuff like that.”
    Appellant consented to giving a saliva sample. He also agreed to give the
    clothes he was wearing to police.
    Officers Dodson and Rodriguez drove Appellant back to his grandfather’s
    house. They had been instructed to wait there in their patrol car until a search
    warrant could be issued. Once the warrant was issued, the officers went to the
    home and arrested Appellant, who was asleep.
    7
    Appellant was charged with murdering his grandfather.               Appellant’s
    competency to stand trial was reviewed in 2009 and in 2010, and he was found
    competent each time to stand trial. Appellant’s competency was again evaluated in
    July 2012. At that time, he was found not to be competent to stand trial. Appellant
    was committed to an inpatient mental health facility where he received court
    ordered mental health services.       In December 2012, the trial court found
    Appellant’s competency to be restored and ordered the criminal proceedings to
    proceed. It was reported to the trial court in December 2013 that Appellant was
    not taking his psychoactive medication, prescribed during his inpatient treatment.
    In January 2014, the trial court signed an order permitting the involuntary
    administration of medication to Appellant.
    Appellant waived his right to a jury, and the case was tried to the bench in
    June 2014. At trial, the State admitted the video-recorded statements Appellant
    gave to Detectives Chandler and Johnston and the recording of the 9-1-1 call.
    In addition to the police officers involved in the investigation of the case, the
    State also called Gonzales’s oldest son, Junior, and his granddaughter, Danielle to
    testify. Junior testified that he had a close relationship with his father. He also
    testified that, on more than one occasion, Danielle had called him to come to
    Gonzales’s house. When he had arrived at Gonzales’s home on those occasions,
    8
    Junior had observed Appellant “up to my dad, wanting to beat him up or hit
    him . . . .”
    Junior also testified that, around 4:00 on the day of the murder, he had been
    talking to his mother in front of his brother, Thomas’s house, which was next to
    Gonzales’s house. At that time, Junior noticed Appellant sitting on the front porch
    and saw Danielle walking down the street toward the house. It was soon after this
    that Danielle discovered Gonzales’s body in the house.
    Danielle was 17-years-old at the time of trial. She acknowledged that, on
    the day of murder, she had told police that Appellant was sitting outside her
    grandfather’s house on the front porch when she arrived home, as Junior had also
    testified. However at trial, Danielle testified that Appellant had not been sitting
    outside on the porch. She stated that Appellant had arrived home at the same time
    she did. Danielle testified that she saw him walking toward the home as she was
    arriving and that he then sat down on a chair on the porch.
    In her testimony, Danielle also indicated that she had called home from near
    her bus stop. Appellant had answered the phone and had told her he did not know
    where their grandfather was. Danielle stated that it took her 20 minutes to walk
    home.
    The State also presented the testimony of C. Head, a DNA analyst at the
    Houston Forensic Science Center. She tested the blood on the clothing Appellant
    9
    was wearing on the day of the murder. Head was able to obtain a DNA profile
    from the blood on Appellant’s shorts. Appellant was excluded as a contributor to
    the blood.     Gonzales, however, was not excluded as a contributor.         Head’s
    testimony indicated that the probability that the DNA belonged to unrelated,
    randomly selected individual, other than Gonzales, was one in 64 quintillion for
    Caucasians, one in 410 quintillion for African-Americans, one in 14 quadrillion for
    Southeast Hispanics, and one in 50 quintillion for Southwest Hispanics. Head
    testified that she could not obtain a sufficient DNA profile from the blood on
    Appellant’s shirt or shoes to conduct a DNA analysis.
    In addition, the State called the assistant medical examiner, Dr. Mary Lynn
    Anzalone, who had performed Gonzales’s autopsy. Dr. Anzalone testified that
    Gonzales had sustained an estimated 48 “sharp force injuries” to his body,
    including 17 such injuries to his head and neck and 16 such injuries to his neck and
    torso.    Dr. Anzalone stated that Gonzales had been “truly decapitated.”       She
    testified that she had determined that all of the injuries had occurred about the
    same time.
    At trial, the State theorized that Gonzales was killed with the gardening
    shears that the police had seen in Gonzales’s garage. Officer Rodriguez testified
    that it had appeared to him that the shears were covered with blood. The State
    was, however, unable to introduce the shears into evidence because the shears had
    10
    been seized by police without a search warrant. At trial, the State offered a pair of
    gardening shears for demonstrative purposes. The State showed Officer Rodriguez
    the gardening shears, and he testified that they were similar to the shears he had
    seen in the garage. Dr. Anzalone testified that Gonzales’s injuries were consistent
    with having been caused by a tool such as the gardening shears offered by the State
    for demonstrative purposes.
