in the Interest of C.T., D.T., J.T., and J.T., Children ( 2019 )


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  •                     In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-18-00383-CV
    ___________________________
    IN THE INTEREST OF C.T., D.T., J.T., AND J.T., CHILDREN
    On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 323-105839-17
    Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Womack, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children,
    C.T., D.T., J.T., and J.T. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001. Mother’s court-
    appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in
    support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    (1967);
    In re P.M., 
    520 S.W.3d 24
    , 27 (Tex. 2016). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
    requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the
    record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 
    See 386 U.S. at 741
    –42, 87 S. Ct. at 1399. Further, counsel informed Mother of her right to request
    the record and to file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 
    436 S.W.3d 313
    , 319–21
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In addition, this court informed Mother of these rights and
    gave her the opportunity to notify this court of her intent to respond. Mother filed a
    pro se response. The Department of Family and Protective Services did not file a
    response.
    As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to
    decide whether counsel is correct in determining that an appeal in this case is
    frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); In re
    K.R.C., 
    346 S.W.3d 618
    , 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Having carefully
    reviewed the record and the Anders brief, we agree with counsel that the appeal is
    frivolous. See 
    K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619
    . We find nothing in the record that might
    arguably support Mother’s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    2
    We deny Mother’s counsel’s motion to withdraw in light of P.M. because the
    brief does not show “good cause” other than counsel’s determination that an appeal
    would be frivolous. 
    See 520 S.W.3d at 27
    (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought
    in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be
    premature.”); In re A.M., 
    495 S.W.3d 573
    , 582 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
    2016, pets. denied) (noting that since P.M. was handed down, “most courts of appeals
    affirming parental termination orders after receiving Anders briefs have denied the
    attorney’s motion to withdraw”). The supreme court has held that in cases such as
    this, “appointed counsel’s obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing
    a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” 
    P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27
    –28.
    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth
    Bonnie Sudderth
    Chief Justice
    Delivered: March 7, 2019
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-18-00383-CV

Filed Date: 3/7/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/9/2019