Russell Wayne McSland v. State ( 2016 )

NUMBER 13-15-00054-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RUSSELL WAYNE MCSLAND, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of
Jackson County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
By a single issue, appellant Russell Wayne McSland appealed his jury sentence
of ninety-nine years imprisonment following his conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony that was elevated to a first degree felony. See
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
McSland argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence
of how methamphetamine is manufactured during the punishment phase of his trial. We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A jury convicted McSland of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
See id. McSland pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs for prior felony
convictions, which made the range of punishment twenty-five to ninety-nine years
imprisonment or life and a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars. During the punishment
phase of the trial, the State introduced testimony and documentary evidence regarding
how methamphetamine is manufactured. McSland’s trial counsel objected to the
relevance of this testimony. The trial court overruled this objection. The jury subsequently
assessed McSland’s punishment at ninety-nine years’ imprisonment with the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Division. This appeal followed.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
By a single issue, McSland asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during
the punishment phase of his trial by admitting evidence regarding the manufacturing of
methamphetamine because the evidence was not relevant to his conviction for
possession with intent to deliver.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review questions regarding whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence
for an abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). Therefore, so long as the trial court's ruling was at least within the “zone of
reasonable disagreement,” we will not interfere with the trial court’s decision. Id. at 391.
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When deciding what evidence is admissible during the punishment phase, the
State may offer evidence “as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing.” See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). The
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not specifically define the term “relevant.” See
id. In our analysis, we are guided by article 37.07, section 3(a) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that evidence “relevant to sentence” includes, but is
not limited to: (1) the prior criminal record of the defendant; (2) the defendant's general
reputation; (3) the defendant's character; (4) an opinion regarding the defendant's
character; (5) the circumstances of the offense being tried; and (6) notwithstanding Texas
Rules of Evidence 404 and 405, any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act
that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the
defendant or for which the defendant could be held criminally responsible, regardless of
whether the defendant has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime
or act. See id.
Given the broad standard of article 37.07, section 3(a), the admissibility of
evidence at the punishment phase of a non-capital felony offense is a function of policy
rather than relevancy. See Miller–El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990). Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals has observed that in determining what
is “relevant to sentencing,” the important question is “what is helpful to the jury in
determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case.” See
Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc).
B. Discussion
The trial court admitted testimony and documentary evidence at the punishment
phase, over defense counsel’s objection, of how methamphetamine is manufactured or
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created. McSland argues this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible because the jury
convicted him of possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver it, not for
manufacturing it himself. However, we find this testimony was relevant because it gave
the jury a full view of the methamphetamine drug chain from creation to consumer. This
full account allowed the jury to determine the appropriate punishment for the role McSland
played in the broader drug trade. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting this evidence because it was helpful to the jury in determining an
appropriate sentence for the crime he did commit. See id. We overrule McSland’s sole
issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
14th day of July, 2016.
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