Cody Sherrod Ford v. State ( 2019 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-18-00076-CR
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CODY SHERROD FORD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 16-26110
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Jefferson County grand jury indicted Cody Sherrod Ford for the offense of
delivery of a controlled substance, specifically cocaine, in an amount less than one
gram. 1 See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D) (West Supp. 2018);
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The indictment originally alleged that Ford delivered cocaine in an amount
greater than one gram but less than four grams; however, the State amended the
indictment at trial to allege an amount less than one gram.
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481.112(a), (b) (West 2017).2 The indictment included enhancement paragraphs for
two prior felony convictions. A jury convicted Ford of the offense of delivery of a
controlled substance in an amount less than one gram. Ford pled true to the
enhancements alleged in the indictment, and the jury sentenced him to ten years of
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.35, 12.425 (West 2019). Ford timely
appealed and in one issue contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
jury’s verdict because a rational jury could not have found he “knowingly” delivered
a controlled substance. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
An undercover officer with the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department
Narcotics Task Force arranged to purchase one hundred dollars’ worth of crack
cocaine from Ford. The vehicle the officer drove contained covert audio and video
recording devices, which captured the interactions between the officer and Ford. At
trial, the State admitted the video footage of the transaction into evidence.
The officer testified that he arranged to meet Ford at a location in Port Arthur,
Texas to purchase crack cocaine. The officer testified that Ford “got in the vehicle
2
We cite to the current version of the statutes, as any subsequent amendments
do not impact the outcome of this appeal.
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and advised that he would have to go to another location to get the stuff.” 3 The
officer said Ford then directed him to another location on Alamo Street, where he
told the officer to stop. The officer explained that Ford exited the vehicle while he
waited in the car, and Ford returned to the vehicle “within a couple of minutes.” The
officer told the jury that when Ford left the vehicle, he “assumed that [Ford] was
going to get the narcotics.”
The officer testified that although the video angle did not show what Ford had
in his hand or what he deposited in the passenger’s seat, when Ford leaned inside the
vehicle, he placed what appeared to be crack cocaine in the passenger’s seat and
accepted one hundred dollars from the officer. The officer testified that after the
transaction, Ford declined a ride, and the officer left the scene. Officers did not
immediately arrest Ford; instead, a backup detective in a separate vehicle testified
that he quickly drove by the scene to get a visual identification of Ford after the sale.
The undercover officer testified that he sealed the substance Ford delivered to
him inside an envelope, placed it in an evidence locker, and transported it to the
crime lab about two days later. The trial court admitted the envelope and its contents
into evidence. A forensic scientist from the Jefferson County Regional Crime Lab
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Video evidence shows Ford getting into the officer’s vehicle, instructing the
officer to drive to another location, and telling the officer, “I gotta (sic) grab it for
you.”
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testified that she had specialized training in drug chemistry analysis and had testified
as an expert at trials many times. The forensic scientist told the jury she analyzed
and weighed the substance contained in the envelope, which tested positive for
cocaine in an amount of .954 grams.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case,
the “Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979)). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 318–319; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We give deference to the jury’s responsibility “‘to fairly resolve conflicts in
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts.’” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–
19)); see also Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining
the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight to be given their
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testimony). We look to all evidence in the record, including admissible and
inadmissible evidence, and direct and circumstantial evidence. Dewberry v. State, 4
S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Analysis
In his sole issue, Ford contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support
the jury’s verdict and specifically challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to
the “knowingly” element of the offense.
Under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, cocaine is a substance in Penalty
Group 1. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D). A person commits the
offense of delivery of a controlled substance if he knowingly delivers a controlled
substance in Penalty Group 1. Id. at § 481.112(a). The Texas Penal Code that
[a] person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or the circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (West 2011).
A jury may infer intent or knowledge from a defendant’s acts, words, and
conduct. See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “Intent and
knowledge are fact questions for the jury, and are almost always proven through
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Manrique v. State, 994
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S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Myers, J., concurring) (citing Robles v.
State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Mouton v. State, 923 S.W.2d 219,
223 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1996, no pet.)). In a delivery case, intent may
be proved by circumstantial evidence. Avila v. State, 15 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citations omitted).
Here, the undercover officer testified that Ford agreed to sell him one hundred
dollars’ worth of crack cocaine. Testimony at trial and other evidence established
that the two agreed to meet at a location on Memorial Highway, a busy street in Port
Arthur, Texas. From there, Ford entered the officer’s vehicle and said, “I gotta (sic)
grab it for you.” Ford then directed the officer to a different location. Once at Ford’s
chosen location, Ford left the vehicle, then returned a short time later. The officer
explained to the jury that when Ford leaned into the vehicle, he placed a baggy of
what appeared to be crack cocaine in the seat and took one hundred dollars from the
officer. Ford’s actions were consistent with his agreement to sell crack cocaine to
the undercover officer, and a forensic scientist testified at trial that the substance
Ford delivered to the officer was, in fact, cocaine.
Ford’s words and actions revealed his agreement to sell crack cocaine to the
undercover officer. Therefore, we determine that a rational jury could infer Ford
knew the baggy he placed in the vehicle contained crack cocaine. Specifically, the
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jury could reasonably conclude that Ford telling the officer “I gotta (sic) grab it for
you” evidenced a prior agreement between them. Ford’s subsequent delivery of the
cocaine also indicated the existence of an agreement and his knowledge of the
baggy’s contents. Finally, a rational jury could infer that the amount of money Ford
accepted established his knowledge that the substance he delivered was crack
cocaine.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring
to the jury’s role of drawing reasonable inferences, we conclude that the evidence is
legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford knowingly
delivered cocaine in an amount less than one gram. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895;
Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Clark v. State, 777 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1989, no writ) (holding appellant’s conduct when delivering packages of
cocaine wrapped in foil to an undercover officer was sufficient proof of his
knowledge and that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
Conclusion
The evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that Ford knowingly delivered cocaine in an amount of one gram or less. Therefore,
we overrule Ford’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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AFFIRMED.
_________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on March 6, 2019
Opinion Delivered July 10, 2019
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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