    After the State rested, the defense also re-called Danielle to testify. On
    direct examination, Danielle testified that Junior and Gonzales did not have a good
    relationship. Danielle stated that her grandfather had changed his will less than a
    year before his death, leaving all of his property to her. She stated that the other
    family members, particularly Junior, were upset by the change in the will.
    Danielle testified that she had witnessed a physical altercation between her
    grandfather and Junior in the backyard.
    Danielle also testified that, after her grandfather’s death, she had seen Junior
    rifling through items in her grandfather’s bedroom. She stated that her grandfather
    kept his will in a black box in his bedroom.          After she saw Junior in her
    grandfather’s room, Danielle noticed that the box and the will were missing.
    Earlier in the trial, Danielle had also testified that Junior had initiated court
    proceedings to have her removed from her grandfather’s home.
    11
    On cross-examination by the State, Danielle acknowledged that she had seen
    Appellant act violently toward her grandfather, and her grandfather act violently
    toward Appellant.      Danielle acknowledged that she never told the district
    attorney’s office that her uncle had an altercation with her grandfather or that she
    believed he had taken the will.
    In its closing argument, the defense pointed out that, in his recorded
    statement, Appellant told Detective Chandler that he had not taken his medication
    that day.   The defense argued that may explain why Appellant did not act
    appropriately when he found his grandfather’s body. Specifically, it may explain
    why Appellant covered Gonzales with a blanket and did not call 9-1-1. Defense
    counsel argued that Appellant may not have been able to comprehend the
    seriousness of the situation, given that he was off his medication.
    The defense also asserted that Junior was the only person with a motive to
    kill Gonzales. The defense pointed to Danielle’s testimony, which had indicated
    that (1) the family was angry that Gonzales had changed the will to leave all of his
    property to Danielle, (2) Junior and Gonzales had a physical alteration, and (3)
    Gonzales’s will went missing after Junior had been seen rummaging through
    Gonzales’s room.
    12
    After closing arguments, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the offense
    of murder. Following the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
    70 years in prison. This appeal followed.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    In his sole issue, Appellant asserts that the evidence is not sufficient to
    support the judgment of conviction.
    A.    Standard of Review
    We review the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the elements of a
    criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under a single
    standard of review. Matlock v. State, 
    392 S.W.3d 662
    , 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
    (citing Brooks v. State, 
    323 S.W.3d 893
    , 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). This
    standard of review is the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    319, 
    99 S. Ct. 2781
    , 2789 (1979). See Winfrey v. State, 
    393 S.W.3d 763
    , 768 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2013).
    Pursuant to the Jackson standard, evidence is insufficient to support a
    conviction if, considering all the record evidence in the light most favorable to the
    verdict, no rational fact finder could have found that each essential element of the
    charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789; In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 361, 
    90 S. Ct. 1068
    , 1071
    (1970); Laster v. State, 
    275 S.W.3d 512
    , 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams v.
    13
    State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We can hold evidence to be
    insufficient under the Jackson standard in two circumstances: (1) the record
    contains no evidence, or merely a “modicum” of evidence, probative of an element
    of the offense, or (2) the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt. See
    
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314
    , 318 & n.11, 
    320, 99 S. Ct. at 2786
    , 2789 & n.11; see
    also 
    Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518
    ; 
    Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750
    .
    The sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard gives full play to the responsibility
    of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and
    to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2007). An appellate court presumes that the fact finder resolved any conflicts
    in the evidence in favor of the verdict and defers to that resolution, provided that
    the resolution is rational. See 
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326
    , 99 S. Ct. at 2793.
    In our review of the record, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated
    equally; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
    the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to
    establish guilt. 
    Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778
    . Finally, “[e]ach fact need not point
    directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative
    force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”
    Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
    14
    B.    Elements of the Offense
    As charged in the indictment in this case, the State was required to prove
    that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused Gonzales’s death, or that
    Appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly
    dangerous to human life that caused Gonzales’s death. See TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 19.02(b)(1),(2) (Vernon 2011).
    C.    Analysis
    The evidence offered at trial was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, each element of the offense of murder. Appellant, by his own statement to
    police, admitted that he was at home all day on the day of his grandfather’s murder
    and that no one else had visited the home that day. Appellant admitted that he saw
    his grandfather come home that day but denied interacting with him. Appellant
    denied knowing what had happened to Gonzales but admitted to covering his
    grandfather’s body with a blanket because he did not want to look at it. Appellant
    stated that he did not call 9-1-1 because he did not want “to talk about it.” We note
    that, the trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to believe the inculpatory
    portions of Appellant’s statement and to disbelieve the exculpatory portions. See
    Trenor v. State, 
    333 S.W.3d 799
    , 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no
    pet.) (noting jury free to believe or disbelieve all or part of appellant’s statements).
    15
    Junior and Danielle testified that Appellant had been violent toward
    Gonzales in the past. The evidence also showed that Appellant had fresh cuts on
    his hand that were treated by HFD on the scene. Appellant asserts in this brief that
    nothing refuted his claim that he had cut his finger either doing dishes or cutting
    lemons from a tree. However, the record shows that he told inconsistent stories to
    the police about how he cut his finger. He told Detective Chandler that he cut his
    finger doing dishes, and he told Detective Dodson that he cut his finger cutting
    lemons from a tree with a pruning saw. Detective Johnston also indicated that the
    cut was not consistent with having been made by a pruning saw.
    In addition, the evidence showed that the blood found on Appellant’s shorts
    was, in all statistical probability, Gonzales’s blood. The responding police officers
    saw blood on the bathroom floor consistent with someone attempting to clean up.
    There was a blood trail leading through the backyard. In the backyard, the police
    found gardening shears in the garage with what appeared to be blood on them. The
    assistance medical examiner testified that Gonzales’s injuries were consistent with
    having been caused by gardening shears.
    In his brief, Appellant points out that the 9-1-1 recording shows that he had
    also spoken to the operator. He told the operator that he had come home to find his
    grandfather. He points out that he did not tell the operator that he had been at
    home all day. Danielle also told the operator that she and Appellant had arrived
    16
    home to find Gonzales. Danielle testified at trial that Appellant had arrived home
    at the same time she did that day. In contrast to these statements, Appellant, in his
    recorded statements, told the detectives that he had been home all day either inside
    the home or outside in the front of the home.
    Additionally, Danielle testified that she had called the house 20 minutes
    before she arrived home that day. Appellant had answered the phone and had told
    Danielle that he did not know where Gonzales was. Junior also testified that he
    saw Appellant sitting on the front porch at the time Danielle arrived home from
    school. From this evidence, the trial court, as factfinder, could have reconciled any
    conflicts in the evidence and believed that Appellant was at home all day on the
    day of the murder. See Wesbrook v. State, 
    29 S.W.3d 103
    , 111 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2000).
    Appellant also asserts that he may have gotten Gonzales’s blood on his
    shorts when he was covering Gonzales’s body with the blanket. He claims that,
    given the nature of the offense, there should have been more blood on his clothing
    than was found on them.         Appellant acknowledges that Officer Rodriguez
    remembered seeing a pile of clothing in the bathroom with what appeared to be
    blood on them, but he points out that no other evidence regarding that clothing was
    admitted at trial.   In any event, the trial court was free to make reasonable
    inferences regarding the evidence, including the inference that the blood was
    17
    transferred to Appellant’s shorts when he stabbed Gonzales. See 
    Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13
    .
    Next, Appellant asserts that his recorded statements show that he had
    “borderline intellectual functioning.” Appellant points to his medical records as
    support for this assertion; however, Appellant’s medical records were admitted
    during the punishment phase, not during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
    Appellant also points to his demeanor during his statements and the simplicity of
    his answers, as an indication that he lacked intellectual functioning. Appellant
    asserts that his conduct of covering up his grandfather with a blanket and other
    actions, such as allowing Danielle to enter the home to find her grandfather’s body
    and agreeing to speak to the police, showed a lack of understanding of the gravity
    of the situation. He avers that “[h]is actions in making . . . are more consistent
    with a lack of understanding of the situation, rather than evidence of guilt.”
    As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses, it was within
    the province of the trial court to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
    inferences from the facts. See Adames v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 854
    , 860 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2011). This would include a determination of whether Appellant’s actions,
    his answers to the detective’s questions, and his demeanor during the interviews
    indicated a lack of understanding of what occurred on the day of the murder or
    whether his actions and answers were evidence of his guilt.
    18
    Lastly, Appellant points to evidence supporting the defense’s theory that
    Junior killed Gonzales. However, as stated, it was for the trial court to weigh the
    evidence and make reasonable inferences therefrom. See 
    id. Viewing the
    evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a
    rational fact finder could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, each element
    necessary to support the finding that Appellant committed the offense of murder.
    Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment of
    conviction.
    We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
    Conclusion
    We affirm the judgment of conviction.
    Laura Carter Higley
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Higley, Bland, and Massengale.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    19